Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.

Filing 253

Order by Hon. Vince Chhabria denying 213 Motion to Intervene.(vclc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/28/2016)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK COTTER, et al.,

Case No. 13-cv-04065-VC

Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
INTERVENE

v.

Re: Dkt. No. 213

LYFT, INC.,
Defendant.

Alex Zamora and Rayshon Clark, the named plaintiffs in a related case, Zamora v. Lyft,
Inc., No. 16-cv-02558-VC, have filed a motion to intervene in this case, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No.
13-cv-04065-VC, in which they are also class members. The Zamora plaintiffs argue either that
they are entitled to intervene as of right, or that they should be granted permissive intervention.
The motion is denied.
The Zamora plaintiffs are not entitled to intervene as of right. "An applicant seeking
intervention as of right must show that: (1) it has a 'significant protectable interest' relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application
is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest."
Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v.
United States, 450 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478,
1481 (9th Cir. 1993). The Zamora plaintiffs' ability to protect their interest in the claims
released by the Cotter action will not be impaired by the Cotter settlement, because the Zamora
plaintiffs may file formal objections and appear at the final approval hearing, or opt out of the

Cotter settlement and continue to pursue their claims against Lyft if they wish. See, e.g.,
Hofstetter v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 10-cv-01313-WHA, 2011 WL 5415073, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (citing Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir.
2006); Bergman v. Thelen LLP, No. 08-cv-05322-EDL, 2009 WL 1308019, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 11, 2009) (citing Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., No. 06-cv-4068-MMC, 2007 WL 474936, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2007)); see also Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2015).
Nor have the Zamora plaintiffs shown that the Court should exercise its discretion to
grant them permissive intervention. "An applicant who seeks permissive intervention must
prove that it meets three threshold requirements: (1) it shares a common question of law or fact
with the main action; (2) its motion is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for
jurisdiction over the applicant's claims." Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir.
1998) (citing Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996)). Even if
the proposed intervenor meets those requirements, however, a district court has discretion to
deny the motion if "intervention will unduly delay the main action or will unfairly prejudice the
existing parties." Id. Here, permitting the Zamora plaintiffs to intervene for the purpose of
carving their claims out of the Cotter release would either unduly delay or scuttle the parties'
long-negotiated settlement, to the detriment of both Lyft and the Cotter plaintiff class. Given
that the Zamora gratuity claims appear to be worth significantly less to the Cotter class members
than the Cotter reimbursement claims, and given that the Cotter settlement as a whole is fair,
reasonable, and adequate on the current record, it would unfairly prejudice the Cotter parties if
their settlement were undone by the Zamora plaintiffs at this stage.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 28, 2016
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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