Wheat v. Lee et al
Filing
33
ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Granting 24 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/23/2013)
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7
8
DEREK WHEAT,
9
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
No. C-12-6299 EMC
ALBERT LEE, et al.,
12
Defendants.
___________________________________/
(Docket No. 24)
13
14
15
16
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Derek Wheat is a parolee under the supervision of the California Department of
17
Corrections, Division of Adult Parole. He brings the instant suit against Charles Gibson, his parole
18
officer, and Albert Lee, Gibson’s supervisor, in connection with various events arising in the course
19
of his parole supervision. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first
20
amended complaint. Defendants seek dismissal of one of the three federal claims and six of the
21
seven state claims asserted by Plaintiff. Defendants also seek dismissal of the state assault and
22
battery claim as to Defendant Lee.
23
24
II.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In September 2009, Plaintiff was released from county jail after conviction of a non-violent
25
felony, and told to report the parole office. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 11. Upon
26
reporting to the parole office, Plaintiff was assigned to Parole Agent Charles Gibson. FAC ¶ 12.
27
28
1
On this motion to dismiss, the following facts are drawn from the First Amended
Complaint and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
1
The Berkeley parole office was supervised by Albert Lee. FAC ¶ 13. Since being on parole,
2
Defendant has maintained stable housing and gainful employment as a paralegal. FAC ¶¶ 14-15.
3
On June 19, 2010, Plaintiff was arrested by the Berkeley Police Department on charges of
4
making threats. FAC ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that these charges were fallacious, and they were later
5
dismissed. Id. After this arrest, Plaintiff served three and a half months for a parole violation. Id.
6
Plaintiff concedes that there was probable cause for this parole revocation, and does not bring claims
7
against Defendants for this incident. Id. After serving three and a half months for this parole
8
violation, Plaintiff posted bail and was released. FAC ¶ 17.
with Defendant Gibson about whether his investigation and litigation would run afoul of his parole
11
For the Northern District of California
As Plaintiff began to fight the threats charges, he elected to represent himself, and conferred
10
United States District Court
9
restrictions. FAC ¶¶ 18-19. Gibson told Plaintiff that contact with police would not constitute a
12
violation of his parole so long as Plaintiff was not arrested. FAC ¶¶ 19-20. Gibson acknowledged
13
that Plaintiff had contact with police officers in the course of his work as a paralegal, and told
14
Plaintiff that such contact was not a violation of his parole so long as he was not arrested.2 FAC ¶
15
21. After receiving these reassurances, Plaintiff began to conduct an investigation into the threats
16
charge that included researching the relationship between the arresting officer and the complaining
17
witness. FAC ¶ 22.
18
Around this time, Gibson began to confide in Plaintiff that he was having serious financial
19
troubles, and began to demand that Plaintiff lend him money. FAC ¶¶ 24-26. Plaintiff objected that
20
such requests were inappropriate and constituted extortion. FAC ¶ 27. Gibson continued to request
21
a loan. Id.
22
In the same conversation, Plaintiff informed Gibson that he needed to contact a police officer
23
in order to investigate his case. FAC ¶ 28. Plaintiff told Gibson what he wished to discuss with the
24
officer, and gave him a “verbatim recitation of the message he intended to leave if the officer did not
25
26
27
28
2
The relevance of Plaintiff’s contact with police in the course of his employment is not at all
clear, since it does not seem that Plaintiff is alleging that his research on the threats charges was part
of his employment duties.
2
1
answer.” FAC ¶ 28. Gibson indicated that this would not violate the conditions of Plaintiff’s parole.
2
FAC ¶ 29.
3
Also at the same time, Plaintiff inquired about a grievance he had filed requesting to be
4
placed on non-revocable parole. FAC ¶ 30. He further indicated that he would be submitting two
5
new grievances: one about Gibson’s request for a loan, and one about Gibson’s refusal to put
6
Plaintiff on non-revocable parole. Id. When Plaintiff indicated his intention to file these two
7
grievances, Gibson became hostile and informed Plaintiff that if he filed the grievances, Gibson
8
would revoke Plaintiff’s parole if he so much as “slipped on a banana peel.” FAC ¶ 31. Gibson
9
then ordered Plaintiff out of the office. FAC ¶ 32.
On December 1, Plaintiff placed a call to the Berkeley police officer in the course of
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
investigating the threats charges against him. FAC ¶ 33. He left a voice mail message for the
12
officer that was identical to the message Gibson had approved. Id. On December 4, 2010, members
13
of the Berkeley Police Department questioned Plaintiff and searched his home, in what Plaintiff
14
contends was an act of retaliation for his decision to proceed in pro per in defending himself against
15
the threats charges. FAC ¶ 34. Plaintiff contacted Gibson and informed him of the search, even
16
though Gibson had earlier indicated that Plaintiff only needed to report arrests, and not searches.
17
FAC ¶ 35.
18
After the search of Plaintiff’s home, the Berkeley police officers involved wrote a report and
19
delivered it to Gibson on December 10, 2010. FAC ¶ 36. This report recommended that Plaintiff’s
20
parole be revoked for leaving a threatening message on the Berkeley police officer’s voice mail.
21
FAC ¶¶ 38-39; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 (copy of police report). That same day, Gibson called Plaintiff and
22
told him that the message Plaintiff left for the Berkeley police officer contained no threats, and did
23
not constitute a crime or a violation of his parole. FAC ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that Gibson told him
24
that Gibson had researched the law on this question and that Plaintiff’s message was protected by
25
the First Amendment. FAC ¶¶ 39-40. At this time, Gibson indicated to Plaintiff that as long as
26
Plaintiff did not file the two grievances the two had previously discussed, Gibson would not revoke
27
Plaintiff’s parole. FAC ¶ 41.
28
3
1
On December 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his request for non-revocable
2
parole, and indicated that he wished to file a second grievance regarding Gibson’s request for loans.
3
FAC ¶ 42. Plaintiff was told that he could only file one grievance at a time. FAC ¶ 43. On
4
December 27, 2010, Plaintiff received a phone call telling him that he needed to come to the parole
5
office to sign a paper. FAC ¶ 44. Plaintiff went to the parole office, and was called back to meet
6
with Gibson. FAC ¶ 45. Plaintiff alleges that he was then rushed by a group of six officers led by
7
Gibson, who had his fists clenched and was “in a boxer’s pose.” FAC ¶ 45. The complaint does not
8
identify the other officers involved.
9
Gibson informed Plaintiff that he was being arrested for calling the police. FAC ¶ 47.
Plaintiff protested that he had a First Amendment right to call whomever he pleased, and Gibson
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
stated that Plaintiff “had no rights when he was on Gibsons’s ‘case load’” and that Gibson would
12
revoke Plaintiff’s parole if Plaintiff exercised his rights in a way that Gibson disliked. FAC ¶ 48.
13
When Plaintiff objected that Gibson had given Plaintiff permission to call the police officer, Gibson
14
allegedly replied:
15
16
17
I gave you permission to call the mother fucker, not to file a grievance
against me. You just slipped on that banana peel I warned you about.
You filed the first one and now you’re threatening to file the second
about me asking you for a little loan. Fuck that, I’m violating you for
that shit. Next time you will shut up and not speak out. You could
have cost me my job.
18
19
FAC ¶ 49. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Gibson told him that Defendant Lee “had agreed to
20
sign off on the false violation, and agreed to assist Gibson in his admitted retaliation against
21
plaintiff, and that Lee was aware and approved of using this ‘ruse’ to prevent plaintiff from engaging
22
in further speech.” FAC ¶ 52. Lee apparently signed off on the Berkeley police report, which was
23
then 17 days old, as the basis for revoking Plaintiff’s parole. FAC ¶ 53. Plaintiff was told that he
24
should not complaint about his treatment, or there would be “serious consequences.” FAC ¶ 54.
25
Plaintiff was handcuffed in the back of a police vehicle, and transported to North County Jail
26
in Oakland, where he was booked on a parole violation. FAC ¶ 56. Plaintiff later received a copy of
27
the parole violation document, which indicated that the basis for revocation was that Plaintiff had
28
harassed police officers. FAC ¶ 57. The document also falsely stated that Plaintiff was unemployed
4
1
and did not have stable housing. FAC ¶ 58. Plaintiff alleges that Gibson and Lee knew these
2
statements were false, and made them in an attempt to prevent Plaintiff from being released at his
3
subsequent parole hearing. Id. Lee and Gibson recommended that Plaintiff receive nine months in
4
custody for his parole violation. FAC ¶ 59.
5
Plaintiff was held in custody for 13 days, and then was released at his probable cause
6
hearing. FAC ¶ 60. After being released, Plaintiff reported to Gibson, and indicated that he wanted
7
to file a new grievance about his treatment. FAC ¶ 61. Gibson refused to provide Plaintiff with a
8
grievance form, despite Plaintiff’s protests that Gibson was required to do so under state and federal
9
law. Id. Plaintiff attempted to complain to Lee, but Lee told Plaintiff that he was “too busy” and
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
that Plaintiff was a “pain in the ass.” Id.
On or about January 20, 2011, Gibson received word from the Contra Costa County District
12
Attorney’s office that Plaintiff had an outstanding warrant. FAC ¶ 62. The warrant apparently
13
stemmed from conduct that occurred before Plaintiff was on parole, and that was thus not a violation
14
of his parole. FAC ¶ 63. The DA’s office explained this to Gibson, and further explained that the
15
warrant was a result of an unrelated offense in 2006-2007. FAC ¶ 64.
16
Shortly thereafter, Gibson called Plaintiff and told him that he needed to come to the parole
17
office to sign some paperwork. FAC ¶ 65. Plaintiff went to the parole office later that day, and was
18
again rushed by a group of parole agents led by Gibson, who was “in the same clenched-fist boxer’s
19
pose.” FAC ¶ 66. Gibson approached Plaintiff, grabbed him by the back of the neck, and slammed
20
him into the wall. Id. Plaintiff objected that the Contra Costa warrant was for conduct that occurred
21
before his parole, and that it thus could not be a parole violation. FAC ¶ 67. Gibson agreed, and
22
stated that Plaintiff was being arrested on the warrant, but not for a parole violation. Id.
23
Plaintiff was again transported to the North County Jail, where he was booked only on a
24
parole violation. FAC ¶ 68. Plaintiff called and again stated his objection that the conduct that
25
formed the basis for the Contra Costa warrant occurred before he was on parole. FAC ¶ 69. Gibson
26
responded that he and Lee wanted to “send a message” to Plaintiff to discourage him from
27
complaining or filing grievances. Id. Gibson kept Plaintiff on a parole hold for 10 days, which
28
prevented Plaintiff from posting bail, though Gibson knew that Plaintiff had not violated parole. Id.
5
1
As soon as Gibson lifted the hold, Plaintiff posted bail and was released. FAC ¶ 70. Plaintiff
2
alleges that Gibson and Lee placed the hold in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints. FAC ¶ 71.
3
Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendant’s actions, he has experienced lost wages, wrongful
4
seizure and imprisonment, severe emotional distress, violation of constitutional rights, and other
5
damages. FAC ¶ 72.
6
Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Gibson and Lee on December 12, 2012. Docket No. 1.
March 13, 2013. Docket No. 10, 21. The first amended complaint alleges ten causes of action:
9
(1) unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) violation of the Fourteenth
10
Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (3) violation of First Amendment rights; (4) violation of
11
For the Northern District of California
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and in response, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on
8
United States District Court
7
California Civil Code § 52.1; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) breach of fiduciary
12
duty; (7) negligence; (8) assault and battery; (9) false imprisonment; and (10) retaliatory harassment.
13
Defendants bring the instant motion seeking dismissal of claims two, four through seven, nine, and
14
ten. Defendants also seek dismissal of claim eight as to Defendant Lee only. Defendants argue that
15
the Fourteenth Amendment claim fails to state a claim, and that Defendants are immune as to claims
16
four through seven, nine and ten. Defendants also argue that the complaint fails to state a claim as to
17
claims six, seven, eight, and ten.
18
III.
DISCUSSION
19
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon
20
which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6)
21
challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged. See Parks Sch. Of Bus. Symington, 51 F.3d
22
1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In considering such a motion, a court must take all allegations of
23
material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although
24
“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6)
25
dismissal.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). While “a complaint need not
26
contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
27
plausible on its face.’” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
28
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
6
1
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
2
544, 556 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
3
more than sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
4
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The pro
7
se complaint will be dismissed only if it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can
8
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Pena v. Gardner,
9
967 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has recently
10
clarified that courts “continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under
11
For the Northern District of California
Ordinarily, a pro se complaint will be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
6
United States District Court
5
Iqbal.... [O]ur ‘obligation’ remains, ‘where the petitioner is pro se . . . to construe the pleadings
12
liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342
13
(9th Cir.2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc)).
14
However, the Court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”
15
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982); see also Ghazali v.
16
Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in
17
their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.”).
18
A.
19
20
21
22
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants:
violated plaintiff’s rights by incarcerating him without probable cause,
knowingly subjecting him to seizure of his person without violating
parole, and subjecting him to summary punishment without due
process of law and, in doing so, violated his rights as secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, including unlawfully depriving him of his
liberty.
23
24
FAC ¶ 76. Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because: (1) to the degree that
25
Plaintiff complains that he was arrested without probable cause, this claim is duplicative of
26
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim; and (2) to the degree that the claim alleges that Plaintiff was
27
not provided due process after his initial arrest, it fails as a matter of law.
28
7
1
1.
2
Defendants argue that to the degree that Plaintiff’s Due Process claim is based on his
3
allegations that the parole officers had him arrested without probable cause, it should be dismissed
4
because it is duplicative of his Fourth Amendment claim.
5
Initial Arrest
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to view claims for constitutional wrongs as sounding
6
in substantive due process when the wrong complained of could more aptly be placed within “the
7
specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
8
273 (1994). In Albright, the Court rejected a petitioner’s claim that his arrest without probable cause
9
violated his substantive due process rights. Holding instead that “it is the Fourth Amendment . . .
under which petitioner Albright’s claim must be judged,” the Court stated “where a particular
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort
12
of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due
13
process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Id. Likewise, the Court in Graham v.
14
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), refused to construe a petitioner’s excessive force claim as a violation
15
of his substantive due process rights when it could more appropriately be framed as a violation of his
16
rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 395 (holding that “because
17
the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
18
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion
19
of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”).
20
Plaintiff argues that while it is “generally true” that false arrest claims should be analyzed
21
under the Fourth Amendment rather than the “more generalized Fourteenth Amendment
22
protections,” his Fourteenth Amendment claim should nonetheless be permitted to proceed because
23
“certain wrongs affect more than a single right, and accordingly, can implicate more than one of the
24
constitution’s commands.” Pl.’s Opp. at 7-8 (quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320
25
(9th Cir. 1996)). The case Plaintiff cites for this proposition, however, is unhelpful as it specifically
26
holds that the plaintiffs in that case could not bring a substantive due process claim under the
27
Fourteenth Amendment when the complained-of conduct fell squarely within the Fourth and Fifth
28
Amendments:
8
1
Because the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provide explicit limitations
on the type of government conduct challenged by the plaintiffs,
Graham dictates that those Amendments, not the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process, should guide the
analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim. This conclusion follows
straightforwardly from Graham, for while this case does not arise in
the criminal context, the Supreme Court’s admonition in Graham is no
less applicable here than in that case or in Albright.
2
3
4
5
6
Amendariz, 75 F.3d at 1320, abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Action Apartment Ass’n,
7
Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2007).
8
9
Plaintiff cites to a number of other cases in support of his position that he may bring a
Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the revocation of his parole, but these cases all concern the
procedural due process requirements once an individual is in police custody. Both Fairley v.
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) and Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th
12
Cir. 2001), for example, concerned allegations of due process violations where the arresting
13
agency’s failure to take certain steps to verify an arrestee’s identity post-arrest resulted in innocent
14
person being detained for lengthy periods of time. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
15
(2001) (concerning due process rights of immigrants in removal proceedings facing indefinite
16
detention).
17
Plaintiff also points to Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, where the court found that
18
several state statutes requiring speedy arraignment and restricting lengthy pre-trial detention created
19
a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 954 F.2d 1470, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff argues
20
that in this case, Cal. Code Reg. § 2600, which restricts the circumstances under which a parole
21
agent may impose a parole hold, similarly creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Pl.’s
22
Opp. at 8. Even assuming, arguendo, that this is the case, Oviatt does not support Plaintiff’s
23
contention that he should be able to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim for the initial detention in
24
addition to his Fourth Amendment claim.3 Initially, Oviatt did not concern allegations that the
25
3
26
27
28
Though neither party raises this, it would also seem that Plaintiff’s argument that this
regulation creates a liberty interest that was violated by his arrests is undermined by a state statute
providing that all parolees shall be provided notice, upon release, that “he or she is subject to search
or seizure by a probation or parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with
or without a search warrant or with or without cause.” Cal. Penal Code § 3067. The Supreme Court
has held that this statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
9
1
plaintiff’s initial arrest lacked probable cause; the allegation instead was that the defendant’s
2
administrative error caused the plaintiff to languish in jail for over 100 days without an arraignment.
3
954 F.2d at 1473. The court in that case thus did not squarely address the question at issue here.
4
Looking at the court’s analysis in Oviatt, however, further suggests that Plaintiff’s argument
protected liberty interest, it next turned to the question of “what process is due under the Fourteenth
7
Amendment.” Id. at 1475. In the case at bar, the analysis under this question would concern what
8
procedures are appropriate to review parole holds to ensure that they were justified under § 2600. In
9
this case, however, Plaintiff concedes that his complaint is not with the revocation hearings that
10
followed his arrests, but with the initial arrests and his subsequent detention prior to the parole
11
For the Northern District of California
is unavailing. Once the court there determined that the state statute created a constitutionally
6
United States District Court
5
revocation hearings. Pl.’s Opp. at 6. The analysis of Plaintiff’s post-arrest detention under the
12
Fourteenth Amendment is discussed further below, but under Graham, the appropriate lens for
13
evaluating the constitutionality of these arrests is the Fourth, not the Fourteenth Amendment.
14
Plaintiff objects that preventing him from bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim for
15
revocation of parole without due process is “troubling” because it would allow a parole officer to
16
repeatedly arrest a parolee on a frivolous allegation of violation, and the parolee would lack recourse
17
so long as he was released at a timely parole hearing. While a parolee wrongfully arrested may not
18
bring a due process claim, he would still have recourse, as Plaintiff does here, under the Fourth
19
Amendment to challenge each arrest, even where appropriate procedures were followed afterwards
20
to review the arrest and release him.
21
This Court thus finds that to the degree that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is based
22
on allegations that his initial arrests were without probable cause, such complaints are more
23
appropriately addressed by the Fourth Amendment claim in his complaint.
24
2.
25
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim must also fail as to any claim
26
Post-Arrest Due Process
that Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were violated by a failure to timely review the parole
27
28
843, 856 (2006).
10
1
revocation after his arrest. The Supreme Court considered the procedural due process rights of
2
parolees facing revocation in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court
3
recognized that there are two stages to the process of parole revocation: the arrest of the parolee and
4
preliminary hearing, and the formal revocation of parole. Id. at 485.
5
As Plaintiff was released and never suffered formal revocation, only the first stage is at issue
6
in the instant case. As to the first stage, the Court held that “due process requires that after the
7
arrest, the determination that reasonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by
8
someone not directly involved in the case.” Id. The parolee must be given notice of the preliminary
9
hearing, and must be provided the opportunity to speak on his own behalf and present relevant
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
13
14
15
evidence. Id. at 486-87. Further,
The hearing officer shall have the duty of making a summary, or
digest, of what occurs at the hearing in terms of the responses of the
parolee and the substance of the documents or evidence given in
support of parole revocation and of the parolee’s position. Based on
the information before him, the officer should determine whether there
is probable cause to hold the parolee for the final decision of the
parole board on revocation. Such a determination would be sufficient
to warrant the parolee’s continued detention and return to the state
correctional institution pending the final decision.
16
Id. at 487. Though the Court in Morrissey did not specifically indicate how soon after arrest the
17
preliminary hearing had to occur, the Ninth Circuit has found that an administrative hearing
18
conducted 21 days after a parolee was initially detained “was prompt enough to qualify as the
19
preliminary probable cause determination required by Morrissey.” Pierre v. Washington State Bd.
20
of Prison Terms & Paroles, 699 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1983).
21
In this case, Plaintiff received a preliminary hearing thirteen days after his first arrest, and
22
was released ten days after his second arrest without a hearing. FAC ¶ 60, 69. As to the first arrest,
23
Plaintiff does not contend that the revocation hearing was inadequate. Pl.’s Opp. at 6. In the second
24
case, it appears that all attempts to revoke his parole were dropped after the parole hold was lifted
25
and he was released. FAC ¶ 69. No procedural due process rights under Morrissey were violated in
26
either instance.
27
28
The Court thus concludes that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for violation of his procedural
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the post-arrest proceedings.
11
1
As the facts Plaintiff alleges do not support a claim for the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
2
rights at any point in the parole revocation proceedings, Plaintiff’s second claim is dismissed with
3
prejudice.
4
B.
5
Immunity on State Law Claims
Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s state law claims except the assault and battery claim
6
should be dismissed on immunity grounds. Defendants base their claim of immunity on three
7
different provisions of California state law.
8
9
Prosecutorial Immunity
a.
Initiation of Revocation Proceedings
California Government Code § 821.6 provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
1.
injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the
12
scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov. Code
13
§ 821.6. Though this section is primarily applied to immunize prosecuting attorneys and related
14
personnel, it applies to all employees of government entities. Kemmerer v. Cnty. of Fresno, 200 Cal.
15
App. 3d 1426, 1436 (Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, though it is most often applied in the context of
16
malicious prosecution claims, it is not limited to such claims. Id. (rejecting argument that § 821.6 is
17
“limited to suits for damages for malicious prosecution”). Courts have applied this section to bar
18
suits by parolees against parole officers based on the officer’s actions in initiating parole revocation
19
proceedings. See Kim v. Walker, 208 Cal. App. 3d 375, 382 (Ct. App. 1989), rejected on other
20
grounds in State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 n.7 (2004).
21
Plaintiff argues that § 821.6 is inapplicable as that section only applies to claims for
22
malicious prosecution and that inasmuch as Kemmerer holds to the contrary, it is no longer good
23
law. Pl.’s Opp. at 10-11. He points to two cases in this District that he contends support his
24
argument. The first, Randolph v. City of E. Palo Alto, does not address Kemmerer’s rulings on §
25
821.6 at all, but focuses on Kemmerer’s immunity analysis under Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2.
26
27
28
12
1
C 06-07476 SI, 2008 WL 618908, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2008).4 It is thus inapplicable to the
2
immunity analysis under § 821.6.
3
The second case Plaintiff cites does, at first blush, appear to provide some support for his
4
position. In Dinius v. Perdock, the plaintiff brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional
5
distress in connection with allegations that the defendants made false statements and fabricated
6
evidence in the course of a police investigation that ultimately led to criminal charges being filed
7
against him. C 10-3498 MEJ, 2012 WL 1925666, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2012). The court
8
rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were
9
barred by § 821.6. Id. at *8-9. While acknowledging that a number of California court decisions
had found § 821.6 to barred tort claims other than malicious prosecution that were brought for
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
actions taken in the course of initiating judicial or administrative proceedings, the court relied upon
12
the California Supreme Court decision in Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710 (1974) to
13
conclude that § 821.6 applies only to claims for malicious prosecution.
14
The Court agrees with the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Sullivan and finds that Section 821.6 only applies to claims for
malicious prosecution. A recent law review article has examined the
inconsistent positions taken by California courts on this issue and
explained why the better approach – which this Court adopts – is to
interpret Section 821.6 as only immunizing public employees’ conduct
with respect to claims stemming from the institution or prosecution of
a judicial proceeding. . . . For these reasons, the Court is not
persuaded by the County Defendants’ argument and follows Sullivan
to find that Section 821.6 does not automatically immunize County
Defendants’ investigatory conduct against Dinius’s IIED claim.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Id. at *9.
In Sullivan, the California Supreme Court addressed “the question whether an individual who
22
is confined in a county jail beyond his proper jail term may maintain an action for false
23
imprisonment against the county or whether such a suit is barred by” § 821.6. 12 Cal. 3d at 713.
24
The Court there found that § 821.6 did not apply to claims for false imprisonment, noting that the
25
language and legislative history of § 821.6 indicated that the legislature had not intended to disturb
26
27
28
4
The case in Randolph concerned allegations of negligent hiring, training, and supervision
of police officers, and the court found that § 820.2 did not apply because the defendant’s actions
were ministerial rather than discretionary. 2008 WL 618908, at *11.
13
but not false imprisonment. Id. at 719-22. The court in Dinius quotes Sullivan as holding that “the
3
history of section 821.6 demonstrates that the Legislature intended the section to protect public
4
employees from liability only for malicious prosecution.” 2012 WL 1925666 at *8. This quote,
5
however, omits the end of the sentence. The full quote from Sullivan is: “the history of section
6
821.6 demonstrates that the Legislature intended the section to protect public employees from
7
liability only for Malicious prosecution and not for False imprisonment.” Id. at 719. As the Dinius
8
court acknowledges, numerous California state courts have distinguished Sullivan and limited its
9
holding to false imprisonment claims. See, e.g., Randle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 186 Cal.
10
App. 3d 449, 456 (Ct. App. 1986) (“The cases which appellant discusses as limiting the immunity
11
For the Northern District of California
the historical rule that government employees were immune from claims of malicious prosecution
2
United States District Court
1
under section 821.6 do so in the specific context of distinguishing actions for malicious prosecution
12
from ones for false arrest or false imprisonment.”); Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 208 Cal. App. 3d
13
1496, 1501 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that § 821.6 barred claims for libel and slander, and noting that
14
“[w]hat the court [in Sullivan] held was that Government Code section 821.6 does not apply to a
15
prosecution for false imprisonment”). Other than Dinius, it appears that no California state court has
16
yet to read Sullivan as limiting the scope of § 821.6 immunity to malicious prosecution actions to
17
nothing else. Instead, Sullivan only appears to hold § 821.6 immunity does not apply to false
18
imprisonment claims.
19
The precise reach of Sullivan need not be determined, however, because even assuming
20
Dinius is an accurate statement of California law, Dinius does not preclude the applicability of §
21
821.6 here. Though Dinius suggests that § 821.6 only immunizes for claims of malicious
22
prosecution, the court later frames this rule as “only immunizing public employees’ conduct with
23
respect to claims stemming from the institution or prosecution of a judicial proceeding.” 2012 WL
24
1925666, at *9. See 2012 WL 1925666 at *9 n.10 (“[t]his result does not mean that future plaintiffs
25
may plead around Section 821.6 immunity by simply alleging claims other than malicious
26
prosecution.”). Thus, even under Dinius, acts constitute malicious prosecution within § 821.6
27
immunity may be somewhat determined expansively.
28
14
1
Consistent with that interpretation, in Ross v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,
2
146 Cal. App. 4th 1507, 1516 (2007), the court found that § 821.6 barred claims that fell “under the
3
general rubric of malicious prosecution.” Id. The court held that § 821.6 applied to the plaintiff’s
4
claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because “[t]he gravamen of these
5
claims is that, acting out of discriminatory and retaliatory motives, BART employees initiated and
6
prosecuted administrative proceedings to discipline or discharge Ross based on accusations they
7
knew to be false.” Id.
8
9
In this case, the “gravamen” of most of Plaintiff’s state law tort claims is that Defendants had
initiated parole revocation proceedings even though they knew that he had not violated his parole
and in retaliation for the grievances that he had filed. See FAC ¶¶ 79-84, 88-93, 96-102. For
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
example, Plaintiff’s claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 states that Defendants violated
12
Plaintiff’s “right to be free of unreasonable and unlawful seizure of” his person, his “right to be free
13
from retaliation for exercise of speech and expression” under the First Amendment, his “right to be
14
free from summary punishment without due process,” and his “right to protection from bodily
15
restraint, harm, or personal insult.” FAC ¶ 80. Similarly, the negligence claim alleges that
16
Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff in that they failed to “refrain from wrongfully arresting
17
and/or detaining plaintiff; [t]o refrain from abusing their authority granted them by law; [t]o refrain
18
from recommending that the plaintiff’s parole be violated when they knew plaintiff did not violate
19
parole; [and] [t]o refrain from violating plaintiff’s rights guaranteed by the united [sic] States
20
Constitution and California Constitution.” FAC ¶ 91. The threat and bulk of both these claims
21
would appear to fall under the “general rubric” of malicious prosecution. The claims for intentional
22
infliction of emotional distress and retaliatory harassment likewise appear to stem primarily from
23
conduct connected with the initiation of parole revocation proceedings. FAC ¶¶ 82-84, 99-102. To
24
the extent these claims are so connected, they are barred by § 821.6 under Ross. On the other hand,
25
to the extent these claims are based on the initial arrest/detention separate from the initiation of
26
parole revocation proceedings, the discussion below of false imprisonment claims applies.
27
28
Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is not barred by § 821.6 to the extent it is based on
Plaintiff’s allegations that Gibson breached his duty to Plaintiff by “shaking down plaintiff when
15
1
plaintiff complained and retaliating against plaintiff when plaintiff filed grievances.” FAC ¶ 86.
2
Since this is only partially based on Gibson’s actions in revoking parole, § 821.6 does not entirely
3
bar suit on this claim, at least to the extent it is based on Gibson’s “shake down” of Plaintiff.
4
5
b.
False Imprisonment
The application of § 821.6 to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim presents a closer question.
6
As discussed above, Sullivan held that § 821.6 does not provide immunity for claims of false
7
imprisonment. 12 Cal. 3d at 719-20. The Sullivan court specifically noted another provision of the
8
Government Code, § 820.4, provides immunity for public employees exercising due care in the
9
exercise or enforcement of the law but specifically states that “[n]othing in this section exonerates a
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
public employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.”
Defendants correctly point out, however, that the facts here are distinguishable from those in
12
Sullivan in that Sullivan involved an individual who had been detained in jail after all proceedings
13
against him had terminated and he had completed his sentence. 12 Cal. 3d at 713-14. Here, on the
14
other hand, parole revocation proceedings were pending during the duration of Plaintiff’s
15
incarceration in both of the challenged incidents. Defendants argue that because Plaintiff’s false
16
imprisonment claim is fundamentally aimed at Defendants’ actions in revoking Plaintiff’s parole, it
17
is barred by § 821.6.
18
Defendants’ contention is supported by a California Supreme Court case holding that § 821.6
19
prevented a plaintiff from recovering damages for false imprisonment for any period after his
20
arraignment on criminal charges. Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 748 (1997). In
21
Asgari, the plaintiff was arrested and later charged with a criminal offense. Id. at 748. He remained
22
in custody until he was ultimately acquitted following a jury trial. Id. He then brought suit against
23
the arresting police officers, alleging false arrest and related causes of action. Id. The jury in this
24
civil suit was instructed that it could award the plaintiff damages for the entire time he had been in
25
custody if it found sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the district attorney exercised
26
independent judgment in filing the criminal charges. Id. at 752. The California Supreme Court
27
found this to be an error, and held that “the jury should have been instructed that the immunity from
28
liability for injury caused by malicious prosecution, provided to public employees by Government
16
1
Code section 821.6, precludes a plaintiff in a false arrest action from recovering damages that are
2
attributable to the period of the plaintiff’s incarceration that follows his or her arraignment on
3
criminal charges.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
4
The Court distinguished between the tort of false imprisonment, which “is defined as the
“consists of initiating or procuring the arrest and prosecution of another under lawful process, but
7
from malicious motives and without probable cause.” Id. at 757 (internal citations and quotation
8
marks omitted). Thus, “[f]alse arrest or imprisonment and malicious prosecution are mutually
9
inconsistent concepts, the former relating to conduct that is without valid legal authority and the
10
latter to conduct where there is valid process or due authority.” Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
11
For the Northern District of California
unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another,” and the tort of malicious prosecution, which
6
United States District Court
5
“false imprisonment ended when he was arraigned in municipal court on the felony complaint seven
12
days after he was arrested” because “[a]t that point, plaintiff’s confinement was pursuant to lawful
13
process and no longer constituted false imprisonment.” Id. The Court expressed concern that a
14
contrary rule would undermine the statutory immunity for malicious prosecution by allowing the
15
plaintiff to recover for time spent in jail while criminal charges were pending. Id. at 754.
16
In this case, parole revocation proceedings were pending against Plaintiff the entire time that
17
he was in custody. It cannot be said that his detention during this period was “without valid legal
18
authority.” See Cal. Penal Code § 3067 (parolees are “subject to search or seizure by a probation or
19
parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant
20
or with or without cause).” Under Asgari, therefore, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is barred
21
by § 821.6 because there were formal proceedings pending against him during the entire time of his
22
incarceration.
23
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants are immune from liability under § 821.6 for
24
Plaintiff’s claims under California Civil Code § 52.1, and his claims for negligence, intentional
25
infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and retaliatory harassment. Section 821.6 does
26
not, however, bar Plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty based on the alleged “shake down”
27
28
17
1
and assault and battery, as those claims are based on actions other than the initiation of parole
2
revocation proceedings.5
3
2.
4
Defendants also argue that immunity applies based on two statutes immunizing public
5
employees for injuries resulting from actions taken pursuant to discretion vested in them by virtue of
6
their positions, and from decisions about parole. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 820.2, 845.8. Plaintiff raises
7
various arguments as to why these immunities do not apply to his claims here. As Defendants are
8
immune under § 821.6 for all of Plaintiff’s state law claims except the breach of fiduciary duty based
9
on the “shake down” and assault and battery claims, the Court need not consider whether these other
Immunity for Parole Determinations and for Discretionary Actions
statutory immunities also bar suit for those claims. Further, as the fiduciary duty and assault and
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
battery claims do not stem from actions within Defendants’ legitimately vested discretion or actions
12
related to the revocation of Plaintiff’s parole, neither § 820.2 nor § 845.8 provide immunity for those
13
claims.
14
C.
Failure to State a Claim for State Law Claims Six and Eight
15
Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff’s sixth, seventh, and tenth claims should be
16
dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that Plaintiff’s eighth claim should be dismissed as to
17
Defendant Lee. As Defendants are immune from suit as to Plaintiff’s seventh and tenth claims, this
18
Court need not address the question of whether those claims should be dismissed on the merits.
19
1.
20
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim should be dismissed because
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
21
a parole officer owes no fiduciary duty to the parolees she supervises. “Before a person can be
22
charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on behalf and for the
23
benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship which imposes that undertaking as a matter of
24
law” City of Hope Nat. Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 43 Cal. 4th 375, 386, 181 P.3d 142, 150 (2008)
25
(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).
26
27
28
5
For other reasons stated below, however, the breach of fiduciary claim is dismissed.
18
1
Plaintiff cites to Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) in support of his position that
2
parole officers owe a fiduciary duty to parolees under their supervision. Pl.’s Opp. at 20-21. While
3
Gagnon does contain a discussion of a parole officer’s responsibilities to parolees, it did not discuss
4
whether such an officer owes a fiduciary duty to the parolee. Also, the court explicitly recognized
5
that a parole officer’s responsibilities to the public will at times trump her responsibilities to
6
parolees under her supervision. Id. at 784 (“The parole agent ordinarily defines his role as
7
representing his client’s best interests as long as these do not constitute a threat to public safety.”).
8
Plaintiff points to no case, citing Gagnon or otherwise, holding that a parole officer has a fiduciary
9
duty towards parolees, and this Court could find none.
Nor does Plaintiff allege any facts that would support a finding that Gibson “knowingly
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
under[took] to act on behalf and for the benefit of” Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this
12
claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
13
2.
14
Defendants seek to dismiss the assault and battery claims as to Defendant Lee. Plaintiff’s
Assault & Battery
15
complaint does not allege that Lee was one of the group of officers who rushed him on either of the
16
two occasions described in the complaint. FAC ¶¶ 45-46, 66. On each occasion, Plaintiff alleges
17
that Gibson was involved, and several other unnamed parole agents. Id. A party who has been
18
injured by an assault “may recover damages not only from the actual assailant, but from any other
19
person who aids, abets, counsels or encourages the assault.” Ayer v. Robinson, 163 Cal. App. 2d
20
424, 428 (1958). While Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Lee was the supervisor of the Berkeley
21
parole office, and that he agreed to assist Gibson in retaliating against Plaintiff by falsely reporting
22
that he violated his parole, nothing in the complaint indicates that Lee was aware of the alleged
23
assault and battery, much less that he aided, abetted, counseled, or encouraged Gibson in committing
24
it.6
25
6
26
27
28
The Court notes “[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the relationship
between a supervisor and his subordinate employees,” so it wouldn’t apply to hold Lee responsible.
George F. Hillenbrand, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 104 Cal. App. 4th 784, 823 (2002) (quoting
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 378 (1951)); see also Godoy v. Wadsworth, CV 05-02913 NJV,
2009 WL 1458041 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2009) (citing Hillenbrand and dismissing assault and battery
claims against supervisors because respondeat superior was inapplicable).
19
1
2
Accordingly, this Court dismisses this claim as against Defendant Lee for failure to state a
claim.
3
4
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion, dismissing Plaintiff’s
5
second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth claims with prejudice, and dismissing Plaintiff’s
6
eighth claim as to Defendant Lee with leave to amend. Thus, the status of the claims are as follows:
7
(1)
8
9
this motion;
(2)
10
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause – dismissed
with prejudice;
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment – not challenged on
(3)
violation of First Amendment rights – not challenged on this motion;
12
(4)
violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 – immune – dismissed with
13
14
prejudice;
(5)
15
intentional infliction of emotional distress – immune – dismissed with
prejudice;
16
(6)
breach of fiduciary duty – dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
17
(7)
negligence – immune – dismissed with prejudice;
18
(8)
assault and battery – dismissed as to Defendant Lee without prejudice;
19
(9)
false imprisonment – immune – dismissed with prejudice; and
20
(10)
retaliatory harassment – dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
21
This order disposes of Docket No. 24.
22
23
IT IS SO ORDERED.
24
25
Dated: May 23, 2013
26
_________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
27
28
20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?