Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc. et al

Filing 146

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM NONDISPOSITIVE ORDERS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Judge Jon S. Tigar denying 132 Motion for Relief from Nondispositive Pretrial Order of Magistrate Judge [Dkt. 124]; denying 136 Motion for Relief from Nondispositive Pretrial Order of Magistrate Judge [Dkt. 124]; denying 140 MOTION for Relief from Nondispostive Pretrial Order of Magistrate Judge re 126. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/8/2013)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

CHRISTOPHER OTEY, et al.,

Case No. 12-cv-05524-JST

Plaintiffs,
8
v.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR
RELIEF FROM NONDISPOSITIVE
ORDERS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

9
10

CROWDFLOWER, INC., et al.,

ECF Nos. 132, 136, 140

Defendants.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
CrowdFlower moves for relief from three nondispositive orders entered by the Magistrate

13
14

Judge presiding over discovery in this case. For the reasons set forth below, each of the motions is

15

DENIED.
I.

16

LEGAL STANDARD

After a district court refers a pretrial matter to a magistrate judge, the district court may

17
18

reconsider the matter “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly

19

erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“The

20

district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the

21

order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”). “In finding that the magistrate judge’s

22

decision is ‘clearly erroneous,’ the Court must arrive at a definite and firm conviction that a

23

mistake has been committed.” Wi–Lan, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., No. 10–cv–80254, 2011 WL

24

841271, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (citation omitted). “This standard is extremely deferential

25

and the [m]agistrate’s rulings should be considered the final decisions of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id.

26

(citation omitted).

27

//

28

//

II.

1
2

A.

DISCUSSION

Dispute Regarding Requests for Admission, ECF No. 132
On April 15, 2013, CrowdFlower served on Otey eight requests for admissions (“RFA”),

3
4

all of which relate to Otey’s work for employers other than CrowdFlower and to the amount of

5

money that Otey earned from those employers. ECF No. 117 at 4. Otey refused to provide

6

substantive answers to any of the RFA on the ground that the information sought is not relevant to

7

the claims or defenses in this action. ECF No. 117, Ex. A.
The parties filed a discovery letter brief, in which CrowdFlower requested an order

8
9

requiring Otey to respond to the RFA. ECF No. 117. The Magistrate Judge denied
CrowdFlower’s request, finding that “this case turns only on the alleged employment relationship

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

between [Otey] and CrowdFlower” and, for that reason, Otey’s “other employment or receipt of

12

other income is irrelevant to the question of whether [Otey] was Defendants’ employee or whether

13

he was an independent contractor.” ECF No. 124 at 2-3. The Magistrate Judge based her ruling

14

on “the reasons stated in the Court’s April 11, 2013 Order.” Id. In that order, the Magistrate

15

Judge properly relied on Nesselrodte v. Diva’s, LLC, Case No. 3:11-cv-95, 2012 WL 2061523, at

16

*2 (N.D. W.Va. June 7, 2012) and Young F. Ke v. Fourth Ave., Case No. 07-cv-6897, 2009 WL

17

1058627, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2009), for the proposition that evidence of other sources of

18

income is irrelevant to the question of whether a plaintiff is an employee within the meaning of the

19

FLSA.

20

CrowdFlower now argues that the Magistrate Judge’s ruling is “clearly erroneous” and

21

“contrary to law” in light of several Ninth Circuit cases, including Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387,

22

1393-94 (9th Cir. 1993), Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F. 2d 748, 754 n. 5 (9th Cir.

23

1979), and Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F. 2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981). Each of these

24

cases holds that the existence of an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA depends on

25

whether, as a matter of economic reality, the employee is dependent upon the business to which he

26

renders service. These cases also hold that a court may consider several factors in determining

27

whether an employer-employee relationship exists, such as the employer’s right to control the

28

manner in which the work is to be performed, and the degree of permanence of the working
2

1

relationship. See, e.g., Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1370.
CrowdFlower contends that, contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling, Otey’s work for

2
3

other employers is relevant to the employer-employee relationship inquiry because the Ninth

4

Circuit recognized in Donovan that “independent contractors typically offer their services to

5

different employers in analyzing permanency,” ECF No. 132 at 3. For this reason, CrowdFlower

6

argues that the Magistrate Judge’s order erroneously “precludes Defendants from finding out

7

whether (and the degree to which) Otey has provided services to other task requesters and the

8

extent to which he is involved in other business pursuits.” Id.
The Court concludes that CrowdFlower has not shown that the Magistrate Judge’s ruling is

9

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Neither Donovan nor the other Ninth Circuit cases that

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

CrowdFlower has cited compel a finding that CrowdFlower is entitled to information pertaining to

12

Otey’s work for other employers, because the question of whether Otey had the capacity to offer

13

his services to other employers can be answered by determining the quantity, nature, and duration

14

of the work that Otey performed for CrowdFlower. Moreover, CrowdFlower concedes that it

15

already has “reliable evidence supporting that [Otey] performed tasks for hundreds of other

16

Requesters during the relevant period.” ECF No. 132 at 3. CrowdFlower does not explain why, in

17

addition to this evidence, it also needs specific information about Otey’s earnings from other

18

employers.
Accordingly, CrowdFlower’s request for relief from the Magistrate Judge’s order is

19
20

DENIED.

21

B.

Dispute Regarding Otey’s Deposition, ECF No. 140

22

This dispute pertains to CrowdFlower’s request for an order compelling Otey to appear for

23

an additional two hours of deposition for the purpose of questioning him about work he performed

24

for other employers. ECF No. 118 at 6.

25

The Magistrate Judge denied CrowdFlower’s request on the basis that Otey’s other

26

employment or income is irrelevant to the question of whether Otey was CrowdFlower’s

27

employee under the FLSA. ECF No. 126.

28

CrowdFlower now moves for relief from that order based on the same arguments and
3

1

authorities discussed in the previous section. ECF No. 40. For the same reasons articulated

2

above, CrowdFlower’s request for relief from the Magistrate Judge’s order is DENIED.

3

C.

Dispute Regarding Discovery as to Contributor Channel Partners, ECF No. 136

4

CrowdFlower offers work through various websites called “contributor channel

5

partners” (“CCPs”). Otey worked for CrowdFlower through a “contributor channel partner”

6

called “Amazon Mechanical Turk” or “AMT.” Otey has sought discovery regarding

7

CrowdFlower’s policies, practices, and treatment of workers with respect to all of CrowdFlower’s

8

CCPs, not just AMT. Defendants, however, limited their discovery responses to AMT. ECF No.

9

105 at 3.
The parties filed a discovery letter brief, in which CrowdFlower requested an order

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

denying Otey discovery as to non-AMT CCPs on the basis that Otey has not shown that all CCPs

12

operate “in exactly the same manner.” ECF No. 132 at 7.

13

The Magistrate Judge held that “discovery regarding all CCPs is appropriate” because Otey

14

has presented sufficient evidence to suggest company-wide violations. ECF No. 123 at 2; cf.

15

Nguyen v. Baxter, 275 F.R.D. 503, 508 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (denying an FLSA plaintiff discovery

16

pertaining to facilities where he never worked because he failed to produce any evidence to

17

indicate company-wide violations).

18
19
20

CrowdFlower seeks relief from that order, arguing that the evidence that Otey has
presented in support of his request for the discovery at issue is unreliable. ECF No. 136 at 3.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate’s Judge’s conclusion as to the sufficiency of Otey’s

21

evidentiary showing for the purpose of establishing his entitlement to the discovery at issue.

22

Additionally, the Court finds that the discovery at issue is relevant to the question of whether this

23

action is suitable for conditional certification. Accordingly, CrowdFlower’s motion for relief from

24

the Magistrate Judge’s order is DENIED.

25
26
27
28

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 8, 2013
______________________________________
JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge
4