Alderson et al v. Redwood Coast Medical Services, Inc.

Filing 34

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND TO ADD DOE DEFENDANTS 26 (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 11/18/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEANNIE ALDERSON, et al.,

Case No. 13-cv-04663-SI

Plaintiffs,

Related Case No. 14-cv-03564-SI

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v.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
AND TO ADD DOE DEFENDANTS

REDWOOD COAST MEDICAL
SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

Re: Dkt. No. 26

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Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Setting Aside Judgment of Dismissal and Adding Doe

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Defendants Pursuant to FRCP 60(b) is scheduled for a hearing on November 21, 2014. Pursuant

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to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for resolution

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without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

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DENIES the motion.

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs Jeannie Alderson and William R. Brown have filed two tort actions alleging

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negligence/medical malpractice and loss of consortium against Redwood Coast Medical Services,

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Inc. and Does 1-250. Those two actions are Case No. 13-cv-04663-SI (the “2013 action”) and

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Case No. 14-cv-03564-SI (the “2014 action”).

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Plaintiffs filed the 2013 action in Mendocino County Superior Court on May 22, 2013. On

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October 8, 2013, the United States removed that case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

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1441(a), 1441(c) and 1442(a)(1) because Redwood Coast Medical Services is a federally

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supported health center deemed a Public Health Service "employee."

Under the Federally

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Supported Health Centers Assistance Act ("FSHCAA"), the Federal Tort Claim Act ("FTCA") is

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the exclusive remedy for lawsuits against a federally supported health center deemed a Public

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Health Service "employee." 42 U.S.C.A. § 233(g). On November 18, 2013, the United States

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moved to dismiss the 2013 action for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to

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exhaust their required administrative remedies under the FTCA.

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defendant’s motion, and the Court dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute.

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On February 25, 2014, the Court entered judgment against plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs failed to oppose

Plaintiffs subsequently pursued their administrative remedies, and on July 31, 2014, Health

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and Human Services denied plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiff's counsel states that the claim was denied

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because the federal government had questions regarding whether Redwood Coast Medical

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Services was the source of the sponge that was left in plaintiff Alderson's body.

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On August 7, 2014, plaintiffs filed their second lawsuit against Redwood Coast Medical
Plaintiffs’ second complaint alleges that

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Services in this Court, Case No. 14-cv-03564-SI.

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plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies and asserts the same claims set forth in the

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2013 complaint. On October 9, 2014, plaintiffs moved to set aside the judgment in the 2013

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action in order to add additional defendants who are not connected with Redwood Coast Medical

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Services, and avoid possible statute of limitations issues that may arise in the 2014 action. The

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United States filed an opposition to the motion, and plaintiffs, through their counsel, informed the

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Court that they would not file a reply.

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DISCUSSION

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Prior to filing an action under the FTCA, plaintiffs were required to exhaust their

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administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “The requirement of an administrative claim is

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jurisdictional” and “must be strictly adhered to.” Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855

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(9th Cir. 2011); see also Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). An

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action that is filed before the administrative exhaustion requirement has been satisfied must be

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dismissed. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("The FTCA bars claimants

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from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.
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Because petitioner failed to heed that clear statutory command, the District Court properly

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dismissed his suit."); Nero v. Ives, No. 14-cv-00859 BRO, 2014 WL 3347529, at *6 (C.D. Cal.

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May 27, 2014) (“When a civil action is filed before the FTCA administrative claim has been

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denied, the court has no jurisdiction and the claim must be dismissed. Lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction cannot be cured by amending a defective complaint.”) (citation omitted); Galvan v.

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Brock, No. 11-cv-02079 AWI MJS, 2012 WL 4863068, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012) (“Because

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§ 2675(a) requires that an administrative claim be finalized at the time the complaint is filed, this

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court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present action against the United States, which was

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filed before the administrative exhaustion period had expired. This jurisdictional defect cannot be

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cured by amendment, and instead Plaintiffs must file a new action.”).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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For these reasons, the Court cannot set aside the judgment in the 2013 action and reopen

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plaintiffs’ FTCA claims against the United States. The Court had no jurisdiction over plaintiffs’

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FTCA claims in the 2013 action, and plaintiffs’ subsequent exhaustion of their administrative

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remedies cannot cure that lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112; Nero, 2014 WL

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3347529, at *6. If plaintiffs wish to add new defendants, they must attempt to do so in the 2014

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action over which this Court has jurisdiction.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 18, 2014

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SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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