Henneberry v. City of Newark et al
Filing
98
ORDER by Judge Maria-Elena James granting in part and denying in part 89 Motion for Summary Judgment. All currently-scheduled pretrial and trial deadlines are vacated. Case Management Conference set for 5/11/2017 10:00 AM in Courtroom B, 15th Floor, San Francisco. (mejlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/26/2017)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOHN PATRICK HENNEBERRY,
Case No. 13-cv-05238-MEJ
Plaintiff,
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ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
v.
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CITY OF NEWARK, et al.,
Re: Dkt. No. 89
Defendants.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants City of
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Newark, Newark City Manager John Becker, Newark Police Officer Karl Fredstrom and now-
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retired Newark Police Commander Renny Lawson. See Mot., Dkt. No. 89. Plaintiff John
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Henneberry filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 90), and Defendants filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 91). The
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Court heard oral argument on March 2, 2017 and ordered supplemental briefing on a number of
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issues. Having considered the parties’ positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this
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case, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion for the following reasons.
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MATERIAL FACTS
For several years leading up to the events at issue in this lawsuit, Plaintiff attended every
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City Council meeting held by the City of Newark. See Henneberry Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 90-1.
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During these meetings and at other times, he actively participated in Newark politics, criticizing
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the salaries of City officials and their decisions to curtail public services. Id. ¶¶ 2-8, 18. As a
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result of his frequent and vocal participation at City Council meetings, Plaintiff was well known to
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Becker, Fredstrom, and former Defendant and Newark Chamber of Commerce President Linda
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Ashley. See Becker Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 89-3; Ashley Dep. at 39:16-43:25, Huang Decl. Ex. D,
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Dkt. No. 90-2; Fredstrom Dep. at 22:6-18, 24:24-25:13, Huang Decl., Ex. C. They and other
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Newark City officials felt Henneberry was disruptive, and that he complained too much. See
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Ashley Dep. at 39:16-41:24 (describing prior interactions where Henneberry complained about
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City), 42:8-43:25 (Ashley had discussed Henneberry with “a large portion of” the members of the
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City of Newark, including Becker: the gist of those conversations was that “it was hurtful what
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Henneberry did to people at the council meetings”); Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 90:15-25 (Plaintiff “has
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a history of calling the Mayor Hitler, of cussing at him, at cussing at the other council members, at
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City staff, me. And when you create a pattern, you expect that pattern to continue. And we had
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every reason to believe he would do it again and no reason to belief he wouldn’t”), Thornton Decl.
Ex. B, Dkt. No. 89-1; Fredstrom Dep. at 22:5-25:16 (recognized Plaintiff’s name from prior
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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council and planning meetings where Plaintiff was disruptive and “very loud”).
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Plaintiff saw advertisements about an upcoming State of the City address to be held on
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April 18, 2013 at a Hilton Hotel in Newark (the “Event”). Henneberry Decl. ¶ 13; see also Becker
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Decl. ¶ 3; Fredstrom Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 89-3. He looked up further information about the Event
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online and was directed to a “Community Events” page on the City of Newark Chamber of
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Commerce website. Henneberry Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, see id., Ex. A. The webpage makes no mention
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of reservations being required, does not state the Event is private or indicate the Chamber of
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Commerce is hosting the Event, and states there “will be gallery seating for those who do not
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attend the luncheon.” Id. ¶ 14 & Ex. A. He also clicked a link on the Community Events page
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that directed him to a flyer for the Event, which bears the Newark Chamber of Commerce’s and
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the City of Newark’s logos and the title “2013 State of the City Address & Showcase Mayor Al
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Nagy.” Id. ¶¶ 14-15 & Ex. B. The flyer states “Registration & Networking Showcase Open
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(lunch ticket not req.)” and “Gallery Seating Open (no charge).” Id., Ex. B. It describes “New
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Sponsor Opportunities!” and lists fees associated with different levels of sponsorship; the lower
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half of the flyer allows attendees to reserve showcase space and order lunch. Id. The flyer also
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states “[r]eservations are required by April 16” and directs attendees to pay the Chamber of
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Commerce online or by mail. Id.
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At 12:05 p.m. on April 18, 2013, Plaintiff arrived at Event. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 16. He
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waited in the lobby, filled out a nametag he found at an unstaffed table, helped latecomers fill out
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nametags, asked them if they were registered to vote, and directed them to the event room. Id. ¶
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17. Just before 12:30 p.m., he entered the ballroom, where the Event was taking place; he was not
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asked whether he had a reservation. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. He sat in the back row of the gallery section of
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the ballroom. Id.; see also Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 60:2-14. Plaintiff wrote on a pad of paper and
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did not say a word. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 20.
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Becker spotted Plaintiff and found Ashley; he told her he did not want Plaintiff
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“embarrassing the Mayor” and asked Ashley whether there was “some reason why [Plaintiff]
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shouldn’t be here.” Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 55:6-9, 58:18-59:23; see also Becker Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.
Ashley told Becker that Plaintiff did not have a reservation, stated “we don’t let anybody in who
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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doesn’t have a reservation,” and assured Becker she would “take care of it.” Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at
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55:6-9; Id. at 94:5-13 (Ashley told Becker words to the effect that she would get Henneberry to
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leave because he did not have a reservation, and that Becker understood Henneberry was leaving);
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see also Becker Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 (“Ms. Ashley confirmed that Henneberry did not have a reservation
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for the Event, and that any person who did not have a reservation was not permitted at the Event.
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Ms. Ashley then told me that she would take care of the situation, and she walked over to
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Henneberry.”). Becker did not provide any direction to Ashley regarding Plaintiff’s removal.
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Becker Decl. ¶ 10. Within a few minutes of Plaintiff sitting down in the gallery, Ashley informed
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him he needed to leave because he had not made a reservation. Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 59:22-25;
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Henneberry Decl. ¶ 20. Ashley did not check whether persons in the gallery had reservations until
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Becker noticed Plaintiff in attendance. See Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 51:10-55:5.
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Plaintiff declined to leave, because “[h]e had every right to be there.” Defs.’ Ashley Dep.
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at 61:8-9. Ashley replied the Event was not a public event, but a private event run by the Chamber
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of Commerce, and that Plaintiff did not have a right to be there because he did not make a
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reservation. Id. at 61:10-15; see also id. at 80:10-13 (Ashley had rented the room for the Chamber
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event); Henneberry Decl. ¶ 20; see also Becker Decl. ¶ 5 (Event “was not a City of Newark event.
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I did not have control over who was permitted to attend the event.”) Plaintiff explained that he
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was entitled to attend the meeting under the Brown Act.1 Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 61:17-20;
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Henneberry Decl. ¶ 20.
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Lawson and a plain-clothed police officer joined Ashley. Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 61:25-15;
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see also Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at Ex. 1 (Incident Report) at 5-8 (identifying plain-clothed officer
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as Shannon Todd), Thornton Decl. Ex. A. At 12:25 p.m., Ashley informed Lawson that Plaintiff
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did not have a reservation and she had asked him to leave, but that Plaintiff refused to do so.
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Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 67:3-12; Lawson Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 89-4. Fredstrom was dispatched to the
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Event “because there was some type of disturbance involving Mr. Henneberry.” Defs.’ Fredstrom
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Dep. at 20:5-21:6. There is no dispute that Plaintiff refused to leave after being asked to do so;
however, there is no evidence Plaintiff was loud, used inappropriate language, was
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Northern District of California
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confrontational, or abusive. Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at 103:1-105:22; Henneberry Decl. ¶ 20; see
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also Lawson Decl. ¶ 10 (“Henneberry’s actions were disruptive to the event. As a result of [his]
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refusal to leave the Event or otherwise cooperate with requests, the scheduled program was
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delayed.”).
Plaintiff contends two uniformed police officers “approached me yanked me out of my
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seat, and took me into the lobby, and handcuffed me. After a few minutes, I was taken outside and
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placed into the back of a patrol car. Neither police officer spoke with me, nor told me what was
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happening.” Henneberry Decl. ¶ 21. Defendants introduce evidence Lawson repeatedly asked
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Plaintiff to leave and explained what was happening. Fredstrom Dep. at 26:6-9; 29:22-23, 34:18-
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35:16; Lawson Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7.
There is no dispute that, while Henneberry was seated, Lawson and Fredstrom grabbed
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Plaintiff by the hands and arms and escorted him out of the building using a rear wrist lock. Defs.’
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Fredstrom Dep. at 38:16-40:21 & Incident Report at 6. Fredstrom asked Lawson whether he
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wanted Plaintiff detained; Lawson responded affirmatively. Id. at 40:22-41:7 & Incident Report at
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The Brown Act provides that a “majority of the members of a legislative body shall not, outside
a meeting authorized by this chapter, use a series of communications of any kind, directly or
through intermediaries, to discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item of business that is within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 54952.2(b)(1). There
are a number of exceptions to this requirement. Id. §§ 54952.2(c)(1)-(6).
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6. At this point, Fredstrom handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in a patrol car. Incident Report at
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6. Fredstrom returned to the conference to investigate the incident. Id.
Plaintiff was kept in a patrol car for 30-45 minutes while Fredstrom was conducting his
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investigation. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 22. Fredstrom took statements from Ashley and several other
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witnesses who reiterated that they had told Plaintiff or had overheard Plaintiff being told that the
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Event was private and not open to the public, and that Ashley had asked Plaintiff to leave but he
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refused. See Incident Report at 6-9 (Ashley, Newark City Attorney David Benoun, and two
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others, all told Fredstrom conference was a private event; Ashley, Todd, and another witness, all
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told Fredstrom Ashley had asked Plaintiff to leave).2 One of the witnesses Fredstrom interviewed
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was Benoun, who
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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told me that Linda Ashley had come up to him and said that Mr.
Henneberry was at the event and that Henneberry was claiming a
violation of the Brown Act. Benoun said that Ashley told him that if
Henneberry was to be removed, that Henneberry wanted to speak to
the city attorney. Benoun agreed and spoke with Henneberry.
Benoun . . . advised Henneberry that this was a private affair, has
nothing to do with the city, it’s a [Chamber of Commerce] event and
that if they ask you to leave, it is within their rights.
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Incident Report at 8. Fredstrom determined he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for
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trespassing based on his investigation. Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at 61:22-62:1. Fredstrom also
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believed the arrest was supported by Ashley’s willingness to sign a Citizen’s Arrest form. Id. at
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62:2-63:9, 73:20-75:12.
Becker did not give Fredstrom or Lawson any directions regarding detaining or arresting
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Plaintiff. Becker Decl. ¶ 10.
By the time Fredstrom drove Plaintiff to the Newark Police Department, the Event was
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over, evidenced by the fact that people were leaving. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 22. Fredstrom
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continued to interview Plaintiff at the police station. Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at 75:13-19;
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Henneberry Decl. ¶ 23. Fredstrom arrested Henneberry for violating California Penal Code
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While Plaintiff declares neither Lawson nor Fredstrom spoke to him or explained what was
happening, he does not deny that the other witnesses identified in Fredstrom’s Incident Report told
him the event was private and/or that he needed to leave. Cf. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 21.
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Section 602.1(a). See Consolidated Arrest Report, Huang Decl. Ex. A. Fredstrom made the
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decision not to “field cite” Plaintiff at the Newark Police Station. Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at 94:25-
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95:5; see also id. at 95:10-15 (Newark Police Department policy allows officers either to issue a
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citation and release somebody from the scene under certain circumstances, or to transport the
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person to Fremont Jail and have them issue a citation and release the subject after booking). At
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2:54 p.m., Fredstrom left the police station to transport Plaintiff to the Fremont Jail. Defs.’
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Fredstrom Dep. at 88:1-13. Persons booked at the Fremont jail are eligible for “cite and release,”
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and Fredstrom intended to tell the officers booking Plaintiff at Fremont Jail that Plaintiff was
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eligible for immediate release and citation. Id. at 91:20-93:2. The cite and release process can
take anywhere from 10 minute to hours, depending on how many people are waiting to be booked.
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Northern District of California
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Id. at 93:21-94:2. But when they arrived at Fremont Jail, Fredstrom was ordered to take Plaintiff
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and another arrestee to Santa Rita Jail. Id. at 91:12-19, 94:14-16.
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Plaintiff was booked into Santa Rita Jail where, instead of being cited and released, he was
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held for more than thirty hours. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 24. As a result of this experience, Plaintiff
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has drastically reduced his participation in local government, and has stopped attending City
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Council meetings. Id. ¶ 26.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrate
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that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment
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bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that
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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is
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sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
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Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must
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affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving
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party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where
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the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by
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pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
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party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25.
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If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific
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facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 56(c)(1); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.
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2004). However, it is not the task of the Court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of
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triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court “rel[ies] on the
nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary
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Northern District of California
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judgment.” Id.; see also Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Thus, “[t]he district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine
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issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references
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so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031
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(9th Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled
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to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (internal quotations omitted).
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Additionally, at the summary judgment stage, parties must set out facts they will be able to
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prove at trial. At this stage, courts “do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form . . . .
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[but] instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036
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(9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “While the evidence presented at the summary judgment stage
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does not yet need to be in a form that would be admissible at trial, the proponent must set out facts
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that it will be able to prove through admissible evidence.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d
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966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “[t]o survive summary judgment, a
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party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as
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long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.” Block v. City
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of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (a party need not “produce
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evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.”); see
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also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must
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be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that
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the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”).
DISCUSSION
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After this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Order,
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Dkt. No. 75), Plaintiff’s remaining claims in this action are as follows: (1) Section 1983 claims
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against all Defendants based on violations of the First and Fourth Amendments; (2) False
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Arrest/False Imprisonment claims against Lawson, Fredstrom, and the City of Newark; and (3)
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Bane Act claims against Lawson, Fredstrom and the City of Newark. Defendants move for
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summary judgment as to each of these claims.
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A.
Section 1983—Fourth Amendment
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Northern District of California
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1.
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The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported by probable cause. Atwater v.
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City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (an
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arrest generally is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause). An arrest is supported
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by probable cause if, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officer, a
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prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the defendant had
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committed a crime. Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010); Beier v. City of
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Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004); Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1085
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(9th Cir. 2002).
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Probable Cause
Defendants contend they cannot be liable for wrongful arrest or imprisonment because
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Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for trespassing. In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues
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the arrest was not lawful because there was no probable cause to arrest him, and because the arrest
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was motivated by the invidious purpose of chilling his right to free speech and political
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participation. He argues the fact Fredstrom changed his mind about the penal code section he used
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to charge Plaintiff demonstrates Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him in the first place.
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He argues the fact Fredstrom suggested to Ashley that she sign a Citizen’s Arrest form further
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demonstrates Defendants lacked probable cause. During the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that he
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does not base his Fourth Amendment claim on any excessive force allegations.
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a.
Fredstrom
Fredstrom arrested Plaintiff pursuant to California Penal Code section 602.1(a), a
misdemeanor, which provides that:
Any person who intentionally interferes with any lawful business or
occupation carried on by the owner or agent of a business
establishment open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating
those attempting to carry on business, or their customers, and who
refuses to leave the premises of the business establishment after
being requested to leave by the owner or the owner’s agent, or by a
peace officer acting at the request of the owner or owner’s agent, is
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county
jail for up to 90 days, or by a fine of up to four hundred dollars
($400), or by both that imprisonment and fine.
“[A] violation of § 602.1 has two elements: (1) intentional interference, and (2) refusal to leave.”
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Northern District of California
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Dubner v. City and Cty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2001). Under this statute,
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“interference” requires obstruction or intimidation, not mere presence. See, e.g., Hamburg v. Wal-
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Mart Stores, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 497, 511 (2004), as modified (Mar. 3, 2004) (while there was
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evidence that fifteen persons were on store property, and some were collecting signatures for a
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petition, “nowhere in the police report is there any suggestion that the officers on the scene
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believed appellants or other protestors were intentionally interfering with Wal–Mart’s business by
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obstructing or intimidating its customers or otherwise engaging in any criminal act”); Han v. City
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of L.A., 2016 WL 2758241, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2016) (“No one disputes that [p]laintiff was
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arrested while he was waiting in line to order food” but there was no evidence that plaintiff, who
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previously had been banned from the area for distributing pamphlets on veganism, “had obstructed
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or intimidated or in any other fashion interfered with any of the businesses in [the area], other than
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[d]efendants’ contention that [p]laintiff’s presence . . . was sufficient to interfere with the
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business”); cf. Chaffee v. Chiu, 2013 WL 6664785, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2013) (probable
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cause existed where arresting deputy witnessed “chaos” during Board of Supervisors meeting,
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“observed” plaintiff “raising his voice, “‘heard’ the profanity-laced shouting match between”
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plaintiff and others, and was told by witnesses plaintiff had started the disturbance).
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The undisputed witness statements memorialized in Fredstrom’s Incident Report and the
conversations Fredstrom recalled during his deposition constitute “reasonably trustworthy
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information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution” to believe that the Event was a
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private event organized by the Chamber of Commerce for which Plaintiff did not have a
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reservation, that Plaintiff sat in an “area designated for guests (public) who had reserved a spot,
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but would not be eating (no charge)”, and that Plaintiff “was asked politely to leave on several
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occasions by several [Chamber of Commerce] members.” Incident Report at 9; see also Defs.’
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Fredstrom Dep. at 61:12-16. But there is no evidence Fredstrom was informed that Plaintiff had
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done anything besides refusing to leave after being asked to do so. While it is disputed whether
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Plaintiff’s refusal to leave “caused a delay to the start of the” conference (id.), there is no evidence
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Plaintiff was being disruptive before Ashley and Defendants approached him. At the hearing,
Defendants argued the Court should “infer” Plaintiff had an “intent” to disrupt based on his refusal
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Northern District of California
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to leave the conference. An inference regarding Plaintiff’s intent is insufficient to create a triable
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issue of fact that Plaintiff in fact caused a disturbance. Defendants thus have not met their burden
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of showing no genuine dispute exists that Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under
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section 602.1(a).
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Probable cause nevertheless may exist for an arrest “for a closely related offense, even if
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that offense was not invoked by the arresting officer, as long as it involves the same conduct for
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which the suspect was arrested.” Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The “closely related offense” doctrine crafts a compromise. On one hand, it ensures police
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officers are not required to charge every arrested citizen with every offense for which the officer
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thought the citizen could be held in order to ensure that at least one charge would survive probable
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cause. On the other, it ensures police officers are not allowed to provide ex post facto
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justifications to justify sham arrests. Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 950-51
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(9th Cir. 2003) (while doctrine did not apply because crime initially charged and crime later
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offered as justification did not arise out of same conduct, court nonetheless found qualified
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immunity because no concerns about sham arrest were implicated). “As long as the officers had
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some reasonable basis to believe [Plaintiff] had committed a crime, the arrest is justified as being
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[] based on probable cause. Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be charged
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under the circumstances.” Id.; see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 473-75 (9th
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Cir. 2007) (applying Bingham and finding probable cause existed where suspect was arrested for
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trespassing in violation of California Penal Code section 602(j), but ultimately charged with
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trespassing in violation section 602(n).)
The Court finds there is no dispute that Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for
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violating Penal Code section 602(o). Section 602 lists trespasses constituting misdemeanors, and
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includes
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[r]efusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures
belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and not open to the
general public, upon being requested to leave by (1) a peace officer
at the request of the owner, the owner’s agent, or the person in
lawful possession, and upon being informed by the peace officer that
he or she is acting at the request of the owner, the owner’s agent, or
the person in lawful possession, or (2) the owner, the owner’s agent,
or the person in lawful possession.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Cal. Penal Code § 602(o). Land “not open to the general public” includes otherwise “public
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property that is temporarily closed to all but ticket-buying members of the public”:
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[T]he Court concludes that the California Supreme Court would
define property “not open to the general public” to include property
open only to ticket-buyers.
In reviewing criminal trespass
convictions for entry onto public property, courts in other
jurisdictions have distinguished between areas of public facilities for
which a ticket is required, and areas which anyone may enter.
[Cite.] Courts addressing the analogous problem of determining
whether areas of a public stadium constitute public forums for free
speech purposes have distinguished between areas open to the nonticket buying public and areas for which a ticket is required. [Cite.]
The California Supreme Court, in defining the state constitutional
protections for speech in privately-owned shopping centers, has
emphasized that the owners of such centers allow the public to enter
and exit freely. [Cite.]. Here, it is uncontroverted that tickets were
required to enter Blair Field during the game at which the plaintiffs
were seized. [Cite.] The field was not open to the public without
permission from the baseball team. This element of [trespass] was
therefore present at the time Sergeant Jacobson made his
determination of probable cause.
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James v. City of Long Beach, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084-85 (C.D. Cal. 1998).3 While the hotel at
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Plaintiff argues this case is distinguishable because the stadium charged for tickets, while the
gallery seating was free. See Opp’n at 16-17. The Court does not find this distinction relevant:
the James Court focused on permission from the baseball team, not the cost of attendance. See
also Garcia v. City of Santa Clara, 2016 WL 7212192, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016) (whether
a property is “open to the general public” hinges on whether patrons must obtain permission to
enter.”) Thus, farmers’ markets, fast food restaurants, and department stores all “have
11
1
which the Event was held was open to the public, it is undisputed that Lawson, Benoun, and
2
Ashley, among others, told Fredstrom the room in which the Event took place was only open to
3
persons who made reservations and thus was not open to the general public for the duration of the
4
Event.
The totality of the circumstances thus reasonably could lead a reasonable officer to believe
5
6
that (1) the Newark Chamber of Commerce was hosting a private event that was only open to
7
persons having reservations, i.e., that it was not open to the public; (2) Ashley, as then-President
8
of the Chamber of Commerce, was a person in lawful possession of that space; (3) Plaintiff had
9
refused to leave the conference room upon Ashley’s request; and (4) Plaintiff again refused to
leave the conference upon Lawson’s request at Ashley’s behest. Accordingly, Fredstrom would
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
have had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for violating section 602(o) based on the same conduct
12
that lead him to arrest Plaintiff for violating section 602.1(a).
Because there is no dispute Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the
13
14
closely related arrest doctrine, the Court grants summary judgment to Fredstrom on Plaintiff’s
15
Fourth Amendment claim. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
b.
16
Becker and Lawson4
There is no evidence that Becker arrested Plaintiff or participated or directed his arrest. On
17
18
the contrary, Becker declares he did not provide any direction to Ashley, Lawson, or Fredstrom
19
regarding Plaintiff’s removal or arrest. Becker Decl. ¶ 10. At the hearing, Plaintiff argued the
20
“implication” of Becker’s statements to Ashley constituted a “very clear” direction to have
21
Plaintiff arrested. This statement is not based on personal knowledge, lacks foundation, and is
22
insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) to create a genuine dispute about
23
Becker’s participation or direction. At most, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show Becker
24
directed his removal from the ballroom. This does not constitute evidence supporting a false
25
arrest claim. See, e.g., Jones v. Town of Quartzsite, 2014 WL 4771851, at *6 (D. Az. Sept. 24,
26
27
unquestionably been deemed ‘open to the general public.’” Id. at *3.
4
28
Plaintiff has not identified any deposition testimony by Becker or Lawson, and relies instead on
the testimony of Fredstrom and Ashley to meet his burden on summary judgment.
12
1
2014) (plaintiff failed to state a claim for wrongful arrest where plaintiff only alleged removal
2
from meeting).
3
Similarly, while there is evidence that Lawson told Fredstrom to “detain” Plaintiff, there is
4
no evidence Lawson instructed Fredstrom to arrest him. Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at 40:22-41:13.
5
There is a distinction between detention and arrest:
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of
citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes of
limited inquiry in the course of routine police investigations. [Cite.]
A line between reasonable detention for routine investigation and
detention which could be characterized as capricious and arbitrary
cannot neatly be drawn. But due regard for the practical necessities
of effective law enforcement requires that the validity of brief,
informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from the
totality of the circumstances that the detaining officers could have
had reasonable grounds for their action. A founded suspicion is all
that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine
that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing.
13
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966). Based on the totality of the circumstances,
14
Lawson had reasonable ground for ordering Fredstrom to detain Henneberry; Fredstrom did so and
15
conducted his investigation. Plaintiff argued at the hearing that Lawson’s instruction, combined
16
with the fact a second unit was called to the hotel, “implied” to Fredstrom he should arrest
17
Plaintiff. Again, Plaintiff’s interpretation is not based on personal knowledge, lacks foundation,
18
and amounts to speculation. It is insufficient to create a genuine dispute about Lawson’s
19
participation or direction in Plaintiff’s arrest.
20
Because Plaintiff has identified no evidence that these Defendants participated, directed, or
21
otherwise caused his arrest, the Court grants summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim
22
to Becker and Lawson.
23
24
c.
City of Newark
Plaintiff argues the City of Newark is liable for the violation of his rights through Becker’s
25
conduct. See Opp’n at 22-23. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of fact
26
exists with respect to Becker’s liability as to his Fourth Amendment claim, the Court also grants
27
summary judgment on this claim to the City of Newark.
28
13
1
2.
Invidious Purpose
2
Plaintiff argues that, because his arrest was for the “invidious purpose of interfering with
3
his right to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment,” he does not need to
4
establish a lack of probable cause. See Opp’n at 21. But the cases Plaintiff cites for this
5
proposition do not support it. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park primarily addresses statute of
6
limitations and accrual issues, and in fact states: “To prevail on his § 1983 claim for false arrest
7
and imprisonment, [plaintiff] would have to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest
8
him.” 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998). In Murgia v. Municipal Court, the trial court denied a
9
motion on the ground that alleged discriminatory prosecution, even if established, could not
10
constitute a defense in criminal proceedings. The California Supreme Court reversed:
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
Neither the federal nor state Constitution countenances the singling
out of an invidiously selected class for special prosecutorial
treatment, whether that class consists of black or white, Jew or
Catholic, Irishman or Japanese, United Farm Worker or Teamster. If
an individual can show that he would not have been prosecuted
except for such invidious discrimination against him, a basic
constitutional principle has been violated, and such a prosecution
must collapse upon the sands of prejudice.
12
13
14
15
16
15 Cal. 3d 286, 290 (1975). Murgia does not apply here. First, Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his
17
equal protection claim. See Dkt. No. 15 at 2. Second, he does not identify any evidence that
18
suggests Defendants singled out an invidiously selected class for special prosecutorial treatment or
19
that he was a member of such a class—he argues only that he was prosecuted to prevent him from
20
engaging in free speech. See Opp’n at 21. The Court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to further
21
brief his argument that First Amendment retaliation negates probable cause for his arrest. See
22
Suppl. Br. Order at 1, Dkt. No. 95. While Plaintiff does not concede the issue, the cases he cites
23
confirm this argument is properly asserted in support of his First Amendment retaliation claim—
24
not his Fourth Amendment claim. See Suppl. Br. at 1-2, Dkt. No. 97. The Court will address that
25
argument below.
26
3.
27
Plaintiff argues his Arrest Report shows Fredstrom “did not know what violation to charge
28
Plaintiff with” because someone crossed off § 602.1(a) on the report, wrote § 602(o) below it, then
Flip Flopping & Citizen’s Arrest
14
1
crossed out that section and wrote § 602.1(a) below it. See Opp’n at 7-8; Consolidated Arrest
2
Report. The Court sustains Defendants’ objections that Plaintiff’s counsel has not shown she
3
personal knowledge of the document or of the meaning of the cross-outs. See Reply at 2.
4
Moreover, as discussed above, Fredstrom can establish probable cause based on the closely related
5
arrest doctrine.
Plaintiff also argues the fact Fredstrom convinced Ashley to complete a Citizen’s Arrest
6
form demonstrates he lacked probable cause to arrest him. See Opp’n at 7. Ashley testified
8
Fredstrom initiated the conversation about signing a Citizen’s Arrest form and told her the “only”
9
way to remove Plaintiff from the Event was to have Ashley sign the form. See id. (citing Ashley
10
Dep. at 78:6-12). This admission by Fredstrom is of minimal probative value in light of the other
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
7
evidence in the record. As discussed above, based on the totality of the circumstances, Fredstrom
12
had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. In addition, Fredstrom testified he believed he had probable
13
cause to arrest Plaintiff for trespassing based on his investigation, and that it was his practice “in a
14
lot of cases” to use Citizen’s Arrests to “bolster” the arrest. Fredstrom Dep. at 71:6-18; see also
15
Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep. at 61:6-62:18, 72:9-75:12 (Fredstrom believes arrest was proper based on
16
both probable cause and on Citizen’s Arrest). That Fredstrom told Ashley a Citizen’s Arrest was
17
the “only” way to secure Plaintiff’s removal does not create a genuine dispute that, based on the
18
evidence before the Court, Fredstrom lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
The edited Consolidated Arrest Report and the Citizen’s Arrest Form do not create a
19
20
genuine dispute whether Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
d.
21
Summary
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants all Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
22
23
as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.
24
B.
Section 1983—First Amendment
25
1.
Elements
26
To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show Defendants’ (1)
27
action “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment
28
activities” and (2) their “desire to cause the chilling effect was a but for cause of the [their]
15
1
action.” Holland v. City of S.F., 2013 WL 968295, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (quoting
2
Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
3
citation omitted)).
4
Generally, “the general public does not . . . have a First Amendment right to access private
property for expression.” Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1137
6
(9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases). The United States Supreme Court “has never held that a trespasser
7
or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and
8
used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.” Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568
9
(1972). The general public also does not generally have a First Amendment right to access public
10
property for expression when access to that property is restricted to persons having permission to
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
5
enter. See supra at [12] (citing cases, including Garcia, 2016 WL 7212192, at *3-4 (whether a
12
property is “open to the general public” hinges on whether patrons must obtain permission to
13
enter.”)).
14
2.
15
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s removal and subsequent arrest did not violate his First
Analysis
16
Amendment rights because the State of the City Address was a private event Plaintiff was not
17
entitled to attend. They identify evidence showing the Event was a private affair hosted by the
18
Newark Chamber of Commerce, a private entity, which had rented a ballroom at the Hilton Hotel
19
for that purpose. See Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 89:17-90:1; Becker Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 (the 2013 State of the
20
City Address and Showcase “was not a City of Newark event”); Defs.’ Fredstrom Dep., Ex. 3 at 2
21
(article in Newark News states gallery seating will be available, and that “anyone who wishes to
22
hear what has been happening in Newark over the past year and what is on the horizon” may
23
contact the Chamber “to reserve a space.”); Incident Report at 6 (according to Fredstrom, in
24
speaking to Plaintiff, Ashley “stated that this was a [Chamber of Commerce] event and not a
25
[C]ity event. Ashley said that she hosted, paid for the event and that all the people in the room
26
had made reservations to attend. Ashley added that all five of the City Council members were
27
present and that the Mayor (Al Nagy) was the only person speaking at this event.”). Ashley
28
testified reservations were required, even to attend the free gallery seating Plaintiff utilized. See
16
1
Defs.’ Ashley Dep. at 61:21-24. She testified attendees made reservations for the luncheon, and
2
that several also made reservations for the gallery. Id. at 11:2-13:10 & Ex. 2. Based on this
3
evidence, Defendants contend the State of the City was a private event, held in a private space, and
4
Plaintiff had no right to attend it because he lacked reservations.
5
But Plaintiff demonstrates the flyers and other materials announcing the Event advertised
6
“free gallery seating” for the public. These materials are at the very least ambiguous about
7
whether persons seated in the gallery needed reservations for what was advertised on the Chamber
8
of Commerce’s website as a “Community Event.” Plaintiff declares no one was monitoring the
9
ballroom’s entry or exit, no one asked him if he had a reservation, and there was no indication that
the Event was not open to the public. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 18. While there is evidence some
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
gallery attendees reserved seats, Ashley also testified she did not check whether gallery attendees
12
had reservations until Becker pointed out Plaintiff was there. The evidence establishes no one
13
associated with the Event seemed interested in checking whether persons in the gallery had
14
reservations until Becker noticed Plaintiff in attendance. The evidence also establishes there was
15
ample seating available in the gallery. Id. ¶ 19.
16
While the Event may have been organized by a private organization, the Chamber of
17
Commerce, Plaintiff has established a genuine dispute exists as to whether entry to the Event was
18
in fact restricted to persons with reservations—or just restricted to him based on his prior political
19
advocacy. Based on this finding, the Court need not evaluate the evidence supporting Plaintiff’s
20
contention the State of the City Address was a public meeting as defined by the Brown Act.
21
22
a.
Becker
The evidence shows that for several years, Plaintiff had actively and vocally criticized City
23
of Newark officials and attended City Council meetings. Becker and Ashley knew Plaintiff and
24
felt he had been disruptive at prior events. Becker approached Ashley and asked her whether she
25
knew Plaintiff was there, and whether there was any reason he should not be there. Ashley
26
confirmed Plaintiff did not have a reservation, people without reservations were not allowed at the
27
event, and she would take care of the situation. Ashley testified she told Becker “something to the
28
effect” of “I will get him to leave.” At the time Ashley approached Plaintiff in the ballroom
17
1
gallery and asked him to leave, Plaintiff was seated quietly and taking notes. There is no evidence
2
Plaintiff caused any disruption until he was asked to leave.
3
As discussed above, Plaintiff has created a genuine dispute whether the event was open to
the public. Removing an individual from a public meeting does not violate the individual’s First
5
Amendment rights, “provided the individual is sufficiently disruptive and is not removed because
6
of his or her views.” Dehne v. City of Reno, 222 Fed. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
7
cases); see also Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 2013) (municipalities
8
can enforce rules of decorum to remove citizens from city council meetings if attendee “actually”
9
disturbs or impedes meeting). Becker declares he did not direct Ashley regarding Plaintiff’s
10
removal and did not intend to chill Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. But given Becker and
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
4
Ashley’s familiarity with Plaintiff’s history at City-sponsored events, a reasonable trier of fact
12
could conclude that Becker’s singling Plaintiff out among other attendees and asking Ashley
13
whether there was some reason why Plaintiff should not be there, intimated to Ashley in
14
unmistakable terms that Plaintiff should be removed because Becker did not want Plaintiff to
15
disturb the Event as he had disturbed other events in the past. “[F]ear or apprehension of
16
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Norse, 629 F.3d at
17
979 (Kozinski, J. concurring) (quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d
18
497, 504 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant, a senator who had
19
requested plaintiff be removed from hearing on immigration bill after plaintiff was disruptive, and
20
banned plaintiff from returning to state senate building indefinitely: “imposing a complete bar” on
21
entering the building “clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonableness clearly established by White,
22
Kindt, and Norse as a response to a single act of disruption.”).
23
A reasonable trier of fact could conclude Becker approached Ashley to trigger Plaintiff’s
24
removal based on a fear of future conduct by Plaintiff, was told by Ashley that she would get
25
Plaintiff to leave, and communicated satisfaction with her response. Because Plaintiff was not
26
“sufficiently disruptive” to warrant removal from a public meeting, a genuine issue of material
27
fact exists whether Becker violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by encouraging Ashley to
28
remove Plaintiff.
18
1
b.
Fredstrom
2
The fact that Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff “is not dispositive” to
3
Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, but it “ha[s] high probative force.” Dietrich v. John
4
Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008). Although there “is almost always a weak
5
inference of retaliation whenever a plaintiff and a defendant have had previous negative
6
interactions[,]” where there is “very strong evidence of probable cause and very weak evidence of
7
a retaliatory motive[,]” a case cannot survive summary judgment. Id. (citing Skoog, 469 F.3d at
8
1225-32); see also Maidhof v. Celaya, 641 Fed. App’x 734, 735 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing denial
9
of summary judgment on qualified immunity defense and reversing decision because plaintiffs had
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
not shown “specific, nonconclusory evidence of a retaliatory motive.”).
While there is very strong evidence of probable cause, there is more than “very weak”
12
evidence of a retaliatory motive. There is specific, nonconclusory evidence that (1) Fredstrom
13
knew Plaintiff from prior encounters at City Council and City Planning Meetings, where he had
14
found Plaintiff “very loud” and disruptive; (2) as a result of these past interactions, Fredstrom in
15
fact recognized Plaintiff by name when he was dispatched to the Hilton Hotel during the
16
Conference; (3) Lawson instructed Fredstrom to detain Plaintiff, but he did not direct Fredstrom to
17
arrest Plaintiff; and (4) even after arresting Plaintiff, Fredstrom had the discretion to cite and
18
release him from the Newark Police Station, but he made the decision not to do so and instead
19
drove Plaintiff to be booked at the Fremont City Jail.
20
Defendants argue no liability can attach for failing to cite and release Plaintiff because
21
Fredstrom, pursuant to the “clear and unambiguous” language of Penal Code § 853.6, had the
22
discretion to book Plaintiff instead of citing and releasing him. See Mot. at 18-19. But police
23
officers cannot use their discretion to book arrestees in retaliation for exercising First Amendment
24
rights. In Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2013), a driver arrested for
25
violating a noise ordinance alleged he was in fact arrested in retaliation for exercising his First
26
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding they
27
had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that probable cause did
28
not mean the booking and jailing necessarily was constitutional, and that a jury would need to
19
decide whether the arresting officers’ retaliatory motive was a but-for cause of their action. Id. at
2
1194-95. In rejecting the application of qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit found a “reasonable
3
officer would have understood [in 2007] that he did not automatically possess the authority to
4
book and jail an individual upon conducting a lawful arrest supported by probable cause. . . . [A]
5
reasonable police officer would have understood that he could not exercise his discretion to book
6
an individual in retaliation for that individual’s First Amendment activity.” Ford, 706 F.3d at
7
1196 (“Duran[ v. City of Douglas, Arizona, 904 F.2d 1372, 1375-78 (9th Cir. 1990)] clearly
8
established that police officers may not use their authority to punish an individual for exercising
9
his First Amendment rights, while Skoog[, 349 F.3d at 1235] clearly established that a police
10
action motivated by retaliatory animus was unlawful, even if probable cause existed for that
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
action. . . . While the precise issue of retaliatory booking and jailing has not been addressed in this
12
Circuit, ‘closely analogous preexisting case law is not required to show that a right was clearly
13
established.’”).
Defendants have not introduced evidence about Fredstrom’s reasons for choosing to
14
15
exercise his discretion and book Plaintiff instead of citing and releasing him.5 Cf. Maidhof, 641
16
Fed. App’x at 735 (officer who had discretion to issue citation at scene or at arresting agency,
17
testified he decided to transport arrestees to Santa Rita instead in order to avoid disruptive or
18
possibly violent confrontations with protestors and because university Operational Plan called for
19
protestors with prior arrests to be transported to Santa Rita). Despite Fredstrom’s conclusory
20
disavowal of any retaliatory motive (Fredstrom Decl. ¶ 5), based on the evidence in the record, a
21
reasonable trier of fact could find a primary motivation for Fredstrom’s decision to arrest and book
22
Plaintiff into jail, rather than cite and release him from the Newark Police Department, was to
23
retaliate against Plaintiff for his prior free speech activity and was intended to chill Plaintiff’s free
24
25
26
27
28
5
Plaintiff argues Fredstrom justified his decision based on his concern Plaintiff would return to
the hotel to disrupt the Event, but that this decision was pretextual since the event had ended by
the time Fredstrom drove Plaintiff away. Opp’n at 8, 19-20. To support this argument, Plaintiff
purports to quote a passage from Fredstrom’s testimony. See id. at 8 (Plaintiff refers to “p. 3-9”);
id. at 19 (referring to “89:3-9”). Pages 3-9 are not included in the deposition transcript either party
filed in connection with this Motion, and the Court has not found the passage quoted in either
transcript, including on page 89.
20
speech. “The possibility that other inferences could be drawn that would provide an alternate
2
explanation for [defendant’s] actions does not entitle [him] to summary judgment.” Mendocino
3
Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1303 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing grant of summary
4
judgment to defendants on First Amendment retaliation claim because “evidence is sufficient to
5
raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the appellants intended to interfere with the appellees’
6
political activities . . . .”). A reasonable trier of fact also could find this type of arrest would chill a
7
person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. See Ford, 706 F.3d at 1193
8
(retaliatory police action such as arrest would chill a person of ordinary firmness from future First
9
Amendment activities). A reasonable trier of fact also could find this incident chilled Plaintiff
10
from future political participation. See Henneberry Decl. ¶ 26. The Court accordingly finds, in
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact and
12
denies Fredstrom’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.6
c.
13
Lawson
Plaintiff identifies no evidence that Lawson knew him prior to removing him from the
14
15
Event, or that anyone informed Lawson of Plaintiff’s past interactions with City of Newark
16
officials. The evidence only shows that Ashley and Becker, among others, informed Lawson that
17
the Event was a private affair and that Plaintiff was trespassing. Lawson removed Plaintiff from
18
the Event and indicated to Fredstrom that he wanted Plaintiff detained. A brief informal detention
19
for purposes of routine investigation under these circumstances would be distinct from an arrest.
20
See Wilson, 361 F.2d at 415.
There is no evidence Lawson ordered Fredstrom to arrest Plaintiff or had any part in
21
22
deciding not to cite and release Plaintiff, or to book him in jail. Plaintiff has identified no
23
evidence Lawson’s conduct was motivated by any retaliatory animus. See Dietrich, 548 F.3d at
24
901 (where evidence of retaliatory motive is weak, and of probable cause is strong, case cannot
25
6
26
27
28
The Court recognizes that the evidence of retaliatory motive, while specific and non-conclusory,
is circumstantial. There simply is no direct evidence that Fredstrom’s conduct was retaliatory.
But because Defendants have failed to rebut the circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive with
anything other than Fredstrom’s conclusory statement in his declaration, the Court finds Plaintiff
has succeeded in creating a triable issue of fact, and that it is appropriate for a jury to decide the
issue at trial based on the evidence presented to them.
21
1
survive summary judgment). Plaintiff has not established a genuine dispute of fact exists whether
2
Lawson violated his First Amendment rights, and the Court accordingly grants Lawson summary
3
judgment on this claim.
4
4.
Qualified Immunity
5
Defendants assert that, even if the Court finds they violated Plaintiff’s Constitutional
6
rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to them that
7
their conduct was unlawful. Mot. at 25.
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Determining whether an official is entitled to summary judgment
based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity requires
applying a three-part test. First, the court must ask whether “[t]aken
in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [ ] the
facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right?” If the answer is no, the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity. If the answer is yes, the court must proceed to the next
question: whether the right was clearly established at the time the
officer acted. That is, “whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
If the answer is no, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. If
the answer is yes, the court must answer the final question: whether
the officer could have believed, “reasonably but mistakenly . . . that
his or her conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right.” If the answer is yes, the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity. If the answer is no, he is not.
Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1229 (internal citations omitted).
a.
Violation of a Constitutional Right
As discussed above, Plaintiff has established the existence of genuine dispute as to whether
20
Becker and Fredstrom violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for past free
21
speech activities. But Plaintiff has not created a genuine dispute of fact that Lawson violated his
22
Constitutional rights; accordingly, the Court need not consider whether Lawson is entitled to
23
qualified immunity.
24
25
26
27
28
b.
Clearly Established
Next, the Court must determine whether these rights were “clearly established” at the time
of Plaintiff’s arrest in April 2013.
With respect to Becker, it was clearly established by April 2013 that attendees could only
be removed from public meetings if they were actively disturbing the proceedings. See supra.
22
1
When Becker triggered Plaintiff’s removal from the Event, Plaintiff was seated quietly and not
2
disrupting the proceedings. As such, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer in Becker’s
3
position that arresting Plaintiff was unlawful.
4
With respect to Fredstrom, it also was clearly established in April 2013 that officers could
5
not exercise their discretion to “automatically” book individuals even though they had probable
6
cause to arrest them if the booking officer was retaliating against the individual for exercising his
7
or her First Amendment rights. See Ford, 706 F.3d at 1196 (finding in February 2013 that this
8
right was clearly established in 2007). Based on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Ford, the Court
9
finds a reasonable officer would have known in April 2013 that he could not exercise his
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
discretion to book Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff’s First Amendment activity.
c.
Reasonable Mistake
12
Finally, the Court must determine whether Becker or Fredstrom “reasonably but
13
mistakenly” could have believed their conduct did not violate a Constitutional right. Qualified
14
immunity applies whether the error is a mistake of law or fact, or mixed question of law and fact.
15
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
16
Becker could reasonably have believed the Conference was not a public event: the
17
evidence establishes he believed it was a private event organized by the Chamber of Commerce at
18
a private hotel, and not a City of Newark event. Ashley informed him that reservations were
19
required and that Plaintiff did not have one. Based on the evidence before the Court, Becker
20
reasonably could have believed Plaintiff was intruding on a private party, and reasonably could
21
believe having Plaintiff removed from the private party did not violate Plaintiff’s rights. As a
22
result, the Court finds Becker is entitled to qualified immunity.
23
With respect to deciding to book Plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
24
rights at the Event and/or prior events, there is nothing in the record that suggests Fredstrom
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reasonably believed his conduct did not violate Plaintiff’s rights. His conclusory declaration that
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he did not intend to interfere with Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights does not establish the
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grounds for reasonable mistake; at most, it creates a triable issue of fact whether Fredstrom acted
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in retaliation. Accordingly, Fredstrom is not entitled to qualified immunity at this point.
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5.
Monell liability for City of Newark
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A local government entity “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by
its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
4
When an individual sues a municipality for violation of a constitutional right, the municipality is
5
liable only if the individual can establish that the municipality “had a deliberate policy, custom, or
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practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation he [or she] suffered.” Id.
7
at 694-95; Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007); Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d
8
652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). In order to hold a public entity liable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
9
the unlawful governmental action was part of the public entity’s policy or custom, and that there is
10
a nexus between the specific policy or custom and the plaintiff’s injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
3
92, 694-95.
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Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence that the City of Newark had a deliberate policy,
13
custom, or practice that was the moving force behind any of the alleged violations he suffered.
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He does not argue the City of Newark is liable based on Lawson’s or Fredstrom’s actions; he only
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contends the City is liable based on Becker’s actions as a decision-maker with final authority. See
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Opp’n at 22-23. A single act of a policymaker in some instances can be sufficient for a Monell
17
claim when “the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect
18
to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1986).
19
Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action ordered.
The fact that a particular official—even a
policymaking official—has discretion in the exercise of particular
functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability
based on an exercise of that discretion. [Cite.] The official must
also be responsible for establishing final government policy
respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.
Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a
legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who
possesses such authority, and of course, whether an official had final
policymaking authority is a question of state law.
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21
22
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25
26
Id. at 481-83 (citations and footnotes omitted). Municipal liability will attach “only where ‘a
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deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the
28
official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
24
1
question.’” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S.
2
at 483-84). “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose
3
liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an
4
existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal
5
policymaker. Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be
6
separately proved.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985).
7
Becker declares on personal knowledge as the City Manager for the City of Newark that he
does “not possess final authority, and [does] not have the responsibility, to establish municipal
9
policy for the City of Newark, including any policy for the Newark Police Department. The
10
Newark City Council possesses final authority, and the responsibility, to establish municipal
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
8
policy for the City of Newark, including policy for the Newark Police Department.” Becker Decl.
12
¶ 3. Plaintiff nonetheless argues Becker is a decision-maker with final authority because the
13
Newark Municipal Code provides that the City Manager has full authority to “control, order and
14
give directions to all heads of departments and to subordinate officers and employees of the city
15
under his supervision” and to “exercise control over and supervise in general all departments and
16
divisions of the city government and all appointive officers and employees thereof. . . .” Opp’n at
17
22 (quoting Newark Muni. Code § 2.040.070). Because Becker made the deliberate choice to
18
have Plaintiff removed, Plaintiff argues municipal liability attaches. Id. Plaintiff’s briefing on this
19
issue is anemic. See id. Plaintiff did not depose Becker or any person most knowledgeable about
20
the role of City Manager generally, policy making for the Police Department, or policy making for
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Chamber of Commerce events. Plaintiff, once again, fails to establish any foundation for his
22
interpretation of documents, and fails to establish he or his attorney have personal knowledge of
23
the facts they seek to rely upon in their Opposition.
24
Based on the present record, the Court cannot find a genuine dispute of material fact exists
25
that Becker had final decision-making authority with respect to any policy relevant to the subject
26
matter. In addition, as noted above, Becker is entitled to qualified immunity because he could
27
reasonably believe removing Plaintiff from the ballroom was lawful because the Event was a
28
private one. As a result, the Court grants the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
25
1
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
2
D.
3
False Arrest/Imprisonment
Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment directed at his false
4
arrest/imprisonment claim. See Opp’n. The Court is not clear whether Plaintiff rests on the
5
arguments he used in connection with his Fourth Amendment claim, or whether he is abandoning
6
his parallel state law claim. In the interest of thoroughness, the Court addresses this claim as well.
1.
8
“The tort of false imprisonment is the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person,
9
without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time . . . .” Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB,
10
32 Cal. 4th 350, 372-73 (2004) (alteration in original; quotation and internal marks omitted); Tekle
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
7
v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that under California law, “[t]he
12
elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional
13
confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time,
14
however brief.” (quotation marks omitted)). “[A] false arrest is merely one way in which a false
15
imprisonment may be accomplished—the two are not separate torts.” Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 372
16
n.7 (citation omitted). Peace officers are not civilly liable for false arrest if “[t]he arrest was
17
lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was
18
lawful.” Cal. Penal Code § 847(b). “The terms ‘reasonable cause’ and ‘probable cause’ are
19
interchangeable, and California courts look to cases decided under the Fourth Amendment to
20
determine whether reasonable cause existed for purposes of section 847.” Holland, 2013 WL
21
968295, at *3.
22
Elements
Additionally, “a party who ‘authorizes, encourages, directs or assists an officer to do an
23
unlawful act, or procures an unlawful arrest, without process, or participates in the unlawful arrest
24
or imprisonment, is liable.’” Garcia v. City of Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 754 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
25
(quoting Du Lac v. Perma Trans Prods., Inc., 103 Cal. App. 3d 937, 941 (1980)) (overruled on
26
other grounds by Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 377). “‘[T]he actor is not liable unless his [or her] act is
27
done for the purpose of imposing confinement upon the other, or with knowledge that such a
28
confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it. It is not enough that the actor realizes
26
1
or should realize that his [or her] actions involve a risk of causing a confinement, so long as the
2
likelihood that it will do so falls short of a substantial certainty.’” Id. (citing Du Lac, 103 Cal.
3
App. 3d at 943 (citations omitted)).
4
While the existence of probable cause renders the arrest reasonable under the Fourth
5
Amendment, and thus constitutional, more is needed to authorize a custodial arrest under
6
California law. Edgerly v. City & Cty. of S.F., 599 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing People v.
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McKay, 27 Cal. 4th 601 (2002) (holding that state arrest procedures do not limit the
8
constitutionality of arrests under the Fourth Amendment, but emphasizing that that holding “in no
9
way countenance[s] violations of state arrest procedure,” as “[v]iolation of those rights exposes the
10
peace officers and their departments to civil actions seeking injunctive or other relief”)).
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
2.
12
The Court already found that Fredstrom had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and that
13
Lawson neither arrested nor directed Fredstrom to arrest Plaintiff. Plaintiff identifies no state
14
procedures that were violated in the course of his arrest. While he was eligible for citation and
15
release pursuant to California Penal Code section 853.6, there is “no requirement that a person
16
arrested for a non-Vehicle Code misdemeanor violation must be released without bail or without
17
booking. It is a matter within the discretion of the arresting officer or the booking officer.”
18
People v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 257, 264 (1973). To the extent Plaintiff bases this
19
claim on the use of excessive force, the only evidence he identifies is that he complained to
20
Fredstrom that his handcuffs were too tight. Henneberry Decl. ¶ 23. Plaintiff does not introduce
21
any evidence that tight handcuffs, under the circumstances of his arrest, violated state arrest
22
procedures.
23
Analysis
A municipality is vicariously liable for its employees actions under California law, which
24
“has rejected the Monell rule and imposes liability on [cities] under the doctrine of respondeat
25
superior for acts of [city] employees.” See Robinson v. Solano Cty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.
26
2002) (en banc) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2); see also Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 961 (citing
27
Robinson). Because the Court grants summary judgment to Fredstrom and Lawson, no vicarious
28
liability attaches to the City on the false arrest/imprisonment claim.
27
1
E.
Bane Act
2
1.
Elements
3
The Bane Act provides a private right of action against a person who interferes by “threats,
4
intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the
5
exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or
6
laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state . . . .”
7
Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. “There are two distinct elements for a section 52.1 cause of action. A
8
plaintiff must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal
9
constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats,
intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (2015), as
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 6, 2015), review denied (May 20, 2015) (citations omitted).
12
In assessing whether an overlong detention in County Jail violated the Bane Act, the
13
California Court of Appeal held that “where coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation
14
alleged, i.e., an overdetention in County jail, the statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or
15
coercion’ is not met. The statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion
16
inherent in the wrongful detention itself.” Shoyoye v. Cty. of L.A., 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 948
17
(2012). In Shoyoye, a motorist was arrested for violating the Vehicle Code and held in County Jail
18
for more almost 20 days because County employees negligently assigned a parole hold to him in
19
the computer system and failed to detect the error during quality control; employees could
20
reasonably rely on the information in the computer system. The Court of Appeal found the
21
motorist did not prove coercion independent from that inherent in wrongful detention, and
22
reversed the judgment entered in the plaintiff’s favor on that claim. Id. at 961-62. But subsequent
23
courts have made clear that Shoyoye should not be read to bar a Bane Act claim where a plaintiff
24
asserts his rights were violated by intentional conduct, as opposed to error. See, e.g., Holland,
25
2013 WL 968295, at *10 (citing cases); see also Bass v. City of Fremont, 2013 WL 891090, at *5-
26
6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss Bane Act claim where motorist alleged
27
officers detained him based on false claims brake lights did not work and vehicle tags were
28
expired; accused plaintiff of selling and being on drugs; arrested him for driving under the
28
1
influence without conducting field sobriety tests; and held him in county jail).
2
2.
Analysis
3
No reasonable jury could find Lawson threatened, intimidated, or coerced Plaintiff.
4
However, a reasonable jury could find Fredstrom arrested Plaintiff to chill his constitutionally-
5
guaranteed right to free speech. A reasonable jury could further find that Fredstrom’s refusal to
6
cite and release Plaintiff for this misdemeanor from the Newark Police Department and instead to
7
book him at the Fremont City Jail constitutes threats, intimidation, or coercion. The City would be
8
vicariously liable for any damages resulting from Fredstrom’s actions. See Robinson, 278 F.3d at
9
1016. For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment to Lawson, and denies
10
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim to Fredstrom and the City.
CONCLUSION
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
Based on the analysis above, the Court hereby GRANTS summary judgment as follows:
13
(1)
14
to Defendants Becker, Fredstrom, Lawson, and the City on Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment and False Arrest/Imprisonment claims;
15
(2)
to Defendants Becker, Lawson, and the City on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim;
16
(3)
to Defendant Lawson on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim.
17
As a result of this Order, the two claims remaining in this action are (1) a First Amendment
18
retaliation claim against Fredstrom, and (2) a Bane Act claim against Fredstrom and the City of
19
Newark. Both claims are based on the same narrow question: whether Fredstrom’s desire to chill
20
Plaintiff from engaging in future First Amendment activities was a but for cause of his decision
21
not to cite and release Plaintiff from the Newark Police Department.
22
Lead trial counsel for Henneberry, Fredstrom, and the City shall appear for a Case
23
Management Conference before the undersigned on May 11, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. to discuss
24
alternative dispute resolution and trial setting. The parties need not file a Joint Case Management
25
Statement. All currently-scheduled pretrial and trial deadlines are VACATED.
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2
There are no claims remaining against Defendants Becker or Lawson. The Court shall
enter a separate judgment as to these two Defendants.
3
4
5
6
7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 26, 2017
______________________________________
MARIA-ELENA JAMES
United States Magistrate Judge
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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