Coleman v. Teamsters Local 853

Filing 32

ORDER by Judge Samuel Conti granting 16 Motion to Dismiss; denying 18 Motion for Sanctions (sclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/18/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JASON COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL 853, and DOES 150,

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Defendants.

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Case No. 12-05981 SC
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DENYING MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS

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Now before the Court is Defendant Teamsters Local 853's

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("Defendant") motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions.

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16, 18.

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file an opposition to the motions, the issues presented are

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straightforward and, thus, amenable for determination on the merits

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without further briefing or oral argument, per Civil Local Rule 7-

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1(b).

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GRANTED, and the motion for sanctions is DENIED.

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ECF Nos.

Though Plaintiff Jason Coleman ("Coleman") declined to

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is

Plaintiff brings this action, pro se, in connection with his

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termination by Southern Wine & Spirits of California, Inc.

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("Southern").

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and sought assistance from Defendant, which had agreed to represent

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Plaintiff in all matters dealing with his employment by Southern.

Plaintiff alleges that the termination was wrongful

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ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 11, 30.

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Defendant failed to assist Plaintiff with his grievance, and that

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Defendant's failure to act was motivated by racial bias.

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30, 37.

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discrimination based on race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and

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(2) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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Plaintiff further alleges that

Id. ¶¶

Plaintiff now asserts causes of action for (1)

This is not the first time that Plaintiff has sued Defendant

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in connection with his termination.

In 2010, Plaintiff filed a

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similar discrimination suit against Defendant, along with Southern

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and one of Defendant's representatives.

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filed in California Superior Court and subsequently removed to

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federal court and assigned to the undersigned.

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Wine & Spirits of California Inc., Case No. 11-00501 SC (N.D. Cal.)

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("Coleman I").

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Plaintiff asserted eleven causes of action, including causes of

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action for discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional

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distress.

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are identical to those underlying Plaintiff's claims in the instant

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action.

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to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for

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discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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MTD Ex. B ("Nov. 13, 2011 Order") at 12.

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Plaintiff's request for leave to amend to allege a claim under 42

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U.S.C. § 1981.

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his entire action with prejudice.

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The case was initially

Coleman v. Southern

In the First Amended Complaint filed in Coleman I,

MTD Ex. A ("FAC").

The facts underlying these claims

On November 14, 2011, the Court granted Defendant's motion

Id. at 13.

The Court also denied

Plaintiff later stipulated to dismiss
MTD Ex. C.

Since the instant action involves the same parties, the same

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subject matter, and the same causes of action as Coleman I,

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Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata.

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Res judicata, also

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known as claim preclusion, bars successive litigation of the same

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claims following a final adjudication on the merits.

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Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

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The doctrine applies where there is "(1) an identity of claims, (2)

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a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between

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parties."

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1192 (9th Cir. 1997).

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identity of claims since the instant action and Coleman I arise out

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of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

Amadeo v.

Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189,
As to the first condition, there is an

See Frank v. United

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2000).

With respect to

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the second condition, the November 14, 2011 Order and Plaintiff's

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voluntary dismissal with prejudice in Coleman I operate as final

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judgments on the merits.

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08 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Defendant were parties to Coleman I.

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motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

See Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1507-

As to the third condition, both Plaintiff and
Accordingly, Defendant's

Defendant also moves for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 11.

"[Rule 11] provides for the imposition of

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sanctions when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or

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without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose."

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Estate of Blue v. Cnty. of L.A., 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997).

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"When a reasonable investigation would reveal that a claim is

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barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, for example, Rule 11

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sanctions may be imposed within the district court's discretion."

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Id.

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proceeds pro se, since "arguments that a lawyer should or would

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recognize as clearly groundless may not seem so to the pro se

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[litigant]."

The analysis is slightly different where, as here, a plaintiff

Pryzina v. Ley, 813 F.2d 821, 823-24 (7th Cir. 1987).

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While the Court might be inclined to impose Rule 11 sanctions if

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Plaintiff were represented by counsel, the present circumstances

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call for more leniency.1

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sanctions is DENIED.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion for

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Teamsters Local 853

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motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.

Defendant's motion for sanctions is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dated:

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July 18, 2013
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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The Court does not mean to imply that Rule 11 sanctions are never
available against pro se litigants. Indeed, the case law holds
otherwise. See Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359
(5th Cir. 1986) ("That his filings are pro se offers [plaintiff] no
impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass
others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and
abuse already overloaded court dockets.").
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