Ai-Daiwa, Ltd. v. Apparent, Inc. et al
Filing
123
Order by Hon. Vince Chhabria granting in part and denying in part 113 Motion to Disqualify Counsel. (vclc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/10/2015)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7
AI-DAIWA, LTD.,
Case No. 13-cv-04156-VC
Plaintiff,
8
v.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL
9
10
APPARENT, INC., et al.,
Re: Dkt. No. 113
Defendants.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
AI-Daiwa and Apparent are embroiled in what is primarily a contract dispute about
14
products that AI-Daiwa delivered to Apparent. Everyone seems to agree the products were
15
defective; the question is whether they were defective because of the design specifications
16
provided by Apparent, or because of a failure by AI-Daiwa to meet those specifications.
17
Apparent is represented in this litigation by Jaqueline deSouza. She is a corporate officer
18
of Apparent, was involved in contract negotiations with AI-Daiwa, and was involved in
19
negotiations with AI-Daiwa about how to resolve the dispute about the defective products. There
20
is little doubt deSouza will be a necessary witness at trial; indeed, in motion practice she has
21
already submitted her own testimony about what happened in this case. Apparent was previously
22
represented by co-counsel (the law firm of Parton Sell Rhoades), but co-counsel has withdrawn,
23
raising the prospect that deSouza will serve as sole counsel at trial. AI-Daiwa has moved to
24
disqualify her on the ground that she will be required to give testimony at trial and therefore
25
should not be acting as trial counsel.
26
After holding a hearing and after reviewing the papers filed by the parties, including the
27
supplemental briefs filed the day after the hearing, the Court grants in part the motion to disqualify
28
deSouza. However, after reviewing the supplemental briefs, the terms of the disqualification
1
2
differ somewhat from the tentative ruling the Court articulated from the bench.
It is plainly a problem for deSouza to serve as trial counsel for Apparent given her likely
3
testimony and her overall involvement in the contract dispute. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct
4
R. 3.7; see also Kennedy v. Eldridge, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1197, 1209 (affirming trial court's
5
disqualification of attorney because "it is a virtual certainty that his testimony as a witness . . . will
6
be necessary"). On the other hand, deSouza's outright disqualification would have a significant
7
adverse impact on Apparent, because her work thus far would be a sunk cost for Apparent, and a
8
new lawyer would need to get up to speed on complicated technical matters (that will be the
9
subject of expert testimony) relating to the cause of the product defects. Given these competing
concerns, as the Court explained at the hearing, the ideal solution would be to find a way to allow
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
deSouza to continue representing Apparent through trial while minimizing the risk that her
12
personal involvement in the dispute would infect the trial process. Accordingly, the Court
13
proposed the following solution at the hearing: deSouza would not be disqualified, but Apparent
14
would be required to hire co-counsel for purposes of the trial only. Co-counsel would obviously
15
handle deSouza's testimony, and likely would also be required to handle the testimony of any
16
other witnesses who would testify about matters in which deSouza was personally involved (for
17
example, deSouza would not be allowed to cross-examine witnesses about conversations in which
18
she participated). This proposal would leave deSouza free to give the opening statement and the
19
closing argument (so long as she didn't inject her own testimony into those phases of the trial), and
20
to handle any witnesses who would testify about matters in which deSouza was not personally
21
involved. This includes handling the testimony of expert witnesses, who will likely be the most
22
important witnesses in the case given the primary question presented, and whose examinations and
23
cross-examinations require the most preparation. Under this proposed approach, the parties would
24
confer before the pretrial conference about which witnesses deSouza could handle at trial, and any
25
dispute would be resolved by the Court at the pretrial conference.
26
At the hearing, counsel for AI-Daiwa did not object to this approach. But deSouza, on
27
behalf of Apparent, raised a number of objections, based primarily on a concern that requiring
28
Apparent to have two lawyers at trial would hinder the effectiveness of Apparent's trial
2
1
presentation. Most of these objections do not merit a response. One legitimate concern, however,
2
was that the pretrial conference is scheduled to take place two weeks before trial, and if there are
3
disputes about which witnesses deSouza should be allowed to handle, it would be difficult for
4
Apparent's lawyers to wait until the pretrial conference to get that resolved. In light of this
5
concern, the Court stated it would hold the pretrial conference a full month before the start of the
6
trial.
Notwithstanding this, deSouza (on behalf of Apparent) stated that she refused to adhere to
7
8
this approach. Accordingly, the Court has no choice but to grant the motion to disqualify her.
9
However, after reviewing the supplemental briefs, the Court has determined that the
disqualification will only be partial. First, deSouza is not disqualified from continuing to
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
participate in pretrial litigation, including the pretrial conference. Accordingly, the case
12
management dates that were in place before the hearing on the motion to disqualify remain in
13
place, and the parties must proceed accordingly. Second, deSouza will only be disqualified from
14
representing Apparent at trial if Apparent continues to refuse to have a second lawyer at trial to
15
handle the witnesses who will testify to matters in which deSouza was personally involved. If
16
Apparent decides to bring on a second lawyer to handle those witnesses, and if Apparent agrees
17
that its lawyers will confer with opposing counsel before the pretrial conference in an attempt to
18
identify the witnesses deSouza should not handle (so that if there is any dispute the Court may
19
resolve it at the pretrial conference), deSouza will only be disqualified from handling those
20
witnesses at trial. But if Apparent refuses to bring in a second lawyer to ensure the integrity of the
21
trial process, deSouza will be fully disqualified from representing Apparent at trial.1
The trial date is continued 14 days, to November 2, 2015, so that there will be a full four
22
23
weeks between the pretrial conference and the start of trial.
Apparent has ample notice that deSouza will be fully disqualified from participating in the
24
25
trial if it does not bring in a second lawyer. Therefore, if Apparent does not bring in a second
26
1
27
28
If it becomes clear at the pretrial conference that deSouza's testimony is unnecessary, the Court
will lift the disqualification order. However, AI-Daiwa has made a strong showing in this motion
that deSouza's testimony will be necessary, and deSouza has not submitted adequate evidence or
explanation to rebut that showing.
3
1
lawyer and if deSouza is fully disqualified, that will not be a basis for continuing the trial date.
2
3
4
5
6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 10, 2015
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?