Subramani v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 83

ORDER by Judge Samuel Conti denying 65 Motion for Sanctions; denying 66 Motion for Sanctions (sclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/18/2015)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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KARTHIK SUBRAMANI,

) Case No. 13-cv-01605-SC
)
Plaintiff,
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
) MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS
v.
)
)
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WELLS FAGO BANK, N.A.; and
)
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY, )
)
Defendants.
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)

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Now before the Court are Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s

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("Wells Fargo") two motions for sanctions.

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briefed, 1 and the Court deems them suitable for disposition without

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oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

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are DENIED.

Both motions

These sanctions motions both relate to alleged violations of

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The motions are fully

the discovery rules by Plaintiff Karthik Subramani.

On October 7,

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ECF Nos. 65 ("RFA Mot."), 74 ("RFA Opp'n"), 66 ("Interr. Mot."),
75 ("Interr. Opp'n"). Wells Fargo declined to file a reply brief
for either motion.

and first set of interrogatories on Plaintiff.

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("Grewal Decl.") Exs. A ("RFA") at 4, B ("Interrs.") at 6.

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November 10, 2014, Plaintiff provided responses to both.

See

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Grewal Decl. Exs. C ("RFA Resp."), D ("Interrs. Resp.").

However,

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only Plaintiff's attorney, and not Plaintiff himself, signed the

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reponses.

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United States District Court

2014, Wells Fargo served its first set of requests for admission

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For the Northern District of California

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believed some responses to both requests were inadequate.

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for Wells Fargo conferred with counsel for Plaintiff, explained why

See ECF No. 53-2

See RFA Resp. at 3; Interrs. Resp. at 9.

On

Wells Fargo
Counsel

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it believed the responses were inadequate, and demanded amended

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responses.

See Grewal Decl. Ex. E.

Counsel for Plaintiff replied:

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We believe that the answers that were provided answered
the questions and were responsive, although maybe not to
the degree that you would like.
The answers provided
will not be amended any further. You have the option of
making a motion to compel with the Court for the relief
you seek.
Grewal Decl. Ex. F.
Taking Plaintiff's counsel's suggestion, Wells Fargo filed

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motions to compel amended responses to the interrogatories and

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requests for admission.

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2014, the Court granted both motions.

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See ECF Nos. 53, 54.

On December 18,

See ECF No.63.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits a party who

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prevails on a motion to compel to recover the "reasonable expenses

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incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees" from the

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party who necessitated the motion.

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In fact, Rule 37 requires the Court to order the party who

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necessitated the motion to pay those expenses, unless (i) the

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movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain

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the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

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party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially

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justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses

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unjust.

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exist, the Court must not order the payment of expenses.

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also has the discretion to determine who should pay the costs: "the

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party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party

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or attorney advising that conduct, or both . . . ."

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

If any of those three extenuating circumstances
The Court

Id.

"[T]he burden of showing substantial justification and special

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Id.

circumstances is on the party being sanctioned."

Hyde & Drath v.

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Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (July 25,

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1994).

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difficult standard to meet; it simply requires that there be "a

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genuine dispute" or that "reasonable people could differ."

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v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 2

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denied the imposition of sanctions where a party's oppositions to

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requests for admission were overruled, but where "the case law on

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the issue [was] not fully delineated or settled . . . ."

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ASIC Advantage Simplified Pension Plan, 301 F.R.D. 431, 436 (N.D.

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Cal. 2014).

However, substantial justification is not usually a

Pierce

Courts have, for example,

Colaco v.

In response to both motions, Plaintiff asserts that he had

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substantial justification for his responses to Wells Fargo's

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interrogatories.

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were inadequate, they were not so egregious that no reasonable

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person could believe they were sufficient.

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The Court agrees.

While Plaintiff's responses

Once the Court granted

Pierce dealt with the definition of "substantially justified" in
a different context (the section of the United States Code related
to award costs and fees in civil actions brought by or against the
United States). However, the Supreme Court cited the Advisory's
Committee's Notes on Rule 37 in deriving its definition, and the
Court sees no reason that a different definition would apply here.

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Wells Fargo's motions to compel, Plaintiff timely provided revised

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responses.

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inappropriate.

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DENIED.

Accordingly, the Court finds monetary sanctions
Defendant Wells Fargo's motions for sanctions are

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dated: March 18, 2015

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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