Dodson et al v. Tempur-Sealy International, Inc. et al

Filing 183

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting in part and denying in part 160 Motion to Dismiss. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/28/2016)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 ALVIN TODD, et al., 7 Case No. 13-cv-04984-JST Plaintiffs, 8 v. 9 TEMPUR-SEALY INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants. Re: ECF No. 160 This putative class action alleges violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, 12 13 California’s Unfair Competition Law, California’s False Advertising Law, and eleven states’ 14 consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws. Defendants move under Federal Rules of Civil 15 Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint (“TAC”). The 16 Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of 19 purchasers of Tempur products against Tempur-Sealy International, Inc. and Tempur-Pedic North 20 America, LLC (collectively “Defendants”) for claims arising out of Defendants’ marketing and 21 sale of mattresses, pillows, and other bedding products containing Tempur material.1 Specifically, 22 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ representations of their Tempur products as “formaldehyde free,” 23 “free of harmful VOCs,” “allergen and dustmite resistant,” “hypoallergenic,” and with a 24 “completely harmless” odor, are false and misleading. TAC ¶¶ 3(h), 3(m), 3(n), 4. Plaintiffs 25 allege that Defendants knew their products did not conform to these representations because 26 1 27 28 Currently, the Plaintiffs include: Alvin and Melody Todd, Brian and Sara Stone, Robbie Simmons, Thomas Comiskey, Toni Kibbee, Tina White, Johnny Martinez, Keith Hawkins, Patricia and Alan Kaufman, Jerry and Diane Kucharski, Julie Davidoff, Ericka and Kurt Anderson, and Tracey Palmer. 1 internal testing revealed that Defendants’ products off-gassed many VOCs, including 2 formaldehyde, which can cause allergic reactions. Id. ¶ 4. Further, Plaintiffs claim that 3 Defendants were aware of customer complaints about the odor and correlating physical symptoms 4 such as headache, nausea, asthma, eye and throat irritation, and allergic reactions. Id. 5 Plaintiffs bring twenty-three claims under the laws of eleven states: (1) violations of 6 California’s Unfair Competition Law; (2) violations of California’s False Advertising Law; (3) 7 violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (4) violations of Illinois’s Consumer 8 Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act; (5) unjust enrichment under Illinois common law; (6) violation 9 of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act; (7) unjust enrichment under Maryland common law; (8) violations of Massachusetts’s Consumer Protection Act; (9) unjust enrichment under 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Massachusetts common law; (10) violations of Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act; (11) 12 unjust enrichment under Missouri common law; (12) violation of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud 13 Act; (13) unjust enrichment under New Jersey common law; (14) violations of New Mexico’s 14 Unfair Practices Act; (15) unjust enrichment under New Mexico common law; (16) violations of 15 New York’s Deceptive Acts and Practices law; (17) violation of New York’s False Advertising 16 Law; (18) unjust enrichment under New York common law; (19) violation of Washington’s 17 Consumer Protection Act; (20) unjust enrichment under Washington common law; (21) violation 18 of Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (22) unjust enrichment under Wisconsin common 19 law; and (23) unjust enrichment under Kentucky common law. 20 Plaintiffs filed this case in 2013, and discovery has been ongoing for more than a year. In 21 2014, this Court denied a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. ECF No. 50. 22 Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on July 16 and August 7, 2015. See ECF Nos. 133, 23 145 (respectively). When Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint in August 2015, the 24 parties submitted a new schedule, placing any responsive motions to Plaintiffs’ TAC before the 25 issue of class certification. See ECF No. 154. The Court approved this revised schedule, ECF No. 26 157, and Plaintiffs filed the TAC on August 27, 2015. Defendants filed the current motion to 27 dismiss on September 16, 2015. ECF No. 160. Plaintiffs filed their response brief on September 28 30, 2015. ECF No. 167. 2 1 II. JURISDICTION The Court has jurisdiction over this case as a class action in which a member of the class 2 3 of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant and the matter in controversy 4 exceeds the sum of $5 million, exclusive of interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs 5 6 lack standing. ECF No. 160 at 11. The Court addresses this argument below. 7 III. A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 8 9 LEGAL STANDARD is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. “To survive a motion 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 12 relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 13 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 14 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”2 Id. at 678. Furthermore, because Plaintiffs’ claims sound in fraud, they must satisfy the heightened 17 18 pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). This rule requires the plaintiff to 19 “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A 20 plaintiff satisfies her pleading burden under Rule 9(b) by alleging the “who, what, where, when, 21 and how” of the charged misconduct. Cooper v. Picket, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 IV. DISCUSSION Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on several grounds. Defendants contend 23 24 2 25 26 27 28 Generally, on a motion to dismiss, the Court considers only the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, a court may take judicial notice of certain information under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, and consider this information with the complaint. Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants have requested judicial notice of a final rule from the Consumer Product Safety Commission regarding the standard for the flammability of mattress sets. ECF No. 160-2. This case is premised on misleading or fraudulent advertising, however, and Defendants do not endeavor to explain why the Commission’s rule is relevant. Accordingly, the Court declines Defendants’ request for judicial notice. 3 1 that Plaintiffs: (1) have not met the heightened pleading requirements for fraud and their 2 misrepresentation claims cannot be saved by the Tobacco II exception; (2) have not adequately 3 alleged facts for class members who purchased Tempur products in 2006; (3) have not adequately 4 alleged an injury sufficient to support standing for misrepresentation by omission; (4) have not 5 adequately alleged a duty to disclose; (5) cannot sustain claims under state unjust enrichment laws 6 for misrepresentation by omission; and (6) cannot sustain a nationwide class claim for unjust 7 enrichment under Kentucky state law because of conflicts with other state laws. ECF No. 160. 8 The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. 9 A. 10 Pleading Standard for Fraud and Tobacco II Exception Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims for misrepresentation because they United States District Court Northern District of California 11 contend that Plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements. Id. at 11. Plaintiffs’ 12 TAC alleges misrepresentation arising under the state consumer protection statutes of ten states. 13 TAC ¶¶ 97-397. 14 This Court has already addressed whether Plaintiffs’ complaint provides sufficient factual 15 allegations for claims sounding in fraud. See ECF No. 50 at 7-8. Plaintiffs continue to plausibly 16 allege that: (1) since at least 2007 and continuing through at least August 7, 2013, Defendants 17 have misrepresented the contents and quality of their Tempur products, claiming such products 18 were “formaldehyde free,” “hypoallergenic,” “safe,” “free of harmful VOCs,” “allergen resistant,” 19 and “safe and healthy” on their website, in their retail in-store brochures, and in other marketing 20 materials; (2) that Defendants knew these assertions were untrue based on their own internal 21 testing and consumer complaints; (3) that Defendants continued making the representations and 22 omitted any facts suggesting otherwise; (4) that such representations were likely to deceive a 23 reasonable consumer because Plaintiffs did not have access to information regarding the chemical 24 makeup of Defendants’ products; (5) that Plaintiffs relied on such misrepresentations and 25 omissions in purchasing Tempur products; and (6) that Defendants’ misrepresentations and 26 omissions caused injury to Plaintiffs in that Plaintiffs would not have purchased, or would have 27 purchased at a significantly reduced price, the Tempur products had Plaintiffs known their true 28 contents. TAC ¶¶ 10, 23-35, 51-54. 4 1 As stated in the Court’s prior order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs 2 sufficiently plead the “who” required by Rule (9)(b). Where there are multiple defendants 3 involved in allegedly fraudulent acts, the plaintiffs must “identify the role of each defendant in the 4 alleged fraudulent scheme.” Fields v. Wise Media, LLC, No. C-12-05160-WHA, 2013 WL 5 3187414, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013) (citing Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764-65 6 (9th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiffs have properly alleged that both Defendants jointly engage in marketing 7 the Tempur products at issue in this case. See TAC ¶¶ 36-38. 8 9 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege whether any Plaintiff actually saw or heard the specific misrepresentations and relied on those misrepresentations in their purchase. ECF No. 160 at 12-13. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Tobacco II exception previously discussed by the Court, which allows a party to rely on “an 12 extensive long term advertising campaign” for the alleged misrepresentations, rather than 13 requiring plaintiffs to point to specific advertisements they remember. ECF No. 50 at 9-10. 14 These arguments are unavailing. Plaintiffs identify in the TAC the specific marketing 15 phrases they saw and relied on, provide copies of the various advertisements themselves, and 16 include a spreadsheet detailing which advertisements were seen by each Plaintiff. See TAC ¶¶ 23- 17 35; ECF No. 165 Ex. H-1, Part 1-10. These pleadings are sufficient to meet the requirements 18 imposed by Rule 9(b), and so there is no need to resolve the Tobacco II issue. Therefore, 19 Defendants’ motion to dismiss on these grounds is denied. 20 B. 2006 Purchases 21 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of Class Members who purchased 22 Tempur products in 2006 should be dismissed because the earliest purchase date Plaintiffs allege 23 is 2007. See TAC ¶ 52-54, 95. Because Plaintiffs do not allege that misrepresentations were 24 made in 2006, the TAC does not support any claims based on purchases before 2007. Defendants’ 25 motion to dismiss claims based on pre-2007 sales is granted without leave to amend. 26 C. 27 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing for claims of misrepresentation by omission 28 Standing because Plaintiffs allege no injury. ECF No. 160 at 17. The Court has previously addressed and 5 1 rejected this argument. See ECF No. 50 at 16. It explained that “Plaintiffs have alleged that the 2 chemicals contained in Tempur-pedic’s products can and do cause physical harm and that the 3 products have injured some customers.” Id.; See TAC ¶ 56. Further, the Court highlighted the 4 Ninth Circuit’s recognition that “where plaintiffs have ‘spent money that, absent defendants’ 5 actions, they would not have spent’ there is ‘a quintessential injury-in-fact’ that establishes 6 standing under Article III’s injury requirement.” ECF No. 50 at 16 (quoting Maya v. Centex 7 Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiffs here have alleged both that some 8 customers have been harmed by the Tempur product and that they would not have purchased the 9 products had they known of the products’ chemical contents. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for 10 lack of standing is denied. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 D. Duty to Disclose and Omission Claims 12 Because the Plaintiffs’ affirmative misrepresentation claims are properly alleged, they need 13 not rely on misrepresentation by omission. Nevertheless, the Court considers Defendants’ 14 arguments against Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation by omission claims. Defendants argue that 15 Plaintiffs’ claims based on misrepresentation by omission should be dismissed because Plaintiffs 16 do not adequately allege a duty to disclose. ECF No. 160 at 10-12. Defendants claim that they 17 have no duty to disclose the chemical content in their Tempur products because Plaintiffs allege 18 no set of facts indicating whether the presence of formaldehyde or other potentially harmful VOC 19 was material to themselves or a reasonable consumer. Id. 20 This is inaccurate. Plaintiffs repeatedly allege that the presence of VOCs, formaldehyde, 21 and other possible allergens was material, because they would not have purchased the Tempur 22 product, or would have paid less for them, had they known the true contents of the product. See 23 TAC ¶¶ 23-35, 107. 24 25 26 27 28 Defendants also specifically argue that the following state law claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ pleadings of misrepresentation by omission are insufficient: 1. Counts I-III (California) Defendants argue that omission claims under these counts must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing the levels of VOCs or formaldehyde that have caused 6 1 harm to Plaintiffs. ECF No. 160 at 13. As previously stated in the section on standing, Plaintiffs 2 have adequately pleaded an injury-in-fact caused by the alleged inaccurate or misleading 3 information provided by Defendants. The Court has previously addressed the standard to establish 4 a duty to disclose under California law and found that Plaintiffs meet that standard. See ECF No. 5 50 at 6. The pleadings for these counts have not changed. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 6 I-III is denied. 7 2. Count VII (Massachusetts) Defendants argue that Massachusetts plaintiff Ms. White has failed to allege facts to 9 support a duty to disclose under Massachusetts law. Massachusetts follows the Restatement 10 (Second) of Torts, which states that a duty to disclose exists where “‘(i) there is a fiduciary or 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 other similar relation of trust and confidence, (ii) there are matters known to the speaker that he 12 knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being 13 misleading, or (iii) the nondisclosed fact is basic to or goes to the essence of, the transaction.’” 14 Knapp v. Neptune Towers Associates, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 507 (2008) (quoting Stolzoff v. 15 Waste Sys. Intl., Inc., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 763 (2003)). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that 16 Defendants were aware of information that was contrary to the assertions in their advertising, and 17 that their advertising was misleading without this information. See TAC ¶¶ 8-10. This is 18 sufficient to allege a duty to disclose under the second prong as defined by the Restatement. For 19 this reason, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII is denied. 20 3. Count XII (New Jersey) 21 Defendants argue that Count XII should be dismissed because it is subsumed under New 22 Jersey’s Product Liability Act. ECF No. 160 at 23. They further argue that the claim should be 23 dismissed because there is no duty to disclose in New Jersey absent a fiduciary duty or special 24 relationship. Id. 25 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated that “the [Product Liability Act] is paramount 26 [over the Consumer Fraud Act] when the underlying claim is one of harm caused by a product.” 27 Sinclair v. Merck, 195 N.J. 51, 66 (2008). Although Plaintiffs allege many examples of harms 28 that result from the presence of chemicals in Defendants’ products, TAC ¶¶ 57-87, the underlying 7 1 claim is not based on product liability. Rather, it is a consumer fraud case based on inaccurate or 2 misleading advertising. See TAC ¶¶ 90-93. Additionally, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 3 recognizes both affirmative misrepresentations and omissions. See Talalai v. Cooper Tire & 4 Rubber Co., 360 N.J. Super. 547, 561-62 (2001). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count XII is 5 denied. 6 7 4. Count XIV (New Mexico) New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act “‘imposes a duty to disclose material facts reasonably necessary to prevent any statements from being misleading.’” Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 9 258 P.3d 1075, 1094-95 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Lohman v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 166 10 P.3d 1091, ¶ 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)). Defendants argue that the duty to disclose “only arises if 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 some other representation would be misleading without disclosure.” ECF No. 160 at 23. They 12 assert that New Mexico plaintiff Mr. Martinez could not have been misled because he failed to 13 allege that he saw or heard any representations. Id. 14 Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Mr. Martinez specifically alleges that Defendants 15 advertised their product as “allergen resistant” and “hypoallergenic” and points out the 16 advertisements he saw. TAC ¶¶ 283-85, ECF No. 165 Ex. H-1, Part 1. Mr. Martinez further 17 alleges that Defendants concealed contrary information that would have corrected the misleading 18 advertising. Id. These pleadings are sufficient under New Mexico law. Defendants’ motion to 19 dismiss Count XIV is denied. 20 21 5. Count XXI (Wisconsin) Defendants correctly state that omission claims are not actionable under Wisconsin’s 22 Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, 40. 23 However, Plaintiffs do not rely on an omission claim to fulfill the pleading requirements under 24 this statute, only on an affirmative misrepresentation. See ECF No. 167 at 25-26. 25 motion to dismiss Count XXI is denied. 26 27 28 8 Defendants’ 1 E. State Unjust Enrichment Claims 2 Defendants argue that all unjust enrichment claims3 must be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ 3 omission claims fail. ECF No. 160 at 23. Because neither Plaintiffs’ affirmative 4 misrepresentation nor their omission claims fail, Defendants’ motion to dismiss these counts is 5 denied. 6 F. Kentucky Unjust Enrichment Claim and Conflict of Laws 7 “A federal court sitting in diversity must look to the forum state’s choice of law rules to 8 determine the controlling substantive law.” Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 9 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, California’s choice-of-law rules apply. Plaintiffs allege that Kentucky law should apply to a nationwide class claim for unjust enrichment. They allege that 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Defendants’ principal place of business is in Kentucky and that Kentucky has a significant 12 aggregation of contacts to the unjust enrichment claims because the misleading marketing 13 statements originated there. TAC ¶ 36. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ nationwide unjust 14 enrichment claim under Kentucky law must be dismissed because Kentucky law would not apply 15 under California’s choice-of-law provisions. ECF No. 160 at 24. Plaintiffs respond that a choice- 16 of-law analysis is premature at the pleading stage. ECF No. 167 at 27. Many courts reserve choice-of-law analysis and dismissal of nationwide class claims for 17 18 the class certification stage. See e.g., Brazil v. Dole Food Co., No. 12-CV-01831-LHK, 2013 WL 19 5312418 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). They emphasize that dismissal at the pleading stage 20 would be premature prior to discovery and the development of a factual record. See e.g., Dean v. 21 Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. EDCV 15–0107 JGB, 2015 WL 3999313 at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 22 2015) (holding that a choice-of-law analysis “is not appropriate at this stage of litigation” but 23 rather should occur “after the parties have engaged in discovery”); Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. 24 Supp. 3d 999, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (stating that “choice of law analysis is a fact-specific inquiry 25 which requires a more developed factual record than is generally available on a motion to 26 dismiss”). Other courts have been willing to dismiss nationwide class claims at the pleading stage. 27 3 28 The state unjust enrichment claims can be found in Counts V, VII, IX, XI, XIII, XV, XVIII, XX, XXII, and XXIII. 9 1 See e.g., Brandon Banks v. Nissan North Am., Inc., No. C 11–2022 PJH, 2012 WL 8969415 at *1 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012); Koehler v. Litehouse, Inc., No. CV 12–04055 SI, 2012 WL 6217635 at 3 *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012). Here, in light of the advanced stage of litigation and the extensive 4 discovery that has already been completed, the Court concludes it is appropriate to conduct a 5 choice-of-law analysis. 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 Under California law, there is a three-step governmental interest test to determine which state’s laws apply. The test states: First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different. Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law to determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinate to the policy of the other state, and then ultimately applies the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied. Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590 (citing McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 48 Cal. 4th 68, 81-82 (2010)). 1. Differences in Laws of Affected Jurisdictions 17 “The fact that two or more states are involved does not itself indicate that there is a conflict 18 of law problem. A problem only arises if differences in state law are material, that is, if they make 19 a difference in this litigation.” Id. (citation omitted). Defendants have supplied the Court with a 20 table detailing the differences in unjust enrichment claims for all 50 states. ECF No. 160-3, 160 at 21 25-28. The Court concludes that the differences in law between the states involved in this 22 litigation are material. Accord., Mazza, 666 F.3d at 591 (holding “the elements necessary to 23 establish a claim for unjust enrichment also vary materially from state to state.”). Thus, the Court 24 moves to the test’s second step. 25 2. 26 Interests of Foreign Jurisdictions “It is a principle of federalism that each state may make its own reasoned judgment about 27 what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders. Every state has an interest in having its 28 law applied to its resident claimants.” Id. at 591-92. The issues presented in this case are similar 10 1 to those in Mazza. Both cases involved misleading advertising and unjust enrichment, and in both 2 cases a party attempted to apply a single state’s law to a nationwide class. Under step two of the 3 test, the Mazza court concluded that “[e]ach of our states also has an interest in being able to 4 assure individuals and commercial entities operating within its territory that applicable limitations 5 on liability set forth in the jurisdiction’s law will be available to those individuals and businesses. 6 These interests are squarely implicated in this case.” Id. at 592-93. In line with Mazza, the Court 7 finds here that the foreign states have significant interests in applying their own laws to Plaintiffs’ 8 claims. 3. 9 Impairment of State’s Interest “California’s governmental interest test is designed to accommodate conflicting state 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 policies, as a problem of allocating domains of law-making power in multi-state contexts . . .” Id. 12 at 593. The test is not intended to weigh conflicting state interests by evaluating which law has 13 the “better” or “worthier” social policy, but rather “recognizes the importance of our most basic 14 concepts of federalism, emphasizing ‘the appropriate scope of conflicting state policies,’ not 15 evaluating their underlying wisdom.” Id. (quoting McCann, 48 Cal. 4th at 97.). Under California law, “the place of the wrong has the predominant interest.” Id. 16 17 “California considers the ‘place of the wrong’ to be the state where the last event necessary to 18 make the actor liable occurred.” Id. (quoting McCann, 48 Cal. 4th at 94 n.12). For a claim of 19 unjust enrichment, the last event necessary for liability appears to be acceptance of a benefit that is 20 inequitable to retain.4 In this case, the final act is the alleged acceptance of money for the 21 purchase of a Tempur product, and so each class member’s unjust enrichment claim should be 22 governed by the unjust enrichment laws of the jurisdiction in which the money was accepted. As 23 a result, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the nationwide Kentucky unjust enrichment claim is 24 4 25 26 27 28 Many states’ laws contain this type of language for an unjust enrichment claim. See e.g., Brandt v. Ward Partners, 242 F.3d 6,16 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that the third element of unjust enrichment under Massachusetts law is retention of a benefit that makes the retention unjust); Berry & Gould v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151 (Md. 2000) (holding that the third element of unjust enrichment under Maryland law is acceptance of a benefit under circumstances that would make it inequitable to keep); Credit Inst. v. Veterinary Nutrition Corp., 133 N.M. 248, 253 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that under New Mexico law, the final element of an unjust enrichment claim is benefitting in a way that makes retention of that benefit unjust). 11 1 granted without leave to amend.5 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby granted in part and 3 4 denied in part. IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 Dated: January 28, 2016 7 ______________________________________ JON S. TIGAR United States District Judge 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 5 28 Given this conclusion, the Court does not consider Defendants’ alternative argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to allege a violation of Kentucky law. 12

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