Whalen v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 491

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen denying #473 Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration. (emclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/20/2018)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JENNIFER WHALEN, et al., Plaintiffs, 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Case No. 13-cv-03072-EMC ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Docket No. 473 Defendant. 12 13 In March 2018, Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) moved to decertify certain class 14 claims in this litigation, including the express warranty claims brought by California and 15 Washington class members. See Docket No. 393 at 5–9. On August 1, 2018, the Court issued an 16 Order on the decertification motion that, inter alia, denied Ford’s request to decertify the 17 California and Washington express warranty claims. See Docket No. 465 (“Decert. Order”) at 2– 18 4. Pending before the Court is Ford’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of this 19 part of the Decertification Order. Docket No. 473. In particular, Ford contends that the Court 20 “inadvertently overlooked” Ford’s argument that the unsuccessful-repair element of the express 21 warranty claims requires individualized adjudication that renders the claims unsuitable for class 22 treatment. Id. at 2. 23 Ford is correct that the Decertification Order did not explicitly discuss the unsuccessful- 24 repair element. However, because Ford’s argument on this issue is essentially unchanged from 25 when it was made in opposition to class certification, and does not rest on material new evidence, 26 Ford’s motion is DENIED. 27 28 I. LEGAL STANDARD Under Local Rule 7-9, a party must seek leave of the court to file a motion for 1 reconsideration. N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). To prevail, a party “must specifically show reasonable 2 diligence in bringing the motion” and establish one of the following: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or (3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored, and are not the place 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. 12 v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988). “Nor is reconsideration to be 13 used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought.” Garcia v. City of Napa, No. C-13- 14 03886 EDL, 2014 WL 342085, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (citing United States v. Rezzonico, 15 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998)). 16 Ford contends that reconsideration is warranted under Local Rule 7-9(b)(3) because the 17 Decertification Order did not address Ford’s argument that the California and Washington express 18 warranty claims should be decertified because they require Plaintiffs to show that Ford’s repair 19 attempts on their vehicles were unsuccessful. See Mot. at 1. According to Ford, this requirement 20 necessarily raises individualized issues of proof, and therefore renders the claims inappropriate for 21 class resolution. See id. In a narrow sense, Ford is correct—the Decertification Order did not 22 directly address the unsuccessful-repair argument. Nevertheless, reconsideration is not warranted 23 because the Court already rejected Ford’s argument at the class certification stage, for reasons that 24 continue to apply now. 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 In its class certification order, the Court explained that “[t]o recover for breach of express 27 warranty, a plaintiff must have brought his or her vehicle in for repair twice, and Ford must have 28 been unable to repair it.” Docket No. 279 at 42. The Court reasoned that 2 this information should be reflected in Ford’s records. If Ford has no record that a particular consumer took his or vehicle in for repair twice, then the fact finder can presume that the consumer did not do so. A consumer may rebut that presumption by producing proof that he or she took the vehicle in for two repairs, from his or her own records. As the consumer has the burden of proof, if he/she is not able to produce such proof, then he or she will not recover. The inquiry will turn on records and is relatively simple. It does not defeat predominance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Id. 7 In its decertification motion, Ford raised arguments regarding both the presentment 8 element and the unsuccessful-repair element of the express warranty claims. See Docket No. 393 9 at 5. The Court’s decertification order squarely addressed and rejected Ford’s presentment argument. See Decert. Order at 3–4 (holding that “[e]ven assuming that presentment could be an 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 individualized fact-based issue for a small number of class members, that does not defeat 12 predominance”). However, the Court—at least expressly—did not address Ford’s unsuccessful-repair 13 14 argument.1 Ford’s decertification motion asserted that there was no classwide evidence as to the 15 successfulness of Ford’s repairs because some customers’ issues were repaired by hardware fixes, 16 and other issues were fixed by software upgrades. See Docket No. 383 at 8–9. Ford made this 17 same argument at the class certification stage. See Docket No. 219-4 at 31–33. Moreover, with 18 respect to both the hardware repairs and software updates, Ford largely points to evidence it 19 already presented at the class certification stage. See Docket No. 393 at 8–9 (citing declaration of 20 Kenneth Williams, report by Dr. Paul Taylor, report by Dr. John Kelly, documents, and deposition 21 transcripts, all filed in support of Ford’s opposition to class certification). The Court, in certifying 22 the express warranty class claims for California and Washington, already evaluated this evidence 23 and determined that the inquiry as to presentment and unsuccessful repair “will turn on records 24 and is relatively simple,” and therefore that Ford’s concerns about individualized evidence “do[] 25 not defeat predominance.” Docket No. 279 at 42. 26 27 28 1 Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that footnote 2 of the decertification order is evidence that the Court did consider the unsuccessful-repair element. See Docket No. 482 at 3. That footnote was responding to Plaintiffs’ argument that the presentment requirement should be waived where repairs would be futile. See Decert. Order at 3 n.2. 3 1 The only “new evidence” Ford presented in its decertification motion is a new expert report from Dr. Taylor, which shows that 91.9% of class members in California and Washington 3 received fewer than two repairs (and thus likely have no claim for breach of express warranty) and 4 only 2.4% received more than two. Docket No. 484 at 2 (citing Docket No. 393 at 5–8). But the 5 Court did review this data and recognized that they suggest only a relatively small percentage of 6 class members could assert a breach of express warranty claim. See Decert. Order at 3. On the 7 merits, with respect to the presentment element, the Court concluded that this did not necessitate 8 decertification, because “[e]ven assuming that presentment could be an individualized fact-based 9 issue for a small number of class members, that does not defeat predominance.” Id. The same 10 reasoning applies to the unsuccessful-repair element. First, adjudicating of a small number of 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 2 unsuccessful-repair claims “is not likely to be more difficult than . . . the adjudication of 12 individualized affirmative defenses, which typically does not defeat predominance.” Id. at 3–4. 13 Second, the Court has “various tools at its disposal to manage resolution of those issues to the 14 extent they arise,” such as the use of individual claim forms or the appointment of a special 15 master. Id. at 4. Third, the net benefits of resolving the common issues central to all class 16 members’ claims substantially predominate over the potential individualized issues. Thus, Rule 17 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is still satisfied. Ford’s assertion that Dr. Taylor’s new 18 information renders the Court’s analysis of the decertification argument obsolete is meritless; the 19 information does not materially change the analysis. Docket No. 484 at 1. 20 Finally, Ford rehashes its argument that individualized adjudication is required for the 21 California and Washington express warranty claims because “an unsuccessful express warranty 22 repair requires that the ‘dealer actions were unable to fix the specific concern the class member 23 presented.’” Docket No. 473-1 at 3 (quoting Docket No. 415 at 5) (emphasis in original). As 24 Plaintiffs point out, the Court has already rejected this argument in the past. See, e.g., Docket No. 25 383 at 27 (“[T]o the extent a repair request arises out of that systemic, underlying defect, then it 26 appears that grouping of service requests for purposes of fulfilling the terms of the express 27 warranty—even with respect to distinct symptoms—is permissible.”). The Court reaffirms its 28 analysis. 4 III. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Ford’s motion is DENIED. 3 This Order disposes of Docket No. 473. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: November 20, 2018 8 9 10 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN United States District Judge United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

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