Caldwell et al v. Facet Retiree Medical Plan et al

Filing 88

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Hon. William Alsup denying 54 Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings.(whalc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/3/2014)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 PATRICK CALDWELL, FRAN CHARLSON, DOUGLAS EBERSOLE, and CARY QUEEN, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 15 No. C 13-00385 WHA v. ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 FACET RETIREE MEDICAL PLAN and TIMOTHY RICHMOND AS PLAN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FACET RETIREE MEDICAL PLAN, 18 Defendants. 16 / 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 In this ERISA benefits action inherited from a colleague, the parties have filed cross- 22 motions for summary judgment on the administrative record. For the reasons stated below, the 23 motions are DENIED. STATEMENT 24 25 1. 26 The following facts are uncontested. Protein Designer Labs (“PDL”) established a retiree THE PLAN. 27 medical benefits plan for select PDL executives in 2003. The Plan provided post-employment 28 health benefits to retirees who were officers of PDL with at least ten years of service, eligible to participate in PDL’s health plans as active employees, and elected to require under the terms of 1 whatever PDL retirement program applied at the time of their retirement. Plaintiffs Patrick 2 Caldwell, Fran Charlson, Douglas Ebersole, and Cary Queen were executives at PDL who 3 retired between December 31, 2003, and August 31, 2005, and elected to participate in the PDL 4 plan (along with any applicable dependants). 5 PDL spun off part of itself into Facet Biotech Corporation (“Facet”) on December 18, Plan (“the Plan”). On March 9, 2010, Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (“Abbott”) acquired Facet and 8 renamed the company Abbott Biotheraputics, which remained the sponsor of the plan. On 9 January 1, 2013, Abbott spun off its pharmaceutical business into an independent company 10 named AbbVie Inc. AbbVie assumed ownership of Abbott Biotherapeutics and renamed it 11 For the Northern District of California 2008. Facet assumed the PDL plan, amending and restating it as the Facet Retiree Health Care 7 United States District Court 6 AbbVie Biotherapeutics. AbbVie Biotherapeutics is the current Plan sponsor. 12 At its inception, the Plan required no contribution by its participants, including plaintiffs, 13 to the premium that the Plan paid on behalf of the participant, and only required a 25-percent 14 contribution to the premium paid on behalf of dependants. 15 16 Both sides identify the following three sections of the Plan as relevant to the instant dispute: 17 Section II (Eligibility) 18 2.3 (Contribution Requirements): In the event that PDL requires contributions towards the cost of this Plan, coverage under this plan shall not take effect for persons for whom contributions are required, until such time as the contribution requirements are met. Contributions, if any, are described in Appendix A of this Plan. 19 20 21 Section III (Benefits) 22 23 24 3.1 (Benefits Provided): A participant, who meets the eligibility requirements of Section 2 of this Plan, shall be eligible to participate in the PDL retiree Health Plan. The Benefits under this Plan shall be identical to those provided under the health plans available to the eligible active employees of PDL. 25 Section VI (General Provisions) 26 27 28 6.10 (Amendment or Modification): The Plan may at any time and from time to time be amended or modified by written instrument duly adopted by PDL. Other provisions of this Plan notwithstanding, this Plan may be amended or modified only with regard to the eligibility requirements contained in Section II, 2 1 paragraphs 2.1 through 2.8 of this Plan document . . . (Compl. ¶¶ 4–7, 10–13, 15, 17–18; Ans. ¶¶ 4–7, 10–11, 15, 17–18, 23; Dkt. No. 18; Hasselman Decl., Exhs. 13–14). 2 3 2. THE 2009 AMENDMENT. 4 The Compensation Committee of the Facet Board of Directors met on June 15, 2009, to 5 discuss amending the Plan to shift responsibility for payment of the retiree medical premiums by 6 the company to the participants. According to the presentation materials provided to the 7 Compensation Committee, shifting the costs to the participants would save Facet $92,592 per 8 year. In addition, the pre-meeting materials included a proposed revised Plan for adoption, 9 including an edit to close the Plan to new participants. The revised Plan presented to the 10 the revised Plan established that participants would be responsible for paying 20 percent of their For the Northern District of California United States District Court Committee, however, did not require participants to pay 100 percent of their premiums. Rather, 11 12 premiums for their coverage and 25 percent of the premiums for their dependants’ coverage. 13 Facet would cover the rest. This proposed revised Plan was contrasted with a PowerPoint slide 14 that recommended requiring participants to bear 100 percent of all premium costs. 15 The minutes of the Compensation Committee’s June 15 meeting appear to show that the 16 Committee approved the revised Plan, “together with such changes thereto as any officer of the 17 Company may deem necessary and appropriate and as any officer shall approve with such 18 approval to be conclusively established by the execution of the Amended and Restated Plan.” 19 On August 31, 2009, Facet sent letters to each plaintiff that enclosed a copy of an “amended and 20 restated copy” of the Plan. The amended Plan substituted “PDL” for “Facet” throughout the 21 document and replaced “Appendix A” in Section 2.3 with “Appendix B.” Appendix B, however, 22 stated a different contribution requirement than the revised Plan presented to the Compensation 23 Committee. The amended plan sent to plaintiffs provided that, effective January 1, 2010, retirees 24 would be responsible for 100 percent of the premiums for their and their dependants’ coverage: 25 26 27 28 Appendix B, Paragraph 5 (Monthly Contribution): Effective January 1, 2020, monthly premiums under the Plan will increase to an amount equal to the cost of premiums Facet Biotech pays to its health providers with respect to the benefits provide under the Plan to participants and their eligible dependants (i.e., similar to a COBRA rate structure). 3 1 After receiving the letters, plaintiffs contested the loss of their premium subsidies in 2 communications with Facet (Compl. ¶¶ 18–19; Ans. ¶18–19; Torres Decl. ¶4, Exh. 2 at FBID 3 000045; Exh. 17 at FBID 000244–65, 000270–77, 000286–310; Exh. 18 at FBID 000163). 4 3. ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS. 5 On October 27, 2010, plaintiffs filed their claim for benefits with the administrator of the 6 Plan (Torres Decl., Exh. 3 at FBID 000319). The claim was denied by Lois Laurie, Abbott’s 7 Divisional Vice-President of Benefits. Plaintiffs appealed the denial on June 21, 2011, which 8 was subsequently denied by defendant Timothy Richmond, who is the Plan administrator 9 (Compl. ¶ 36; Ans. ¶ 36). Plaintiffs claim that the Plan administrator was tainted by a conflict of interest. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Plaintiffs now move for a Rule 52 judgment on partial findings on plaintiffs’ claim for 12 benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B), while defendants move for summary judgment 13 under Rule 56. Plaintiffs’ Rule 52 motion is properly adjudicated as a motion for summary 14 judgment on the administrative record. See Evans v. Bank of Am. Corp. Long Term Disability 15 Plan, No. 11-6271, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154296, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (Judge 16 William Alsup), citing Stephan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 697 F.3d 917, 929–30 (9th Cir. 17 2012). 18 This order follows full briefing and oral argument. 19 ANALYSIS 20 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and the evidence in the record “show 21 that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 22 judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). A dispute is genuine only if there is sufficient 23 evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to find for the non-moving party, and material only if the 24 fact may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 25 (1986). 26 27 28 4 1 1. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 2 Both sides agree that a threshold issue in this action is whether the 2009 amendment 3 eliminating the subsidy on plaintiffs’ medical premiums was validly adopted. Plaintiffs argue 4 that evaluating whether the 2009 amendment was validly adopted is subject to de novo review 5 because “the procedural validity of the [2009] amendment is a question of compliance with 6 ERISA’s requirements . . . not an interpretation of a plan document” (Br. at 10). Our court of 7 appeals has stated that procedurally-defective amendments violate Section 402 of ERISA and are 8 therefore not a part of the plan. Thus, a plan administrator’s interpretation of a procedurally- 9 defective amendment is not afforded deference because the amendment is not a valid part of the plan. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 321 F.3d 933, 937–39 (9th Cir. 2003). 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Defendants argue that Winterrowd is inapplicable to this action because it addressed a direct 12 challenge to a procedurally-defective amendment, whereas plaintiffs here assert a claim for 13 benefits under ERISA, which is subject to a more onerous abuse of discretion standard of review. 14 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 15 Plaintiffs do not contest that the administrator’s denial of benefits is evaluated under the 16 Firestone abuse of discretion standard (Reply Br. at 2). In order to reach the merits of the denial, 17 however, it must first be determined whether the amendment, which the administrator 18 interpreted, was properly adopted. ERISA mandates that a plan may only be amended in 19 conformity with the amendment procedures set forth in the master plan document. 20 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 82 (1995). Moreover, an administrator is 21 only granted discretion when authorized by a plan. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112–13. Here, the 22 Plan does not empower the administrator with discretion to determine whether an amendment is 23 procedurally valid (Hasselman Decl., Exh. 14 at 7). While Section 4.4 of the Plan states that the 24 “Plan Administrator shall have all powers necessary to administer this Plan . . .” including 25 interpreting the Plan, it also states that the “Plan administrator shall have no power to add to, 26 subtract from or modify any of the terms of the plan . . . or to waive or fail to apply any 27 requirements of eligibility for a benefit under the plan.” Ibid. As the Plan does not clearly give 28 the administrator the discretion to determine whether an amendment is procedurally valid, 5 1 plaintiffs’ procedurally-defective amendment claim is subject to de novo review. Feibusch v. 2 Integrated Device Technology, Inc. Employee Benefit Plan, 463 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). 3 If and when defendants are able to prove that the 2009 amendment was validly adopted, then the 4 administrator’s denial of benefits will be evaluated under the Firestone abuse of discretion 5 standard. 6 2. 7 Defendants alternatively argue that plaintiffs waived their procedurally-defective 8 amendment argument because they did not present the argument in their administrative claims or 9 in their complaint. As to plaintiffs’ administrative claims, our court of appeals has held that plaintiffs may 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 WAIVER. introduce new theories in court that were not presented to the plan administrator. Vaught v. 12 Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan, 546 F.3d 620, 633 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, Vaught 13 emphasized that issue exhaustion does not apply in ERISA cases because the statute 14 contemplates "that a claimant's appeal will be heard by an impartial decisionmaker who may 15 review new information in addition to information from the previous denial," and because the 16 statute does not warn claimants that an issue exhaustion requirement will apply. Id. at 631-32. 17 Accordingly, plaintiffs need not raise all possible arguments to the administrator in order to raise 18 the argument in this Court. Similarly, defendants cannot rely on Winters v. Costco Wholesale 19 Corporation because our court of appeals in Winters held that “[t]he abuse of discretion 20 standard permits the district court to review only the evidence presented to the plan trustees.” 21 49 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Here, plaintiffs’ claim is subject to de novo 22 review. Defendants’ reliance on other out-of-circuit authority is non-binding and unpersuasive. 23 Regarding plaintiffs’ complaint, our court of appeals in Vaught ordered the district court 24 to consider a theory that the plaintiff raised “for the first time” in the joint case management 25 report. Vaught, 546 F.3d at 633. Thus, plaintiffs do not need to raise all arguments in support of 26 their claim for benefits in their complaint. Likewise, plaintiffs’ counsel states in her sworn 27 declaration that she informed plaintiffs’ counsel and Judge Maxine Chesney at the May 10 case 28 management conference that plaintiffs intended to serve discovery on the issue whether the 2009 6 1 amendment was validly adopted (Hasselman Supp. Decl. ¶ 3). This is uncontested. Moreover, 2 plaintiffs’ complaint clearly states that plaintiffs never received “an executed copy of the Plan 3 purporting to make the amendments required to put in place the changes in contribution 4 requirements that Facet has applied to Plaintiffs” (Compl. ¶ 45). This section of the complaint 5 includes the necessary factual allegations to support their procedurally-defective amendment 6 theory underlying their claim for benefits. Therefore, defendants’ waiver argument fails. 7 3. 8 Both sides present evidence on the issue of whether the 2009 amendment was 9 WHETHER THE AMENDMENT WAS PROCEDURALLY VALID. procedurally valid. Plaintiffs point to the “red-line” proposed version of the Plan, presented to the Compensation Committee, which only raised plaintiffs’ premium contributions to 20 percent 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 (Hasselman Decl., Exh. 17). Indeed, defendants admit this document exists and that the 12 Committee’s final minutes indicated that the Committee adopted it (Opp. at 10; Torres Decl., 13 Exh 4 at FBID 000554–78). Defendants, however, argue that a PowerPoint slide presented to 14 the Compensation Committee supports the view that the Committee intended to approve a 100- 15 percent contribution requirement (Torres Decl., Exh. 4 at FBID 000516). Moreover, both sides 16 agree that the administrative record does not contain evidence to establish whether the 17 Compensation Committee’s had the authority to adopt the 2009 amendment (Opp. at 10; Reply 18 Br. at 9). These substantive disagreements about the evidence in the administrative record 19 demonstrate genuine disputes over material facts as to whether the 2009 amendment, which 20 imposed a 100-percent contribution requirement, was validly adopted. 21 As both sides concede that the validity of the 2009 amendment is a threshold issue, this 22 order does not need to address whether the Plan administrator abused his discretion in 23 interpreting the 2009 amendment. Accordingly, the cross-motions for summary judgment are 24 DENIED. 25 4. 26 In reviewing a denial of benefits de novo, the court is not limited to the record before the DISCOVERY. 27 plan administrator. A court may allow evidence that was not before the administrator in 28 circumstances where it is clearly established that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an 7 1 adequate review of the benefit decision. Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Emple. Benefits Org. 2 Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003). One such circumstance is “the 3 necessity of evidence regarding interpretation of the terms of the plan rather than specific 4 historical facts . . . .” Opeta v. Northwest Airlines Pension Plan for Contract Employees, 484 5 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Anderson v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 2012 U.S. 6 Dist. LEXIS 158689, at *20 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2012) (Judge Cindy Jorgenson). 7 This order finds it necessary to open discovery and supplement the administrative record 8 on all issues necessary to resolve the dispute, including all issues raised at oral argument today. 9 For example, both sides should supplement the record to determine whether the Facet Compensation Committee was in fact delegated the authority to amend the Plan and, if so, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 whether the Committee properly amended the Plan. 12 CONCLUSION 13 For the reasons stated above, the cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED. 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 Dated: April 3, 2014. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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