Frlekin et al v. Apple Inc.

Filing 166

ORDER STAYING CASE AND DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 156 MOTION for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof filed by Apple Inc. Signed by Judge Alsup on 5/30/2014. (whalc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/30/2014)

1
2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9
AMANDA FRLEKIN, et al.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13

Plaintiffs,

No. C 13-03451 WHA

v.

No. C 13-03775 WHA

APPLE, INC.,

14

No. C 13-04727 WHA
Defendant.
/

15

ORDER DENYING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

16
17

ADAM KILKER, et al.
Plaintiffs,

18
19
20

v.
APPLE, INC.,
Defendant.

21

/

22
23

TAYLOR KALIN,

24
25
26
27
28

Plaintiff,
v.
APPLE, INC.,
Defendant.
/

1
2

INTRODUCTION
In two related FLSA wage-and-hour actions, defendant moves for summary judgment

3

against all individually-named plaintiffs on all claims. For the reasons stated below, the motions

4

are DENIED.

5

STATEMENT

6

Plaintiffs Amanda Frlekin, Dean Pelle, Adam Kilker, and Brandon Fisher bring this

7

action on behalf of current and former hourly-paid and non-exempt specialists, managers, and

8

“genius bar” employees of defendant Apple, Inc. As one of the world’s largest global

9

technology companies, Apple operated approximately 250 retail stores in 44 states in 2012.
Apple employs approximately 307,250 people, 26,000 of whom work in Apple’s retail segment.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

Most hourly employees work eight hours per day and 40 hours per week. Apple requires

12

its hourly employees to clock-in when they arrive to work, clock in-and-out during meal breaks,

13

and clock-out when they leave for the day. To clock in-and-out, employees must enter a

14

username and password into time-tracking software that is allegedly used at all of Apple’s retail

15

stores. Plaintiffs claim that Apple requires its hourly employees to wait in line and undergo

16

multiple off-the-clock security bag searches and clearance checks when they leave for their meal

17

breaks and after they have clocked-out at the end of their shifts. Apple’s written policy states:

18

General Overview:

19

All employees . . . are subject to personal package and bag searches.
Personal technology must be verified against your Personal
Technology Card . . . during all bag searches.

20
21

Failure to comply with this policy may lead to disciplinary action, up
to and including termination.

22
Do:
23
24

Find a manager or member of the security team (where applicable) to
search your bags and packages before leaving the store.

25

Do Not:

26

Do not leave the store prior to having your personal package or back
[sic] searched by a member of management or the security team
(where applicable).

27
28

Do not have personal packages shipped to the store. In the event that a
personal package is in the store, for whatever reason, a member of
2

1

management or security (where applicable) must search that package
prior to it leaving the premises.

2
3

Employees’ “Personal Technology Cards” list the serial numbers of employees’ personal Apple

4

devices. Apple does not inspect an employee’s personal device if it is not Apple-branded

5

technology. Hourly employees allegedly end their shifts or take breaks at the same time,

6

allegedly resulting in lengthy lines to undergo security screenings. Customers are not subject to

7

the same security screenings. Plaintiffs claim that these uncompensated security screenings can

8

last between 10–15 minutes each time, including time spent waiting in line. Accordingly,

9

plaintiffs allege violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, along with violations of various
California, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio state labor and unfair competition laws (First

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 10–139; Shalov Decl., Exh. J, Dkt. No. 67).

12

A month after Frlekin and Pelle filed their action, Kilker and Fisher filed a separate

13

action alleging identical claims. A joint stipulation to consolidate the Frlekin and Kilker actions

14

was granted. Soon afterwards, plaintiff Taylor Kalin filed a separate action alleging the same

15

claims as the Frlekin action, and the Kalin action was related. The Kalin action, however, is not

16

currently consolidated with the Frlekin action. Apple moves for summary judgment against all

17

individually-named plaintiffs on all claims. This order follows full briefing and oral argument.

18
19

ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

20

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

21

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

22

of law.” Rule 56(c). A dispute is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable

23

fact finder to find for the non-moving party, and “material” only if the fact may affect the

24

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). “In

25

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make

26

credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the

27

nonmoving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). With regards to the

28

FLSA, “[w]hether an activity is excluded from hours worked under the FLSA, as amended by

3

1

the Portal-to-Portal Act, is a mixed question of law and fact. The nature of the employees’

2

duties is a question of fact, and the application of the FLSA to those duties is a question of law.”

3

Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2004).

4

1.

WHETHER UNDERGOING A SECURITY SCREENING IS WORK.

5

Under the FLSA, a covered employee must be paid for all “hours worked.” 29 U.S.C.

6

206, 207. In 1947, Congress amended the FLSA by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.

7

251–62, which carved out two exemptions, both relating to activities which the employee

8

performs prior to commencing or subsequent to ceasing his principal activities. 29 U.S.C.

9

254(a). The first is for time spent traveling to and from the place where he performs his
principal activities. The second is for activities which are “preliminary to” or “postliminary to”

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

those activities. Ibid. As a result, work that is preliminary or postliminary to a principal activity

12

is generally not compensable unless it is “an integral and indispensable part of the principal

13

activities for which [he or she is] employed.” Rutti v. Lojack Corp. Inc., 596 F.3d 1046, 1055

14

(9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

15

To simplify the analysis, our court of appeals adopted a three-step approach to determine

16

whether an activity was compensable within the definitions of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal

17

Act. The three steps are: (1) whether the activity constituted “work,” (2) whether the activity

18

was an “integral and indispensable” duty, and (3) whether the activity was de minimis. Bamonte

19

v. City of Mesa, 598 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). “Work” is defined as “physical or mental

20

exertion . . . controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the

21

benefit of the employer.” Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis

22

added). Both the “control or requirement” prong and the “necessity and benefit” prong must be

23

met to make a colorable claim under the FLSA. Bamonte, 598 F.3d at 1225.

24

A threshold issue in this action is whether an Apple employee is “working” when

25

undergoing a security screening because he or she is required to do so by Apple. Although

26

generally more protective of employee’s interests than the FLSA, California state labor laws also

27

look to employer control to determine whether an activity is compensable. Morillion v. Royal

28

Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 578–85 (2000). The parties agree that the state labor laws of New

4

1

York, Massachusetts, and Ohio generally mirror the FLSA (Dkt. No. 156, Br. at 20–22; Opp. at

2

10 n.70) (collecting cases).

3
4

A.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact.

At the initial case management conference, the presentation led the assigned judge to

expense for the parties. Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 542–44 (9th Cir. 1984) (district courts

7

have discretion to rule on summary judgment before deciding class certification); accord Khasin

8

v. Hershey Co., 2014 WL 1779805, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014) (Judge Edward Davila).

9

Summary judgment motions were invited and considered. The record in this action, however,

10

involves many varying fact patterns and lends itself to a myriad of different interpretations of

11
For the Northern District of California

expect the issues could possibly be resolved on summary judgment and therefore save litigation

6

United States District Court

5

Apple’s policy and practice regarding when an employee is required to undergo a security

12

screening. Apple argues that only employees who have bags or Apple devices are required to

13

undergo a security screening. The summary judgment record, however, does not specify how

14

broadly or narrowly the policy is in practice. For example, it is unclear how Apple supervisors

15

across the country interpret the word “bag.” While Frlekin testified at her deposition that she did

16

not have to undergo a security screening if she only brought a wallet to work, Kilker testified

17

that he occasionally had to undergo a security screening for wearing a jacket with pockets

18

(Frlekin Dep. 59:12–17; Kilker Dep. 87:9–24). There is also a genuine issue of material fact as

19

to whether Apple employees must wait in line in order to determine whether they will be subject

20

to a security screening or waved through. Kalin testified that all employees in the San Francisco

21

store were subject to security screenings even if they did not have a bag or Apple device (Kalin

22

Decl. ¶¶ 75–79):

23
24
25
26
27
28

During [September 2010 to August 2012], when I was exiting, I
observed that every employee (including me) who wanted to exit
the store was required to wait in line and go through the SF Store
Security Check, regardless of whether the employee had any
personal Apple technology to security check, had any personal bag
to check or had any Apple store products that he or she had
purchased that had to be checked.
*

*

*

During [September 2010 to August 2012], I was told by Apple
management and trainers (Chris Lamb, Brian Altman and other
5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

management persons conducting the “daily downloads” for
employees) on more than one occasion that even if I did not have
any personal Apple technology to security check, did not have any
personal bag to security check or any Apple store products that I
had purchased that needed to be checked, I still was required wait
in line to go through the SF Store Security Check and that I could
not just skip the line and get myself waived through.
In fact, during [September 2010 to August 2012], while I was
waiting in the SF Store Security Check Line trying to exit, I
observed new employees from time-to-time trying to skip the line
and pass through the SF Store Security Check. When this
happened, I observed them being sent back to the end of the line
by the security guard.

8
9

Moreover, Kalin testified that bringing a bag or Apple device to work was for Apple’s benefit
because it actively encouraged employees to show their personal Apple devices to customers and

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

that “it would be positive for [his] job performance perception to do this” (Kalin Decl. ¶¶

12

94–103). Another issue concerns the extent to which employees are required to stand in line

13

merely because they brought “necessities of life” into the workplace in a “bag.”

14
15

B.

Novel Question of Law.

Apple argues that undergoing a security screening is not “work” because it does not

16

require employees to undergo a security screening. Citing to Vega v. Gasper, 36 F.3d 417 (5th

17

Cir. 1994), and Alcantar v. Hobart Service, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177608 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13,

18

2012) (Judge Philip Gutierrez), Apple argues that employees may voluntarily choose to bring a

19

bag or Apple device to work, and therefore they freely volunteer to undergo a security screening.

20

In Vega, the defendant-employer provided transportation by bus from set meeting locations to

21

the fields in which the plaintiffs worked. The employer, however, allowed the plaintiffs to

22

choose whether to take the bus to the fields. Vega, 36 F.3d at 423–24. The Court of Appeals for

23

the Fifth Circuit in Vega ruled that the travel time from the meeting location to the fields and

24

back was not compensable under the FLSA in part because the “workers were not required to use

25

[the defendant-employer’s] buses to get to work in the morning [because] they chose where they

26

lived and how they got to work.” Id. at 425. This was true even though workers were required

27

to work in a particular field if they chose to ride on the employer’s bus and it would otherwise be

28

very inconvenient for employees to take alternative transportation. Id. at 423, 425. Similarly,

6

1

the district court in Alcantar found that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation under

2

California labor laws when he chose to drive his employer’s van instead of his own vehicle for

3

work because he “was not required to subject himself to Defendants’ control.” Alcantar, 2012

4

U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11, citing Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal. App. 4th 263, 265 (2006).

5

In so holding, the district court rejected the plaintiff’s “feasib[ility]” argument that he could not

6

drive his own vehicle, regardless of formal policy, because of the expensive equipment in the

7

vehicle for which he was responsible and the lack of available parking at the office; “the fact that

8

an alternate means of transportation is not available or feasible does not make travel time

9

compensable; rather, the inquiry turns on whether a plaintiff has the option of taking the

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

employer-provided transportation.” Id. at *9–10 (emphasis added).
The Vega and Alcantar decisions, while providing guidance, do not compel summary

12

judgment in favor of Apple. The records in both of those actions established that the employees

13

could decide not to volunteer to subject themselves to their employers’ requirements.

14

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs here, the summary judgment

15

record is at best ambiguous about whether the security screenings were mandatory for at least

16

some locations and circumstances. Moreover, the “choices” made by the Vega and Alcantar

17

employees were driven by personal convenience, not by the necessities of life. In Vega, the

18

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on the fact that not “all of [the] field workers rode

19

[the employer’s] buses.” That was in part because the employees “chose where they lived and

20

how to get to and from work.” Vega, 36 F.3d at 425. In other words, the employees in Vega had

21

a free choice to drive to the fields to work. Similarly, the plaintiff in Alcantar expressly admitted

22

that he had a free choice to leave his employer’s van at work or drive the van home with him.

23

Alcantar, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10–11. Here, Apple employees may need to bring a bag to

24

work for reasons they cannot control, such as the need for medication, feminine hygiene

25

products, or disability accommodations.

26

On the other hand, plaintiffs’ authorities are also not on point because they all involve

27

requirements placed on all employees by their employer or the nature of their work, rather than

28

by the necessities of life. See Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir.

7

1

2013); Cervantez v. Celestica Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Maciel v. City of

2

L.A., 569 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575

3

(2000); Jordan v. IBP, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 790 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).

4

No decision is on point and, indeed, these actions seem to present a range of policies and

5

practices at various stores, rather than a single crisp scenario. To be of more assistance to our

6

court of appeals, it would be better to hold a trial (or at least produce a more comprehensive

7

record) and then decide the fact issues.
STAY.

8

2.

9

In Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013), our court of
appeals held that the time spent by hourly-paid employees in mandatory security screenings is

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

compensable under the FLSA. Id. at 530–31. The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari

12

in Busk on March 3, 2014. As both parties agree that the state labor laws of New York,

13

Massachusetts, and Ohio mirror the FLSA, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Busk might control the

14

outcome of all claims in both the Frlekin and Kalin actions except for the California state-law

15

claims (Dkt. No. 156, Br. at 20–22; Opp. at 10 n.70) (collecting cases). It is anticipated that the

16

Supreme Court will decide Busk in the spring of 2015.

17

A March 26 order denied plaintiffs’ motion to stay the Frlekin action pending the

18

Supreme Court’s ruling in Busk without prejudice to reconsidering the motion after ruling on

19

Apple’s summary judgment motions. In its motion for summary judgment in the Frlekin action,

20

Apple argues that the Supreme Court’s review of Busk does not affect either the Frlekin or Kalin

21

actions because “Busk did not involve an avoidable security procedure such as the one at issue

22

here . . . .” (Dkt. No. 156; Br. at 19). As explained above, however, the record in this action and

23

established law in this circuit do not support Apple’s voluntary choice argument at this stage of

24

the proceedings.

25

This order hereby STAYS both the Frlekin and Kalin actions pending the Supreme

26

Court’s ruling in Busk. Both sides, however, are expected to continue with discovery as to the

27

California state-law claims alleged in all suits as those claims may survive even if the Supreme

28

Court’s ruling in Busk moots the FLSA and non-California state-law claims.

8

CONCLUSION

1
2
3

For the reasons stated above, Apple’s motions for summary judgment in the Frlekin and
Kalin actions as to all claims are DENIED.

4

The case management deadlines will be reset after the Supreme Court releases its

5

decision in Busk. Accordingly, both sides shall please file a joint case management statement in

6

both the Frlekin and Kalin actions within SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS after the Busk decision is

7

released and advise how the parties propose this action should proceed.

8
9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10
Dated: May 30, 2014.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9