G.F. et al v. Contra Costa County et al
Filing
307
ORDER by Judge Maria-Elena James granting Final Approval of the Settlement Agreements 303 and granting Motion for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs 292 (mejlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/25/2015)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
G. F., et al.,
7
Case No. 13-cv-03667-MEJ
Plaintiffs,
8
v.
9
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, et al.,
10
Defendants.
Re: Dkt. Nos. 292, 303
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
ORDER GRANTING FINAL
APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS AND GRANTING
MOTION FOR REASONABLE
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
12
INTRODUCTION
13
The Court preliminarily approved the parties’ settlement of this class case on July 30,
14
15
2015. Prelim. Approval Order, Dkt. No. 288. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’
16
unopposed Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreements (Dkt. No. 303) and Motion
17
for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Dkt. No. 292). The Court held a final fairness hearing
18
on these matters on November 12, 2015. Dkt. No. 306. Having carefully considered the Motions,
19
the relevant legal authority, and the proposed Settlement Agreements and all supporting
20
documents, the Court GRANTS FINAL APPROVAL of the Settlement Agreements and
21
GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs as set forth below.
BACKGROUND1
22
23
A.
Case Background
On August 8, 2013, Plaintiffs G.F. (by and through her guardian ad litem, Gail F.), W.B.,
24
25
and Q.G. filed this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging
26
discrimination against a proposed class of youth with disabilities who are detained, or will be
27
1
28
A more thorough description of the background of this case, the settlement negotiations, and the
terms of the settlement agreement can be found in the Preliminary Approval Order. See Prelim.
Approval Order at 1-15.
1
detained, at the Juvenile Hall located in Martinez, California (“Juvenile Hall”). See Compl. at 1-6,
2
Dkt. No. 1; see also First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) at 1-5, Dkt. No. 87. In doing so, Plaintiffs sued
3
Defendant Contra Costa County (the “County”), which operates Juvenile Hall through its
4
Probation Department, and is responsible for the care of youth detained there. FAC ¶¶ 34-35, 61.
5
Plaintiffs also sued Defendant Contra Costa Office of Education (“CCCOE”), in conjunction with
6
the County Probation Department, which operates Mt. McKinley, the public onsite school that
7
provides educational services for youth held at Juvenile Hall. Id. ¶¶ 47, 122.
In bringing this action, Plaintiffs assert CCCOE and the County (collectively,
9
“Defendants”) have adopted and implemented policies and practices with regard to solitary
10
confinement that have a disparate impact on youth with disabilities. Id. ¶ 297. Specifically,
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
8
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ solitary confinement policies and practices deny youth
12
educational and rehabilitative services, which disproportionately burdens youth with disabilities
13
who require additional assistance to access the general education curriculum and rehabilitative
14
programs. Id. ¶¶ 2, 9. Plaintiffs also contend that while Individualized Education Plans (“IEPs”)
15
are legally required for youth with disabilities, Defendants have an established policy of simply
16
disregarding those requirements, noting the IEPs in Juvenile Hall are strikingly similar regardless
17
of the students’ varying disabilities, needs, and previous IEPs. Id. ¶¶ 134, 150. Plaintiffs allege
18
Juvenile Hall’s IEPs do not consider disability-related behavior that may impact education, and
19
Defendants do not rely on positive behavioral interventions and supports to counter behavior that
20
impedes learning. Id. ¶¶ 166, 169.
21
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification contemporaneously with their original
22
Complaint, and subsequently re-filed their motion for class certification following the filing of
23
their FAC on December 24, 2013. See Dkt. Nos. 8-9 (Mot. and Br. in Supp. of. Class
24
Certification), 92-93 (Am. Mot. and Br. in Supp. of. Class Certification). Plaintiffs’ FAC asserts
25
six causes of action against Defendants: (1) violation of the Individuals with Disabilities
26
Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; (2) violation of the Americans
27
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (3) violation of Section 504 of the
28
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; (4) violation of California Government Code section
2
1
11135; (5) violation of California Education Code for Special Education Requirements, sections
2
56000, et seq.; and (6) violation of California Education Code for General Education
3
Requirements. FAC ¶¶ 247-342.
On January 24, 2014, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss the FAC, Dkt. Nos. 113, 118,
4
5
and on February 7, 2014, they filed their Oppositions to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification,
6
Dkt. Nos. 133, 136. All motions have been fully briefed, but upon notification about the parties’
7
ongoing efforts to reach a settlement, the Court deferred ruling on these motions.
After extensive negotiations and the assistance of three experienced mediators, including
8
Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero, the parties reached an agreement to settle this case. Plaintiffs’
10
final agreement with CCCOE (“CCCOE Agreement”) was fully executed on May 18, 2015, and
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
their final agreement with the County (“County Agreement”) was fully executed on May 19, 2015
12
(collectively, “Settlement Agreements”). Mary-Lee Smith Decl. in Supp. of Prelim. Approval ¶
13
24, Dkt. No. 279-1; see also Dkt. No. 279-2 (“CCCOE Agmt.”); Dkt. No. 279-3 (“Cty. Agmt.”).
14
Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of their Settlement Agreements on
15
June 30, 2015. Dkt. No. 279.
16
B.
Settlement Terms
17
1.
The County Agreement
18
Under the County Agreement, Probation Staff will no longer use room confinement for
19
discipline, punishment, administrative convenience, retaliation, staffing shortages or reasons other
20
than a temporary response to behavior that threatens immediate harm to the youth or others. Cty.
21
Agmt. at 5, § IV(D)(2). Additionally, Probation Staff is prohibited from placing youth in
22
continuous room confinement for longer than four hours. Id., § IV(D)(3). After four continuous
23
hours, Staff must return the youth to the general population, develop “specialized individualized
24
programming” for the youth, or consult with a qualified mental health professional about whether
25
a youth’s behavior requires that he or she be transported to a mental health facility. Id.
26
Further, Probation Staff must develop special individualized programming for youth with
27
persistent behavior problems that threaten the safety of youth or staff or the security of the facility
28
and may not use room confinement as a substitute for special individualized programming. Id. at
3
1
5, § IV(D)(4). Special individualized programming includes the development of any
2
individualized plan designed to improve the youth’s behavior, which is created in consultation
3
with the youth, Contra Costa County Mental Health (“County Mental Health”) staff, and the
4
youth’s family members, when available. Id. at 5-6, § IV(D)(4)(a).
The County Agreement calls for increased coordination between Probation, CCCOE, and
5
6
County Mental Health through the use of multi-disciplinary team meetings, to be held at least once
7
per month with additional meetings held as needed. Id. at 4, § IV(B). Among other things, the
8
meetings will address coordination of responses and interventions as well as coordination of
9
special education and counseling services to all eligible youth. Id., §§ IV(B)(1)-(3).
The County will also retain Professor Barry Krisberg as an expert in this matter, and
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
Professor Krisberg will work with Professor Edward Latessa to conduct a review of the County’s
12
policies and practices at Juvenile Hall. Id., § IV(A)(1)-(2). Specifically, Professors Krisberg and
13
Latessa will review policies and practices relating to: (a) room confinement; (b) use of behavior
14
incentives; (c) coordination between CCCOE and the Probation Department, including but not
15
limited to, the County’s coordination with CCCOE on CCCOE’s implementation of IEPs, Section
16
504 Plans2, and behavior intervention plans; (d) identification, assessment and tracking of youth
17
with disabilities who are detained at Juvenile Hall and referral systems to identify these youth for
18
CCCOE and County Mental Health; and (e) the implementation of Juvenile Detention Alternatives
19
Initiative standard V.D.4., which specifies that disability must be considered in determining an
20
appropriate response when assigning consequences. Id., §§ IV(A)(1)(a)-(e). Following review by
21
the experts of the above policies and practices, the joint recommendations of Professors Krisberg
22
and Latessa will be submitted to the County and Plaintiffs’ counsel, and the County will
23
implement those joint recommendations. Id., § IV(A)(2). The County Agreement also sets forth a
24
dispute resolution process if the experts do not agree on recommendations. Id. at 3-4, §§
25
IV(A)(2)(a)-(e). If the parties are unable to reach a resolution, they may submit the matter for
26
further mediation or to the Court and ultimately the Ninth Circuit if necessary. Id., § IV(A)(2)(a)-
27
2
28
Section 504 Plans refer to plans established in accordance with the Rehabilitation Act.
4
1
(d). Attorneys’ fees and costs are permitted to the prevailing party under the Agreement. Id., §
2
(IV)(A)(2)(e).
The County Agreement consists of two primary phases: the Implementation Period and the
3
4
Monitoring Period. The Implementation Period lasts 18 months, allowing for the experts to
5
conduct their review, issue their expert report detailing their findings and recommendations, and
6
for the County to train staff and revise policies to implement those recommendations. Id. at 6, §
7
IV(E). Following that Period, there will be a Monitoring Period that lasts for 24 months, during
8
which the experts will provide the parties with monitoring reports every six months. Id. The
9
parties will rely on benchmarks to show the County’s compliance with the County Agreement
during the initial phase of the Monitoring Period, concluding with the provision that all units will
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
be in substantial compliance with the provisions of the County Agreement. Id., § IV(E).
12
The County Agreement provides for the payment of $1,340,000 as full and final settlement
13
of all attorneys’ fees and costs related to this case and the named Plaintiffs’ individual due process
14
claims, as set forth in Contra Costa County v. Barbara C., Civil Case No. C-14-00268 MEJ,
15
Contra Costa County v. CiCi C., Civil Case No. C-14-00269 MEJ, and Contra Costa County v.
16
Gail F., Civil Case No. C-14-00270 MEJ. Id. at 11-12, § IX.
17
2.
The CCCOE Agreement
18
The CCCOE Agreement provides for CCCOE to retain an expert with expertise in: (1) the
19
IDEA; (2) the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA; (3) California state law requirements pertaining to
20
special education; and (4) the operation of juvenile court schools. CCCOE Agmt. at 2, § 4.1.1.
21
This expert will conduct a review of CCCOE’s policies, procedures and practices in the following
22
areas: (a) Child Find obligations3 in accordance with the IDEA, related California law, and the
23
Rehabilitation Act for youth with suspected disabilities who are detained at Juvenile Hall; (b)
24
development and implementation of IEPs and Section 504 Plans in accordance with the IDEA,
25
3
26
27
28
According to Plaintiffs’ FAC, “a local education agency (‘LEA’) has what are called ‘Child
Find’ obligations, which means it must have procedures to identify, locate and evaluate ‘[a]ll
children with disabilities . . . who are in need of special education and related services[.]’ 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56301(a); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.32(a). When a LEA
identifies a student suspected of having a disability, an initial assessment must be conducted by
qualified persons in all areas of suspected disability. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320.” FAC ¶ 128.
5
1
related California law, and the Rehabilitation Act for all eligible disabled youth detained in
2
Juvenile Hall; (c) discipline in accordance with applicable law for all eligible disabled youth
3
detained in Juvenile Hall; and (d) CCCOE’s obligation to coordinate with Probation regarding all
4
matters in which CCCOE and Probation have joint or overlapping responsibilities, in accordance
5
with relevant California law. Id. at 3-4, § 4.1.7.
6
To conduct this review, the CCCOE Agreement gives the expert full and reasonable access
7
to any and all information he or she deems necessary, including: (1) full access to the areas in
8
which CCCOE operates; (2) the ability to talk with, consult with, and interview staff from
9
CCCOE; (3) the ability to observe youth in the classroom setting, attend IEP meetings with the
consent of the educational rights holder, observe youth during other special education related
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
services (except for individual counseling services), and review recordings of IEP team meetings;
12
(4) access to CCCOE records, with the exception of private personnel files; and (5) the ability to
13
conduct written surveys of youth detained in Juvenile Hall and to speak with small groups of
14
students as needed. Id. at 4-5, § 4.1.8.
15
Based on this review, the expert will develop a report (“Expert Report”) that will include
16
all proposed revisions to policies, procedures, and practices he or she recommends. Id. at 5, §
17
4.1.10. This report will be completed within six months of the commencement of the expert’s
18
review. Id. Following the issuance of the Expert Report, both Plaintiffs and CCCOE will have an
19
opportunity to challenge any recommendation contained in the report on the basis that it is not
20
required by and/or does not comply with federal and/or state law. Id., § 4.1.11. Once all
21
challenges have been resolved, CCCOE will adopt and implement the report. Id., § 4.1.12.
22
CCCOE shall use best efforts when implementing the Expert Report to coordinate and cooperate
23
with other authorities operating in and providing services at Juvenile Hall, including, but not
24
limited to, the County’s Probation Department. Id. at 6, § 4.3.1.
25
Following selection of the Expert and drafting and approval of the Expert Report, there
26
will be a 24-month monitoring term. Id. at 5, § 4.1.12. During this time, the Expert will provide
27
the parties with monitoring reports on a quarterly basis for the first 12 months and on a semi-
28
annual basis thereafter with a final report at the end of the monitoring term. Id. at 6, § 5.2.
6
1
In addition, CCCOE will designate at least one employee at Juvenile Hall as an “ADA
2
Coordinator” who will be responsible for ensuring compliance with the ADA generally and for
3
investigating and responding to any ADA complaints. Id. at 6, § 4.2.1.
4
To the extent disputes arise regarding the Expert Report and/or compliance with the
5
CCCOE Agreement during its term, the CCCOE Agreement provides for a dispute resolution
6
process, which may be heard by this Court or appealed further. Id. at 7, § 6.2.
7
Finally, the CCCOE Agreement provides for a total payment of $1,165,000 for reasonable
8
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the course of the lawsuit, to be paid in installments, with
9
$70,000 of this amount put aside to compensate for fees, expenses and costs incurred in
10
monitoring CCCOE’s implementation of the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 11, §§ 12.2-7.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
3.
Similar Provisions in Both Agreements
12
Under the CCCOE Agreement, the “Released Injunctive Claims” are “any and all claims,
13
rights, demands, charges, complaints, actions, suits and causes of action, whether known or
14
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, accrued or unaccrued, for injunctive or declaratory relief, that
15
have been brought in the Lawsuit or which could have been brought as educationally-based claims
16
under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and/or IDEA, arising from August 8, 2013 through the Term
17
of the Agreement.” Id. at 10, § 11.2. The Term of the Agreement is defined as “from the
18
Effective Date [i.e., the date of Final Approval] until the completion of the Expert Monitoring
19
Term and issuance of the final Monitoring Report[.]” Id. at 8, § 7.1. The County Agreement is
20
similar: the “Released Injunctive Claims” are “any and all claims[,] rights, demands, charges,
21
complaints, actions, suits and causes of action, whether known or unknown, suspected or
22
unsuspected, accrued or unaccrued, for injunctive or declaratory relief, that have been brought in
23
this lawsuit under the IDEA, Section 504, the ADA, California Government Code § 11135 and/or
24
the California Education Code[,] arising from August 8, 2013 through the Term of the
25
Agreement[.]” Cty. Agmt. at 10, § VI. The Term of the Agreement is defined as “from the
26
Effective Date [i.e., the date of Final Approval] until the completion of the Monitoring Period,
27
which shall be the date of the issuance of the final Monitoring Report.” Id. at 12, § X(A). At the
28
hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the “Terms” of these Agreements would last approximately
7
1
three years to three and a half years, give or take the time built into the CCCOE Agreement to
2
select experts for CCCOE’s monitoring.
3
The settlements do not: (1) provide for any monetary relief to be paid to class members;
4
(2) release any individual claims for damages, or otherwise affect the rights of class members to
5
pursue individual claims for compensatory education or other individual relief under the IDEA
6
and/or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and (3) do not affect any claims for reasonable
7
accommodations related to physical access, communication access, and/or accommodations
8
otherwise relating to hearing, vision and/or mobility disabilities arising under the ADA or the
9
Rehabilitation Act. CCCOE Agmt. at 10-11, § 11; Cty. Agmt. at 10, § VI.4
The Agreements provide for the Court to retain jurisdiction for purposes of approval and
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
enforcement of any award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as well for purposes of dispute resolution.
12
Cty. Amgt. at 11, § VIII; CCCOE Agmt. at 10, § 10.1; see also Stipulation, Dkt. No. 284.
13
C.
Preliminary Approval
14
On Preliminary Approval, the Court conditionally certified the stipulated and proposed
15
class for purposes of settlement pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2),
16
defined as:
17
18
[A]ll youth with disabilities as defined under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act who are currently detained at or who will be
detained at the Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall.
19
Prelim. Approval Order at 26; see also Cty. Agmt. at 2, § V(B).; CCCOE Agmt. at 2, § 3.2.1. The
20
Court also appointed Disability Rights Advocates (“DRA”) and Public Counsel as class counsel to
21
effectuate the settlement, and Plaintiffs G.F., by and through her guardian ad litem, Gail F.; W.B.;
22
and Q.G as class representatives for settlement purposes only. Prelim. Approval Order at 26.
23
4
24
25
26
27
28
Under the County Agreement, however, the three named Plaintiffs have released their individual
claims for compensatory education against the County as a resolution of their related individual
appeals cases, Contra Costa County v. Barbara C., Civil Case No. C-14-00268 MEJ, Contra
Costa County v. CiCi C., Civil Case No. C-14-00269 MEJ, and Contra Costa County v. Gail F.,
Civil Case No. C-14-00270 MEJ. Cty. Agmt. at 10-11, §§ VI-VII. Specifically, the County will
pay the named Plaintiffs a total of $1,140, representing the amount awarded to them for
compensatory education by an administrative judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings
(“OAH”) in their separate individual due process administrative proceedings. See Prelim.
Approval Mot. at 4-5 & 10 n.6. The County will provide these funds in exchange for Plaintiffs
dismissing their cross appeals of the OAH’s decisions. Id. at 10 n.6.
8
The Court also largely approved the form and content of the proposed Notice of Proposed
1
2
Settlement of Class Action Lawsuit (“Notice”), Dkt. No. 284-1, as well as the Notice Plan as set
3
forth in the parties’ Agreements (CCCOE Agmt. at 8, § 8.4; Cty. Agmt. at 9, § V(F)). Id. at 26-27.
4
D.
Post-Preliminary Approval
5
Following preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreements, the parties set off to
6
accomplish the Notice Plan, see Decl. of Kimberly Smith Confirming Distribution of Notice to Pl.
7
Settlement Class Members (“CCCOE Decl.”) ¶ 5(a)-(b), Dkt. No. 300; Decl. of D. Cameron Baker
8
Regarding Distribution of Notice of Settlement (“Cty. Decl.”) ¶ 4(b), Dkt. No. 301; Mary-Lee
9
Smith Decl. In Supp. of Pls.’ Unopposed Mot. for Final Approval of the Settlement Agmts.
10
(“Smith Final Approval Decl.”) ¶ 11, Dkt. No. 304.
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Attys’ Fees
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
Mot.”), Dkt. No. 292, on September 29, 2015, and subsequently, on October 29, 2015, filed their
13
unopposed Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreements (“Final Approval Mot.”),
14
Dkt. No. 303. The Court held the fairness hearing on these matters on November 12, 2015. Dkt.
15
No. 306.
DISCUSSION – FINAL APPROVAL
16
17
18
A.
Legal Standard
The Ninth Circuit maintains a “strong judicial policy” that favors the settlement of class
19
actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless,
20
“[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s
21
approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed members
22
of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” In re Syncor ERISA Litig.,
23
516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
24
“Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement under Rule 23(e).”
25
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, Rule 23(e) requires
26
the Court to determine whether the proposed settlement “is fundamentally fair, adequate, and
27
reasonable.” Id. at 1026; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal would bind class members, the
28
court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”).
9
1
To assess whether a settlement proposal is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the Court must generally
2
balance a number of factors, including:
6
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount
offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the
state of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7)
the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of
the class members to the proposed settlement.
7
In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
8
Where a settlement agreement is negotiated prior to formal class certification, it is subject to a
9
higher level of scrutiny, and a court’s approval order must ensure that the settlement is not the
3
4
5
product of collusion among the negotiating parties. Id. at 946-47.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
B.
12
Adequacy of Notice
Rule 23(e) requires that “[t]he court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class
13
members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). The notice must be
14
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
15
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central
16
Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted); see also Officers for
17
Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty. of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The class
18
must be notified of a proposed settlement in a manner that does not systematically leave any group
19
without notice.” (citation omitted)). “Rule 23(e) requires notice that describes ‘the terms of the
20
settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come
21
forward and be heard.’” In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 946 (9th Cir.
22
2015) (quotation omitted). The court’s role in reviewing a proposed settlement is to represent
23
those class members who were not parties to the settlement negotiations and agreement. See, e.g.,
24
S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
25
1.
How Notice Was Effected
26
The Court previously approved (1) the form and content of the proposed Notice, Dkt. No.
27
284-1; (2) the Notice Plan as set forth in the parties’ Agreements in Dkt. Nos. 279-2 (CCCOE
28
Agmt. at 8, § 8.4) and 279-3 (Cty. Agmt. at 9, § V(F)); and (3) the parties’ Stipulation at Dkt. No.
10
1
284. Prelim. Approval Order at 26-27. The Court also ordered the distribution of the Notice to
2
the class be completed by August 21, 2015. Id. at 27. The parties have largely fulfilled the Notice
3
Plan, as discussed below.
4
5
i.
County’s Notice
First, the County posted the approved Notice in visitor areas, in a prominent place in each
6
unit, and in the entrance lobby of Juvenile Hall, commencing on or about August 6, 2015. Cty.
7
Decl. ¶ 4(b). Second, the County e-mailed the approved Notice to the Contra Costa County
8
Juvenile Court Judges, the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s Office, and the Contra Costa
9
County District Attorney’s Office. Id. ¶ 4(a). Finally, Plaintiffs and the County Department of
Probation posted the Notice and proposed Agreement in prominent places on their respective
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
websites on or before August 20, 2015. Id. ¶ 4(c); Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 11.
12
13
ii.
CCCOE Notice
First, CCCOE distributed the approved Notice to education rights holders of all youth
14
currently enrolled at Mt. McKinley with an IEP and/or a Section 504 plan, by personal delivery or
15
by First Class U.S. mail to the last known address. CCCOE Decl. ¶ 5(a)-(b). CCCOE sent out a
16
total of 65 notices and only two were returned as undeliverable. Supplemental Declaration of
17
Kimberly A. Smith Regarding Distribution of Notice to Plaintiff Settlement Class Members
18
(“CCCOE Suppl. Decl.”) ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 302. At the Hearing, CCCOE’s counsel represented to the
19
Court that it had successfully re-sent one of those previously returned notices, meaning only one
20
notice was ultimately undeliverable. See also id. In addition, CCCOE posted the approved Notice
21
in each classroom of Juvenile Hall, id. ¶ 5(c), and Plaintiffs’ Counsel and CCCOE posted the
22
Notice and proposed Agreement in a prominent place on their respective websites, on or before
23
August 20, 2015. Id. ¶ 6; Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 12.
24
25
iii.
CAFA Compliance
Defendants provided Notice of the proposed Agreements to the U.S. Department of
26
Justice, the U.S. Department of Education, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, the
27
Attorney General for the State of California, the California Department of Education, and the
28
California Board of State and Community Corrections, as required by the Class Action Fairness
11
1
Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b), by registered mail sent on July 10, 2015. Cty. Decl. ¶ 4(d)
2
and Ex. B. None of these class notices were returned as undeliverable. Id. ¶ 4(d).
iv.
3
Website Link Issues
There were a couple problems that arose in posting the Notice and Proposed Settlement
5
Agreements online. Specifically, around August 4, 2015, the County Department of Probation
6
posted the Notice on its website but did not directly provide the Agreement; instead, the County
7
directed viewers to follow a link to the DRA website to find the proposed Agreement. Id. ¶ 4(c).
8
The County discovered this deficiency on October 2, 2015, and promptly posted the Agreement
9
directly to its website. Id. CCCOE likewise had a problem posting this information. Around
10
August 20, 2015, CCCOE posted an announcement of the proposed settlement with a link that
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
4
opened the Proposed Settlement Agreement, but it was later discovered on September 30, 2015
12
that the link did not include the Notice. CCCOE Decl. ¶ 6. CCCOE corrected the website on
13
October 1, 2015. Id.
14
2.
Whether Notice Was Adequate
15
Given the foregoing, the Court finds that notice was directed in a reasonable manner to
16
class members who will be bound by the parties’ proposed Agreements. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
17
23(e)(1). First, the Court previously approved the language of the Notice itself and remains
18
satisfied that the notice describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with
19
adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard. In re Online, 779 F.3d at
20
946. Second, the Court finds Defendants’ manner of effecting notice “apprise[d] interested parties
21
of the pendency of the action and afford[ed] them an opportunity to present their objections.”
22
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. While there were some minor issues with the posting of the
23
Agreements on the Defendants’ websites, the Court finds these minor mistakes do not detract from
24
the overall reasonableness of the notice effected in this case. The Court is satisfied that the notice
25
mailed and personally delivered to the education-rights holders, as well as the various postings of
26
the notice in the classrooms and lobby areas ensures class members received reasonable notice of
27
the Settlement Agreements.
28
//
12
1
2
C.
Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness
The Court now examines the Settlement Agreements to ensure they are “fair, reasonable,
3
and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In doing so, the Court considers the settlement factors
4
listed above. As noted, when settlement occurs before formal class certification, settlement
5
approval requires a higher standard of fairness in order to ensure that class representatives and
6
their counsel do not secure a disproportionate benefit at the expense of the class. See Lane v.
7
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012).
Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case
8
1.
9
Approval of a class settlement is appropriate when plaintiffs must overcome significant
barriers to make their case. Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (N.D.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Cal. 2010). Here, Plaintiffs recognize the multitude of barriers they face to prevail with their
12
claims, including “acknowledg[ing] the novel nature of their class claims” and the obstacles in
13
establishing their claims in light of the uncertainties surrounding class certification and
14
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. See Final Approval Mot. at 9 (citing Smith Final Approval Decl.
15
¶ 8). Plaintiffs and the Court have previewed Defendants’ arguments in those Motions, and there
16
are several contentious issues that threaten Plaintiffs’ ability to maintain this case and their class
17
claims. While Plaintiffs maintain the Court would have certified the class and they would have
18
prevailed at summary judgment or trial, the challenges Plaintiffs face in this case weigh in favor of
19
approving the settlement.
20
2.
Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation
21
Difficulties and risks of litigating weigh in favor of approving a class settlement. See
22
Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009). According to Plaintiffs, “both
23
parties agree that, absent settlement, this case would involve prolonged and costly litigation,
24
which might last years and involve extensive and complex law and motion practice.” Final
25
Approval Mot. at 10 (citing Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 9). In addition to the complexities
26
inherent with the claims here, the case is still at a relatively early stage in the proceedings, with
27
potentially years more protracted litigation before trial. Additionally, as Plaintiffs discussed, the
28
issues raised in this case are somewhat novel, which in the Court’s experience raises the likelihood
13
1
of significant motion practice and often appeals as well. See Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 966
2
(“Inevitable appeals would likely prolong the litigation, and any recovery by class members, for
3
years. This factor, too, favors the settlement.”). Plaintiffs maintain “[t]he proposed Agreements
4
avoid the risk, delay, and cost of further litigation, and allow all parties to participate in fashioning
5
almost immediate relief for young people with disabilities at Juvenile Hall.” Final Approval Mot.
6
at 10. Given the foregoing, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.
7
3.
Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial
8
The potential difficulties associated with achieving and maintaining class certification in
this case weigh in favor of approving the settlement. See Chun-Hoon, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 851. At
10
the time the parties executed the Settlement Agreements, the Court had not certified the class, and
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
it is unclear whether certification would have been granted. Defendants raised a number of
12
forceful challenges to Plaintiffs’ operative Class Certification Motion, including moving to strike
13
Plaintiffs’ expert. See Dkt. No. 143. Plaintiffs’ Counsel acknowledges that even if the Court
14
originally certified the class, there was a risk that “after granting Plaintiffs’ motion [for class
15
certification]” the Court could “later decertify the class.” Final Approval Mot. at 9-10 (citing
16
Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 9). Given these circumstances, the Court finds this factor weighs in
17
slight favor of approving the settlement.
18
4.
19
The class-wide relief proposed in the Settlement Agreements is wholly injunctive;
20
Amount Offered in Settlement
accordingly, this factor does not have weight in the Court’s analysis.
21
5.
Extent of Discovery Completed and the State of the Proceedings
22
“In the context of class action settlements, ‘formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the
23
bargaining table’ where the parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision
24
about settlement.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation
25
omitted). Accordingly, courts often “look to the amount of exchanged information prior to
26
settlement to determine whether the parties have made an informed decision to settle the case.”
27
Willner v. Manpower Inc., 2015 WL 3863625, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) (citation omitted).
28
The extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings weigh in favor of final
14
1
approval. The parties entered into the proposed Agreements nearly two years after Plaintiffs filed
2
their Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 279-2, 279-3. Before filing, Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted an
3
extensive investigation of policies and practices affecting youth at Juvenile Hall, including
4
reviewing thousands of pages of documents obtained through Public Records Act requests and
5
education records requests as well as making numerous visits to Juvenile Hall to meet with
6
detained youth. Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 6. Since the action commenced, the parties have
7
engaged in significant discovery. Among other things, Defendants produced extensive education
8
records concerning individual young people held at Juvenile Hall, and each of the named Plaintiffs
9
have been deposed. Id. Additionally, the parties have briefed two separate sets of motions to
dismiss and a motion for class certification, and Plaintiffs have pursued administrative
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
proceedings against the County and CCCOE on behalf of each of the named Plaintiffs. Id. By the
12
time the Settlement Agreements were reached, the litigation had proceeded to a point where both
13
Plaintiffs and Defendants “ha[d] a clear view of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.”
14
Chun-Hoon, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 852. Approval of the settlement is thus favored.
15
6.
The Experience and Views of Counsel
16
“Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
17
settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” In re Pac. Enters. Sec.
18
Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). Class Counsel, the DRA and Public Counsel, are well-
19
qualified litigators with specialized expertise in the fields of disability and education rights. DRA
20
has served as lead counsel in over one hundred disability rights class action cases across the
21
United States and has specialized expertise in class action litigation to improve physical and
22
programmatic access to governmental programs and activities. Smith Preliminary Approval Decl.
23
¶ 6, Dkt. No. 279-1; see also Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 2010
24
WL 2228531, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2010) (acknowledging DRA’s “extensive experience
25
litigation ADA class action claims.”). Likewise, Public Counsel’s education rights team has
26
extensive experience in impact litigation to improve access to education services, particularly
27
special education services. Laura Faer Decl. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees & Final
28
Approval of Class Settlement Agmts. (“Faer Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-9, Dkt. No. 294.
15
1
Class Counsel consider the proposed Agreements to be fair and reasonable compromises of
2
the disputed issues. Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 10. They also indicate they are aware of no
3
other class action challenging disciplinary and educational policies and practices in a juvenile hall
4
on the basis of disability discrimination that has resulted in such comprehensive reforms,
5
particularly, the adoption of national best practices found in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives
6
Initiative standards. Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the settlements.
7
7.
8
While the government participants in this case are the Defendants, their support of the
9
The Presence of a Governmental Participant
settlements nevertheless weights slightly in favor of approval. Moreover, the United States
Department of Justice submitted a Statement of Interest in this case in February 2014 (Dkt. No.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
159), and it has not objected to the Settlements, despite receiving Notice of the Agreements. See
12
Cty. Decl. ¶ 4(d) and Ex. B. These facts weigh slightly in favor of the settlements.
13
8.
Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement
14
“[T]he absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises
15
a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class
16
members.” In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quotation
17
omitted). No class members submitted objections to either the County or CCCOE Agreement.
18
Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 13. There were no other responses received by Plaintiffs’ counsel
19
from class members. Id. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the settlements.
20
9.
Potential Collusion
21
In addition to the eight factors above, where a settlement is agreed upon prior to class
22
certification, the Court must also consider whether the settlement is the product of collusion
23
among the negotiating parties. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947. In its Preliminary Approval
24
Order, the Court found “[t]he settlements in this case appear to be the product of serious,
25
informed, non-collusive negotiations.” Prelim. Approval Order at 22. In doing so, the Court
26
primarily considered the procedure by which the parties arrived at their settlements. See Chun-
27
Hoon, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 852. In charting out all the various negotiations that took place to settle
28
this case, the Court found these negotiations were “extensive and serious . . . lasting virtually the
16
1
duration of the litigation,” but at the same time the “parties continued to vigorously litigate the
2
action, which in turn permitted them to become more informed about the facts of this case.”
3
Prelim. Approval Order at 22-23. Additionally, the Court noted “the Parties did not negotiate
4
Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees or costs until after agreement was reached on the key merits issues.” Id.
5
at 23; Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (affirming trial court’s approval of class action settlement where
6
parties reached agreement after several months of negotiation and the record contained no
7
evidence of collusion).
8
9
In addition to the procedure by which the parties arrived at their settlements, the Court
must also look for other signs that may demonstrate collusion, including (1) when counsel receive
a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when the class receives no monetary
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded; (2) when the parties negotiate a “clear sailing”
12
arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class funds,
13
which carries the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in
14
exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class; and (3) when the
15
parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be added to the class fund.
16
In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947.
17
The first potential sign of collusion is present here: class counsel seek approximately $2.5
18
million in fees (Attys’ Fees Mot. at 1), while the class receives no monetary compensation under
19
the Settlement Agreements. The second potential sign of collusion is also present to an extent;
20
while there are no class funds, the Settlement Agreements arrange for class counsel to be paid
21
apart from some of the relief for to the class in the sense that Class Counsel will be paid before the
22
Defendants implement much of the injunctive relief established in the Settlement Agreements after
23
the expert reports. The third potential sign of collusion is not present: the Settlement Agreements
24
do not provide for fees not awarded to revert to Defendants. Although two of the potential signs
25
of collusion appear to be present here, their presence is not dispositive; rather, “[w]here a class
26
action settlement results in injunctive relief, the court must ensure that the amount of the requested
27
attorneys’ fees does not result in ‘less injunctive relief for the class than could otherwise have been
28
obtained.’” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947 (quotation omitted).
17
The Court is reassured the amount of requested attorneys’ fees has not resulted in less
1
2
injunctive relief for the class than could have otherwise been obtained. First, as noted previously,
3
the fact that the parties only negotiated attorneys’ fees after agreement was reached on the key
4
merits issues is favorable in showing class counsel did not allow their attorneys’ fees to interfere
5
with the injunctive relief sought for the class. In support of this fact, Class counsel submitted the
6
Declaration of Mary-Lee Smith, an attorney with the DRA, who states under the penalty of perjury
7
that the parties “did not negotiate Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees or costs until after reaching agreement
8
on the key merits issues.” Smith Final Approval Decl. ¶ 7. Second, the parties worked with
9
neutral mediators, including Judge Spero (id.), which is “a factor weighing in favor of a finding of
non-collusiveness,” though not dispositive on its own of whether the end product is a fair,
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
adequate, and reasonable settlement agreement. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 948. Third, the
12
Agreements provide that Class Counsel can seek addition attorneys’ fees in monitoring
13
Defendants’ compliance with the Agreements, which indicates the fee amounts provided for in the
14
Agreements are not necessarily class counsel’s final settling point and provides incentive to ensure
15
the injunctive relief is fully implemented. See Cty. Agmt. at 11, § IX; CCCOE Agmt. at 6, § 5.3
16
and 11, § 12.4. Fourth, considering the Settlement Agreements in their entireties, and comparing
17
the relief originally sought in this case to the relief achieved through these Agreements, the Court
18
finds the Agreements largely accomplish the injunctive relief sought in Plaintiffs’ First Amended
19
Complaint. See Final Approval Mot. at 7-8. Finally, the Court has considered Plaintiffs’
20
Counsel’s fee request and the reasonableness of those fees in the section below and finds them to
21
be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
In sum, while the attorneys’ fees in this case are not insignificant, the Court has not
22
23
uncovered grounds for finding the requested fees have resulted in less injunctive relief for the
24
class or that there is evidence of collusion between the parties.
25
10.
Summary
26
Given the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that even under heightened scrutiny, the
27
Settlement Agreements are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
28
//
18
1
D.
Certification of the Settlement Class
2
In considering Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Approval Motion, the Court considered in detail
3
whether all of the elements of Rule 23 are met such that certification of a settlement class was
4
warranted. See Prelim. Approval Order at 16-22. “Because the Settlement Class has not changed,
5
the Court sees no reason to revisit the analysis of Rule 23.” Sadowska v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am.,
6
Inc., 2013 WL 9600948, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013).
7
E.
Summary Regarding Final Approval
8
Given the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Final Approval of the Settlement
9
Agreements is warranted under the circumstances. The Court now turns to the matter of Plaintiffs’
10
attorneys fees’ and costs.
ATTORNEYS FEES’ AND COSTS – DISCUSSION
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
A.
Legal Standard
“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable
13
14
costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Thus, in
15
awarding attorneys’ fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), “courts have an
16
independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the
17
parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941 (citations omitted).
In this circuit, there are two primary methods used to calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees:
18
19
the lodestar method and the percentage-of-recovery method. In re Online, 779 F.3d at 949. The
20
lodestar method is most appropriate where the relief sought is “primarily injunctive in nature,” and
21
a fee-shifting statute authorizes “the award of fees to ensure compensation for counsel undertaking
22
socially beneficial litigation.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941.5 The lodestar represents a
23
reasonable hourly fee multiplied by the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.
24
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029-30
25
(explaining that courts employ the lodestar method of calculating attorneys’ fees in injunctive
26
5
27
28
See also Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2013) (“It is not per se
unreasonable for attorneys to receive a fee award that exceeds the amount recovered by their
clients,” which is “especially true in civil rights cases, where the dollar amount lawyers recover
for their clients is not the sole measure of the results the prevailing parties’ attorneys obtained.”).
19
1
relief class actions, multiplying the hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate). The lodestar figure
2
is a presumptively reasonable fee. Clark v. City of L.A., 803 F.2d 987, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1986).
Because Plaintiffs pursued claims under statutes with fee-shifting provisions—42 U.S.C. §
3
4
12205 and California Civil Code sections 52(a) and 54.3(a) (see Attys’ Fee Mot. at 1)—and
5
because the relief sought is injunctive in nature, the Court applies the lodestar method to assess the
6
reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees request. See, e.g., Lara v. Renaissance Hotel
7
Operating Co., 2011 WL 6002521, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 29, 2011) (“Although Plaintiffs do not
8
request a lodestar award of attorneys’ fees in this case, this Court uses the fees that it could have
9
awarded Plaintiffs under the lodestar analysis as a gauge of the reasonableness of the attorneys’
fees provided for in the Settlement Agreement.” (citations omitted)).
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
B.
Lodestar Analysis
As an initial matter, the Court notes that in the Preliminary Approval Order it required
12
13
Plaintiffs’ Counsel to file their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs by September 29, 2015—
14
two weeks in advance of the deadline for objections, and over one month in advance of the
15
Fairness Hearing. Prelim. Approval Order at 27. Plaintiffs’ Counsel timely filed their Motion for
16
Attorneys’ Fees, and the Court has received no objections to the Motion. Accordingly, the Court
17
weighs for itself whether Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request is reasonable under the lodestar method.
18
Four legal organizations represented Plaintiffs throughout this action: DRA, Public
19
Counsel, Paul Hastings LLP (“Paul Hastings”) and Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP6 (“Zelle
20
Hofmann”). The following chart represents the breakdown of each of the four law firms’ lodestar
21
in the Federal Class Action7:
22
6
23
Paul Hastings withdrew as Plaintiffs’ counsel on March 13, 2014, and Zelle Hofmann joined
thereafter. Attys’ Fee Mot. at 2 n.1.
7
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiffs’ Counsel provided the numbers and lodestar calculations for their other work on the
related administrative actions for the class representatives (Dkt. Nos. 294-5 and 294-6, Exs. E-F to
Smith Decl.), but for purposes of this Order, the Court finds it more appropriate to focus on the
numbers related to the Federal Class Action (i.e., the litigation apart from the appeals from the
administrative hearings), as those numbers apply more concretely to the Court’s required analysis
under Rule 23(h). It is possible that the time spent on the administrative actions could be
considered under the Rule 23(h) analysis, but the Court finds it unnecessary to consider that data
at this point, particularly as the lodestars for the Federal Class Action are well above the fees
sought through the Settlement Agreements.
20
1
Firm8
2
Disability Rights Advocates 5293.6
$195-$895
$451.92
$2,375,735.50
3
Public Counsel
772.5
$175-$570
$311
$240,247.50
4
Zelle Hofmann
79.6
$175-$550
$336.25
$33,090.00
5
Paul Hastings
2548.10 $205-$975
$497.33
$1,606,542.75
6
TOTALS:
8693.80 ---
---
$4,322,068.75
7
10
Rate Range9 Avg. Rate Lodestar10
See Dkt. No. 293-4 (Ex. D to Mary-Lee Smith Decl. in Supp. of Attys’ Fees Mot.).
Plaintiffs did not settle fees and costs separately, and thus the costs are included in the
8
9
Hours
settlement amounts from the Defendants. The following chart represents the breakdown of each
of the four firms’ costs related to the Federal Class Action:
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
Firm
12
Disability Rights Advocates $15,490.94
13
Public Counsel
$0
14
Zelle Hofmann
$24.33
15
Paul Hastings
$76,461.53
16
TOTAL:
$91,976,80
17
Costs
Id.
18
1.
Hourly Rate
19
First, to determine the appropriate lodestar amount, the reasonableness of the hourly billing
20
rate must be assessed. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). In
21
8
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In the co-counsel agreement between Paul Hastings, Public Counsel, and DRA, these entities
agreed that if they recovered fees and costs, Paul Hastings would be reimbursed for its out-ofpocket expenses but would donate to Public Counsel and DRA any attorneys’ fees obtained as a
result of Paul Hastings’ work. “Therefore, the Paul Hastings share of fees . . . will be donated to
Public Counsel and DRA.” Carter Decl. ¶ 32, Dkt. No. 296.
9
DRA, Public Counsel, and Zelle Hofmann seek only their 2014 rates as negotiations began in
2014 and as a concession in the process of settlement; Paul Hastings seeks only its 2013 rates as
their participation in the case ended in early 2014. Attys’ Fees Mot. at 12.
10
The lodestar figures listed here take into account the hours spent by the various attorneys
working on the case. A breakdown of all the hours spent by the various attorneys and related staff
on the Federal Class Action is found at Docket Number 293-4, an exhibit to the Declaration of
Mary-Lee Smith of DRA.
21
1
considering the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates, as the Court has noted above,
2
Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of between $175 per hour and $975 per hour depending on the
3
particular attorney or counsel. Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $845-$975 for two of the most
4
senior and experienced litigators at the DRA, Sid Wolinsky and Laurence Paradis, as well as the
5
most senior litigator working on this case from Paul Hastings LLP, Grace Carter. The other
6
attorneys’ hourly rates fall between $210 and $700. For non-attorneys, Plaintiffs seek hourly rates
7
of between $175 and $340.
8
To determine whether rates are reasonable, courts must identify the relevant community,
and assess the prevailing hourly rate in that community for similar services by lawyers of
10
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
“Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in
12
which the district court sits.” Id. Consequently, Plaintiffs submit that the relevant community in
13
this case is the San Francisco Bay Area, and the reasonableness of rates charges should be
14
determined by reference to the rates charged by Bay Area attorneys with commensurate skill,
15
experience, and reputation. Attys’ Fees Mot. at 9-10.
16
In support of their rates, skill, experience, and reputation, Plaintiffs provided supporting
17
declarations of attorneys from each of the organizations that worked on this case: Declaration of
18
Mary-Lee Smith of DRA (“Smith Decl.”), Dkt. No. 293; Declaration of Laura Faer of Public
19
Counsel (“Faer Decl.”), Dkt. No. 294; Declaration of Lillian Chen of Public Counsel (“Chen
20
Decl.”), Dkt. No. 295; Declaration of Grace Carter of Paul Hastings (“Carter Decl.”), Dkt. No.
21
296; and Declaration of Daniel S. Mason of Zelle Hofmann (“Mason Decl.”), Dkt. No. 297.
22
These declarations describe the organization the individual declarant attorney works with, their
23
efforts in this litigation, their methods for calculating their lodestars, as well as the experience,
24
skill, and reputation of the organizations and the individuals who worked on this case. All of the
25
declarations demonstrate these firms are experienced and tested in the area of complex litigation
26
with strong reputations in the legal community.
27
In addition, Plaintiffs submitted the declaration of William Alderman, a partner at the San
28
Francisco office of the law firm Orrick, Herrington, & Sutcliffe LLP, who has expertise regarding
22
1
prevailing billing rates for Bay Area attorneys who handle complex litigation and is the co-author
2
of the chapter entitled “Fee Arrangements” in West Group’s treatise, “Successful Partnering
3
Between Inside and Outside Counsel.” Alderman Decl. ¶¶ 1-9, Dkt. No. 298. The majority of his
4
practice focuses on defense of securities class actions and he also is the co-editor of the monthly
5
“Securities Reform Act Litigation Reporter,” both of which give him familiarity with attorney fee
6
requests and awards. Id. ¶ 10. According to Alderman, the rates requested by Plaintiffs’ Counsel
7
are well within the range of market rates for Bay Area attorneys who handle comparable, complex
8
litigation. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Alderman’s own hourly rate in 2014 was $995 per hour. Id. ¶ 11.
9
Alderman also notes he has personal knowledge of the work and reputation of Mary-Lee Smith
and Sid Wolinsky, two attorneys from the DRA, and notes they are “among the leading experts in
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
the country in the area of disability rights.” Id. ¶ 14.
12
The Court finds the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs demonstrates that the range of rates
13
requested by the attorneys here are in line with the overall range of market rates for attorneys and
14
for litigation support staff of similar abilities and experience in this District between 2013 and
15
2014. See Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 455 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
16
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 2008 hourly rates for Bay Area attorneys of
17
up to $875 for a partner, $700 for an attorney with 23 years of experience, $425 for an attorney
18
with approximately five years of experience, and $190 for paralegals); see also Gutierrez v. Wells
19
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 2438274, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2015) (in a complex action,
20
finding reasonable rates for Bay Area attorneys of between $475-$975 for partners, $300-$490 for
21
associates, and $150-$430 for litigation support and paralegals). While under other circumstances
22
greater scrutiny might be appropriate for some of the hourly rates sought here, the Court is
23
satisfied Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates fall under the range of reasonable fees—particularly as
24
the Court is only analyzing the lodestar figure as a secondary test in order to determine whether
25
the sums already agreed to by the parties are reasonable.
26
2.
27
Beyond establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a party seeking attorneys’ bears the burden
28
Hours Expended
to “document[ ] the appropriate hours expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Such an applicant
23
1
must exercise sound “billing judgment” as to the number of hours worked, eliminating excessive,
2
redundant, or unnecessary hours, and provide billing records supporting the time claimed. Id. at
3
433-34. Plaintiffs’ counsel “is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time
4
was expended,” but should “identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures.” Id. at
5
437 n.12; Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (“plaintiff’s counsel can
6
meet his burden—although just barely—by simply listing his hours and ‘identifying the general
7
subject matter of his time expenditures.’” (quotation omitted)).
8
9
Plaintiffs provided declarations from each of the four organizations working on their
behalf, which explain the sorts of things these attorneys worked on and now seek compensation
for through this fee request. Plaintiffs note their counsel “devoted a reasonable and necessary
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
amount of time to develop the case and the legal and factual claims, prepare the complaint (and
12
eventually the First Amended Complaint,” as well as “fully brief two major motions (i.e.,
13
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, propound and
14
respond to discovery including defending three named plaintiff depositions, and prepare mediation
15
briefs and settlement proposals for numerous unsuccessful settlement attempts.” Attys’ Fees Mot.
16
at 15. They further note Plaintiffs’ counsel “dedicated substantial resources to obtain the
17
settlement agreements that ultimately resolved the matter[,]” which “included numerous
18
mediations and the drafting of the settlement agreements, for which Plaintiffs’ Counsel took the
19
lead.” Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel also “took the lead in drafting the motion for preliminary approval
20
and supporting papers, the class notice, the proposed order, this motion and the application for
21
final approval.” Id.
22
In their declarations, each of the four organizations explain they sought fees related to the
23
foregoing activities and tasks related to those activities, including for investigation and research,
24
drafting and editing briefs and related documents, negotiating and structuring the settlement
25
agreements, reviewing documents, interviewing witnesses, preparing and defending depositions,
26
and other such advocacy. See Smith Decl. ¶ 18; Faer Decl. ¶ 15; Carter Decl. ¶ 25; Mason Decl. ¶
27
13. Additionally, each attorney attests to the fact that they reviewed their organization’s time
28
records in this case and independently exercised their billing judgment to eliminate or reduce
24
1
certain time that did not appear to be reasonably spent or to otherwise limit their time to that
2
which was reasonable and benefitted the class. Smith Decl. ¶¶ 19-20; Faer Decl. ¶¶ 16-17; Carter
3
Decl. ¶¶ 23, 26; Mason Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14. The hours spent on the Federal Class Action for each of
4
the four organizations is as follows: DRA = 5, 293.6 hours (Smith Decl. ¶ 21); Public Counsel =
5
772.5 hours (Faer Decl. ¶ 18); Paul Hastings = 2,548.1 hours (Carter Decl. ¶ 27); Zelle Hofmann =
6
79.6 hours (Mason Decl. ¶ 15).
Although Plaintiffs did not provide detailed time records for the attorneys and support staff
7
8
working on this case, having carefully reviewed the declarations above and the supporting
9
documentation, the Court finds Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating the
reasonableness of the time their counsel expended on this litigation.11 There has been no
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
challenge to the time spent by these organizations, and the Court cannot find grounds for further
12
reducing the hours spent in this litigation.12 In the Court’s own first-hand interactions with
13
Plaintiffs’ counsel and their work, the Court has found them consistently well-prepared and
14
thorough. Accordingly, the Court finds the number of hours spent by attorneys and related staff in
15
these four organizations was reasonably expended on the litigation and settlement of this case.
16
3.
Summary of Lodestar and Cost Comparison to Settlement Agreement Amounts
17
As noted above, the total lodestar for the four organizations working on Plaintiffs’ Federal
18
Class Action totals $4,322,068.75 and the costs total $91,976.80. Plaintiffs have only requested
19
that the Court approve the amounts proposed in the parties’ Settlement Agreements, i.e., the
20
11
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting by designation, has emphasized
the overall equitable nature of fee analysis: “[t]he net result of fee-setting jurisprudence . . . is that
the district courts must engage in an equitable inquiry of varying methodology while making a
pretense of mathematical precision.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty.
of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2007) (O’Connor, J., sitting by designation, joining in the
opinion) (citation omitted). Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan has recently echoed these
sentiments: “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.
The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing
perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use
estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 131 S. Ct.
2205, 2216 (2011).
12
As noted earlier, the Court has chosen not to consider the time spent on the administrative
actions for the individual class representatives. Adding the time spent on the administrative
actions adds hundreds of thousands of dollars to Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ lodestar amount. See Dkt.
Nos. 293-5 and 293-6 (charts demonstrating the hourly rates, hours worked, and costs of the
attorneys working on the administrative actions).
25
1
$1,165,000 from CCCOE and $1,340,000 from the County for a total of $2,505,000. That amount
2
is significantly less than what these attorneys might otherwise be entitled to under the lodestar
3
analysis or if Plaintiffs’ costs were included.13 Given the significant reduction in fees and costs,
4
the Court finds Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs reasonable under the circumstances.
5
CONCLUSION
6
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court GRANTS FINAL APPROVAL to the
7
Settlement Agreements in this case and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’
8
Fees and Costs in the amounts specified in the parties’ Settlement Agreements.
The Court thus ORDERS the following:
9
1.
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
the Court confirms class certification of the class for settlement purposes only.
2.
12
13
The Court confirms the appointment of Plaintiffs G.F., by and through her guardian
ad litem, Gail F.; W.B.; and Q.G as class representatives.
3.
14
15
For the reasons set forth in the Order Granting Preliminary Approval, Dkt. No. 288,
The Court confirms the appointment of Disability Rights Advocates and Public
Counsel as Class Counsel.
4.
16
In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and
17
Defendant County, the County shall pay Plaintiffs’ Counsel $1,340,000 within 60 days of the date
18
of this Order.
5.
19
In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and
20
Defendant CCCOE and the stipulation amending the terms of the settlement agreement (Dkt. No.
21
13
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiffs included very little detail about their costs in this litigation; potentially this is because
they already agreed to amounts for fees and costs in their Settlement Agreements. Given the fact
that Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ lodestar for the Federal Class Action is so much more than they
recovered through the amounts assigned in the Settlement Agreements, it seems unnecessary for
the Court to proceed with the typical analysis to assess the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ costs
under Rule 23(h). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (“In a certified class action, the court may award
reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’
agreement.”); see also Newberg on Class Actions § 16:10 (5th ed.) (“[R]ecoverable nontaxable
costs include counsel’s out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a fee paying
client.”); Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 2005) (permitting recovery of costs for “an
expense that would normally be charged to a fee paying client.”). In other circumstances, the
Court might have difficulty determining whether to award costs authorized by the parties’
agreement without greater explanation about what those costs were. Nonetheless, considering the
entirety of the Settlement Agreements in comparison to Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ lodestar and
requested costs, the Court is satisfied that it may issue such an award under Rule 23(h).
26
1
283), CCCOE shall pay Plaintiffs’ Counsel on the following schedule: (1) the first installment of
2
$435,000.00 is payable within 60 days of the date of this Order; (2) the second installment of
3
$435,000.00 is payable on July 1, 2016; and (3) the third installment of $295,000.00 is payable on
4
July 1, 2017.
5
6
7
6.
The above-captioned action is DISMISSED on the merits and with prejudice,
subject to the Court retaining jurisdiction to administer and enforce the Settlement Agreements.
7.
The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this matter for purposes of
enforcement and for purposes of dispute resolution, including disputes related to the final
9
monitoring report with the County and the Expert Report with CCCOE, and to determine and
10
enforce the amount of an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to which Class Counsel is entitled,
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
8
including fees and costs resulting from the litigation to-date and from any future dispute
12
resolution.
13
14
15
8.
Judgment is hereby entered on the terms set forth above. The Clerk of Court shall
close the file on this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
16
17
18
19
Dated: November 25, 2015
______________________________________
MARIA-ELENA JAMES
United States Magistrate Judge
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
27
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?