Sterling et al v. City of Antioch et al

Filing 28

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA'S MOTION TO DISMISS 6 . Signed by Judge Nathanael Cousins. (lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/14/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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FRANK STERLING, ROBERT BARR, and
TIMOTHY VIERRA,
Plaintiffs,

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Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA’s
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
CITY OF ANTIOCH and COUNTY OF
CONTRA COSTA,

Re: Dkt. No. 6

Defendants.

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The issue before the Court is whether plaintiffs’ claims against the County of Contra

18 Costa and its employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expired prior to filing. For the reasons set
19 forth below, the Court holds that the claims did not expire because they were tolled under
20 California Government Code § 945.3 during the pendency of the criminal charges against
21 plaintiffs. The Court, therefore, DENIES the motion to dismiss.
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I. BACKGROUND

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In analyzing claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court

24 assumes that all material facts alleged in the complaint are true. Coal. For ICANN
25 Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 2010). According to the
26 complaint here, on November 21, 2009, Frank Sterling, Robert Barr, and Timothy Vierra
27 (“plaintiffs”) were at Sterling’s residence in the City of Antioch when members of the
28 Antioch Police Department (“APD”) arrived to investigate a noise complaint. Dkt. No. 1
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

1 ¶¶ 13, 34. Plaintiffs allege that, after the noise complaint was resolved, the officers invaded
2 Sterling’s residence and brutally attacked plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 3, 38-45. The APD arrested
3 plaintiffs and took them to the Martinez Detention Facility (“MDF”), which is operated by
4 the Contra Costa County (“County”) Sheriff’s Office. Id. ¶¶ 20, 50, 63. Sterling and Barr
5 were transported in APD patrol vehicles to the MDF after they received medical treatment
6 at the County’s Regional Medical Center. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50. The complaint alleges that Officer
7 Ryan McDonald, who transported Sterling, contacted the MDF beforehand to advise jail
8 personnel of Sterling’s imminent arrival. Id. ¶ 51. When Barr arrived at the jail several
9 Sheriff’s deputies and a sergeant came out wearing blue gloves. Id. ¶ 52. Sterling arrived
10 shortly thereafter. Id. The APD officer who transported Barr to the jail told the deputies
11 and sergeant that “the guy with McDonald” cut the officer’s face. Id. One of the deputies
12 asked which one they could “do first.” Id. When Sterling arrived at the jail the deputies
13 remarked, “so this is the tough guy.” Id. at 57. Vierra was transported to the APD jail after
14 his arrest, held there for a few hours, and later transferred to the MDF. Id. at 63. Upon his
15 arrival at the MDF, Vierra heard one of the Sheriff’s deputies say, “is this another one?” Id.
16 at 64. Based on these allegations, plaintiffs claim that the APD “instigated, created and
17 facilitated” additional attacks on plaintiffs by County employees at the MDF by telling the
18 receiving County deputies that plaintiffs had assaulted and battered the arresting APD
19 officers. Id. ¶ 118. Plaintiffs maintain that, as a result, they were subjected to excessive
20 force by employees of the County while held at the MDF. Id. ¶ 119.
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The complaint further alleges that the APD officers prepared police reports falsely

22 claiming that plaintiffs had attacked them without provocation. Id. ¶¶ 69-82. On December
23 9, 2009, criminal charges were filed against plaintiffs for resisting a peace officer and
24 battery with injury upon a peace officer during their arrest at Sterling’s home by the APD.
25 Id. ¶ 83; Dkt. No. 7 at 2:4-5. In May 2012, an original videotape of plaintiffs’ arrest was
26 located that contradicted the APD officers’ testimony. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 91-92. Shortly
27 thereafter, plaintiffs entered negotiations with the prosecution and, by July 9, 2012, all
28 criminal charges against plaintiffs were dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 96-100.
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1

On February 22, 2013, plaintiffs filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

2 City of Antioch, certain APD officers, the County of Contra Costa, and unidentified
3 employees of the County. Id. ¶¶ 113, 147. The first cause of action alleges, among other
4 things, that employees of the County’s Sheriff’s Office used excessive force on plaintiffs at
5 the MDF by having “willfully and maliciously battered Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs had
6 allegedly fought with APD officers Defendants Kint and Hoffman.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 119-20. The
7 fifth cause of action alleges municipal and supervisorial liability against the County for the
8 actions of the employees of the County Sheriff’s Office. Id. ¶¶ 147-53.
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The County filed the instant motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action under Federal

10 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations.
11 Dkt. No. 6. In its reply in support of the motion, the County also requests that paragraphs
12 119 and 120 of the complaint be stricken for the same reasons. Dkt. No. 20 at 2.
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The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

14 1331, 1343, and 1367(a). Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 29-30. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of
15 a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Dkt. Nos. 5, 12.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

18 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
19 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The
20 plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a
21 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully . . . . Where a complaint pleads facts
22 that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
23 possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57) (internal quotation marks omitted). All allegations of
25 material fact are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the non26 moving party. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d at 501. However, a court is not required to accept
27 as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact.
28 See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1 Additionally, a pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of
2 the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. DISCUSSION

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The County’s Request for Judicial Notice Is Granted.

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As a general rule, a court may not look to matters beyond the complaint without

6 converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Datel Holdings Ltd. v.
7 Microsoft Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 974, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Laporte, J.) (citations
8 omitted). However, a court may take judicial notice of “material which is either submitted
9 as part of the complaint or necessarily relied upon by the complaint,” as well as “matters of
10 public record.” Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a judicially noticed fact must
11 be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
12 territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
13 by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See id.
Here, the County requests that the Court take judicial notice of the criminal complaint

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15 and the charges in The People of the State of California v. Robert Early Barr, and Timothy
16 Michael Vierra, and Frank Thomas Sterling, Case No. 163815-4. Dkt. No. 7 at 2:4-5.
17 Plaintiffs have not opposed this request. Judicial notice of a criminal complaint is
18 appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See, e.g., Hunt v. Check Recovery
19 Systems, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-61 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The Court grants the
20 request and takes judicial notice of the criminal complaint and the charges in it, Exhibit A,
21 Dkt. No. 7 at 3-7.
22 B.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Expired on November 21, 2011 Absent Tolling.

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A claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which

24 is the basis of the action.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). The
25 claims against the County here accrued on November 21, 2009, when plaintiffs allege they
26 were subjected to excessive force by deputies at the MDF. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 34-66, 119.
27 Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not prescribe a limitations period, the Court applies
28 California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, set forth in California Civil
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1 Procedure Code § 335.1. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
2 261, 279-80 (1985)). Under the two-year statute of limitations of § 335.1, plaintiffs’ claims
3 against the County expired on November 21, 2011, absent tolling. See Maldonado v.
4 Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Plaintiffs concede that they did not file suit within two years of the alleged injury.

6 Dkt. No. 17 at 2:8. Plaintiffs, however, argue that their claims did not expire because they
7 were tolled by California Civil Procedure Code § 352.1 and California Government Code §
8 945.3. Id. at 8:4-9, 10:11-17. As courts must consult state tolling statutes in determining
9 the date the statute of limitations expires, the Court considers the applicability of both
10 statutes to the present case. See Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir.
11 1997) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989)).
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1.

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Applying California Civil Procedure Code § 352.1 Would Not Save
Plaintiffs’ Claims.

First, plaintiffs argue that their claims are subject to tolling under California Civil

15 Procedure Code § 352.1. Dkt. No. 17 at 8:1-7. Section 352.1 provides for tolling of
16 applicable statutes of limitations for the duration of a person’s detention not exceeding two
17 years if, at the time the cause of action accrued, the person entitled to bring the cause of
18 action was “imprisoned” for a criminal offense. Here, plaintiffs were arrested and detained
19 on November 21, 2009. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 34-66. Sterling was released on November 22, 2009,
20 Barr on November 23, 2009, and Vierra on November 24, 2009. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 66-68.
21 Thus, any tolling under § 352.1 would extend the expiration of the limitations period by
22 only one to three days. Because plaintiffs’ claims were filed on February 22, 2013, a one to
23 three-day extension beyond November 21, 2011 would not save the claims from being time24 barred.
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2.

California Government Code § 945.3 Tolls the Statute of Limitations.

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Plaintiffs also argue that their claims are subject to tolling under California

27 Government Code § 945.3. Dkt. No. 17 at 8:8-10.
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Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
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Section 945.3 provides in pertinent part:

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No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or other accusatory
pleading charging a criminal offense may bring a civil action for money or
damages against a peace officer or the public entity employing a peace officer
based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which the
accused is charged, including an act or omission in investigating or
reporting the offense or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges
against the accused are pending before a superior court.

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Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting these actions
shall be tolled during the period that the charges are pending before a superior
court.

8 Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3 (emphasis added).
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Were § 945.3 to apply, it would toll the statute of limitations from December 9, 2009,

10 when the criminal charges were filed against plaintiffs, through the dismissal of the criminal
11 charges in July 2012. Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case was filed on February 22, 2013,
12 which is within 8 months of the termination of the criminal prosecutions, and thus within
13 the two-year statute of limitations period after accounting for tolling under § 945.3. The
14 parties, however, disagree as to whether § 945.3 applies to toll the statute of limitations on
15 plaintiffs’ claims against the County. The Court finds that it does.
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The pertinent inquiry under § 945.3 is whether the present civil action against the

17 County and its employees is “based upon conduct of the [County’s employees] relating to
18 the offense” for which plaintiffs were charged in the criminal complaint. Cal. Gov. Code §
19 945.3. Such conduct, according to the plain language of the statute, includes “an act or
20 omission in investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining the accused.” Id.
21 According to the allegations of the complaint, the claims against the County and its
22 employees are based upon the conduct of County employees in “willfully and maliciously”
23 battering plaintiffs during their detention at the MDF after they were arrested by the APD.
24 Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 21, 118-20. The alleged battery, therefore, constitutes “an act or omission in
25 . . . detaining the accused” for the criminal offense with which plaintiffs were charged. See
26 Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3.
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Moreover, the alleged battery of plaintiffs at the MDF occurred on the same day as

28 the violent interaction between plaintiffs and the APD, and was in connection with, and as a
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1 result of, plaintiffs’ arrest by the APD. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 46, 50, 63. The complaint in this
2 case alleges that the use of excessive force by the County employees was instigated and
3 facilitated by the APD in telling the receiving County deputies that plaintiffs had assaulted
4 and battered the arresting APD officers during plaintiffs’ arrest on November 21, 2009,
5 which is the same conduct for which plaintiffs were charged criminally. Id.; Dkt. Nos. 1 ¶
6 83; 7 at 2:4-5. Plaintiffs’ purported use of violence against the APD officers during the
7 arrest is thus relevant to both the criminal complaint and the present civil action.
8 Accordingly, contrary to the County’s contention, plaintiffs have alleged a “nexus between
9 the criminal charges against plaintiffs and what plaintiffs allege occurred in the Martinez
10 Detention Facility.” Dkt. No. 20 at 3:9-10.
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In opposition, the County argues that § 945.3 does not apply because plaintiffs were

12 not criminally charged based on any conduct involving the County or its employees. Dkt.
13 No. 20 at 3:19-22, 4:4-5. This argument reads a non-existing limitation into the statute.
14 Section 945.3 prohibits the filing of civil actions “based upon conduct of the peace officer
15 relating to” the criminal offense charged during the pendency of those charges. Section
16 945.3 does not distinguish between different groups of peace officers, within or between
17 organizations, and specifically contemplates conduct, such as detention, which may involve
18 officers not present when the charged criminal conduct occurred. The County’s position
19 would require that the same conduct constitute a basis for both the criminal charges and the
20 civil action. That argument is not supported by the plain language of the statute. While the
21 statute does not define “relating to,” “a statute should be interpreted in accord with the
22 ‘usual, ordinary meaning of its language unless doing so would undermine its manifest
23 legislative purpose or lead to absurd results.’” McAlpine v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App.
24 3d 1, 6 (1989) (citation omitted). If the Legislature had intended to create a narrower
25 tolling rule, it could have easily used a more restrictive term than the broad term “relating
26 to.” See Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 4th 854, 868
27 (1993) (“‘[R]elated’ is broad enough to encompass both logical as well as causal
28 relationships. . . . [T]he fact that ‘related’ can encompass a wide variety of relationships
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
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1 does not necessarily render the word ambiguous. To the contrary, a word with a broad
2 meaning or multiple meanings may be used for that very reason—its breadth—to achieve a
3 broad purpose.”). Furthermore, the specific inclusion of acts and omissions “in
4 investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining the accused” as instances of
5 conduct “relating to the offense for which the accused is charged” also counsels against the
6 restrictive interpretation advocated by the County.
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In support of its position, the County relies on Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d

8 224, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997). In Torres, the plaintiff was arrested for two misdemeanors:
9 prowling, and resisting and obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties. Torres,
10 108 F.3d at 225. As a result of the arrest, a petition for arraignment on probation violation
11 was filed against the plaintiff, and he subsequently admitted violating his probation which
12 had been imposed in 1991 when plaintiff pled guilty to robbery. Id. The plaintiff initiated a
13 civil action alleging that he was subjected to excessive force during his arrest, and
14 attempted to apply § 945.3 tolling to his civil action from the date the petition for
15 arraignment was filed. Id. at 227-28. Torres held that the plaintiff’s “civil complaint is not
16 related to the petition for arraignment because [plaintiff]’s probation pertains to his 1991
17 robbery conviction, and not to his 1994 arrest.” Id. at 228. Thus, “although the petition
18 was triggered by the arrest upon which [the plaintiff’s] complaint [was] based, it relate[d]
19 only to [the plaintiff]’s original conviction for robbery.” Id.
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The County cites Torres for the proposition that just because two distinct events

21 happen on the same day does not mean they are related to the criminal charges and subject
22 to tolling. Dkt. No. 20 at 5:4-25. This argument is inapposite because, in this case, the
23 events that transpired at Sterling’s residence and the alleged events at the MDF later that
24 day were not two entirely distinct events, if we accept the allegations of the complaint as
25 true as required at this stage. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d at 501. Furthermore, Torres is
26 factually distinguishable. The plaintiff in Torres filed a civil action against peace officers
27 based upon their conduct during his 1994 arrest. Torres, 108 F.3d at 226. That conduct did
28 not “relat[e]” to “an act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1 detaining the accused” because, as the court in Torres held, the offense asserted as tolling
2 was the 1991 robbery conviction, not the misdemeanors for which plaintiff was arrested in
3 1994. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3; Torres, 108 F.3d at 228. Unlike Torres, here there is no
4 other criminally charged offense to which the alleged conduct of the County could relate.
5 Plaintiffs have brought a claim against the County based upon the conduct of its employees
6 during plaintiffs’ detention in connection with the incident for which they were criminally
7 charged. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 50-68, 83. Additionally, plaintiffs here claim they were subjected to
8 excessive force because the County employees were told by the APD that plaintiffs battered
9 the arresting APD officers, thus alleging a direct connection between plaintiffs’ criminally
10 charged offenses and the conduct of the deputies at the MDF. Id. ¶¶ 52, 118-19. Therefore,
11 at least at the pleading stage, the present action against the County and its employees
12 alleges a relationship between the claimed § 1983 violations and the criminal charges that
13 was absent in Torres.
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The other case cited by the County, Cuadra v. City of South San Francisco, No. 08-

15 cv-3439, 2009 WL 593988 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009), is also factually distinguishable and
16 does not support the County’s position. On July 8, 2006, the plaintiff in Cuadra was
17 arrested and transported to county jail. Id. at *1. After his release the plaintiff filed an
18 administrative complaint alleging that the arresting officers used excessive force in
19 effecting his arrest. Id. On December 6, 2006, criminal charges were filed against the
20 plaintiff for preparing a false complaint and he was arrested a second time. Id. Plaintiff
21 then brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which included allegations of excessive force
22 and unreasonable search and seizure pertaining to his arrest on July 8, 2006. Id. at *2.
23 Plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims was tolled
24 under § 945.3 as a result of the December 2006 charges. Id. at *2-3. Like Torres, Cuadra
25 involved two separate criminally charged offenses—the July 2006 offense for which
26 plaintiff was arrested and the December 2006 filing of a false report. Id. at *1. Following
27 Torres, the court in Cuadra sought to determine “which events each of [plaintiff]’s causes
28 of actions [was] related [to].” Id. at *3. The court held that plaintiff’s claims for violations
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1 of § 1983 pertaining to his initial arrest in July 2006 were not subject to tolling under §
2 945.3 as they did not relate to the criminal charges brought against him in December 2006
3 for the subsequent incident of preparing a false administrative complaint. Id. In the words
4 of § 945.3, the conduct of the officers during the July 2006 incident did not “relat[e]” to “an
5 act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining the
6 accused,” because the criminal offense asserted as a basis for the tolling was the December
7 2006 offense. By contrast, here, there was a single instance of criminal charges arising out
8 of plaintiffs’ alleged battery of APD officers. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 83. The alleged § 1983
9 violations by the deputies at the MDF are directly connected to those criminal charges, not
10 to a separate offense as in Cuadra. Id. ¶¶ 39-45, 51-68.
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Finally, the County asserts that tolling plaintiffs’ claims would fail to further the

12 policies behind § 945.3. Dkt. No. 20 at 3:26-28 n.3. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit,
13 the statute was enacted to “eliminate the use of civil damage complaints as plea bargaining
14 levers” and “to prevent the use of civil actions as a discovery device to inquire into
15 prosecutorial information while the criminal charge is pending.” Harding v. Galceran, 889
16 F.2d 906, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The court in Harding explained that,
17 although “under the Supremacy Clause, these policies cannot be served by prohibiting a
18 party from bringing a section 1983 claim, they can be served by tolling the statute of
19 limitations in section 1983 claims when there are criminal charges pending against the
20 potential plaintiff.” Id. at 909. While the APD and the County Sheriff’s Office in this case
21 are separate defendants, the factual overlap between the arrest and subsequent detention,
22 including the identity of the persons involved in those events, and the communications and
23 interactions between the APD officers and County employees, creates a potential for using
24 the civil action against the County as both a discovery device and a plea bargaining lever.
25 Additionally, the tolling provision serves the “independent policy objective” of encouraging
26 criminal defendants to await the outcome of the criminal action prior to initiating a § 1983
27 action, which may result in avoiding unnecessary and costly actions. Id. Applying § 945.3
28 to toll plaintiffs’ claims here is consistent with the policies behind § 945.3.
Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS CLAIMS

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1

Co
onstruing th material fact allegat
he
tions in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the
,

terrelatedne and fact
nds
aintiffs have alleged a sufficient d
e
s
degree of int
ess
tual
2 Court fin that pla
c
ainst them a the claim against the County
and
ms
y
3 overlap between the criminal charges aga
nts
n
s
to
olling.
4 defendan to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant t § 945.3 to
IV. CONCLUS ION
C

5
6

Th County’s motion to dismiss pla
he
s
aintiffs’ cla
aims on the ground tha the claims are
at
s

b
te
tions is DEN
NIED.
7 barred by the statut of limitat

8

At the hearin on the mo
t
ng
otion to dism
miss, the C
County requ
uested that, i the Court denies
if
t

ion
iss,
er
ied
rlocutory ap
ppeal under 28 U.S.C. §
r
9 the moti to dismi the orde be certifi for inter
2
he
m
her
ng
the
10 1292(b). By June 28, 2013, th County may file eith a motion explainin (1) why t
0
hould permi an interlo
it
ocutory appeal, and (2) whether a stay of the case is
)
11 Court sh
1
iate
r
od
o
ent
nd
12 appropri and for what perio of time, or a stateme that the County does not inten to
2
a
utory appeal of this ord
l
der. Any op
pposition to the County motion must
o
y’s
13 pursue an interlocu
3
,
y
st
by
2013.
14 be filed by July 10, 2013. Any reply mus be filed b July 17, 2
4

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5

IT IS SO OR
T
RDERED.

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Date: June 14 2013
4,

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____
__________
__________
_____
Nath
hanael M. C
Cousins
Unit States M
ted
Magistrate J
Judge

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Case No. 13-cv-00812-NC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
R
G
T
DISMISS CLAIMS

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