Gibbs v. Carson et al

Filing 16

ORDER SERVING CONGIZABLE CLAIMS. Dispositive Motion due by 7/17/2013. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 05/15/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(tmi, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/16/2013)

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1 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 No. C-13-0860 TEH (PR) KENNETH B. GIBBS, 5 Plaintiff, 6 ORDER SERVING COGNIZABLE CLAIMS v. 7 (Doc. # 15) CARSON, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 / 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 Plaintiff Kenneth Gibbs, an inmate at Pelican Bay State 12 Prison (PBSP) in Crescent City, California, commenced this action on 13 February 26, 2013 by submitting a letter to the Court. 14 Subsequently, Plaintiff properly filed a complaint on the Court’s 15 civil rights form. 16 dismissing the complaint with leave to amend and, on May 15, 2013, 17 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. 18 before the Court for initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915A. 20 21 On April 24, 2013, the Court issued an Order The amended complaint is now I Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of 22 cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or 23 officer or employee of a governmental entity. 24 The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, 25 or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, 26 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 27 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by pro se 1 litigants, however, must be liberally construed. 2 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 3 Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 4 Hebbe v. Pliler, To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 5 allege two essential elements: 6 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 7 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 8 color of state law. 9 (1) that a right secured by the West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 10 § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately 11 caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. 12 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of 13 Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). 14 another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he 15 does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act 16 or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that 17 causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. 18 F.2d at 633. 19 focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 20 defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 21 constitutional deprivation. 22 will not suffice; the plaintiff must instead "set forth specific 23 facts as to each individual defendant's" deprivation of protected 24 rights. Leer v. A person deprives Leer, 844 The inquiry into causation must be individualized and Id. Sweeping conclusory allegations Id. at 634. 25 II 26 A 27 In the April 25, 2013 Order, the Court noted that 28 2 1 Plaintiff’s allegations could be sorted into three main categories 2 of constitutional violations: (1) deliberate indifference to treat 3 his serious medical needs; (2) retaliation for filing grievances and 4 lawsuits; and (3) placement into administrative segregation (ad seg) 5 upon false charges and without due process. 6 that, as written, the complaint did not state claims upon which 7 relief could be granted and indicated how Plaintiff could remedy the 8 deficiencies. 9 were improperly joined and instructed Plaintiff to file, in an The Court explained The Court also noted that the three types of claims 10 amended complaint, the claims he wished to proceed with in this case 11 and, if he wished, to file a new complaint containing the unrelated 12 claims. 13 categories of violations. 14 contains over 20 claims and names 40 individuals as Defendants. 15 the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court will address all 16 these claims in this Order. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff realleges all three 17 In all, Plaintiff’s amended complaint In B 18 Plaintiff attempts to state violations based on deliberate 19 indifference to his serious medical needs in claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 20 and 15. 21 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates 22 the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 23 punishment. 24 Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 25 grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th 26 Cir. 1997) (en banc). 27 involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the 28 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. A determination of "deliberate indifference" 3 1 prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response 2 to that need. 3 Id. at 1059. A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a 4 prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or 5 the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." 6 of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find 7 important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 8 medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily 9 activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are 10 examples of indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for 11 medical treatment. 12 Id. The existence Id. at 1059-60. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she 13 knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and 14 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate 15 it. 16 official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference 17 could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 18 he “must also draw the inference.” 19 have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not 20 violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 21 Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical 23 authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 24 claim.” 25 claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to make 26 out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 27 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 28 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Id. The prison If a prison official should Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 4 “A A Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1 (9th Cir. 2002). 2 In claim 1, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Evans “neglected to 3 transfer Plaintiff to a hospital when Plaintiff was infected with an 4 incurable and debilitating disease.” 5 he told Dr. Evans that he was passing blood through his rectum and 6 requested treatment for his stomach, Dr. Evans scheduled Plaintiff 7 for a colonoscopy to check for prostate cancer. 8 showed that Plaintiff was infected with herpes. 9 Plaintiff alleges that, after The colonoscopy These allegations do not show that Dr. Evans was 10 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. 11 contrary, they show that Dr. Evans was responsive to Plaintiff’s 12 medical needs by immediately scheduling him for a colonoscopy to 13 check for suspected prostrate cancer based on Plaintiff’s reported 14 symptoms. 15 On the Therefore, this claim against Dr. Evans is dismissed. In claim 2, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Feimer misdiagnosed 16 his herpes as food allergies and ulcers. 17 amount to neglect, but does not constitute deliberate indifference 18 to a serious medical need. 19 is dismissed. 20 A misdiagnosis might Therefore, this claim against Dr. Feimer In claim 4, Plaintiff alleges that he had an outbreak of 21 blisters inside his mouth and requested treatment from Dental 22 Assistant Tupman on three occasions and Ms. Tupman refused to treat 23 him each time. 24 claim of deliberate indifference against Ms. Tupman. 25 These allegations, liberally construed, state a In claims 8 and 9, Plaintiff alleges that he requested 26 treatment from Dr. Crinklaw and Dr. Malo-Clines for his herpes and 27 that these doctors refused to treat him. 28 5 Liberally construed, these 1 allegations state a claim against these Defendants. 2 In claim 15, Plaintiff claims that Officer Davis denied 3 him medical treatment by placing him in a holding cell for thirteen 4 hours and ignoring his complaint that he was experiencing pain in 5 his right ankle and needed medical treatment. 6 to receive medical treatment for ankle pain for thirteen hours does 7 not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to a serious 8 medical need. 9 dismissed. Therefore, this claim against Officer Davis is 10 11 12 13 Plaintiff’s inability C Plaintiff attempts to state First Amendment retaliation violations in claims 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 20, and 21. "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 14 Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: 15 that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 16 (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such 17 action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment 18 rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 19 correctional goal." 20 Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 21 (1) An assertion Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th In claim 5, Plaintiff alleges that, during a search of his 22 cell, Officer Clemons found on Plaintiff’s bunk a piece of paper, 23 tightly rolled up with a piece of paper clip attached. 24 explained that he was using it as a medical device for his herpes. 25 Nurse Carson also told Lt. Diggle that Plaintiff was using the paper 26 clip as a medical device. 27 in ad seg for possessing the paper clip. 28 Plaintiff Nevertheless, Lt. Diggle placed Plaintiff 6 Plaintiff alleges that Lt. 1 Diggle did this in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing grievances 2 against other officers for labeling him as a snitch. 3 Liberally construed, these allegations state a claim 4 against Lt. Diggle. 5 Officer Clemons was involved in the decision to place Plaintiff in 6 ad seg, the allegations fail to state a claim against Officer 7 Clemons and the claim against him is dismissed. 8 9 However, because Plaintiff does not allege that In claim 10, Plaintiff alleges that “prison officials” manipulated psychologists Drs. Arcuri and Butter to raise 10 Plaintiff’s level of care to “EOP” in retaliation for filing 11 grievances against prison officials and medical officers. 12 does not indicate which prison officials manipulated these 13 psychologists nor does he allege that the Defendant psychologists 14 raised his level of care to retaliate against him. 15 allegations do not state a claim and this claim is dismissed against 16 Drs. Arcuri and Butter. 17 Plaintiff Therefore, these In claim 11, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Pope had 18 Plaintiff unassigned from his work positions because Officer Pope 19 did not like Plaintiff. 20 repeatedly harassed and disrespected him. 21 insufficient to state a claim against Officer Pope and the claim 22 against him is dismissed. 23 Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Pope These allegations are In claim 12, Plaintiff alleges that psychologists Drs. 24 Huges and Gonzales and Officer Milton raised Plaintiff’s level of 25 care to EOP in retaliation for Plaintiff’s reporting that Dr. Huges 26 had breached confidentiality. 27 claim against any Defendant and it is dismissed. 28 These allegations fail to state a 7 1 In claim 14, Plaintiff alleges that Warden Lewis and 2 Captain Wood had Officer Clemons transfer Plaintiff from A1 3 Segregation Housing Unit to A3 Segregation Housing Unit to get 4 Plaintiff to withdraw his grievance against the Classification 5 Committee for failing “to bring him to classification within 10 days 6 for Plaintiff’s 114 hearing.” 7 allegations state a claim against Warden Lewis and Captain Wood. 8 Because Officer Clemons is alleged just to have followed orders from 9 Lewis and Wood, the allegations fail to state a claim against 10 11 Construed liberally, these Officer Clemons and the claim against him is dismissed. In claim 17, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance 12 requesting that he be reassigned work group privileges and his 13 position as a barber, however, Defendants documented false 14 information “to put Plaintiff’s life in danger.” Plaintiff fails to 15 name a Defendant in regard to these allegations. Therefore, these 16 allegations fail to state a claim and are dismissed. 17 In claim 20, Plaintiff alleges that Officers Royal and 18 Milton and Captain Wood placed Plaintiff on C status in retaliation 19 for Plaintiff filing grievances against prison officials. 20 construed, this states a claim against these Defendants. 21 Liberally In claim 21, Plaintiff states that Officer Turner removed 22 the face covers from Plaintiff’s grievances causing Plaintiff to 23 miss a court deadline. 24 against Officer Turner and the claim is dismissed. 25 This allegation fails to state a claim D 26 Plaintiff attempts to state due process violations in 27 regard to disciplinary hearings in claims 6, 7, 13, 16, and 22. 28 8 1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 2 United States Constitution protects individuals against governmental 3 deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process of 4 law. 5 amount to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty 6 interest, provided that the liberty interest in question is one of 7 "real substance." 8 An interest of "real substance" will generally be limited to freedom 9 from (1) restraint that imposes "atypical and significant hardship Changes in conditions of confinement for a prison inmate may Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995). 10 on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," 11 id. at 484, or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the 12 duration of [a] sentence," id. at 487. 13 restraint is an “atypical and significant hardship,” courts consider 14 whether the challenged condition mirrored the conditions imposed on 15 inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, the 16 duration of the condition, the degree of restraint imposed, and 17 whether the discipline will invariably affect the duration of the 18 prisoner's sentence. 19 Cir. 2003); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 In determining whether a Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th In claim 6, Plaintiff alleges that, on November 15, 2008, 21 Lt. James heard Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and denied 22 Plaintiff’s request to call witnesses. 23 Plaintiff guilty, which caused Plaintiff to lose 360 days of credit, 24 on January 16, 2009, Lt. James’ findings were reversed and Plaintiff 25 was granted a new hearing. 26 27 28 Although Lt. James found Because the loss of 360 days of credit was reversed, Plaintiff did not suffer an atypical and significant hardship as a 9 1 result of Lt. James’ actions. 2 state a claim and it is dismissed. 3 Therefore, these allegations do not In claim 7, Plaintiff alleges that, at another 4 disciplinary hearing, Lt. Anthony did not allow Plaintiff’s witness, 5 Nurse Carson, to testify even though Warden Lewis had ordered that 6 Carson be allowed to testify. 7 Plaintiff guilty and Plaintiff lost 360 days of credit. 8 liberally, these allegations state a claim against Lt. Anthony. As a result, Lt. Anthony found Construed 9 In claim 13, Plaintiff alleges that Warden Lewis, Captain 10 Wood and Officer Ryan failed to bring Plaintiff to his disciplinary 11 hearing within ten days and Plaintiff was placed in ad seg. 12 construed liberally, these allegations do not state a claim and the 13 claim is dismissed. 14 Even In claims 16 and 22, Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Diggle 15 denied Plaintiff’s request to have Lt. Pepiot appear as a witness at 16 his disciplinary hearing. 17 and the claims are dismissed. 18 19 20 21 These allegations fail to state a claim E Plaintiff also attempts to state several Eighth Amendment claims for cruel and unusual punishment. In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment," the 22 Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, 23 for example, use excessive force against prisoners. 24 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 25 prison officials used excessive force, he must show that the 26 officials applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 27 Id.; Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). 28 10 Hudson v. Where a prisoner claims that 1 Although the Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual 2 punishment, this does not mean that federal courts can or should 3 interfere whenever prisoners are inconvenienced or suffer de minimis 4 injuries. 5 of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, 6 or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court 7 may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship 8 between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any 9 injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible 10 officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 11 response. 12 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th 13 Cir. 1979) (guards may use force only in proportion to need in each 14 situation). 15 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10. In determining whether the use Id., 503 U.S. at 7; LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1454 In claim 3, Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Acosta and Officer 16 Castellaw searched Plaintiff’s cell and confiscated Plaintiff’s 17 legal documents about his case and then leaked this information to 18 other inmates in order to label Plaintiff a snitch. 19 these Defendants knew that Plaintiff’s co-defendant was an informant 20 for the Los Angeles Police Department and that exposing this 21 information to other inmates would put Plaintiff’s life in danger. 22 Plaintiff infers that his life was in danger by alleging that, soon 23 after Defendants confiscated Plaintiff’s legal documents, inmates 24 began asking Plaintiff about his case and his co-defendant. 25 Furthermore, Construing these allegations liberally, they state a claim 26 for cruel and unusual punishment against Defendants Acosta and 27 Castellaw. 28 11 1 In claim 23, Plaintiff alleges that, after Plaintiff 2 allegedly assaulted Officer Evans with his saliva, Officer Evans 3 used excessive force against Plaintiff, causing injuries to 4 Plaintiff’s face, nose and wrist. 5 6 Construed liberally, these allegations state a claim for excessive force against Officer Evans. 7 F 8 9 In claims 18 and 19, Plaintiff attempts to allege claims based on other constitutional violations. In claim 18, Plaintiff 10 alleges that “prison officials” confiscated his transcripts and 11 distributed them to other inmates in order to get Plaintiff stabbed. 12 Plaintiff does not indicate any individual who was responsible for 13 this conduct. 14 claim 3, discussed above. 15 Furthermore, this claim appears to be duplicative of Therefore, this claim is dismissed. In claim 19, Plaintiff alleges that he received a rules 16 violation report (RVR) from Officer Davis, who placed Plaintiff in a 17 holding cell for thirteen hours and denied him medical treatment 18 during this time. 19 Plaintiff guilty and, as a result, Plaintiff lost 360 days credit 20 and, for ninety days, his family visits, telephone calls, 21 recreational and entertainment activities were restricted. 22 construed liberally, these allegations fail to state a claim and 23 this claim is dismissed. 24 27 28 Even III 25 26 His RVR was heard by Lt. Pepiot, who found For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as follows: 1. The following nine claims are found to be cognizable: 12 1 (a) claim 4–-Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against 2 Defendant Ms. Tupman; (b) claims 8 and 9-–Eighth Amendment 3 deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Drs. Crinklaw and 4 Malo-Clines; (c) claim 5–-First Amendment retaliation claim against 5 Lt. Diggle; (d) claim 14–-First Amendment retaliation claim against 6 Warden Lewis and Captain Wood; (e) claim 20–-First Amendment 7 retaliation claim against Captain Wood and Officers Royal and 8 Milton; (f) claim 7–-Due Process claim against Lt. Anthony; 9 (g) claim 3–-Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Sgt. 10 Acosta and Officer Evans; and (h) claim 23–-Eighth Amendment 11 excessive force claim against Officer Evans. 12 summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 13 prepayment of fees, copies of the amended complaint in this matter 14 and all attachments thereto and copies of this order on the 15 following PBSP employees: Ms. Tubman; Dr. Crinklaw; Dr. Malo-Clines; 16 Lt. Diggle; Warden Lewis; Captain Wood; Officer Royal; Officer 17 Hilton; Lt. Anthony; Sgt Acosta; and Officer Evans. 18 also serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff and mail a courtesy 19 copy of this Order and the amended complaint to the California 20 Attorney General’s Office. 21 2. The Clerk shall issue The Clerk shall All other claims are dismissed for failure to state a 22 claim upon which relief may be granted. 23 without leave to amend as Plaintiff has already been provided an 24 opportunity to amend and it is clear that no amount of amendment 25 will cure the deficiencies the Court has identified. 26 27 28 3. These claims are dismissed To expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 13 1 a. No later than sixty-three (63) days from the 2 date of this order, Defendants shall file a motion for summary 3 judgment or other dispositive motion. 4 shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall 5 conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and 6 shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming 7 from the events at issue. 8 required Ninth Circuit notice to Plaintiff for opposing dispositive 9 motions required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. A motion for summary judgment Defendants’ motion shall include the 10 1998)(motion for summary judgment) and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 11 1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003) (motion to dismiss). 12 are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 13 judgment or other dispositive motion, they shall so inform the Court 14 prior to the date their motion is due. 15 Court shall be served promptly on Plaintiff. 16 b. If Defendants All papers filed with the Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion 17 shall be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later 18 than thirty-five (35) days after Defendants serve Plaintiff with the 19 motion. 20 c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary 21 judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, 22 if granted, end your case. 23 order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 24 judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material 25 fact - that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that 26 would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for 27 summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which 28 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in 14 Generally, summary 1 will end your case. 2 summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or 3 other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your amended 4 complaint says. 5 declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 6 authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict 7 the facts shown in Defendants’ declarations and documents and show 8 that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 9 not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if When a party you are suing makes a motion for Instead, you must set out specific facts in If you do 10 appropriate, may be entered against you. 11 granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 12 Rand, 154 F.3d at 962–63. 13 If summary judgment is Plaintiff also is advised that a motion to dismiss for 14 failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. 15 § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 16 prejudice. 17 opposition in order to dispute any “factual record” presented by the 18 Defendants in their motion to dismiss. 19 n.14. You must “develop a record” and present it in your 20 d. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 Defendants shall file a reply brief within 21 fourteen (14) days of the date on which Plaintiff serves them with 22 the opposition. 23 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the 24 date the reply brief is due. 25 unless the Court so orders at a later date. 26 27 28 3. No hearing will be held on the motion Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No further court order is required before 15 1 the parties may conduct discovery. 2 4. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must 3 be served on Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has 4 been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 5 Defendants or Defendants’ counsel. 6 5. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this 7 case. 8 change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a 9 timely fashion. 10 Plaintiff must keep the Court and all parties informed of any Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 14 DATED 05/15/2013 THELTON E. HENDERSON United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 G:\PRO-SE\TEH\CR.13\Gibbs v Carson 13-860 Serve Cognizable Claims.wpd 16

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