Williams et al v. WinCo Foods LLC et al

Filing 53

ORDER by Judge Charles R. Breyer granting #40 Motion to Deny Class Certification. (crblc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/1/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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No. CV 13-00146 CRB

LESTAREA WILLIAMS ET AL.,

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DENY CLASS CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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WINCO FOODS ET AL.,

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Defendants.

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This case is effectively identical to a case previously before this Court, Gales v.

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WinCo Foods, LLC, 09-5813. The same lawyers that lost a fully-briefed class certification

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motion in Gales are back with new named Plaintiffs, seeking to certify a class that is identical

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to subclasses previously rejected by this Court in Gales. Defendants now move to deny class

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certification under Rule 23. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
This Court previously denied class certification in the related case of Gales v. WinCo

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Foods, LLC, No. C 09–05813 CRB, 2011 WL 3794887 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011). The

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class in Gales consisted of Assistant Managers at WinCo stores in California who alleged

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that they were improperly classified as “exempt” employees for the purposes of overtime

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pay. The putative Gales class was divided into three subclasses: one subclass of day shift

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assistant managers and two subclasses of night shift assistant managers. Id. at *1. The
putative class here is the same, except it excludes the day shift assistant managers. Mot. at 4

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(dkt. 40). Plaintiffs originally filed this action in state court in Sacramento County;

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Defendants removed the case to federal district court the Eastern District of California, and

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successfully moved to transfer venue to the Northern District of California and have the case

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related to Gales. Order Transferring Case (dkt. 12), Order Relating Case (dkt. 24).

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Defendants now move to deny class certification.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 23(c) provides that “at an early practicable time after a person sues . . . as a class

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representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class

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action.” Under that rule, “[a] defendant may move to deny class certification before a

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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plaintiff files a motion to certify a class.” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571

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F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). District courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of whether

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the party seeking certification has satisfied Rule 23's prerequisites. Mazza v. Am. Honda

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Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012).

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III.

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DISCUSSION
Although Plaintiffs and Defendants spend a great deal of time wrangling over “stare

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decisis,” “comity,” and preclusion principles, what is not in dispute is that this Court has the

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discretion to consider its decision in Gales in ruling on class certification here. Cf. Smentek

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v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that consideration of previous decisions

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on an identical class action is not mandatory but discretionary). In Gales, this Court

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concluded that due to evidence of significant individual variation in the putative class

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members’ jobs, the individual inquiries required to determine a class member’s proper

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classification would predominate over questions common to the class, precluding

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certification. 2011 WL 3794887, at *6-10; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

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A.

This Court May Consider Class Certification Without Permitting Further
Discovery

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Plaintiffs request that they be allowed to conduct discovery before the determination
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of whether the class here should be certified. Plaintiffs request discovery to (1) determine
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the persons in the putative class, (2) interview as many putative class members as possible,
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(3) depose Defendant’s declarants, and (4) identify a list of tasks performed by the Assistant

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Managers. Opp’n at 14 (dkt. 48).

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“Plaintiff bears the burden of advancing a prima facie showing that . . . discovery is

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likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations.” Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d

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1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985). The discovery requested by Plaintiffs has generally already been

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performed in Gales. Given that the class allegations in Gales were not substantiated, and

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Plaintiffs have not changed the allegations from the Gales litigation, there is no reason to

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permit duplicative discovery.

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The only new discovery Plaintiffs propose consists of a “time and motion study” and a

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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“survey.”1 Opp’n at 13-14. The information that Plaintiffs would allegedly glean about the

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tasks performed by the assistant managers was already gathered and presented to this Court

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by way of affidavit and deposition of night shift assistant managers in the Gales action. See,

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e.g., Gales, dkt. no. 70, attachments 1-11 (affidavits of night shift assistant managers).

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for discovery prior to ruling on

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Defendants’ motion.

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B.

Class Certification Is Inappropriate

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Plaintiffs seek to certify two of the putative subclasses from Gales. Plaintiffs argue

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that by reducing the scope of the class from both day and night shift assistant managers to

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night shift assistant managers, they have distinguished this case from Gales.

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Because each putative subclass undergoes analysis as if it were a class, the denial of

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class certification in Gales was a denial of certification of each of the subclasses. Plaintiffs

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have not changed the subclasses from Gales other than consolidating the two night shift

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subclasses into a single class. Plaintiffs offer no explanation of how that consolidation would

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prevent the putative class here from suffering from the same problems that precluded

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certification of the putative Gales subclasses. Because Plaintiffs have not addressed the

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Plaintiffs describe both as ways of demonstrating commonality. Plaintiffs described the “time
and motion study” as preferred, but do not specify which they actually intend to use. Opp’n at 14.
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reasoning underlying this Court’s previous denial of certification in Gales, the Court

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GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Deny Class Certification.

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C.

Further Relief Is Not Warranted

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Defendants request an “order preventing Plaintiffs from relitigating class certification

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in this case” because “neither this Court nor WinCo should be subject to endless class actions

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from former WinCo Assistant Managers.” Mot. at ix. Defendants further observe that even

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denying class certification in this case might not prevent future inefficient litigation because

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there will be “no assurance that the same lawsuit will not be re-filed yet again by different

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class representatives.” Id. at 12.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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To the extent Defendants request some remedy beyond denial of class certification in

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this action, the Court concludes that none is warranted. This Court has no power to prevent

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any other WinCo Assistant Manager from bringing a putative class action. See Smith v.

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Bayer Corp., 131 S.Ct. 2368, 2380-81; Smentek, 683 F.3d at 376-77. Of course, what

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happened in this case aptly illustrates why future copycat suits would be ill-advised. Cf.

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Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Lawyers must eat, so

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they generally won't take cases without a reasonable prospect of getting paid.”)

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Deny Class

Certification.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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CHARLES R. BREYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 1, 2013

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G:\CRBALL\2013\146\order re class allegations.wpd

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