Subramani v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al
Filing
82
ORDER by Judge Samuel Conti granting 68 Motion for Summary Judgment (sclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/13/2015)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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KARTHIK SUBRAMANI,
) Case No. 13-cv-01605-SC
)
Plaintiff,
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
v.
)
)
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WELLS FAGO BANK, N.A.; and
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FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY, )
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Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Now before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s
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("Wells Fargo") motion for summary judgment.
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briefed, 1 and the Court deems it suitable for disposition without
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oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).
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set forth below, Defendant Wells Fargo's motion for summary
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judgment is GRANTED.
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///
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The motion is fully
ECF Nos. 68 ("Mot."), 76 ("Opp'n"), 80 ("Reply").
For the reasons
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II. BACKGROUND
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A.
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This is a mortgage foreclosure case.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Karthik
Defendant Wells Fargo on October 18, 2006, recorded by an
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adjustable-rate promissory note and secured by a deed of trust
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("DOT") against residential real property in Livermore, California.
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United States District Court
Subramani obtained a $479,600 mortgage loan (the "Loan") from
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For the Northern District of California
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The DOT states that Plaintiff agreed to repay the borrowed $479,600
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or risk foreclosure, and that "[t]he Note or a partial interest in
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the note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one
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or more times without prior notice to [Plaintiff]."
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was the original lender under the DOT, and Fidelity National Title
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Insurance Company ("FNTIC") was the original trustee.
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Wells Fargo
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant first sold the Loan to Wells
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Fargo Asset Securities Corporation ("WFASC") sometime around
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October 24, 2006.
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Plaintiff's Loan (consisting of the note and DOT) with other
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mortgages into a mortgage-backed securities pool, the Wells Fargo
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Mortgaged Backed Securities 2006-AR18 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through
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Certificates, Series 2006-AR18 (the "WFMBS 2006-AR18 Trust").
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WFMBS 2006-ARIB Trust had been established on October 1, 2006 with
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the execution of a pooling and servicing agreement ("PSA").
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Soon after that, WFASC allegedly bundled
The
On July 23, 2009, Plaintiff received a notice of default
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("NOD") from First American Title Insurance Company acting as an
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agent for First American Loanstar Trustee Services ("First American
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Loanstar") as purported "Agent for the Current Beneficiary."
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Compl. Ex. B ("NOD 1").
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On August 25, 2009, First American Loanstar, acting as
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"attorney in fact for [Defendant]," issued a Substitution of
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Trustee ("SOT 1"), substituting itself as trustee.
Plaintiff defaulted again, and a second NOD was recorded on May 10,
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2011.
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Company acting as agent for Federal National Title Company
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("FNTC").
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United States District Court
Plaintiff's first NOD was rescinded on September 10, 2010, but
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For the Northern District of California
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the second NOD, Defendant issued a second Substitution of Trustee
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("SOT 2") appointing FNTC as substitute trustee under the DOT.
The second NOD was issued on May 4, 2011, by LSI Title
On May 6, 2011, between the issuance and recordation of
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Three months later, on August 11, 2011, the second SOT was
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recorded.
Plaintiff did not cure his second default, and on August 11,
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2011 -- the same day the second SOT was recorded -- FNTC, acting as
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trustee under the DOT, issued and caused recording of the Notice of
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Trustee Sale.
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Plaintiff's Property in a foreclosure sale to non-party California
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Equity Management Group, Inc., and issued the Trustee's Deed Upon
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Sale ("TDUS") on August 15, 2012.
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the legal documents described above were void because Defendant was
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no longer the valid lender in the DOT, or even an agent of a
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successor beneficiary, after it sold the Loan in 2006.
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to Plaintiff, Defendant did not assign the DOT or endorse the note
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pursuant to the PSA.
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regarding the endorsement, assignment, and recordation of notes and
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DOTs.
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Loan, neither Defendant nor anyone else had any right to or
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interest in the Loan, so all legal notices associated with the note
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and DOT -- including the SOTs, NODs, and the foreclosure sale
A year later, on August 9, 2012, FNTC sold
Plaintiff contends that all of
According
Nor did Defendant abide by California law
Plaintiff therefore states that after Defendant sold the
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itself -- are illegal and void.
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B.
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Plaintiff has twice amended his complaint, and Defendants have
Procedural History
35 ("SAC"), 36 ("MTD SAC").
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with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for constructive fraud, violation
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of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), declaratory relief, and under
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United States District Court
twice moved to dismiss.
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For the Northern District of California
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See ECF Nos. 24 ("FAC"), 25 ("MTD FAC"),
California Civil Code section 2934(a)(1)(A).
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dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims under the unfair and
At this point, the Court has dismissed
The Court also
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unlawful prongs of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").
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See ECF Nos. 33 ("MTD FAC Order"), 44 ("MTD SAC Order").
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Four causes of action remain: Plaintiff's wrongful
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foreclosure, cancellation of instruments, unjust enrichment, and
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UCL fraud claims.
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The wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instruments, and unjust
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enrichment claims are all premised on the argument that Wells Fargo
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sold the Loan and has no interest through which it may foreclose on
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Plaintiff's home.
See MTD FAC Order at 18, MTD SAC Order at 8-9.
See SAC ¶¶ 77-81, 95-97, 98-100.
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III. LEGAL STANDARD
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Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that
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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
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56(a).
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require a directed verdict for the moving party.
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).
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without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial -- usually, but
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not always, a defendant -- has both the initial burden of
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence would
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Anderson v.
"A moving party
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production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for
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summary judgment."
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Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz
"In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party
nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party
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does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its
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United States District Court
must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the
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For the Northern District of California
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ultimate burden of persuasion at trial."
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its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party
Id.
"In order to carry
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must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material
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fact."
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all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
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scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will
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be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
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reasonably find for the plaintiff."
Id.
"The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and
However, "[t]he mere existence of a
Id. at 252.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's claims all revolve around his assertion that Wells
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Fargo sold its interest in the Loan and therefore does not have
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standing to foreclose on the loan.
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secondary argument that the foreclosure was invalid because the
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second NOD named FNTC as trustee, but FNTC was not substituted as
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trustee until months later.
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substance of those allegations, determining that Plaintiff lacks
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evidence to support the first and that the second is insufficient
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to support any of his causes of action.
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the effect of those holdings on each of Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff makes a brief,
The Court begins by discussing the
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Then the Court assesses
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A.
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It is undisputed that Plaintiff initially obtained the Loan
Wells Fargo's Interest in the Loan
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from Wells Fargo in October 2006.
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Ex. A.
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[Wells Fargo] irrevocably sold the Plaintiff's mortgage loan . . .
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to 'Depositor' WELLS FARGO ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION."
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14.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Plaintiff alleges that "shortly after loan closing . . .
1.
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See SAC ¶ 10; ECF No. 69 ("RJN")
SAC ¶
Evidence That Wells Fargo Retained its Interest in
the Loan
There are, however, a number of reasons to believe that Wells
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Fargo did not sell its interest in the Loan at that time.
In
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August of 2010, Plaintiff entered into a loan modification
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agreement with Wells Fargo.
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("Subramani Depo.") at 46:8-47:18.
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entered into the modification agreement despite his belief that
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Wells Fargo was no longer the beneficiary of the DOT.
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Subramani Depo. at 47:6-48:19.
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bankruptcy petition in December 2010, he listed Wells Fargo as the
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mortgagee on his home loan and certified that the information he
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provided was correct under penalty of perjury.
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24.
ECF No. 70 ("Grewal Decl.") Ex. C
Plaintiff claims that he
See
However, when Plaintiff filed a
RJN Ex. D at 14,
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The deed of trust, both notices of default, the rescission of
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declaration of default, the substitution of trustee, and notice of
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trustee's sale all list Wells Fargo as the beneficiary.
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Ex. A at 1, Ex. B at 2, Ex. C at 1, Ex. F at 2, Ex. G at 1, Ex. H
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at 1. 2
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See RJN
Those documents cover a period from the initiation of the
Plaintiff does not object to the Court taking judicial notice of
these documents, but he does object to the Court's consideration of
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and all suggest that Wells Fargo was the beneficiary of the DOT
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throughout that period.
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attempted to foreclose on the loan and Plaintiff never made
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payments on the Loan to any other person.
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22; Grewal Decl. Ex. A at 2.
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of Loan Documentation has submitted a declaration stating that she
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United States District Court
Loan in October 2006 through the trustee's sale in August of 2011,
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For the Northern District of California
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has personal knowledge of Wells Fargo's records of Plaintiff's
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loan.
Wells Fargo was the only entity that ever
Subramani Depo. at 49:4-
Finally, Wells Fargo's Vice President
See ECF No. 71 ("Mulder Decl.") ¶¶ 1-3.
She states that
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Wells Fargo never transferred its beneficial interest in the loan
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nor sold Plaintiff's debt.
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Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff's contention is that all of the documents Wells
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Fargo provides are fraudulent, and he attacks Ms. Mulder's
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declaration for being insufficiently detailed.
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Neither of those contentions changes the fact that Wells Fargo has
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exceeded its burden (as a moving party that does not bear the
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burden of proof at trial) of production for this motion.
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Fargo has submitted significant evidence that it was the
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beneficiary of the DOT and mortgagee on the Loan throughout the
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relevant time period.
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Court must find that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as
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to whether Wells Fargo sold its interest in the loan.
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the truth of the matters asserted therein. Specifically, Plaintiff
seems to be concerned that the Court will consider the truth of
statements in these documents asserting that Wells Fargo was the
true beneficiary of the DOT. The Court does not consider the truth
of those statements, but it does note that every publicly recorded
document regarding the Loan lists Wells Fargo as the true
beneficiary. While that does not conclusively prove that Wells
Fargo remained the true beneficiary at all times, it does evince a
lack of any evidence that Wells Fargo ever sold or transferred its
interest to someone else.
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See Opp'n at 5-6.
Wells
Absent some contradictory evidence, the
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2.
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Evidence that Wells Fargo Sold its Interest in the
Loan
The only evidence Plaintiff offers in support of his claim
opinion of Lawrence Asuncion.
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economics and was a businessman for many years.
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("Asuncion Rpt.") at 3-4.
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United States District Court
that Wells Fargo transferred its beneficial interest is the expert
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For the Northern District of California
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mortgage loan auditor," and he is now the Chief Forensic
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Securitization Audit and Mortgage Fraud Analyst for Certified
Mr. Asuncion has a degree in
See Opp'n Ex. A
He styles himself as a "forensic
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Securitization Analysis.
Id.
Mr. Asuncion claims "over four
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thousand hours of research and study in the areas of the Truth in
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Lending Act ('TILA'), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
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('FDCPA'), the Fair Credit Reporting Act ('FCRA'), Foreclosure
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Litigation, Asset-Backed Securitization and its effects and
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applications in Foreclosure and Loss Mitigation" during the past
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four years.
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his "research and study" was divided among the topics he lists, nor
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does he provide any indication of where his study occurred or
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whether it was supervised.
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hundreds of Securitized Analysis Reports in residential real estate
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mortgage investigation" and claims familiarity with "industry
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standards, customs, practices and legal requirements of debt
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instruments and mortgage loan securitizations."
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professional certifications or publications.
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an expert opinion that Wells Fargo sold the Loan to HSBC USA,
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National Association shortly after it was executed.
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at 24, 28; ECF No. 79 ("Asuncion Decl.") ¶ 3.
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Asuncion, Wells Fargo sold Plaintiff's loan as part of a
Asuncion Rpt. at 3.
Mr. Asuncion does not specify how
He has "completed and certified
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Id.
He lists no
Mr. Asuncion offers
Asuncion Rpt.
According to Mr.
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securitization process that pooled a large number of mortgages
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together and transferred them to other entities.
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Wells Fargo argues that Mr. Asuncion's opinion is
qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
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to testify in the form of an opinion if (1) his scientific,
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technical, or other knowledge will be helpful to the trier of fact;
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United States District Court
inadmissible.
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For the Northern District of California
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Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an expert
(2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) the
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testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
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(4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
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the facts of the case.
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part test for determining the admissibility of expert testimony:
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(1) the trial court must make a preliminary assessment of whether
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the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
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scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
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properly can be applied to the facts in issue; and (2) the court
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must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is relevant and will
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serve to aid the trier of fact.
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F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the two-part step
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established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
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(1993)).
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The Supreme Court has established a two-
See United States v. Finley, 301
Wells Fargo argues at the outset that Mr. Asuncion cannot be
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qualified as an expert under Rule 702.
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Mr. Asuncion's 4,000 hours of research and study over the past four
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years are insufficient to qualify him as an expert.
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inclined to agree; Mr. Asuncion's background does not demonstrate
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expertise on any matter relevant to this case.
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undersigned has previously excluded Mr. Asuncion's opinion that a
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According to Wells Fargo,
The Court is
Indeed, the
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certain loan was securitized based on similar objections.
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Nos. 14-1, 27, Santos v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-01538-
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SC (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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excluding Mr. Asuncion's opinion is that it is neither based on
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sufficient facts and data nor was it reached using reliable
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methodology.
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See ECF
In this case, however, the clearest basis for
Mr. Asuncion's methodology, to the extent it is discernible
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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from his report (which is rather opaque), was apparently to search
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through Wells Fargo's SEC filings related to a mortgage loan
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purchase agreement from around the time the Loan was executed.
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Asuncion Rpt. at 10-11, Ex. 1 at 80-94; Asuncion Decl. at 2.
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Asuncion claims to have "established a match within the range and
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parameters of the 1,130 mortgage loans pooled under Loan Group I of
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the securitization trust . . . ."
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Asuncion never explains exactly what that means.
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and attached exhibits, it appears that Mr. Asuncion examined the
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SEC filings, which specify certain characteristics of the loans
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bundled in the securitization.
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the origination date of the loan, the purpose of the loan, the
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interest rate, the maximum interest rate, the date to the first
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adjustment, and the size of the loan, Mr. Asuncion found some
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number of loans with the same characteristics as the Loan at issue
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in this case.
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2006, Wells Fargo securitized some number of loans with similar
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characteristics to the Loan at issue here.
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Asuncion Rpt. at 12.
See
Mr.
Mr.
From his report
For each characteristic, such as
In other words, Mr. Asuncion has found that, in
There a number of rather obvious problems with this approach.
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The first is that it does not necessarily tell us anything about
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Plaintiff's loan at all.
The fact that Wells Fargo securitized a
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Plaintiff's, around the time that Plaintiff's loan was executed
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does not mean that Plaintiff's loan was securitized.
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unclear how Mr. Asuncion selected the certain loan pooling
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agreement he examined.
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whatsoever for his inference that Plaintiff's loan must have been
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one of the loans with similar characteristics that was included in
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United States District Court
number of loans, some of which shared certain characteristics with
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For the Northern District of California
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the securitization agreement.
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themselves demonstrate that multiple loans match each of his search
Second, it is
Third, Plaintiff provides no support
Plaintiff's search results
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criteria.
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data permits him to determine whether multiple parameters apply to
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the same loan or loans.
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reveal that Group I included 45 loans with 360 months remaining to
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maturity, and 193 loans with original principal balances in the
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range of $450,001 to $500,000 (both of which "matched" Plaintiff's
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loan).
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how he determined how many loans both had 360 months to maturity
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and an original principal balance in that range.
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no explanation for his conclusion that Plaintiff's loans must have
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been one of the similar loans securitized in 2006.
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the data in the report alone, there does not appear to be any
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conclusive evidence that any of the loans included in the
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securitization agreement matched Plaintiff's loan for all
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parameters.
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provides support for his assumption that one of the loans with
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matching parameters was Plaintiff's loan.
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Fourth, it is unclear from the report that Plaintiff's
For example, Mr. Asuncion's data appear to
But Mr. Asuncion's report does not demonstrate whether or
There is simply
In fact, from
Even if Mr. Asuncion had such information, he never
The best way to phrase Mr. Asuncion's findings is this: he
discovered that Wells Fargo securitized a large number of loans in
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2006, many of which shared certain characteristics with Plaintiff's
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loan.
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Fargo securitized Plaintiff's loan, much less a conclusion that
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Wells Fargo sacrificed any beneficial interest in the Loan.
That fact simply does not support a conclusion that Wells
Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Wells Fargo's objection to Mr.
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neither reached through reliable methodology nor based on
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United States District Court
Asuncion's opinion.
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For the Northern District of California
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The Court finds that Mr. Asuncion's opinion is
sufficient facts and data.
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securitization agreement for loans with similar characteristics is
Searching the records of a
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not a reliable method of determining whether any particular given
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loan was sold as part of that agreement. 3
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3.
Conclusion
The Court finds that Wells Fargo has met both its burden of
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production and burden of persuasion on this issue.
It is
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undisputed that Wells Fargo was the initial mortgagee, and Wells
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Fargo has provided sufficient evidence suggesting that it never
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transferred its beneficiary interest in the Loan.
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would bear the burden of proof at trial, has no evidence at all
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that Wells Fargo ever transferred the Loan.
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finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact: Wells Fargo
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retained its beneficial interest in the Loan and DOT through the
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foreclosure sale.
Plaintiff, who
As a result, the Court
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B.
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Wells Fargo substituted Fidelity National Title Company
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27
28
Substitution of Trustee
3
That is not to say that such data combined with other information
might support a conclusion like the one Mr. Asuncion offers. But
standing alone, Mr. Asuncion's data is insufficient to support his
conclusion. And "matching parameters," standing alone, is an
unreliable methodology.
12
LoanStar Trustee Services, LLC) on August 11, 2011.
3
However, the second notice of default was executed on May 4, 2011
4
(and recorded on May 10) and specified FNTC as the trustee.
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Plaintiff argues that, the second notice of default "is fraudulent,
6
null and void" because it preceded the substitution of trustee.
7
Opp'n at 13-14.
8
United States District Court
("FNTC") as the trustee under the deed of trust (for First American
2
For the Northern District of California
1
was executed by, and the ensuing foreclosure sale was conducted by,
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a trustee that was not duly substituted.
See RJN Ex. G.
Plaintiff argues that the second notice of default
See Opp'n at 9-10.
The California Court of Appeal has already addressed this
10
11
issue.
12
which a notice of default identified Aztec Foreclosure Corporation
13
("Aztec") as the trustee.
14
App. 2015).
15
substitution of trustee to name Aztec as the trustee until several
16
weeks later.
17
"complied with the procedure authorized by the Legislature" and
18
that the "supposed defect" could not "form the basis for rendering
19
the ensuing trustee's sale not just voidable, but absolutely void."
20
Id. at 646. 4
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4
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27
28
In Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB, the court faced a scenario in
183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 641 (Cal. Ct.
However, the beneficiary did not execute a
Id.
The court held that the beneficiary had
Both Wells Fargo and the California Court of Appeal cite
California Civil Code Section 2934a(c) as the basis for this
conclusion. See Ram, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 645; Reply at 5. All
that section says, however, is that it is permissible for a
beneficiary to effect substitution of a trustee after a notice of
default is recorded but before a notice of sale is recorded, so
long as the beneficiary provides proper notice of the substitution.
The statute does not explicitly permit a beneficiary to name as
trustee on a notice of default an entity that is not the trustee of
record but will be substituted in the future. That is, the statute
never says that it is okay for a beneficiary to name the wrong
trustee on a notice of default. And it seems unlikely that
California legislature intended to permit that when it passed the
law. Rather, the statute was probably passed to address
13
1
Moreover, the Ram court made clear that even if prematurely
irregularity, it would be unlikely to cause prejudice.
4
primary purpose of a notice of default is to provide notice of the
5
amount in arrears and an opportunity to cure the default.
6
for a defect in the notice of default to be material, it must cause
7
prejudice."
8
United States District Court
naming an incorrect trustee did constitute a procedural
3
For the Northern District of California
2
has not identified any reason that naming FNTC as the trustee
9
before FNTC was duly substituted as the trustee caused him any
Id. at 649 (internal citations omitted).
"The
In order
Plaintiff
10
prejudice at all.
11
not substituted as trustee until after the notice of default was
12
recorded cannot serve as basis for Mr. Subramani's challenge to the
13
foreclosure.
14
conclusive evidence that [FNTC] had the authority to conduct the
15
trustee's sale and to convey title to [Mr. Subramani's] home to the
16
highest bidder, even if the notice of default was improperly signed
17
and recorded by [FNTC] before it became trustee."
18
19
20
C.
Ram is directly on point: the fact that FNTC was
"[T]he recorded substitution of trustee constituted
See id. at 647.
Mr. Subramani's Claims
1.
Wrongful Foreclosure
The elements or a wrongful foreclosure claim are: "(1) the
21
trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully
22
oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a
23
mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale . . .
24
25
26
27
28
specifically the situation it describes: substitution of a trustee
after a notice of default issues (presumably specifying the correct
trustee of record at the time) but before recording a notice of
sale. This difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of
Section 2934a, however, does not affect the outcome in this case
because Mr. Subramani cannot show that he was prejudiced by Wells
Fargo's failure to name the correct trustee of record.
14
mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered
3
the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from
4
tendering."
5
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
6
in this case was illegal and fraudulent because Wells Fargo lacked
7
the authority to foreclose on the property.
8
United States District Court
was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or
2
For the Northern District of California
1
Plaintiff, Wells Fargo's lack of authority stems from the alleged
9
transfer of its beneficial interest in the Loan to a "true unknown
Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622, 633
Plaintiff alleges that the foreclosure sale
10
beneficiary."
11
there is no evidence that Wells Fargo ever transferred its
12
beneficial interest in the Loan, Plaintiff has no evidence of the
13
first element of this claim.
14
material fact as to whether the foreclosure was illegal,
15
fraudulent, or willfully oppressive.
16
GRANTED as to the wrongful foreclosure claim.
17
18
2.
See SAC ¶¶ 77-81.
According to
Because the Court finds that
Thus, there is no genuine dispute of
Wells Fargo's motion is
Cancellation of Instruments
California Civil Code Section 3412 permits cancellation of
19
"[a] written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable
20
apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury
21
to a person against whom it is void or voidable."
22
claim is premised on Plaintiff's assumption that Wells Fargo
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transferred its beneficial interest in the Loan.
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Plaintiff's legal theory is that the deed of trust and foreclosure
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documents are void "as a result of the bungled securitization and
26
the Defendants acting without any legal standing and authority from
27
the unknown beneficiary . . . ."
28
no evidence that the "bungled securitization" ever occurred, he
Id. ¶ 95.
15
Once again, this
See SAC ¶¶ 95-96.
Because Plaintiff has
1
cannot show that a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists.
2
This claim, too, must fail.
3
judgment is GRANTED as to the cancellation of instruments cause of
4
action.
5
6
3.
Wells Fargo's motion for summary
Unjust Enrichment
"The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are the 'receipt
United States District Court
of a benefit and [the] unjust retention of the benefit at the
8
For the Northern District of California
7
expense of another.'"
9
1583, 1593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Peterson v. Cellco P'ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th
Plaintiff alleges that Wells
10
Fargo unjustly retained his mortgage payments.
11
claim is, again, that Wells Fargo "collected mortgage payments from
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the Plaintiff for years after it sold the loan."
13
Because there is no evidence that Wells Fargo ever sold the Loan,
14
Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to this
15
claim as well.
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17
4.
The basis for that
Opp'n at 14.
UCL Fraud
Plaintiff's UCL fraud claim includes a litany of Defendants'
18
allegedly fraudulent practices.
19
operative complaint alleges that Wells Fargo perpetrated these
20
fraudulent practices, causing "substantial harm to California
21
consumers."
22
Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo perpetrated all of these
23
practices against him.
24
supported by factual allegations in the complaint.
25
that, at least to some extent, Plaintiff's UCL claim is based on
26
the same alleged sale of the Loan as his other claims.
27
behavior he cites includes "[e]xecuting and recording false and
28
misleading documents; and . . . [a]cting as beneficiaries and
Id. ¶ 112.
See id. ¶ 109.
Strangely, the
It is, therefore, unclear whether
Many of the claims are not adequately
16
It is clear
Some of the
opposition brief, Plaintiff clarifies that "[t]he basis of
3
Plaintiff's claim is that Wells Fargo fraudulently continues to
4
assert rights under Plaintiff's note and deed of trust
5
notwithstanding the fact that it sold the mortgage loan in 2006."
6
Opp'n at 14-15.
7
claim, and because the Court has determined that Plaintiff has no
8
United States District Court
trustees without the legal authority to do so."
2
For the Northern District of California
1
evidence that the Loan was sold in 2006, the Court finds that
9
summary judgment is warranted on this claim as well.
10
Id. ¶ 109.
In his
Because that is the basis of Plaintiff's UCL
Wells Fargo's
motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's UCL claim.
11
12
V. CONCLUSION
13
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Wells Fargo's
14
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to all of
15
Plaintiff Karthik Subramani's remaining causes of action.
16
17
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: March 13, 2015
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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