California Pacific Regional Medical Center v. Global Excel Management, Inc
Filing
21
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 5 . Signed by Judge Nathanael Cousins. (lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/4/2013)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
10
11
12
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
v.
13
14
15
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
GLOBAL EXCEL MANAGEMENT,
INC.,
Re: Dkt. No. 5
Defendant.
16
17
The issue before the Court is whether there is an independent, private right of action
18 for violation of California Health & Safety Code § 1371.4, a provision of the state’s Knox19 Keene Act mandating that health plans reimburse emergency services providers. For the
20 reasons set forth below, the Court holds that no such private right of action exists and,
21 therefore, GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss the case without leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
22
23
Plaintiff (“California Medical Center”) is a California non-profit corporation which
24 provides medical care to patients. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2. Defendant (“Global”) is a Canadian for25 profit corporation, which is in the business of arranging for the provision of health care
26 services to its enrollees and/or paying for or reimbursing the cost of those services. Id. ¶ 3.
27 Between August 2, 2008 and August 5, 2008, California Medical Center provided
28 emergency medical treatment to an individual with the initials H.R. who was enrolled in a
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
1 health care service plan sponsored and/or administered by Global. Id. ¶ 8. California
2 Medical Center submitted charges billed for H.R.’s emergency medical treatment to Global
3 for payment. Id. ¶ 12. In response, Global submitted a payment of $38,240.65, but has not
4 paid the balance of $78,346.71 that California Medical Center alleges is owed. Id. ¶¶ 125 14.
On February 7, 2013, California Medical Center filed this suit, alleging that Global’s
6
7 failure to fully reimburse the emergency services rendered to H.R. violated California
8 Health & Safety Code § 1371.4(b). Id. ¶¶ 16-21. On April 4, 2013, Global filed a motion
9 to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 5. The
10 Court held a hearing on the motion on May 15, 2013.
The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 1-3. The
11
12 parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. §
13 636(c). Dkt. Nos. 8-9.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
14
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
15
16 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
17 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The
18 plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a
19 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully . . . . Where a complaint pleads facts
20 that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
21 possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
22 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57) (internal quotation marks omitted). All allegations of
23 material fact are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the non24 moving party. Coal. For ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 501
25 (9th Cir. 2010).
26 //
27
28
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
2
III. DISCUSSION
1
2 A.
The Request for Judicial Notice of Legislative History Is Granted.
3
As a general rule, a court may not look to matters beyond the complaint without
4 converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Datel Holdings Ltd. v.
5 Microsoft Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 974, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Laporte, J.) (citations
6 omitted). However, a court may take judicial notice of “material which is either submitted
7 as part of the complaint or necessarily relied upon by the complaint,” as well as “matters of
8 public record.” Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a judicially noticed fact must
9 be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
10 territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
11 by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See id.
Here, both parties request that the Court take judicial notice of unreported district
12
13 court decisions. While a court may take judicial notice of another court’s order, see Holder
14 v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002), there is no need to do so here. The parties
15 may cite to unreported district court decisions to the extent permitted by the local rules and
16 the Court discusses these decisions below. See Civil L.R. 3-4(e), 7-14; see also Ninth
17 Circuit Court of Appeals Rule 36-3.
In addition, Global requests that the Court take judicial notice of certain portions of
18
19 the legislative history of California Health & Safety Code § 1371.4. California Medical
20 Center does not oppose this request. Judicial notice of the legislative history of state
21 statutes is appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See, e.g., Hunt v. Check
22 Recovery Systems, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-61 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The Court grants
23 Global’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 3 and 4, Dkt. Nos. 15-3 and 15-4. The
24 parties’ remaining requests for judicial notice are denied, as not necessary.
25 B.
26
27
California Health & Safety Code § 1371.4 Does Not Provide a Private Right of
Action.
Global moves to dismiss California Medical Center’s complaint arguing that, while
private parties may pursue violations of section 1371.4 of the Knox-Keene Act under
28
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
3
1 California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) or certain common law theories, there is no
2 independent right of action by private parties directly under the statute. Dkt. No. 5 at 2:113 14. In response, California Medical Center argues that there is “no binding precedent which
4 holds that an independent cause of action is barred,” and that the legislative intent indicates
5 the existence of a private right of action under section 1371.4. Dkt. No. 10 at 5:26-27, 12:46 13:23.
7
This Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of California when
8 interpreting state law. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994)
9 (citations omitted). When the California Supreme Court has not spoken to a particular
10 controversy, the Court must determine what result it would reach based on state appellate
11 court opinions, statutes, and treatises. Id. (citations omitted). The Court is not bound by the
12 decisions of lower state courts or other federal courts of equal rank. Hart v. Massanari, 266
13 F.3d 1155, 1169-70, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001). Because there is no binding case law on the
14 issue presented by Global’s motion, this Court must interpret the Knox-Keene Act to
15 determine whether a stand-alone, private cause of action exists under California Health &
16 Safety Code § 1371.4(b).
17
As a threshold issue, the parties appear to disagree about the relevant test for
18 determining the existence of a private right of action under California law. In its opposition
19 to the motion to dismiss, California Medical Center asserts that California courts imply a
20 private right of action in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874(A). Dkt.
21 No. 10 at 12:22-27. The Restatement test “allows the court itself to create a new private
22 right to sue, even if the Legislature never considered creation of such a right, and if the
23 court is of the opinion that a private right to sue is appropriate and needed.” Lu v. Hawaiian
24 Gardens Casino, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 592, 602 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
25 omitted). As the California Supreme Court has made clear, however, the use of the
26 Restatement test is limited to determining whether to “recognize a tort action for damages
27 to remedy a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Katzberg v. Regents of University of
28 California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 325 (2002)).
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
4
1
In Lu, the California Supreme Court recognized that a “violation of a state statute
2 does not necessarily give rise to a private cause of action.” Id. at 596 (citations omitted).
3 “Instead, whether a party has a right to sue depends on whether the Legislature has
4 ‘manifested an intent to create such a private cause of action’ under the statute.” Id.
5 (citations omitted). Such legislative intent may be revealed through the language of the
6 statute and its legislative history. Id. (citations omitted). A statute may contain “clear,
7 understandable, unmistakable terms, which strongly and directly indicate that the
8 Legislature intended to create a private cause of action,” for instance, by expressly stating
9 that “a person has or is liable for a cause of action for a particular violation,” or “more
10 commonly, a statute may refer to a remedy or means of enforcing its substantive provisions,
11 i.e., by way of an action.” Id. at 597 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “If,
12 however, a statute does not contain such obvious language, resort to its legislative history is
13 next in order.” Id. (citations omitted). If a statute does not expressly create a cause of
14 action, there must be a “clear indication” that the Legislature intended to do so. Id. at 600.
15 Applying this test, the Court concludes that, if presented with this issue, the California
16 Supreme Court would likely hold that no private right of action is available for violation of
17 California Health & Safety Code § 1371.4(b).
18
1.
19
20
The Statutory Language Does Not Expressly Create a Private Cause of
Action.
California Health & Safety Code § 1371.4 is part of the Knox-Keene Health Care
21 Service Plan Act of 1975, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1340 et seq. Section 1371.4(b)
22 provides:
23
24
25
26
27
A health care service plan, or its contracting medical providers, shall reimburse
providers for emergency services and care provided to its enrollees, until the
care results in stabilization of the enrollee, except as provided in subdivision
(c). As long as federal or state law requires that emergency services and care
be provided without first questioning the patient’s ability to pay, a health care
service plan shall not require a provider to obtain authorization prior to the
provision of emergency services and care necessary to stabilize the enrollee’s
emergency medical condition.
This language does not expressly refer to a cause of action, a remedy, or means of
28
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
5
1 enforcing its substantive provisions. There are no clear or unmistakable terms indicating an
2 intent to create a private right of action for violation of section 1371.4(b).
3
In support for its position that the language of section 1371.4(b) indicates a legislative
4 intent to create a private right of action, California Medical Center argues that the provision
5 is similar to the refund provision in Goehring v. Chapman University, 121 Cal. App. 4th
6 353, 377-78 (2004) which was found to explicitly denote a private right of action. In
7 Goehring, the statute at issue, California Business and Professions Code § 6061, required
8 unaccredited law schools to provide certain disclosure statements to students, and further
9 provided that “[i]f any school does not comply with these requirements, it shall make a full
10 refund of all fees paid by students.” Id. at 377. The court held that the purpose of the
11 refund provision was to “encourage compliance with disclosure requirements,” and that this
12 was indicative of the Legislature’s intent to create a private right of action. Id. at 379.
13 Goehring is distinguishable. Here, the statutory provision at issue sets forth rules regarding
14 the authorization and reimbursement of emergency services. Unlike the provision in
15 Goehring, California Health & Safety Code § 1371.4 contains no language that expressly
16 entitles private parties to a remedy or penalty for violation of the statute. See id. at 377; Lu,
17 50 Cal. 4th at 603 n.8.
18
While no California court has been called upon to determine the availability of a
19 stand-alone, private right of action for violation of section 1371.4(b), two California
20 appellate decisions have held that medical providers could bring private actions for
21 violations of the Knox-Keene Act under the UCL and common law theories. In Coast
22 Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. UHP Healthcare, 105 Cal. App. 4th 693, 696, 705-06 (2002) the
23 court held that the Knox-Keene Act did not bar a health care provider from seeking
24 reimbursement required by California Health & Safety Code § 1371 directly from the health
25 care insurer for services rendered to enrollees of the health care plan “on a common law
26 breach of contract theory or under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §
27 17200).” The court noted that “[t]he Knox-Keene Act itself contemplates that a health care
28 plan may be held liable under theories based on other law.” Id. at 706; see Cal. Health &
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
6
1 Safety Code § 1371.25 (“A plan, any entity contracting with a plan, and providers are each
2 responsible for their own acts or omissions . . . . Nothing in this section shall preclude a
3 finding of liability on the part of a plan, any entity contracting with a plan, or a provider,
4 based on the doctrines of equitable indemnity, comparative negligence, contribution, or
5 other statutory or common law bases for liability.”). Similarly, the court in Bell v. Blue
6 Cross of California, 131 Cal. App. 4th 211, 214-16 (2005) held that emergency room
7 physicians could bring a UCL claim based on section 1371.4 or a common law claim for
8 quantum meruit against a health care services plan to obtain reimbursement for services
9 provided. The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the Department of Managed Health Care has
10 jurisdiction over the subject matter of section 1371.4 (as well as the rest of the Knox-Keene
11 Act), its jurisdiction is not exclusive and there is nothing in section 1371.4 or in the Act
12 generally to preclude a private action under the UCL or at common law on a quantum
13 meruit theory.” Id. at 216-17 (citations omitted). The courts in Coast Plaza and Bell
14 contemplated causes of action under the UCL or at common law, and did not discuss the
15 availability of a stand-alone, private cause of action for violations of the Knox-Keene Act.
16 Therefore, they do not support California Medical Center’s position.
17
Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal has observed that private parties do not
18 have a general power to enforce the Knox-Keene Act. See Blue Cross of California, Inc. v.
19 Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1250 (2009) (“although the Knox-Keene Act
20 expressly authorizes the DMHC to enforce the statute and does not include a parallel
21 authorization for suits by private individuals, private individuals can bring suit under the
22 UCL for violations of the Knox-Keene Act.” (citing Bell, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 216-17));
23 California Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th
24 151, 161 (2001) (noting that a private party did not have a general power to enforce the
25 Knox-Keene Act, and that such power has been entrusted exclusively to the DMHC
26 (citations omitted)).
27
In its opposition, California Medical Center relies on language from California
28 Medical Association stating that private parties may “sue to enjoin acts made unlawful by
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
7
1 Knox-Keene.” California Medical Association, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 161 (citations omitted).
2 California Medical Center’s assertion, that this is precisely what it is seeking to do in the
3 present case, has no merit. Dkt. No. 10 at 8:18-22. As California Medical Center
4 acknowledged at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it is seeking damages, not an
5 injunction against Global. See also Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Moreover, in the above quoted
6 statement, the court in California Medical Association relied on Samura v. Kaiser Found.
7 Health Plan, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 1299 (1993) which involved unfair competition
8 claims, not a stand-alone cause of action under the Knox-Keene Act. Likewise, the plaintiff
9 in California Medical Association brought a UCL claim seeking to enjoin an act made
10 unlawful by the Knox-Keene Act. 94 Cal. App. 4th at 169.
11
Unlike the plaintiffs in the above state court cases, here, California Medical Center
12 has not brought a UCL or common law cause of action, and instead seeks to maintain a
13 stand-alone cause of action directly under section 1371.4. At least one U.S. district court
14 has held that no such private right of action is available under that statute. See Regents of
15 University of California v. Global Excel Management, Inc., No. 10-cv-8164, 2010 WL
16 5175034, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010). In Regents, the court considered a Rule 12(b)(6)
17 motion to dismiss a private action against Global for its alleged failure to provide
18 reimbursement in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 1371.4. In granting the
19 motion, the court stated that, while there is nothing in section 1371.4 that precludes private
20 causes of action to pursue reimbursement of amounts owed, those actions are limited to
21 “other statutes, like California’s Unfair Competition Law, or common law doctrines such as
22 ‘equitable indemnity, comparative negligence, contribution,’ or quantum meruit.” Id.
23 (citing Coast Plaza, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 706-07).
24
California Medical Center asserts that the holding in Regents is not persuasive in that
25 the decision conflicts with the same court’s earlier decision in Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v.
26 Global Excel Mgmt., Inc., No. 09-3627, 2009 WL 7322253 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2009). Dkt.
27 No. 10 at 9:20-23. This point is not well taken. Cedars-Sinai involved unfair competition
28 and common law claims for reimbursement by a hospital which was an assignee of patients’
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
8
1 insurance polices, not a stand-alone claim under the Knox-Keene Act. WL 7322253, at *1.
2 One of the defendant insurance companies moved to dismiss all the claims for improper
3 venue based on a forum selection clause in the insurance policy. Id. The hospital argued
4 that the forum selection clause should be limited to the breach of contract and breach of
5 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, but not to the remaining,
6 “unassigned claims” for breach of implied contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and
7 unfair competition. Id. at *4. The court noted in passing that, “even in the absence of an
8 assignment, Cedars-Sinai’s unassigned claims may have been brought under the Knox9 Keene Act.” Id. at *6. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the unassigned claims were
10 also covered by the forum selection clause because they originated in the policy between
11 the insurance company and the patients. Id. There is nothing in the court’s opinion that
12 suggests the availability of a stand-alone claim under the Knox-Keene Act. Dkt. No. 10 at
13 9:20-10:15. To the contrary, the language from Cedars-Sinai upon which California
14 Medical Center relies cites to Bell, which involved a UCL claim and a common law claim
15 for quantum meruit, not a private right of action under the Knox-Keene Act. See Bell, 131
16 Cal. App. 4th at 214, 216.
17
California Medical Center also urges the Court to adopt the holding in Enloe Medical
18 Center v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 10-cv-2227, 2011 WL 6396517, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal.
19 Dec. 20, 2011), which disagreed with the Regents court’s holding that causes of actions
20 under section 1371.4 are limited to other statutes. Dkt. No. 10 at 10:19-11:18. In so
21 holding, the Enloe court observed that Bell and Coast Plaza only analyzed claims based in
22 the UCL and common law, and that neither case foreclosed a stand-alone claim. Id. at *8-9.
23 The court noted, however, that the parties did not adequately brief whether the statute
24 provides an independent cause of action and expressly declined to engage in a sua sponte
25 analysis of this issue. Id. This issue is now presented by the motion to dismiss before this
26 Court. Because section 1371.4 does not contain language expressly creating a private cause
27 of action, the Court will turn to an examination of the Legislature’s intent, as required by
28 the California Supreme Court. Lu, 50 Cal. 4th at 597.
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
9
1
2.
2
The Legislative History Does Not Manifest an Intent to Create a Private
Right of Action.
The Knox-Keene Act is a comprehensive system of licensing and regulation under the
3
4 jurisdiction of the Department of Managed Health Care. Bell, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 215
5 (citation omitted). The purpose of section 1371.4, as articulated in the comments to the Bill
6 Analysis, was to alleviate concerns regarding managed healthcare. S. Rules Comm., Office
7 of S. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Bus., Analysis of S.B. No. 1832 (Cal. 1993-1994 Reg.
8 Sess.) as amended May 4, 1994. Section 1371.4 introduced a series of provisions to ensure
9 that California’s citizens received proper care and to eliminate “incentives for carriers to
10 deny care and reduce payments to physicians.” Id. Specifically, section 1371.4 details
11 guidelines and procedures for handling authorization of a patient’s care. Analysis of S.B.
12 1832 as amended Aug. 12, 1994. As articulated by Assembly Member Bill Morrow in
13 connection with a proposed amendment to the statute, the purpose of section 1371.4 was to
14 “ensure that health care service plans provide coverage for emergency services and care up
15 to the point of stabilization,” after which point authorization would be required. Cal.
16 Assemb. Journal, No. 264 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.); see also Ochs v. PacifiCare of
17 California, 115 Cal. App. 4th 782, 790 (2004) (noting that the intent of section 1371.4 was
18 to require health care service plans to pay for emergency services that were not preapproved
19 and that otherwise might not be covered). The Legislative Counsel’s Digest states that the
20 bill which introduced section 1371.4 “would require health care service plans to reimburse
21 providers for emergency services and care without prior authorization in specified
22 circumstances.” Legislative Counsel’s Digest for S.B. 1832 (Sept. 16, 1994), Dkt. No.
23 15-3.
24
As in Lu, 50 Cal. 4th at 601, there is no acknowledgement in the legislative history
25 that a private right of action existed under section 1371.4, see Dkt. Nos. 15-3 and 15-4,
26 which “is a strong indication the Legislature never intended to create such a right of action.”
27 Moreover, section 1371.4 has been amended four times since it was ratified in 1994. The
28 substantive changes were clarifications regarding post-stabilization care which further
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
10
1 emphasizes the section’s focus on patient care. Analysis of S.B. 1832 as amended May 4,
2 1994. A review of the legislative history of section 1371.4 thus reveals no intent to create a
3 private right of action under the statute.
4
Despite arguing that the “legislative underpinnings of the statute clearly point to the
5 existence of a private right of action under Section 1371.4,” California Medical Center has
6 failed to identify any manifestation of an intent to create such a private right of action in the
7 legislative history. Dkt. No. 10 at 13:21-22. Instead, California Medical Center makes the
8 sweeping assertion that, without a private right of action, the statute “would never be
9 enforced.” Dkt. No. 10 at 13:3-4. In support of this assertion, California Medical Center
10 cites Bell, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 218, where the court noted that the Department of Managed
11 Health Care has supported private enforcement of the Act. Dkt. No. 10 at 13:3-19.
12 California Medical Center’s argument does not provide a sufficient basis for finding a
13 private right of action in the absence of a clear manifestation of legislative intent. See Lu,
14 50 Cal. 4th. at 601 (noting that “when neither the language nor the history of a statute
15 indicates an intent to create a new private right to sue, a party contending for judicial
16 recognition of such a right bears a heavy, perhaps insurmountable, burden of persuasion.”
17 (citations omitted)). In any event, that argument fails because nothing prevents the
18 enforcement of the statute under the UCL or common law theories, as the court in Bell and
19 the Department of Managed Health Care, as quoted in Bell, both acknowledged. Bell, 131
20 Cal. App. 4th at 218; see Lu, 50 Cal. 4th at 603-04 (a court’s holding that a statute does not
21 provide a private cause of action does not necessarily foreclose the availability of other
22 remedies such as common law theories, or prevent the Legislature from creating additional
23 remedies).
24
Furthermore, courts have noted that the Knox-Keene Act, in conferring on private
25 parties the right to enjoin violations of the Act under the UCL or at common law, did not
26 confer on parties a general power to enforce it. See California Medical Association, 94 Cal.
27 App. 4th at 161. Since California Medical Association, California Health & Safety Code §
28 1371.4 has been amended three times without any clarification as to whether an
Case No. 13-cv-00540 NC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
11
te
a
vailable. Th Legislatu
he
ure’s silence on the iss may
sue
1 independent, privat cause of action is av
ot
ch
of
See
tle,
2 be indicative of its intent to no create suc a cause o action. S Wilcox v. Birtwhist 21
nowledging that, while not determ
g
e
minative, leg
gislative sil
lence
3 Cal. 4th 973, 983 (1999) (ackn
tatute may give rise to an inferenc of acquie
g
ce
escence or p
passive
4 after a court has construed a st
al).
5 approva
Be
ecause neith the lang
her
guage, nor the legislati history o section 1
t
ive
of
1371.4(b) co
ontain
6
ndication of the Legisl
lature’s inte to provi for an in
ent
ide
ndependent, private cau of
use
7 a clear in
t
d
c
ly,
urt
S
8 action, this Court declines to create one. Accordingl the Cou GRANTS Global’s motion
iss.
9 to dismi
10 C.
0
Le
eave to Am
mend Would Be Futile
e.
11
1
Where a cour dismisses for failure to state a c
W
rt
s
e
claim under Rule 12(b)
r
)(6), it shou
uld
y
ve
d
d
that
ading could not possib be
d
bly
12 normally grant leav to amend unless it determines t the plea
2
y
tion
er
ook,
s
ollection Se
erv.,
13 cured by the allegat of othe facts. Co Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Co
3
d
(
990). At the hearing on the motio to dismis Californi
e
n
on
ss,
ia
14 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 19
4
l
nceded that it does not have recou under t UCL or at common law,
urse
the
n
15 Medical Center con
5
p
aims are tim
me-barred. A
Accordingly, Californi Medical
ia
16 because any such potential cla
6
s
ne
der
nia
Code § 1371.4 is dismis
ssed
17 Center’s stand-alon claim und Californ Health & Safety C
7
mend.
18 without leave to am
8
IV. CONCLUS ION
C
19
9
20
0
Gl
lobal’s mot
tion to dism Californ Medica Center’s c
miss
nia
al
claim for vi
iolation of
nia
ode
round that t
there is no p
private righ of
ht
21 Californ Health & Safety Co § 1371.4, on the gr
1
or
n
tute, is gran withou leave to am
nted
ut
amend.
22 action fo violation of that stat
2
23
3
IT IS SO OR
T
RDERED.
24
4
Date: June 4, 2013
4
25
5
____
__________
__________
_____
Nath
hanael M. C
Cousins
Unit States M
ted
Magistrate J
Judge
26
6
27
7
28
8
Case No. 13-cv-0054 NC
40
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
R
N
DISMISS
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?