Lopez v. Clous et al

Filing 65

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART by Judge Charles R. Breyer. (crblc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/18/2016).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff,

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No. C 13-3870 CRB

FERNANDO G. LOPEZ,

v.
SERGEANT CLOUS, et al.,
Defendants.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff Fernando Lopez has alleged that several Santa Clara County police officers

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used excessive force against him during his arrest. See Summary Judgment Order (dkt. 35).

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Defendants have moved to dismiss portions of Lopez’s First Amended Complaint, arguing

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that it raises claims barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Motion (dkt. 58). For

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the following reasons, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral

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argument under Civil Local Rule 7–1(b), agrees that Lopez’s claims against the County are

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time-barred, and GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to those claims.

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Lopez filed his initial complaint pro se in August 2013. See Complaint (dkt. 1).

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Lopez subsequently obtained counsel, and the parties agreed to his filing a First Amended

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Complaint (“FAC”). See FAC (dkt. 49). The FAC added Santa Clara County as a defendant

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and brought failure to train and Monell causes of action against the County. See FAC at 3–4.

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Defendants move to dismiss these new claims against the County as time-barred, see Motion

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(dkt. 58); Memorandum of Points and Authorities (dkt. 57), arguing that the applicable two

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year statute of limitations has run. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir.

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2004); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1.

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Lopez responds that the claims against the County should “relate back” to the date

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that Lopez filed his initial complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). He argues that although his

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initial complaint did not name the County as a defendant, he sued the individual officers
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“individually and in their official capacities” and requested declaratory relief against those

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officers’ “acts policies, and practices.” See Compl. at 4. Lopez argues that his

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pleadings—construed liberally given that he was pro se at the time they were filed—placed

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the County on notice that Lopez intended to bring Monell and failure to train claims against

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it. See Opp’n (dkt. 62) at 4–5. Lopez’s arguments fail for the following reasons.

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Although “we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the

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rules of procedure.” See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Pena v. Gardner,

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976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Oct. 9, 1992) (“[A] liberal interpretation of a [pro

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se] civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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pled.”). Lopez has not established under Rule 15(c) that the County “must or should have

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known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought

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against it.” See Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1202 (9th

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Cir. 2014). On the contrary, although Lopez named the Santa Clara County Police

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Department as a defendant in an earlier state suit, he chose not to name the County or the

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Police Department as a defendant in the action now before the Court. See Opp’n at 5.

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Furthermore, Lopez’s initial complaint did not challenge any specific County policies—it

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exclusively addressed the actions of the named officers who he alleged used excessive force

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against him during his arrest. See generally Complaint. The County thus had no reason to

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know “that it would have been named as a defendant but for an error.” See Krupski v. Costa

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Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010).

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The Court concludes that Lopez has not satisfied the requirements of Rule 15(c), his

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claims against the County do not relate back to the filing of his initial complaint, and thus the

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Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the claims outlined in Lopez’s second cause of action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 18, 2016
CHARLES R. BREYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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