JMA Investments v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Company
Filing
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ORDER by Judge Richard Seeborg denying 35 Motion for Relief from Judgment. (cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/28/2014)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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No. C 13-04581 RS
JMA INVESTMENTS,
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
v.
MT. HAWLEY INSURANCE COMPANY;
14 and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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On May 19, 2014, judgment was entered in favor of defendant Mt. Hawley Insurance
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Company (“Mt. Hawley”) following cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff JMA
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Investments (“JMA”) sought relief from that order in a motion styled as a motion for
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reconsideration. The motion was construed as a timely motion for relief from the judgment,
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consistent with Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Mt. Hawley was
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directed to respond to parts II.C through II.I of JMA’s motion for relief concerning the issue of
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estoppel. As was indicated in that order, the proper interpretation of California Insurance Code
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section 673(i) was addressed at length in the Court’s Order granting summary judgment to Mt.
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Hawley following extensive prior briefing by both parties and would not be revisited in response
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to the instant motion.
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NO. 13-CV-04581 RS
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
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Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion to alter or
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amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Rule 60(b)
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provides that such relief may be granted for the following reasons: “(1) mistake, inadvertence,
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surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud . . . ; (4) the
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judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
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earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
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equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Neither JMA’s motion nor its brief in
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reply set forth the grounds upon which it seeks relief. To the extent the motion might be
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construed as one for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), JMA seeks a remedy that is to be exercised
“sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.” United States v. Alpine Land &
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.1993). To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party
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must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” that prevented him or her from ably prosecuting
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the case in the normal course. Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010). Attempts to
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re-litigate matters already decided by the court, or to introduce new arguments or evidence, are
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disfavored. See Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2004)
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Setting aside JMA’s renewed contentions relative to the Court’s interpretation of
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Insurance Code section 673, JMA raises three basic arguments for relief. First, JMA argues that
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California not federal law should be applied regarding the presumption of receipt of a properly-
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mailed letter. Although the federal rules and related laws concerning evidence “ordinarily
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govern in diversity cases,” “state evidence rules that are ‘intimately bound up’ with the state’s
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substantive decision making must be given full effect by federal courts sitting in diversity.”
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Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 2003). JMA chose not to litigate the
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question of which rule should apply and presents no reason now why its present arguments to the
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contrary could not have been raised in the prior motion. In any event, even if JMA were correct
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that the state rule should apply here, it would not be entitled to relief from the judgment as
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explained below.
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NO. 13-CV-04581 RS
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
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JMA argues that specific items of evidence noted in the Court’s prior Order are not
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sufficient to prove that GGCG was on notice at the time it entered into the settlement agreement
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with JMA that its policy with Mt. Hawley had been canceled. The crux of these arguments by
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JMA is that notice to an independent insurance agent or broker is not sufficient to put the insured
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on notice because a broker has no continuing obligation as the insured’s agent after the original
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policy has been secured. The question of whether notice to the broker was sufficient was first
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raised in Mt. Hawley’s opening brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, when it
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cited Marsh & McLennan of California v. City of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. App. 3d 108 (1976), for
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the well-settled proposition that an insurance broker acts as the agent for the insured, not the
insurer, in a transaction. JMA had ample opportunity to challenge the relevance of this rule and
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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whether the broker continued to act in its capacity as an agent for the insured at all relevant times
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in JMA’s response to Mt. Hawley and in the hearing concerning the parties’ cross-motions for
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summary judgment. It did not do so then and presents no grounds to re-litigate the issue now.
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Therefore, regardless of whether Mt. Hawley satisfied either the state or federal mailbox
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presumption, the uncontested evidence that the agent knew the policy had been terminated was
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sufficient to put the insured itself on notice.
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Finally, JMA argues that it is entitled to a finding that Mt. Hawley is estopped from
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asserting termination of the policy based on representations by its agents to agents of the insured
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that the policy remained in effect through the original policy period. Again, this issue was
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briefed by both parties on their cross-motions for summary judgment and was the subject of the
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hearing on those motions. JMA presents no new arguments necessitating relief from the court’s
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prior order. On that basis, JMA’s motion for relief (Dkt. No. 35) is denied.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED: August 28, 2014
_______________________________
RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge
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NO. 13-CV-04581 RS
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
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