The Estate of Evangelia Macias et al v. Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. et al

Filing 22

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND VACATING HEARING by Judge William Alsup [granting 14 Motion to Dismiss]. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/29/2014)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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THE ESTATE OF EVANGELINA MACIAS,
an individual; ANA LAURA MACIAS;
MARIA DE JESUS MACIAS; and VICTOR
MACIAS, individually and as co-successors in
interest of decedent Evangelina Macias,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ALAMEDA
COUNTY, INC., a corporation; JOSE
CASTELLANOS, individually; WASTE
MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS, INC.; WASTE
MANAGEMENT SECURITY, LLC; WM
CORPORATE SERVICES, INC.; and DOES
1– 50, inclusive,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS
AND VACATING HEARING

Defendants.
/

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No. C 13-04648 WHA

INTRODUCTION

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In this wrongful-death action, defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint for

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failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. To the extent stated below,

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the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. The hearing on

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February 6, 2014, is hereby VACATED.

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STATEMENT
The following facts are assumed to be true for the purposes of defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Plaintiffs are the daughters and husband of decedent Evangelina Macias. At the time

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of her death, decedent was a traffic director for defendant Waste Management of Alameda

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County, Inc.

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In addition to WMAC, defendants include WMAC employee Jose Castellanos, WMAC’s

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parent corporation, Waste Management Holdings, Inc., and WM Corporate Services, Inc.,

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which allegedly was identified incorrectly in the pleadings as Waste Management Security, LLC.

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WM Corporate Services is a wholly owned corporation of Waste Management Holdings and

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the entity reportedly responsible for (1) developing internal safety policies and procedures for all

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Waste Management corporations; and (2) monitoring and controlling the security cameras on all

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Waste Management corporation properties (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19).
According to the amended complaint, decedent was fatally injured when she was run

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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over by a front-end loader driven by Castellanos at WMAC’s dumpsite in San Leandro,

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California. She died from her injuries that same day. WM Corporate Service’s safety policy

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allegedly required traffic controllers to be in a protective zone to prevent serious bodily harm or

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death. Decedent, however, had no such protective zone from which she could safely perform her

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job (id. ¶¶ 16, 22, 23, 25).

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The amended complaint asserts six claims: (1) violation of the federal Occupational

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Safety and Health Act; (2) violation of the California Occupational Safety and Health

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Regulations; (3) negligence; (4) wrongful death; (5) survival; and (6) negligent infliction of

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emotional distress. Defendants now move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).

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ANALYSIS

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The central issue is whether there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal courts

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have original jurisdiction over claims that raise a federal question or where there is a matter in

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controversy exceeding $75,000 between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332(a).

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The action was commenced here on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction in light of

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allegations that defendants violated federal OSHA laws. Federal OSHA violations, however,

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do not themselves create a private right of action. 29 U.S.C. 653(b)(4); Crane v. Conoco, Inc.,

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41 F.3d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the first claim for violations of federal OSHA

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is dismissed.

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The only basis for exercising jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims is

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supplemental jurisdiction. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

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over a state claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

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jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). “To decline jurisdiction under [Section] 1367(c)(3), the

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district court must first identify the dismissal that triggers the exercise of discretion and then

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explain how declining jurisdiction serves the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to

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the parties, and comity.” Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v.
Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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has also instructed that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not

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insubstantial in a jurisdiction sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine

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Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

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In this action, the principles of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the parties,

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and comity weigh against retaining supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed the amended

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complaint less than three months ago and the case remains in the early stages of litigation.

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There has not been enough work done on this action and it is more efficient to dismiss the claims

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than exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Furthermore, in their opposition, plaintiffs concede

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there is no subject-matter jurisdiction (Opp. 2). For these reasons, the order dismisses the

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amended complaint without prejudice.

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Nonetheless, plaintiffs seek leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

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It is true that under this rule, a court “should freely give leave when justice so requires,” but

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the problem here is that there is no subject-matter jurisdiction at all. Indeed, in addressing

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Section 1653 of Title 28 of the United States Code, the Supreme Court explained that

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amendments may be made “only [to] incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually

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exists, and not [to] defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves.” Newman-Green, Inc. v.

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Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 831 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Zee Medical Distributor

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Ass'n, Inc. v. Zee Medical, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1157 (1998) (Judge Charles Breyer).
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Because there is no subject-matter jurisdiction here, as conceded by plaintiffs, their request for

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leave to amend is DENIED.

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Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION

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To the extent stated above, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is
GRANTED. The hearing on February 6, 2014, is hereby VACATED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 29, 2014.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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