Verinata Health, Inc. et al v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc et al

Filing 199

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER RE: US PATENT NO. 7,955,794 #171 #176 (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 12/17/2014)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 VERINATA HEALTH, INC., et al., 7 Case No. 12-cv-05501-SI Consolidated Case: 14-cv-1921-SI Plaintiffs, 8 v. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER RE: US PATENT NO. 7,955,794 9 ARIOSA DIAGNOSTICS, INC, 10 Re: Dkt. No. 176 Defendant. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 On December 16, 2014, the Court heard argument on the parties' proposed claim 14 constructions. Having considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, the Court 15 construes the disputed terms as follows. BACKGROUND 16 17 I. Procedural History 18 This dispute began in 2011, when Ariosa1 filed a declaratory relief action against 19 Sequenom, seeking a declaration that Ariosa's “Harmony Test” does not infringe any claims of 20 U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 (“the ’540 patent”). Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., C 11- 21 6391-SI (filed Dec. 19, 2011). 22 infringement of Sequenom's ’540 patent. 23 Verinata, also filed declaratory judgment actions in this Court seeking judgments that their 24 products do not infringe Sequenom’s ’540 patent and asserting that the ’540 patent is invalid. See 25 Natera Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., C 12-0132-SI (filed Jan. 6, 2012) (regarding Natera's “Non- 26 Invasive Paternity Test”); Verinata Health, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. (Verinata I), C 12-0865-SI Sequenom filed a counterclaim against Ariosa, asserting 27 1 28 Formerly known as Aria Diagnostics, Inc. Subsequently, two other companies, Natera and 1 (filed Feb. 22, 2012) (regarding Verinata's “Verifi Prenatal Test”). Sequenom then filed 2 counterclaims alleging that Natera, DNA Diagnostics Center, Verinata, and Stanford are infringing 3 the ’540 patent. See id. On October 30, 2013, this Court held the ‘540 patent to be invalid. 4 Sequenom has appealed this ruling to the Federal Circuit, and that appeal is pending. C 11-cv- 5 6391 SI, Docket No. 254. In Verinata I, Verinata and Stanford also alleged that Sequenom is infringing U.S. Patent 7 Nos. 7,888,017 (“the ’017 patent”), 8,008,018 (“the ’018 patent”), and 8,195,415 (“the ’415 8 patent”). In addition, Verinata and Stanford filed a case alleging that Ariosa and LabCorp are 9 infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 8,296,076 (“the ’076 patent”) and 8,318,430 (“the ’430 patent”). See 10 Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. (Verinata II), C 12-5501-SI (filed Oct. 25, 2012). 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 6 Finally, Illumina1 filed a case alleging that Ariosa is infringing U.S. Patent No. 7,955,794 (“the 12 ’794 patent”). See Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., C 14-1921-SI (filed April 25, 2014). 13 This final action was consolidated with Verinata II. 14 15 II. 16 17 18 Factual Background These patents involve methods to conduct non-invasive prenatal DNA testing. Fetal DNA testing can aid sex determination, blood typing and other genotyping, and detection of preeclampsia in the mother. It can also detect fetal aneuploidy, which is a disorder in which the fetus 19 20 21 has an abnormal number of chromosomes, instead of the normal 23 pairs. Common aneuploidy disorders include Down syndrome (a third copy, or “trisomy,” of chromosome 21), Edwards 22 syndrome (a third copy of chromosome 18), and Patau syndrome (a third copy of chromosome 23 13). 24 25 Prior to these patents, testing fetal DNA required invasive techniques that took samples from the fetus or placenta. However, invasive prenatal testing presented risks to both the fetus and 26 the mother. Scientists began researching various techniques to make these prenatal diagnoses non27 28 1 In January of 2013, Illumina acquired Verinata. .. 2 1 invasively. Initially, non-invasive research had focused on detecting fetal cells that had passed 2 through the amniotic sac into the mother’s bloodstream. The fetal cells then had to be separated 3 from the much more common maternal cells. This process of isolating intact fetal cells was labor- 4 intensive and produced unreliable results. 5 6 The ’540 patent followed the discovery in 1996-1997 by Drs. Lo and Wainscoat that fetal DNA is detectable in maternal serum or plasma samples in extra-cellular or cell-free form. 7 According to Sequenom, prior non-invasive research had focused on detecting fetal cells because 8 9 the presence of cell-free fetal DNA was not known. Evans Decl. ¶ 40. Therefore, the significance of the discovery by Drs. Lo and Wainscoat was that the process of isolating fetal cells was not 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 necessary because fetal DNA was present outside of cells, as “extracellular” or “cell-free DNA” 12 suspended together with the mother’s DNA in the maternal bloodstream. This was a more 13 14 efficient and reliable method then previous non-invasive techniques. A decade later, Drs. Quake and Fan at Stanford further advanced the science in non- 15 16 17 invasive prenatal testing using molecular counting techniques. Previously, researchers had believed that because aneuploidies do not present a mutational change in the DNA sequence (but 18 are merely a change in the number of chromosomes), they would need to distinguish fetal DNA 19 from maternal DNA in order to diagnose fetal aneuploidy non-invasively. 20 researchers used advanced DNA sequencing techniques, such as digital polymerase chain reaction 21 (“PCR”) and massive parallel sequencing. They discovered a method to diagnose fetal aneuploidy The Stanford 22 through their molecular counting techniques, without needing to distinguish the maternal DNA 23 24 from the fetal DNA. Stanford and Verinata claim that these techniques are much more efficient 25 and effective than those utilized previously. They further refined their method by teaching how to 26 correct for sequence tag density variances, how to selectively analyze specific DNA sequences, 27 and how to generate a library from a pool of multiple samples, all in order to increase the accuracy 28 and efficiency of the prenatal tests. The '017, '018, and '415 patents reflect some of the 3 1 2 3 discoveries. The ’794 patent, which is the subject of this Claim Construction Order, is not confined to prenatal DNA testing. Titled "Multiplex Nucleic Acid Reactions," "the invention is directed to a 4 5 6 variety of multiplexing methods used to amplify and/or genotype a variety of samples simultaneously.” The ’794 Patent, Abstract. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Terms contained in claims are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312. In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court begins with the intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of the claim language, the patent specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Id. at 1313; see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “The appropriate starting point . . . is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.” Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Accordingly, although claims speak to those skilled in the art, claim terms are construed in light of their ordinary and accustomed meaning, unless examination of the specification, prosecution history, and other claims indicates that the inventor intended otherwise. See Electro Medical Systems, S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The written description can provide guidance as to the meaning of the claims, thereby dictating the manner in which the claims are to be construed, even if the guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format. SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In other words, the specification may define claim terms “by implication” such that the meaning may be “found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent 4 1 documents.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6. 2 In addition, the claims must be read in view of the specification. Markman, 52 F.3d at 3 978. Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, this “does not mean that 4 everything expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims.” Raytheon Co. v. Roper 5 Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For instance, limitations from a preferred embodiment 6 described in the specification generally should not be read into the claim language. See Comark, 7 156 F.3d at 1187. However, it is a fundamental rule that “claims must be construed so as to be 8 consistent with the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Therefore, if the specification 9 reveals an intentional disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, the claims must be read consistently 10 with that limitation. Id. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Finally, the Court may consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence. 12 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to 13 exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution. See Southwall Technologies, 14 Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In most situations, analysis of this 15 intrinsic evidence alone will resolve claim construction disputes. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. 16 Courts should not rely on extrinsic evidence in claim construction to contradict the meaning of 17 claims discernable from examination of the claims, the written description, and the prosecution 18 history. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 19 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). However, it is entirely appropriate “for a court to consult 20 trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent 21 file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in 22 the pertinent technical field.” Id. Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the 23 patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned 24 treatises.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. All extrinsic evidence should be evaluated in light of the 25 intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1319. 26 27 28 DISCUSSION The ’794 patent is "directed to a variety of multiplexing methods used to amplify and/or 5 1 genotype simultaneously.” The ’794 Patent, Abstract. The invention allows for the detection of 2 over 100 different target sequences by introducing probes with complementary sequences into a 3 sample and observing whether hybridization occurs. The parties dispute the construction of two 4 terms: (a) “modified probes” and (b) “wherein said different modified probes are amplified and 5 forming different amplicons.” Relevant for the purposes of this motion, Claim 1 of the ’794 6 patent claims the following: 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 1. A multiplex method for determining whether a sample contains at least 100 different target sequences, comprising: a) providing a sample which may contain at least 100 different single-stranded target sequences attached to a first solid support; b) contacting said target sequences with a probe set comprising more than 100 different single-stranded probes, wherein each of said more than 100 different probes comprises: i) a first universal priming site, wherein each of said more than 100 different probes has identical universal priming sites, and 16 ii) a target specific domain, such that different double-stranded hybridization complexes are formed, each of the different hybridization complexes comprising one of said more than 100 different single-stranded probes and one of the different singlestranded target sequences from the sample; 17 c) removing unhybridized probes; 18 d) contacting said probes of the hybridization complexes with a first enzyme and forming different modified probes; 15 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 e) contacting said modified probes with: i) at least a first primer that hybridizes to said universal priming site; ii) NTPs; and iii) an extension enzyme; wherein said different modified probes are amplified and forming different amplicons; f) immobilizing said different amplicons to a second solid support, and g) detecting said different amplicons immobilized to said second solid support, thereby determining whether the sample contains at least 100 different target sequences. Claim 1 is the ’794 patent’s only independent claim. 6 1 2 A. “modified probe” 3 Claim Term 4 5 Illumina's Proposed Construction "modified polynucleotide that hybridizes to a target sequence" "modified probe" 6 Ariosa's Proposed Construction "enzymatically altered nucleic acid fragments, each of which contains a universal priming site and a region complementary to a specific target sequence" 7 8 First, the parties disagree regarding whether a modified probe is always the result of enzymatic alteration. Claim 1(d) describes: “contacting said probes of the hybridization complexes 10 with a first enzyme and forming different modified probes.” Illumina first points to dependent 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 claims 9 and 13, to show that probes in Claim 1 may be modified by non-enzymatic means. 12 13 14 15 16 17 9. The method of claim 1, wherein step (b) further comprises hybridizing said target sequences with a plurality of other probes and step (d) further comprises ligating said other probes to said probes. 13. The method of claim 9, wherein each of said target sequences comprises a detection position, each of said probes comprises an interrogation position, and said first enzyme modifies said probes if there is substantial complementarity between the bases at said interrogation position and said detection position. 18 19 The ’794 Patent 69:39-42, 70:7-12. 20 Neither of these claims supports Illumina's contention. Claim 9 states only that step 1(d) 21 “further comprises” ligation, not that it has eliminated the introduction of enzymes. Claim 13 22 23 specifically describes the use of enzymes to modify the probes. Nonetheless Illumina contends that “[s]ince claim 13 applies to the modification disclosed in claim 1, step (d), modification in 24 25 26 1(d) can be accomplished by using an enzyme, as required by claim 13, or by other means, as disclosed more broadly by claim 1.” Docket No. 171-4, Pl. Brf. at 9. This argument ignores the 27 fact that claim 1(d) itself requires the use of “a first enzyme” to modify the probes. A person 28 skilled in the art would understand claim 1(d) to describe enzymatic modification, while claims 9 7 1 2 and 13 provide for specific variations wherein enzymatic modification occurs. Illumina’s reliance on embodiments in the specification is similarly misplaced. 3 Next, the parties dispute whether the definition of “modified probe” must include the 4 presence of a universal priming site. On this point, Illumina’s argument appears internally 5 inconsistent. Illumina concedes that claims 1(b)(i)(the probes comprise, inter alia, "a first universal 6 priming site") and 1(e)(i) (contacting modified probes with a primer that hybridizes to "said 7 universal priming site") require that a universal priming site be present in both the modified and 8 9 unmodified probes, but argues that modified probes should not be construed to have universal priming sites because it would be redundant of the claim language. Pl. Brf. at 10. However, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Illumina also argues that including a universal priming site as part of the definition would 12 improperly import a limitation from the specification. Pl. Brf. at 11; Docket No. 176-4, Pl. Rep. at 13 3 (“Thus, the specification states that to the extent probes [include] priming sites, they need not be 14 ‘universal priming sites.’”). This latter argument does not square with the plain language of the 15 16 17 claims.2 Next, the parties dispute whether a modified probe “hybridizes” to a target sequence, or 18 merely has a “region complementary” to a target sequence. Here, the parties seem to have 19 substantial agreement on what the definition should conceptually convey, but rather disagree on 20 the best rhetorical mode of conveyance. Both parties acknowledge that (1) an unmodified probe 21 must possess a threshold level of complimentarity to hybridize, but need not be perfectly 22 complementary, (2) an unmodified probe may never hybridize at all, (3) a modified probe does not 23 24 necessarily remain hybridized at all times throughout the multiplexing process, but that (4) a 25 26 27 28 2 At argument, the Court asked Illumina if a preferred embodiment involves cleaving the universal priming site from the modified probe during the amplification stage. The ’794 Patent 33:51-34:33. However, Illumina was unable to confirm whether that was the case. The Court finds that to the extent the embodiment provides for amplification without the use of a universal priming site, it is unclaimed. 8 1 2 3 modified probe must at some point hybridize to a target sequence.3 Finally, Ariosa has agreed to Illumina’s proposed term “polynucleotide” in lieu of its proposed term, “nucleic acid fragments.” Docket No. 175, Def. Resp. at 13 nt. 3. 4 For the reasons stated above, the Court construes “modified probe” to mean: “an 5 enzymatically altered polynucleotide which contains a universal priming site and is capable of 6 7 8 substantially hybridizing to a target sequence.” B. “wherein said different modified probes are amplified and forming different amplicons” Claim Term 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 "wherein said different modified probes are amplified and forming different amplicons" Illumina's Proposed Construction "wherein the different modified probes are amplified to yield amplicons different in sequence from the modified probes" Ariosa's Proposed Construction "wherein said different modified probes are copied to form PCR amplification products of each of the different modified probes." 12 13 First, the parties disagree regarding whether the word “copied” should be substituted for 14 15 the word “amplified.” Illumina argues that amplification encompasses an array of processes 16 broader than mere copying, including for example using RNA to create a complementary strand. 17 Pl. Brf. 13-14. Illumina further points out that amplification often involves copying only a portion 18 of a template sequence, Id. at 13. Ariosa points the Court to numerous citations in the specification 19 which employ the term copying in the context of amplification, and argues that copying is the 20 21 “essence” of amplification. Def. Resp. at 20. Nonetheless, Ariosa acknowledges that “amplification can involve more than simple copying.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court 22 23 agrees that amplification can involve more than copying, and that Ariosa’s proposed definition 24 therefore unduly circumscribes what is a more nuanced and expansive concept – regardless of 25 whether copying is the essence of amplification or not. However, Illumina’s proposed construction 26 27 28 3 In its brief, Ariosa argues that “a probe will not hybridize to its target sequence unless there is substantial complementarity.” Def. Resp. at 3-4. However, at argument, Ariosa claimed that a probe which has only a minimal level of complementarity may “incorrectly” hybridize. 9 1 merely parrots the language of the claim, without explaining it, and therefore falls short of 2 “ensur[ing] that the jury fully understands the court's claim construction rulings and what the 3 patentee covered by the claims.” Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Technologies, Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 4 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010), quoting Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1366 5 (Fed.Cir.2004). 6 Next, the parties dispute whether all amplicons are the product of the PCR technique. 7 Ariosa argues that while the specification discloses other methods for amplification (i.e. SDA, 8 9 NASBA, LCR), these methods are unclaimed because they do not include the three steps outlined in claim 1(e) and because the specification only refers to the products of PCR amplification as 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 “amplicons.” Def. Resp. at 21-22. However, it is clear that the specification refers to the products 12 of other methods of amplification as "amplicons." See e.g. ’794 Patent 32:56-57. Further, it 13 14 appears that, at a minimum, the LCR method reflects the three steps outlined in claim 1(e). See id. 31:45-49, 37:34-43.4 15 16 17 Finally the parties disagree over the meaning of the term “different” when used to modify “amplicons.” Illumina suggests that “different” means that the amplicons are different in sequence 18 from the modified probes, while Ariosa interprets the term to mean that the amplicons are different 19 from one another. Illumina argues that “if the amplicons are required to be different from one 20 another, additional rounds of amplification would fall outside the claim.” Pl. Brf. at 16. 21 Conversely, Ariosa remarks that amplicons “are different from one another because the target 22 sequences to which they […] correspond are different from one another.” Def. Resp. at 24. To an 23 24 extent, the parties’ divergent proposals arise out of the same disagreement regarding whether an 25 amplicon is a copy. As discussed above, while an amplicon is not necessarily a copy of the 26 modified probe, the amplification process itself involves replicating the amplicons so that they 27 28 4 At argument, Ariosa conceded that amplicons need not be the product of PCR. 10 1 may be more readily detected. Therefore, while a sample may have millions of identical 2 amplicons, each type of amplicon corresponds to a unique modified probe, and each type of 3 modified probe is unique, and thus different from the other types of modified probes. Therefore 4 “different” means that each type of amplicon is different, and that this difference arises out of the 5 uniqueness of the types of modified probes which they amplify. 6 7 For the reasons stated above, the Court construes “wherein said different modified probes are amplified and forming different amplicons” to mean: “wherein the different modified probes 8 9 10 are replicated, in whole or in part, to yield amplification products of each of the different modified probes.” United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court adopts the constructions set forth above. 14 15 16 17 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 17, 2014 ______________________________________ SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

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