Denton v. Bala et al

Filing 8

ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 6/13/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BARRY G. DENTON,

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Plaintiff,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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No. C 13-1374 SI (pr)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.
C/O BALA; et al.,
Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION

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Barry G. Denton, currently an inmate at the California State Prison - Sacramento, filed

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this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to complain about events at Salinas Valley

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State Prison, where he previously was incarcerated. His complaint is now before the court for

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review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

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BACKGROUND
Denton alleges in his complaint that he tripped and fell while descending stairs and
continues to have back problems from the fall. The complaint alleges the following:

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On March 29, 2012, Denton was housed in a cell on the second tier of a housing unit that

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was on lockdown at Salinas Valley State Prison. Correctional officer ("C/O") Bala came to the

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cell door to ask if Denton and his cellmate wanted to shower. They said they did, but Denton

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stated that he should be able to shower free of restraints and an escort because he was not a gang

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member. C/O Bala disagreed, and said he was marked as a "crip" on the board. This

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classification was a mistake, and was later corrected to show that Denton was non-affiliated.

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They argued, but eventually Denton and his cellmate were handcuffed behind their backs and

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exited their cell. According to a plan of operation for the facility then in place, the inmates were

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to be escorted to showers, and the policy was "one inmate per shower - own tier." Docket # 1-2,

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p. 2. C/O Bala escorted the cellmate's arm to take him to a shower on the second tier, and

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ordered Denton "to proceed to the downstairs shower, without an escort, where Defendant

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McClean waited, adjacent to the lower tier shower on the dayroom floor." Docket # 1, p. 9.
Restrained inmates were supposed to be moved under escort, according to prison policy.

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The policy attached to the complaint that shows this policy states that during all escorts of

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inmates in restraints, "one of the escorting staff will maintain physical control of the inmate. The

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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staff member will physically hold the inmate at the upper arm area. The physical hold will allow

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the escorting officer to immediately apply physical force should the inmate attempt to resist the

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escort." Docket # 1-4, p. 2 (emphasis added). The policy does not state that the physical control

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was to protect inmates from slip-and-falls.

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When told to walk down to the first floor, Denton told Bala and McClean, "'y'all want me

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to walk down these damn steps handcuffed with my bad knee? I might fall on my face.'" Docket

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# 1, p. 9. C/O Bala "responded in part, 'Denton, you're in better shape than me,' while he

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(Defendant Bala) and Plaintiff's cellmate laughed as if Plaintiff's statement was a joke." Id. C/O

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McLean said, "'it's always something, Denton.'" Id. Denton descended the stairs handcuffed and

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unescorted "while exchanging heated words with Defendant McClean [who was on the first tier]

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and Defendant Benaag (Control Unit Officer) who was at the tower window ordering the

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Plaintiff to keep it moving on the tier." Docket # 1, p. 10. Denton tripped on the fifth step from

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the bottom of the staircase and fell down to the floor of the dayroom. He was momentarily

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knocked unconscious. When he regained consciousness, defendant McClean was leaning over

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him and asking if he was all right. Denton said he was not all right, and the medical staff was

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summoned. Medical staff examined him, put him in a neck brace and "transportation chains,"

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and sent him on a gurney to the prison's emergency room. Docket # 1, pp. 10-11.

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At the emergency room, Dr. Tuvera examined him, and ordered x-rays. X-rays were

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taken of his hand, back and knee area. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Tuvera informed Denton that his
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x-rays were within normal limits. Denton complained of extreme pain, and Dr. Tuvera stated

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that it was irritation due to the fall and that the inflammation would subside in due time. He was

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discharged from the emergency room in a wheelchair when he was unable to walk due to back

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and knee pain.
Denton sought and received additional care for his ongoing pain issues over the ensuing

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months. He received a lower tier/bunk chrono for 30 days, and later a lower bunk chrono for

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six months; was given several different kinds of pain medications for complaints of pain; had

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additional x-rays of his lumbar spine; had blood tests; had physical therapy; and was provided

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with an in-cell stretching program. As of the filing of the complaint in this action, however,

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Denton continued to suffer from lower back pain and complications from the fall on March 29,

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2012.

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DISCUSSION

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A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

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seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

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any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

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or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b).

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Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d

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696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

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a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

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violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

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U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" imposes a duty

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on prison officials to, among other things, "'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of

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the inmates.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468

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U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two
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requirements are met: (1) the deprivation is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison

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official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

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The test for deliberate indifference is the same as criminal recklessness, i.e., the official must

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actually know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate safety. See id. at 837. The official

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"must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. Neither negligence nor gross

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negligence constitutes deliberate indifference. See id. at 835-36 & n.4; Estelle v. Gamble, 429

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U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Even with liberal construction, the complaint does not state a claim for an Eighth

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Amendment violation. The objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim is not satisfied.

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"[E]very injury suffered by an inmate does not necessarily translate into constitutional liability

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for prison officials." Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996). "[O]nly those

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deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' are sufficiently grave

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to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

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(1991) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938 (defendants entitled to qualified

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immunity against prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim stemming from second degree burns

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suffered when oven door fell off its hinges and burned his arms); Jackson v. State of Arizona,

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885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (slippery floors, by themselves, do not amount to cruel and

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unusual punishment); Connolly v. County of Suffolk, 533 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D. Mass. 2008)

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(summary judgment granted for defendants because ladderless bunk beds did not meet objective

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component of Eighth Amendment in light of evidence that "[t]housands of . . . inmates access

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bunk beds daily without the aid of a ladder and without incident" and only about a dozen injuries

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had been reported). Requiring an inmate to descend stairs while handcuffed behind his back

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does not deny him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Outside of prison, large

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numbers of people regularly climb and descend stairs without falling, large numbers of people

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regularly climb and descend stairs without holding arm-rails, and large numbers of people

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regularly climb and descend stairs with their arms restricted (e.g., by holding packages, children,

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etc.) – all without falling. Prison officials requiring the handcuffed inmate to descend a flight
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of stairs did not present an objectively serious condition required for an Eighth Amendment

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claim. Further, the allegations are very clear that Denton fell; he was not pushed and no one was

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even near him when he fell. Denton's allegation that the absence of an escort on the stairs was

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contrary to policy does not aid him because the policy requiring the officer to physically hold

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the inmate's arm was, by its own terms, to prevent a breach of security and not to prevent falls.

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The Eighth Amendment claim also falters on the subjective prong because the allegations

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do not suggest that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to a known risk to his

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safety. The alleged facts do not suggest that any of the correctional staff told him to descend the

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stairs unescorted with "knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm" to him. See Farmer,

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United States District Court
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511 U.S. at 842. The allegations of the complaint indicate that those persons present did not

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perceive there to be a risk to him. When Denton mentioned he might fall because of his bad

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knee, C/O Bala laughed and said he was in better shape than Bala was, and the cellmate also

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"laughed as if Plaintiff's statement was a joke." Docket # 1, p. 9. Another guard made a

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comment that indicated that Denton always complained about something. These allegations

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indicate that the defendants and the cellmate did not perceive a genuine risk to his safety.

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Denton's allegations also indicate that he didn't perceive much of a risk because, rather than

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paying close attention to the task at hand, he descended while engaging in a yelling match with

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correctional staff.

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An Eighth Amendment claim is not stated. Leave to amend will not be granted because

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the complaint well describes the incident, and it simply does not amount to deliberate

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indifference to a risk to the inmate's safety. This is not to say that the inmate was not hurt, as

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his allegations clearly indicate that he was hurt. Rather, as Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 936-37,

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observed, not every injury translates into constitutional liability for prison officials. This is such

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a case.

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Denton may have a claim for negligence, but the court declines to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over the state law claim now that it has dismissed the federal constitutional claim

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that gave the court federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff may pursue

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his negligence claim in a state court action.
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CONCLUSION

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The complaint is dismissed without leave to amend because it fails to state a claim under

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§ 1983 for a violation of plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Having resolved the federal

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question claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The dismissal of this action is without prejudice to plaintiff filing an

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action in state court to assert any state law claims he has. The clerk shall close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June13, 2013

_______________________
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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