Sanguinetti v. CitiMortgage, Inc. et al

Filing 45

Order by Hon. Samuel Conti granting 33 Motion to Dismiss.(sclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/11/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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GINA SANGUINETTI and GERALD
SANGUINETTI,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., CITIBANK,
N.A., AND DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

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) Case No. 12-5424 SC
)
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
) DISMISS
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I.

INTRODUCTION

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Now before the court is Defendants CitiMortgage, Inc. and

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Citibank, N.A.'s (collectively "Defendants") motion to dismiss

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Plaintiffs Gina and Gerald Sanguinetti's ("Plaintiffs") Second

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Amended Complaint.

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fully briefed,

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appropriate for decision without oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

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For the reasons explained below the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion

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and DISMISSES this case with prejudice.

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///

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///

ECF Nos. 29 ("SAC"), 33 ("MTD").

The motion is

ECF Nos. 34 ("Opp'n"), 35 ("Reply"), and

1 II.

BACKGROUND

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In her first amended complaint, Plaintiff Gina Sanguinetti

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brought an action against Defendants, claiming that she and her

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husband had been harmed by Defendants' malicious lending practices.

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In that complaint, Ms. Sanguinetti claimed that Defendants had

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misled her into entering an unsustainably expensive adjustable-rate

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mortgage ("ARM"), despite knowing that her income was below what

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was reasonable (and in fact falsifying her income information in

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the lending documents).

She also alleged that Defendants did not

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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disclose legally required information or follow proper loan

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modification proceedings, and that Defendants were under a Consent

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Judgment that imposed a duty of care and rendered some of

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Defendants' activities actionably negligent.
Defendants contended that Ms. Sanguinetti's first amended

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complaint was impermissibly vague and did not allege sufficient

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facts as to any claim; that some of her claims were time-barred;

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and that she had failed to join her husband Gerald Sanguinetti as a

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necessary plaintiff.

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dismissed the complaint with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs

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could add more detail on the following points: the illegality of

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the mortgage loan, the completion of the loan application, the

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Consent Judgment, statutes of limitations, the specificity of

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Defendants' actions, and the joinder of Mr. Sanguinetti.

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25 ("Order on MTD FAC").

The Court agreed with Defendants and

ECF No.

Plaintiffs then filed the SAC.

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The only fact that the parties do not now dispute is that

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Plaintiffs obtained a second mortgage from CitiMortgage, a CitiBank

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subsidiary, sometime in March 2008, and later defaulted on it.

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¶ 17.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are alter egos of each

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SAC

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other.

Id. ¶ 12.

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Defendants have:

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(1) provided a loan without providing and
disclosing to Plaintiffs, as required under
law,
the
required
Truth
in
Lending
Disclosures;
(2) failed to provide to Plaintiffs, as
required under law, the required disclosure
of the Annual Percentage Rate ("APR") to be
charged for the loan;
(3) failed to provide to Plaintiffs, as
required under law, a detailed Good Faith
estimate detailing all relevant fees to be
charged to Plaintiffs;
(4) failed to provide to Plaintiffs, as
required under law, a signed original of the
Promissory Note relevant to Plaintiffs'
loan; and
(5) charged an excessive and undisclosed
amount in interest charges in violation of
law.

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United States District Court

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For the Northern District of California

Plaintiffs allege, as background facts, that

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SAC ¶ 14.

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get Plaintiffs to pay excessive fees related to a loan modification

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or settlement, and that Defendants also insisted that Plaintiffs

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pay all existing fees and arrears despite knowing Plaintiffs could

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not afford to do so.

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facts related to the Court's permitted amendments.

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MTD FAC at 7-8.

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Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants tried to

Id.

Plaintiffs' SAC also adds an array of
See Order on

The Court summarizes these facts below.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants, via CitiMortgage acting as

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Citibank's agent or broker, misled them about the terms of the

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mortgage loan they received and falsified Plaintiffs' financial

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information, in order to force Plaintiffs into an ARM, the payments

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of which would escalate to more than 100 percent of Plaintiffs'

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income.

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were incentivized to push as many of these unsustainable loans onto

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unsophisticated buyers as possible, Defendants simply entered false

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information about Plaintiffs into their applications, and did not

See SAC ¶¶ 14-22.

Plaintiffs add that because Defendants

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proceed with due diligence as to Plaintiffs' financial situation.

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See id. ¶¶ 24-26.

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make their monthly payments on the mortgage, and they received a

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Notice of Default on November 15, 2009.

Sometime in 2009, Plaintiffs became unable to

Id. ¶ 38.

Plaintiffs requested a loan modification or settlement from

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Defendants, but they claim that Defendants consistently mismanaged

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their requests by ignoring them and failing to give them correct

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paperwork and information.

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a result of Defendants' negligent and unlawful activities, the

Id. ¶¶ 27-28.

Plaintiffs claim that as

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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mortgage and deed of trust are illegal and unconscionable, thereby

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depriving Defendants of the legal capacity to sell Plaintiffs' home

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or take other action against Plaintiffs based on their default.

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Id. ¶¶ 29-30.

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Plaintiffs with a Notice of Trustee Sale on October 3, 2011, though

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no sale has yet occurred.

Nevertheless, Defendant CitiMortgage served

Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiffs now clarify, as to their original reference to a

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Consent Judgment, that around April 4, 2012, they learned of a

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Consent Judgment entered in a case brought against Defendants by

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the federal government and California as an individual state.

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¶ 32.

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purportedly (i) require Defendants to evaluate all available loan

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modifications for borrowers like Plaintiffs, and (ii) forbid

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Defendants from referring eligible borrowers' accounts to

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foreclosure while applications for loan modification are pending.

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Id. ¶¶ 34-35.1

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1

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Id.

Plaintiffs quote sections of the Consent Judgment that

Plaintiffs claim that they discussed the Consent

Plaintiffs did not include the Consent Judgment in any of their
filings. Pursuant to a Court Order, ECF No. 43, they filed a copy
on August 20, 2013, ECF No. 44 ("Consent Judgment"). Even so,
Plaintiffs did not include the actual settlement terms of the
Consent Judgment. However, as documents incorporated by reference
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Judgment with Bank of America -- presumably a typo, since that bank

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is not a defendant in this case -- and confirmed that Defendants

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were bound by it.

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Defendants' actions do not comport with the requirements of the

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Consent Judgment.

See ¶ 35.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that

From these facts, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action

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against Defendants: (1) quiet title, (2) fraud or negligent

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misrepresentation, (3) negligence, and (4) unfair, unlawful, and

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fraudulent business practices under California's Unfair Competition

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.

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12 III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim."

Navarro v.

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Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

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on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

17

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory."

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Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1988).

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should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

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plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

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must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint

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is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

"Dismissal can be based

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

Ashcroft v.

However, "the tenet that a court

Threadbare recitals of the

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into the Plaintiffs' complaint that are also part of the public
record, the Court considers the publicly filed settlement terms
incorporated by reference here and takes judicial notice of them.
Consent Judgment Settlement Terms, United States v. Bank of America
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (ECF No. 12 Ex.
1).
5

1

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

2

statements, do not suffice."

3

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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generally "limited to the complaint, materials incorporated into

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the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take

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judicial notice."

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540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor

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Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).

Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
The court's review is

Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.,

United States District Court

Additionally, allegations of fraud must meet the heightened

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For the Northern District of California

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pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which

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requires that plaintiffs alleging fraud "must state with

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particularity the circumstances constituting fraud."

13

Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2009).

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satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when,

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where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false

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or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why

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it is false."

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Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

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and citations omitted).

20

Kearns v.
"To

United States ex rel Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics c$

When a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must

21

decide whether to grant leave to amend.

Generally, the Ninth

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Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave

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to amend should be freely granted.

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Freight System, Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

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a court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where the

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court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an

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exercise in futility.

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Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Denial of leave to

See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow
However,

See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo

6

1

amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the

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court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile.").

3
4 IV.

DISCUSSION

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A.

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Plaintiffs' main argument in their SAC is that the loan

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agreements are unconscionable and therefore void, so Defendants'

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arguments are precluded and their legal bases for foreclosure are

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impermissible.

Unconscionability

Opp'n at 8-10; SAC ¶¶ 16-24.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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"[U]nconscionability has both a 'procedural' and a

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'substantive element,' the former focusing on 'oppression' or

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'surprise' due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on 'overly

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harsh' or 'one-sided' results."

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Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (Cal. 2000) (citations

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omitted).

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power which results in no real negotiation and 'an absence of

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meaningful choice.'"

Bruni v. Didion, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1288

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(Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

"'Surprise' involves the extent to which the

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supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix

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printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed

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terms."

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on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they

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create 'overly harsh' or 'one-sided' results as to 'shock the

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conscience.'"

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substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of

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procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion

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that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa."

Armendariz v. Found. Health

"'Oppression' arises from an inequality of bargaining

Id.

"The substantive element of unconscionability focuses

Id.

"Both elements must be present, but the more

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Woodside Homes of

1

Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 107 Cal. App. 4th 723, 727 (Cal. Ct. App.

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2003).

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Plaintiffs' grounds for unconscionability are essentially that

with unfair terms, and presented it to the unsophisticated

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Plaintiffs on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.

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to Plaintiffs, since Defendants' agent completed the loan documents

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for them and assured them that the loan documents "accurately

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reflected what Plaintiffs had been told, what they wanted, and what

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United States District Court

Defendants had overwhelming bargaining power, drafted a contract

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For the Northern District of California

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they could afford," the loan agreements are unconscionable because

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the underlying terms were predatory and contrary to Plaintiffs'

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wishes and financial means.

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SAC ¶ 16.

According

Id. ¶¶ 17-24.

Defendants respond that Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of

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their actual obligations were unclear or surprising on the loan

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documents' terms, or that any specific terms were substantively

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unconscionable.

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Court recognized unconscionability as a claim instead of a defense,

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it would be governed by California Code of Civil Procedure section

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339(1)'s catch-all four-year statute of limitations, and would

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therefore be time-barred because of the more-than-four-year gap

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between the loan's origination in May 2008 and the present action's

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filing in September 2012.

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Reply at 10-11.

Defendants add that even if the

Plaintiffs' unconscionability argument fails.

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Unconscionability is a defense, not a cause of action, see Dean

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Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 766

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(Cal. Ct. App. 1989), so at best Plaintiffs are trying to preempt

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legal action by Defendants by using unconscionability as a

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predicate to other claims.

This fails because, as Defendants note,

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such a theory of unconscionability would be governed by

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California's four-year catch-all limitations period, Cal. Code Civ.

3

Proc. § 339(1).

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procedurally improper, Plaintiffs' unconscionability arguments are

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also time-barred because they are based on a May 2008 origination

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date and this case was filed in September 2012.

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allegations about unconscionability are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Therefore, the Court finds that apart from being

All of Plaintiffs'

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B.

Plaintiffs' Fraud Claims

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Plaintiffs again assert claims for fraud and negligent

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

misrepresentation against Defendants, but Defendants raise the

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threshold argument that both of these claims are time-barred.

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statute of limitations is three years for a fraud claim, Cal. Code

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Civ. Proc. § 338(d), and two years for a negligent

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misrepresentation claim, id. § 339(1).

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Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims are time-barred because Plaintiffs

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obtained their mortgage in March 2008 but did not file the instant

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action until September 14, 2012, and that Plaintiffs have not pled

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facts to toll the statutes of limitations.

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Plaintiffs respond that (1) they filed a related action on February

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17, 2012, earlier than the September date; (2) their

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unconscionability argument renders the statute of limitations

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irrelevant; and (3) they could amend to allege equitable tolling

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should apply because they did not discover that the loan's terms

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had been misrepresented until May 2009.

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The

Defendants argue that

MTD SAC at 4-6.

See Opp'n at 3, 10-11.

First, the Court finds no facts in the record that the

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purported February 2012 action is related to this case.

At no

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point do Plaintiffs provide any proof of such relation.

Second, as

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noted above, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' unconscionability

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1

arguments.

Finally, the Court has already granted Plaintiffs leave

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to amend to allege equitable tolling.

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They did not do so.

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negligent misrepresentation claims barred by the relevant statutes

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of limitations.

Order on MTD FAC at 7-8.

The Court finds Plaintiffs' fraud and

They are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

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C.

Negligence

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Plaintiffs assert a claim for negligence under California

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Civil Code sections 1714(a) and 3333.

The elements of a claim for

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negligence are (1) a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty,

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

(3) proximate or legal cause, and (4) damages.

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San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).

12

institutions generally owe no duty of care to borrowers if their

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involvement in a loan transaction does not exceed their scope as

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mere lenders of money.

15

231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).

16

Ladd v. Cnty. of
Financial

Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n,

The primary dispute as to Plaintiffs' negligence claim

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concerns whether Defendants owe Plaintiffs a duty of care.

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Plaintiffs have three theories of why Defendants owe them a special

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duty of care.

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First, despite Nymark, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants owed

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a duty of care under a Consent Judgment between Defendants and the

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United States of America (including California as an individual

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state).

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beneficiaries of the Consent Judgment, Opp'n at 13, and that it

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both imposes on Defendants a duty to evaluate borrowers for all

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available loan modification options before initiating foreclosure

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and forbids Defendants from referring accounts to disclosure while

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loan modifications are pending, SAC ¶ 33.

See SAC ¶ 61.

Plaintiffs state that they are third-party

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Plaintiffs allege that

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Defendants effectively amended their pre-existing loan agreements

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with Plaintiffs after the Consent Judgment was entered in April

3

2012, thereby requiring Defendants to act under the Consent

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Judgment's duty of care even though the loan agreements in this

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case were entered in May 2008.

See Opp'n at 12-14.

Second, Plaintiffs contend that even under Nymark, Defendants

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7

act beyond the role of "mere lenders of money" and therefore assume

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a duty of care that they would otherwise not have.

Opp'n at 13.

United States District Court

Third, Plaintiffs add in their opposition brief that

10
For the Northern District of California

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Defendants operate under a statutory duty of care per the

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California Homeowners Bill of Rights, California Civil Code

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sections 2923.5 et seq.

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2924.17, and 2924.18 provide the relevant statutory duties of care

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in this case.

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mortgage servicers seeking to send borrowers notices of default.

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Section 2924.17 prohibits "robo-signing," or executing foreclosure

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documents without "substantiat[ing] the borrower's default and the

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right to foreclose."

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which is the initiation of foreclosure proceedings while evaluation

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of a borrower's loan modification application is ongoing.

According to Plaintiffs, sections 2923.5,

Section 2923.5 sets out detailed requirements for

Section 2924.18 prohibits dual-tracking,

The Court finds all of Plaintiffs' arguments unpersuasive.

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22

Regarding Plaintiffs' first theory, "[c]onsent decrees are

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construed as contracts for purposes of enforcement," and "under

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Ninth Circuit precedent, incidental third-party beneficiaries may

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not enforce consent decrees, but intended third-party beneficiaries

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may."

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2008) (citing Hook v. Az. Dep't of Corrections, 972 F.2d 1012,

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1014-15 (9th Cir. 1992)).

United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 819-20 (9th Cir.

When the government is the plaintiff,

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1

third-party beneficiaries of a consent judgment are presumptively

2

incidental beneficiaries absent a clear expression in the consent

3

decree that individual members of the public can enforce the

4

agreement.

5

Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999).

6

clear intent must appear in the consent decree's precise language.

7

Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th

8

Cir. 2009), rev'd on other grounds by Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa

9

Clara Cnty., Cal., 131 S. Ct. 1342 (2011).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

Id. at 821; see also Klamath Water Users Protective
Such

The Consent Judgment's enforcement provisions never reference

11

the possibility of an enforcement proceeding being brought by an

12

individual borrower as a third-party beneficiary.

13

allow enforcement actions to be brought by parties to the Consent

14

Judgment or by the monitoring committee that the Consent Judgment

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establishes.

16

Settlement Terms.

17

precise language does not establish "a clear intent to rebut the

18

presumption that the third parties [to the Consent Judgment] are

19

merely incidental beneficiaries."

20

The Consent Judgment does not provide a basis for Plaintiffs'

21

claims.

22

Instead they

See Consent Judgment at 18-20, 22; see generally
The Court therefore finds that the decree's

Astra USA, 588 F.3d at 1244.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that despite Nymark, the Consent

23

Judgment makes it clear that Defendants have adopted a separate

24

standard of care and are acting not as mere lenders but as some

25

other kind of entity that entitles Plaintiffs to a negligence claim

26

based on the loan modification proceedings.

27

support of this contention, Plaintiffs cite Ansanelli v. JP Morgan

28

Chase Bank, N.A., No. C 10-3892, 2011 WL 1134451 (N.D. Cal. Mar.

12

Opp'n at 13.

In

1

28, 2011).

2

beyond its role as silent lender and loan servicer when it offered

3

a loan modification and trial modification plan, the bank assumed a

4

duty of care that it would otherwise lack under Nymark.

5

The Court finds that reasoning unpersuasive.

6

are part of the lending process, and negotiating a lending

7

agreement's terms is one of a bank's key functions.

8

v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, No. 5:11-cv-05664 EJD, 2012 WL 4747165,

9

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10
11

In that case, the court held that because a bank went

Id. at *7.

Loan modifications

See Armstrong

The Court therefore finds that

this theory of the duty of care also fails.
Finally, Plaintiffs' theories of why Defendants have a duty of

12

care under the California Homeowners Bill of Rights is newly

13

asserted in the opposition brief.

14

complaint.

15

Plaintiffs' theory is futile because the statutes Plaintiffs cite

16

were enacted in 2013, and absent express provision to the contrary,

17

California statutes are not presumed to act retroactively.

18

v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 28 Cal. 4th 828, 840-41 (Cal. 2002).

19

They do not apply to Plaintiffs' claims.

20

It was not pled in the

Amendment might be warranted in such a case, but

Myers

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have not pled a

21

claim for negligence and DISMISSES this claim.

Since the Court

22

previously gave Plaintiffs leave to amend on this point, the

23

dismissal is with prejudice.

24

D.

Quiet Title

25

The purpose of a quiet title action is to settle all

26

conflicting claims to a piece of real property and to declare each

27

interest or estate to which the parties are entitled.

28

Cornelius, 3 Cal. App. 3d 279, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).

13

Newman v.
"A quiet

1

title action must include: (1) a description of the property in

2

question; (2) the basis for plaintiff's title; and (3) the adverse

3

claims to plaintiff's title."

4

C 12–2275 SI, 2012 WL 4099568, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012)

5

(citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 760.020).

6

second requirement, plaintiff must allege that he has discharged

7

his debt, regardless to whom it is owed."

8

Mort. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057

9

(N.D. Cal. 2009)).

Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC,

"In order to satisfy the

Id. (citing Kelley v.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for

11

quiet title, mainly because they have not discharged their debt

12

and, in any event, Plaintiffs' unconscionability allegations must

13

fail.

14

argument.

15

title claim is DISMISSED.

16

the Court gave Plaintiffs leave to amend this claim to make it

17

colorable, and Plaintiffs failed to do so.

MTD SAC at 14-15.

Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants'

The Court agrees with Defendants.

Plaintiffs' quiet

The dismissal is with prejudice since

18

E.

UCL

19

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, including, inter alia,

20

"any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act."

21

Prof. Code § 17200.

22

disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition -

23

- acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent."

24

Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1554

25

(Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

26

Cal. Bus. &

"Because [section 17200] is written in the

Plaintiffs are not very precise about the nature of their UCL

27

claim, but their opposition brief states that they rely on their

28

allegations of unconscionability and the Homeowners Bill of Rights'

14

1

bar against "dual-tracking" as predicate offenses.

See Opp'n at

2

14.

3

prong, which allows plaintiffs to "borrow" from violations of

4

underlying laws.

5

a UCL violation because the Homeowners' Bill of Rights does not

6

operate retroactively.

These allegations would suit a claim under the unlawfulness

As noted above, these are insufficient bases for

However, Plaintiffs' complaint includes several other bases

7
8

for their UCL claim.

First, under the unfairness prong, the

9

allegations that Defendants failed to undertake loan servicing and

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

modification properly, as when they steered Plaintiffs toward an

11

unpayable loan and unfairly kept Plaintiffs circulating through a

12

temporary modification process.

13

allege violations of the UCL's fraud prong.

14

Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions regarding Plaintiffs'

15

payment capacity and the loan's modification process are likely to

16

deceive reasonable consumers.

SAC ¶ 75.

Second, Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs plead that

SAC ¶ 77.

17

Plaintiffs' pleadings under these prongs fail to cure the

18

defects of their first amended complaint: Plaintiffs simply do not

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provide precise enough facts to state claims under the UCL.

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provide a list of conclusory allegations, see SAC ¶¶ 75-78, but

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they do not support these allegations with facts elsewhere in their

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pleadings.

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problems, but they failed to do so.

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DISMISSED with prejudice.

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///

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///

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///

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///

They

The Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to cure these

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Plaintiffs' UCL claim is

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V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Defendants CitiBank, N.A.,

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and CitiMortgage, Inc.'s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Gina

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Sanguinetti's First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

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complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Plaintiffs'

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 11, 2013

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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