Taylor v. Lewis

Filing 3

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. Signed by Judge William H. Alsup on 9/24/13. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(tlS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/25/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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RALPH ANTHONY TAYLOR,
Petitioner,

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

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No. C 13-4118 WHA (PR)

DARRYL G. LEWIS,
Respondent.

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INTRODUCTION

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Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

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corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner challenges his conviction from 1997 obtained in

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Alameda County Superior Court.
ANALYSIS

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A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Rose

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v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading

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requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An application for a federal writ

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of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state

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court must “specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the petitioner ... and shall

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set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.” Rule 2(c) of

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the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not

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sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of

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constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d

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688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)).

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B.

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LEGAL CLAIMS
In 1997, petitioner was convicted in Alameda County Superior Court of first degree

robbery. He was sentenced to a term of 37 years to life in state prison under California’s “Three

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Strikes Laws.” One of his prior “strike” convictions was from 1987, also for robber and also

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from Alameda County Superior Court. According to petitioner, his 1987 conviction was

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obtained via a “no contest” plea. Petitioner states that when he entered that plea, one of the

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terms of the plea agreement was that, if petitioner was convicted of a felony in the future, the

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1987 conviction could be used to enhance his sentence for that future conviction by five years.

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Petitioner complains that he was not informed that the conviction could be used under

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California’s “Three Strikes” law (which did not exist at the time) as a greater enhancement, as it

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was when he was sentenced in 1997.

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He claims that his current sentence violates the terms of his plea bargain in 1987 insofar

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as his 1987 conviction was used to enhance his current sentence by more than five years.

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“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so

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that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be

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fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Fundamental fairness of due

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process requires that promises made during plea bargaining and analogous contexts be

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respected. Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1985). Petitioner’s claim is flawed.

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His current plea sentence or conviction did not involve a plea agreement or promise limiting the

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length of an enhancement. That promise was made in 1987. To the extent there was any breach

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of that promise, it would render the 1987 plea invalid, not his current conviction, and petitioner
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cannot challenge the validity of a prior conviction, even one used to enhance the sentence he is

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currently serving. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04

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(2001). Moreover, the sentence he received in 1997 was imposed by the trial court, not the

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prosecutor who entered the plea agreement in 1987. As a result, the trial court could not have

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“breached” that plea agreement by imposing the 1997 sentence.

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Petitioner also argues that the current sentence renders his plea in 1987 involuntary

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because he did not know that his 1987 conviction could later be used to enhance a sentence on a

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future conviction by more than five years, as it was in 1997. A guilty plea is not involuntary

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solely because the court has not advised the defendant of rights established by judicial decisions
or changes in the law occurring after the plea colloquy. United States v. Pacheco-Navarette,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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432 F.3d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 2005). As noted, the Three Strikes law came into effect after

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petitioner entered his no contest plea in 1987. As such, the changes brought about under the

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Three Strikes law as to how long petitioner’s 1987 conviction would enhance a future

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conviction do not render the guilty plea he entered in 1987 involuntary.

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Accordingly, petitioner’s claim does not state grounds for federal habeas relief and the
petition must be denied.

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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Petitioner has failed to make a

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substantial showing that a reasonable jurist would find this court’s denial of his claim debatable

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or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Consequently, no certificate of

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appealability is warranted in this case.

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The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September

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, 2013.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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