Henneberry v. City of Newark et al

Filing 56

ORDER GRANTING 51 APPLICATION FOR GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT DETERMINATION filed by County of Alameda. The settling parties shall file a stipulation for dismissal. Signed by Judge Maria-Elena James on 9/3/2015. (cdnS, COURT STAFF).

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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 JOHN PATRICK HENNEBERRY, Case No. 13-cv-05238-MEJ Plaintiff, 9 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT DETERMINATION v. 10 11 CITY OF NEWARK, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 51 United States District Court Northern District of California Defendants. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff John Patrick Henneberry (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil rights action against 15 multiple Defendants arising from his arrest and subsequent incarceration in 2013. Compl., Dkt. 16 No. 1. Pending before the Court is Defendant County of Alameda’s (the “County”) Motion for 17 Good Faith Settlement Determination Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 18 877.6(a)(2). No party has objected to the motion. The Court finds this matter suitable for 19 disposition without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered 20 the proposed settlement, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS 21 the County’s motion for the reasons set forth below. BACKGROUND 22 23 A. Factual Background 24 On April 18, 2013, Defendant Newark Chamber of Commerce (the “Chamber”) and 25 Defendant City of Newark (the “City”) held an event called the “2013 State of the City and 26 Showcase” (“Showcase”), featuring Newark Mayor Al Nagy as the keynote speaker. Compl. ¶ 2. 27 All of the members of the Newark City Council were invited and attended the event, along with 28 City administrators and members of the Newark Planning Commission. Id. Also present were 1 Defendants City Attorney David Benoun and City Manager John Becker. Id. Defendants publicized the event via flyers, newspaper listings, and the Chamber and City 2 3 websites. Id. The webpage stated a luncheon would be served, but there would be free gallery 4 seating for the public beginning at 12:20 p.m. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff arrived at the event at 12:15 p.m. 5 as the luncheon was concluding, but did not enter. Id. ¶¶ 3, 30. He entered the main room at 6 12:25 p.m. and sat in an empty seat in what he surmised was the gallery area. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff states he is well known to the elected officials and administrators of the City for 7 8 his frequent attendance and speeches at City Council meetings. Id. ¶ 3. Thus, when Becker 9 noticed him sitting in the gallery, Plaintiff alleges Becker prompted Defendant Chamber of Commerce President Linda Ashley to ask him to leave. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff alleges Benoun and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Defendant Newark Police Commander Renny Lawson told him he had no right to be present as 12 this was not a public event, and they demanded Plaintiff leave. Id. After Ashley signed a citizen’s 13 complaint, Plaintiff alleges Lawson and Defendant Newark Police Officer Karl Fredstrom forcibly 14 pulled him from his chair, band tied his arms with wristlocks, and physically removed him from 15 the room. Id. ¶¶ 4, 33. Plaintiff alleges the officers acted “upon the request and consent” of 16 Benoun, Becker, and Ashley. Id. Once outside the room, Plaintiff was handcuffed and seated in a chair approximately ten 17 18 feet from the entrance of the meeting. Id. ¶ 34. He was then placed in a patrol car for 19 approximately thirty minutes, before being transported to the Newark Police Station. Id. At the 20 station, Fredstrom questioned Plaintiff, at which time Plaintiff asserted his right as a member of 21 the public to be at a public meeting. Id. Police later transported Plaintiff to the Fremont police 22 station, where he remained in the back of a police car, still in wristlocks. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff 23 complained the wristlocks were too tight, but officers denied his requests to have them loosened 24 while he was in the car. Id. Plaintiff was then driven to Santa Rita jail. Id. 25 Ultimately, Plaintiff was charged with a misdemeanor under California Penal Code section 26 602.1(a)1 for interfering with the event. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff was also charged with trespass, a minor 27 1 28 California Penal Code section 602.1(a) provides: “Any person who intentionally interferes with any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner or agent of a business establishment 2 1 misdemeanor, based on Ashley’s citizen complaint. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff was ultimately released on 2 a citation, and the District Attorney declined to file charges. Id. 3 B. Procedural Background On November 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed the present Complaint, alleging eight causes of 4 5 action against the above-named Defendants. Id. at 11-13. On October 6, 2014, the Court 6 dismissed certain claims, but allowed the lawsuit to proceed as to the remaining claims. Dkt. No. 7 25. 8 All of the parties participated in two settlement conferences with Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. Dkt. Nos. 35, 50. With Judge Beeler’s assistance, Plaintiff and the County agreed to a 10 settlement, contingent upon the Court making a good faith settlement determination pursuant to 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. Mot. at 4. Under the terms of the settlement, 12 Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the action against the County, releasing all actual and potential claims 13 against them arising out of the incidents that occurred surrounding Plaintiff’s incarceration, for the 14 total sum of $15,000. Id. at 1. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, both parties shall be 15 responsible for their own costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. On August 6, 2015, the County filed the 16 present motion. 17 18 LEGAL STANDARD California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 permits a court to approve a settlement if 19 it determines that the settlement was made in good faith. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6; see also 20 Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Butler, 904 F.2d 505, 511 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that while the 21 “section 877.6 procedures do not govern a federal action . . . the substantive provisions . . . are 22 applicable”). A finding of good faith settlement between a plaintiff and “one or more of a number 23 of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually 24 subject to contribution rights,” releases the settling defendant “from all liability for any 25 26 27 28 open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business, or their customers, and who refuses to leave the premises of the business establishment after being requested to leave by the owner or the owner’s agent, or by a peace officer acting at the request of the owner or owner’s agent, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to 90 days, or by a fine of up to four hundred dollars ($400), or by both that imprisonment and fine.” 3 1 contribution to any other parties.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877(b). While the settlement does not 2 discharge any other party from liability, unless its terms so provide, “it shall reduce the claims 3 against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the 4 amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.” Id. § 877(a). Section 5 877.6(a)(1) further provides that a determination of good faith settlement within the meaning of 6 the statute applies only to “any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are 7 joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt.” See Forman v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 920 F. 8 Supp. 1065, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Section 877.6 reflects “two major goals”: “the equitable sharing of costs among the parties 10 at fault and the encouragement of settlements.” Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 43 Cal. 3d 858, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 872 (1987). A good faith settlement is one within “the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s 12 proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.” Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. 13 Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499 (1985). When making a determination that a 14 settlement was made in good faith under section 877.6(a)(1), “the intent and policies underlying 15 section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account”: (1) a rough approximation of 16 the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportional liability in view of the settlement 17 amount; (2) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (3) the recognition that a settlor 18 should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after trial; (4) the financial 19 conditions and insurance policy limits of the settling tortfeasor; and (5) the existence of collusion, 20 fraud or tortious conduct intended to injure the interests of the non-settling parties. Id. 21 “Practical considerations” require that the evaluation “be made on the basis of the 22 information available at the time of settlement[,] and a defendant’s settlement figure must not be 23 grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate 24 the settling defendant’s liability to be.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court should approve even a 25 contested settlement, unless there is a showing “that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in 26 relation to these factors to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” Id. at 499- 27 500. The burden of proving that a settlement between the parties was not made in good faith is on 28 the non-settling tortfeasor. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(d). 4 DISCUSSION 1 As an initial matter, section 877.6’s requirement that the action comprise allegations 2 3 4 regarding joint tortfeasors is satisfied here, as Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims against multiple Defendants. Thus, the County is a “party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(a)(1). 5 Turning to the terms of the settlement and the application of the Tech-Bilt factors, the 6 Court finds those factors favor approval of the settlement agreement. 7 A. Approximation of Plaintiff’s Recovery and Defendants’ Proportionate Liability 8 First, the County must establish the settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by 9 the good faith criterion. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(b); Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500; see also 10 Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 220 Cal. App. 3d 864, 871 (1990), as modified United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 (June 5, 1990) (“[i]f . . . there is no substantial evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant’s liability, then a determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.”). To determine whether the proposed amount satisfies California’s good faith requirement, the defendant’s “good faith will not be determined by the 15 proportion his settlement bears to the damages of the claimant. For damages are often speculative, 16 and the probability of legal liability therefore is often uncertain or remote.” Stambaugh v. 17 Superior Ct., 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 239 (1976). Rather, courts are to examine whether the 18 settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would 19 estimate the settlor’s liability to be. City of Ground Terrace v. Superior Ct., 192 Cal. App. 3d 20 1251, 1262 (1987). 21 Plaintiff’s remaining claim against the County is based solely on the length and conditions 22 of his confinement, and they contend the amount of the settlement exceeds what a jury would 23 likely award Plaintiff if it found in his favor regarding the incarceration. Mot. at 6. Plaintiff has 24 raised no objection to the County’s position. Further, Plaintiff did not sustain any economic losses 25 as the result of his arrest and incarceration, and he is seeking only non-economic damages. Id. at 26 3. Finally, while the information produced so far does not establish a perfect apportionment of 27 liability, none of the remaining Defendants have raised objections to the settlement amount, and 28 5 1 “on a motion for a good faith settlement, the Court’s job is not to perfectly apportion liability.” 2 ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. United States, 2013 WL 842856, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (“Here, 3 it cannot be said that there is not enough information to enable the Court to approximate liability 4 for the limited purpose of determining whether the proposed settlement satisfies the good faith 5 test.” (emphasis in original)); N. Cty. Contractor’s Ass’n Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Serv., 27 Cal. 6 App. 4th 1085, 1090-91 (1994)). Given these facts, the Court finds the proposed settlement 7 roughly approximates the County’s proportion of potential liability. 8 B. Allocation of the Settlement Proceeds As there is only one Plaintiff in this case, this factor does not weigh against a finding of a 9 good faith settlement. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 C. Settlor Should Pay Less than at Trial Although the County disputes its liability, Plaintiff and the County seek to avoid continued 12 13 expenses and a possible expensive trial. The Court notes this settlement was arrived at after 14 informal discovery and negotiations between the parties, as well as two settlement conferences 15 with Judge Beeler. Accordingly, the Court finds the amount of the settlement reasonable, given 16 the potential outcome at trial and the fact that the County allowed to receive a potential discount 17 by settling rather than proceeding to trial. See ABF Freight Sys., 2013 WL 3244804, at *4. 18 D. Defendants’ Financial Condition and Insurance Policy Limits As a self-insured public entity, there is no evidence the County would be unable to satisfy 19 20 a judgment. Further, there is no evidence it sought a reduction in its fair share of a settlement 21 based upon any inability to pay, and never claimed any hardship, financial distress, or discount in 22 this regard. All costs and fees to defend this action and the amount of the settlement will be paid 23 from the County’s General Fund. Mot. at 4. Given this information, the Court finds no grounds 24 for concluding this factor weighs against the County’s motion. 25 E. 26 Collusion, Fraud, or Tortious Conduct There is no evidence that any party engaged in collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct in 27 arriving at this settlement. The facts presented show Plaintiff and the County reached this 28 settlement through arms-length negotiations after informal discovery and two settlement 6 1 conferences with Judge Beeler. The settlement is in writing, provides for payment of $15,000 in 2 exchange for release of all claims, contains no other consideration, and there are no undisclosed 3 terms. Mot., Ex. A (“Release of All Claims”). The remaining Defendants make no allegations to 4 the contrary. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the proposed settlement. 5 CONCLUSION 6 Based on the analysis above, the Court finds that application of the Tech-Bilt factors demonstrates the proposed settlement is a good faith settlement under California law. 8 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion for Good Faith Settlement Determination, 9 and bars any present or potential joint tortfeasor from bringing any future claims against the 10 County for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity based on comparative 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 negligence or comparative fault. The parties shall file a stipulation for dismissal. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 15 16 Dated: September 3, 2015 ______________________________________ MARIA-ELENA JAMES United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7

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