L. et al v. Aetna Life Insurance Company

Filing 68

Order dismissing case with prejudice. Signed by Judge Samuel Conti on March 27, 2015. (sclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/27/2015).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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) Case No. CV 13-2554 SC
)
ELIZABETH L., JAMES L., and
) ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH
OLIVIA L., individually and as ) PREJUDICE
representatives of the class of )
similarly situated individuals; )
and L.M. and N.M. as guardians )
of M.M., and as representatives )
of the class of similarly
)
situated individuals;
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
)

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In February, the Court granted a third motion to dismiss in

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this ERISA case.

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ECF Nos. 36 ("First Dismissal Order"); 49 ("Second Dismissal

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Order").

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prior dismissal orders, and are not repeated at length here.

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Nevertheless, the nub of Plaintiffs' allegations is that Aetna,

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which administers a health insurance plan of which Plaintiffs were

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beneficiaries, erroneously rejected their claims for mental health

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benefits based on a flawed reading of the plan's language.

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light of Plaintiffs' counsel's repeated disregard for the Court's

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orders, the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ECF No. 63 ("Third Dismissal Order"); see also

The relevant facts are summarized in each of the Court's

In

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The Court has dismissed Plaintiffs' first cause of action,

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which seeks benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B),

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on three occasions, most recently with prejudice.

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explained each time, Plaintiffs' claim for benefits rests on a

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flawed interpretation of the insurance plan's language.

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Third Dismissal Order at 6.

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this theory has been unambiguous.

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dismiss, the Court found that Plaintiffs' interpretation rendered

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plan language "nugatory and incomprehensible" and concluding

As the Court has

See, e.g.,

Each time, the Court's rejection of
For example, in first motion to

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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"Defendant's interpretation of the terms is correct."

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Dismissal Order at 7.

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amend to "plead facts concerning" the plan language at issue "or

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otherwise amend their pleadings to render their claims plausible."

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Id. at 10.

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First

Nonetheless, the Court granted leave to

Undaunted, Plaintiffs asserted these claims once again in

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their amended complaint and opposition to a second motion to

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dismiss, which the Court also granted.

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granted leave to amend on a single distinct cause of action, and

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warned that "any attempts to re-plead failed arguments without new

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supporting facts may be dismissed with prejudice."

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Dismissal Order at 8.

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second amended complaint, not only did they "re-plead [their]

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failed argument without new supporting facts," but (with the

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exception of a single statutory citation) did so verbatim.

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ECF No. 39 ("First Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 79-82, with ECF No. 50 ("Second

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Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 79-82.

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In doing so, the Court

Second

Nevertheless, when Plaintiffs filed their

Compare

The Court dismissed these allegations as well, this time with
prejudice.

Third Dismissal Order at 9 ("Because Plaintiffs

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supporting facts,' these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.")

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(quoting Second Dismissal order at 8) (emphasis in original).

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Again, however, the Court granted leave to amend on a narrow,

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distinct cause of action.

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amend on that theory and that theory alone.") (emphasis in

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original).

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the Court's instructions, the Court also warned Plaintiffs that

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"[a]ny attempts to replead the first cause of action or further

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United States District Court

have . . . opt[ed] to simply 're-plead failed arguments without new

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For the Northern District of California

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reliance on the now-thrice-rejected interpretation of the [plan

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language] will be dismissed with prejudice."

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Id. at 11 ("[T]he Court GRANTS leave to

Recognizing that Plaintiffs had repeatedly disregarded

Id.

Nevertheless, when Plaintiffs filed their third amended

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complaint on March 25, 2015, Plaintiffs directly contravened the

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Court's prior order, and once again repleaded their first cause of

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action.

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Court's repeated, unambiguous rejection of this legal theory, prior

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dismissal of these allegations with prejudice, and repeated

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instructions not to do exactly what Plaintiffs have done, it is

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difficult to imagine why Plaintiffs have chosen to repeatedly defy

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the Court's orders.

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Third Amended Complaint again repeats the first cause of action

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verbatim.

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¶¶ 79-82, with, Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79-82.

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ECF No. 67 ("Third Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 79-82.

Given the

More incredible still is that Plaintiffs'

Compare First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79-82, and Second Am. Compl.

In deciding whether dismissals for violation of pretrial

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orders are appropriate, courts in the Ninth Circuit consider five

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unweighted, and individually non-dispositive factors.

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Eng'rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.

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1998).

Valley

These factors are: "(1) the public's interest in

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expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to

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manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4)

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the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits;

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and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions."

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Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226

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(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128,

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130 (9th Cir. 1987)).
These factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

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In re

First, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs' repeated repleading of rejected legal

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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theories has resulted in unreasonable delays both in the

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expeditious resolution of this action, and in the Court's ability

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to address other important matters.

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Plaintiffs' obvious disagreements with the Court's decision is to

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seek to appeal, not repeatedly reassert arguments the Court has

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already rejected despite express directions to the contrary.

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Second, while Defendant cannot be prejudiced by "the mere pendency

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of the lawsuit itself," Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642

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(9th Cir. 2002), the costs and burdens of litigation can be a

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relevant prejudice.

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burden of responding to these recycled allegations for a fourth

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time.

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of on the merits, see Third Dismissal Order at 9, and that "this

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factor 'lends little support' to a party [like Plaintiffs] whose

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responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the

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merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction," means

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that the disposition on the merits factor does not weigh in

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Plaintiffs' favor either.

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In re the Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The proper response to

Defendant should not have to bear the cost and

Third, the fact that these claims have already been disposed

See In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228 (quoting

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Finally, the Court must consider whether less drastic

repeatedly warned Plaintiffs that failure to obey the Court's

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orders will result in dismissal.

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consideration of the alternatives requirement.

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(collecting cases).

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second or third chance following a procedural default is a 'lenient

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sanction,' which, when met with further default, may justify

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imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice.'"

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United States District Court

alternative sanctions may be appropriate.

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For the Northern District of California

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Id.

Here, the Court has

Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 132 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987)

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(quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521

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(5th Cir. 1985)).

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repeatedly instructed Plaintiffs not to replead failed legal

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theories, but nevertheless granted leave to amend on distinct

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issues in the hopes that Plaintiffs would either plead an

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actionable legal theory or dismiss their case.

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leniency was met with further disregard for the Court's orders.

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this point, the Court finds dismissal with prejudice is the most

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appropriate sanction.

This alone can satisfy the
See id. at 1229

Furthermore, "'providing plaintiff with a

That is precisely what happened here: the Court

Instead, that
At

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 67,

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is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and judgment will be entered in favor

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of Defendant.

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Brian S. King, who signed the Third Amended Complaint, that in

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future cases, his pattern of repeatedly refiling rejected claims

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contrary to court orders may result in Rule 11 sanctions.

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R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(2) & (c)(3); Glaser v. City of San Diego, 163

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F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (affirming

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monetary sanctions and dismissal of a complaint for filing a "near-

In closing, the Court reminds Plaintiffs' counsel,

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See Fed.

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identical" amended complaint following a dismissal with leave to

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amend).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: March 27, 2015
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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