McNEIL et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 31

ORDER by Judge Samuel Conti granting in part and denying in part 26 Motion to Dismiss (sclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/25/2014)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 TROY L. McNEIL and TRICIA A. McNEIL, ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) ) v. ) WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., U.S. BANK, ) N.A., CAL-WESTERN RECONVEYANCE, ) LLC, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) ) Case No. 13-5519 SC ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Now before the Court is Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 22 ("Wells Fargo") and U.S. Bank, N.A.'s ("U.S. Bank") (collectively, 23 "Defendants") motion, ECF No. 26 ("Mot."), to dismiss Plaintiffs 24 Troy and Tricia McNeil's first amended complaint, ECF No. 24 25 ("FAC"). 26 Defendants have declined to file a reply brief. 27 the motion suitable for determination without oral argument per 28 Plaintiffs oppose the motion, ECF No. 29 ("Opp'n"), and The Court finds 1 Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the 2 Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 3 4 II. BACKGROUND This is a mortgage foreclosure dispute. 5 Plaintiffs are 6 residents of the property at issue in this case, which is located 7 in Livermore, California (the "subject property"). 8 Plaintiffs borrowed $536,000 from Wells Fargo in 2004. 9 was secured by a deed of trust on the subject property. FAC ¶¶ 1, 17. The loan FAC Ex. A. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Wells Fargo subsequently transferred its beneficial interest in the 11 deed of trust to U.S. Bank. 12 of default was recorded against the subject property, indicating 13 that Plaintiffs were $24,848.53 in arrears. 14 2012, the trustee on the deed of trust recorded a notice of 15 trustee's sale, scheduling the sale for April 4, 2012. 16 The notice indicates that the total unpaid balance on the loan was 17 $522,493.45. FAC Ex. C. In December 2011, a notice FAC Ex. B. In March FAC Ex. D. Id. In May 2012, Plaintiffs entered into a loan modification 18 19 agreement with Wells Fargo. FAC ¶ 28. The modification agreement 20 created a secondary principal balance of $34,212.59, on which no 21 interest accrues, and dropped the interest rate on the remaining 22 balance to 2.5 percent for six years. 23 1-2. 24 monthly principal and interest payments of $2,424.62 starting on 25 July 1, 2012. 26 escrow deposits "as defined in the Note." 27 states that escrow deposits may be subject to change in the future. 28 Id. ECF No. 14 ("RJN") Ex. 6 ¶¶ Pursuant to the agreement, Plaintiffs promised to make Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs also promised to make monthly 2 Id. The agreement 1 Plaintiffs allege that the monthly escrow charges initially 2 amounted to $800, bringing Plaintiffs' total monthly payments to 3 $3,224.62. 4 for additional charges, increasing the total monthly payments to 5 $4,400. 6 FAC ¶ 30. Defendants subsequently assessed Plaintiffs Id. ¶ 31. On February 4, 2013, the substituted trustee on the deed of 7 trust recorded another notice of default against the subject 8 property, indicating that Plaintiffs were $29,644.95 in arrears. 9 FAC Ex. F. Another notice of trustee's sale was recorded on May 6, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 2013, setting the sale date for May 28, 2013. 11 that the foreclosure was the direct result of the unauthorized 12 charges assessed by Defendants after they executed the first loan 13 modification agreement. 14 Plaintiffs allege FAC ¶ 39. In June 2013, Wells Fargo agreed to a loan modification 15 review. 16 conduct the review because "Plaintiffs had exceeded the number of 17 modifications allowed by the investor." 18 Wells Fargo, the "investor" lacked contractual authority to modify 19 the loan, and Plaintiffs had exceeded the number of modifications 20 allowed by the investor. 21 modification was "properly given," and therefore Wells Fargo's 22 refusal to conduct a modification review was improper. 23 Fargo subsequently denied Plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of the 24 modification request. 25 FAC ¶ 42. However, Wells Fargo subsequently declined to Id. FAC ¶ 43. According to Plaintiffs contend that no Id. Wells Id. ¶ 45. The trustee's sale was apparently delayed during the 26 application process for the second loan modification, and a new 27 notice of trustee's sale was later recorded, setting the sale date 28 3 1 for October 16, 2013. RJN Ex. 11. According to Defendants, the 2 trustee's sale was postponed yet again to April 14, 2014. 3 Based on these facts, Plaintiffs asserted seven causes of 4 action related to Defendants' alleged misrepresentations during the 5 loan issuance and foreclosure processes. 6 Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to 7 dismiss for failure to state a claim and granted Plaintiffs leave 8 to amend their complaint to rectify certain defects. 9 ("Prior Order"). On July 1, 2014, the ECF No. 23 Plaintiffs filed their FAC on July 31, asserting United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 claims for (1) intentional misrepresentation, (2) negligent 11 misrepresentation, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) violation of 12 California Civil Code Section 2923.55, (5) breach of the implied 13 covenant of good faith, (6) wrongful foreclosure, (6) cancellation 14 of instruments, and (7) unfair and deceptive acts and practices. 15 16 Defendants now move to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 17 18 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. 21 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 22 on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 23 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." 24 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 25 1988). 26 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 27 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." 28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "Dismissal can be based "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court Ashcroft v. However, "the tenet that a court 4 1 must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 2 is inapplicable to legal conclusions. 3 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 4 statements, do not suffice." 5 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Threadbare recitals of the Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened 6 which requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud "must state with 9 particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." See Kearns v. 10 United States District Court pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 8 For the Northern District of California 7 Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). "To satisfy 11 Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and 12 how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or 13 misleading about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it 14 is false." 15 Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and 16 citations omitted). United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 17 18 IV. DISCUSSION 19 A. Intentional Misrepresentation 20 The elements of intentional misrepresentation, also known as 21 fraud, are: "(1) misrepresentation (false representation, 22 concealment, or nondisclosure), (2) knowledge of falsity (or 23 'scienter'), (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance), (4) 24 justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage." 25 Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (Cal. 1996). 26 misrepresentations: (1) Defendants represented that the loan had a 27 fixed rate for 30 years when it actually had an adjustable rate; 28 (2) Wells Fargo represented that the loan modification agreement 5 Lazar v. Super. Plaintiffs allege several 1 ("LMA") provided for monthly escrow deposits of approximately $100 2 and included no hidden fees when, in fact, the LMA called for 3 escrow deposits and fees that totaled around $1,200 monthly; (3) 4 Defendants told Plaintiffs that Defendants would "resolve the 5 discrepancies on the loan balance and default amount," but that 6 Defendants did not make any corrections; (4) Defendants represented 7 that Plaintiffs qualified for the Home Affordable Modification 8 Program ("HAMP") and that Defendants would conduct a loan 9 modification review to address issues with the LMA, but Defendants United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 never conducted such a review; (5) Defendants represented that no 11 review could be conducted because the loan had already been 12 modified when, in fact, "there was never a true modification of the 13 loan;" and (6) Defendants represented that Plaintiffs could appeal 14 the denial, but Defendants never permitted an appeal. 15 54. 16 FAC ¶¶ 51- Defendants argue that each of these claims is insufficiently 17 specific to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b). 18 Defendants are correct. 19 represented that the loan had a fixed rate for 30 years at the loan 20 origination. 21 dates or persons who made that representation. 22 loan documents included an adjustable rate rider specifying (in all 23 capital, bolded letters) that the loan provided for an initial 24 period of monthly payments at a certain rate, but that after the 25 initial period, both the interest rate and monthly payments could 26 be changed. 27 documents, it must be presumed that Plaintiffs allege that one of 28 Defendants' agents made an oral representation about a fixed rate. Id. ¶ 51. FAC Ex. 2. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants However, Plaintiffs do not specify the Id. Plaintiffs' Given this explanation in the loan 6 1 But Plaintiffs do not specify who made such a representation, that 2 person's relationship to Defendants, or when the alleged 3 representation was made. 4 necessary specificity to meet the pleading standards of Rule 9(b). 5 Plaintiffs have failed to add the Plaintiffs' claims regarding Defendants' representations about 6 their payments following the LMA are also insufficient. Once 7 again, Plaintiffs fail to specify who made the representation or 8 even to identify that person's relationship to Defendants. 9 again, the written agreement supports Defendants: the LMA states Once United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 that Plaintiffs must make monthly escrow deposits, which were 11 subject to change. 12 "notice of no oral agreements" stating that the written agreement 13 represents the final agreement between the parties and that there 14 are no oral agreements between them. 15 FAC Ex. 6 at 2. The LMA also includes a Id. at 5. The remaining alleged misrepresentations are also 16 insufficiently specific. Again, Plaintiffs fail to allege the who, 17 where, and (in most cases) when of the allegedly false statements. 18 The remaining statements are also even vaguer than the two 19 discussed previously; it is unclear from the FAC exactly what 20 Plaintiffs allege Defendants said. 21 Defendants' statements that they would conduct a modification 22 review or that a modification had already occurred -- Plaintiffs 23 fail to explain why the statements were false. 24 misrepresentations are pled with sufficient specificity. 25 directed Plaintiffs to plead this claim with additional specificity 26 when granting leave to amend the original complaint. 27 have failed to do so. 28 misrepresentation claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In some cases -- for example, None of the alleged Therefore, their intentional 7 The Court Plaintiffs 1 B. Negligent Misrepresentation 2 Plaintiffs did not bring a claim for negligent 3 misrepresentation in their original complaint. 4 Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint, the Court 5 granted Plaintiffs leave to amend only to rectify certain problems 6 with their existing claims, not to add new ones. 7 Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs' new negligent 8 misrepresentation claim must be dismissed. 9 consider the merits of this claim, though, it would still be United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 In ruling on Accordingly, Even were the Court to dismissed. The elements for a cause of action for negligent 12 misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact, 13 (2) without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, (3) 14 with intent to induce another's reliance on the fact 15 misrepresented, (4) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff, and (5) 16 damages. 17 1986). 18 Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 962 (Cal. Ct. App. There is a split among district courts in the Ninth Circuit as 19 to whether claims for negligent misrepresentation must always meet 20 the Rule 9(b)'s specificity requirements. 21 Allstate Indem. Co., 281 F.R.D. 413, 416-18 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 22 However, the Ninth Circuit's general guidance is that a claim 23 sounds in fraud where a plaintiff "allege[s] a unified course of 24 fraudulent conduct and rel[ies] entirely on that course of conduct 25 as the basis of a claim." 26 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). 27 misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation for precisely 28 the same course of conduct which they claim amounts to intentional See, e.g., Petersen v. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d Here, Plaintiffs allege negligent 8 1 misrepresentation. The FAC repeatedly alleges that Defendants 2 acted intentionally. 3 pleadings indicates that the negligent misrepresentation claim is 4 really just an attempt to repackage the intentional 5 misrepresentation claim: Plaintiffs did not initially allege 6 negligent misrepresentation at all, and they added the claim only 7 after the Court found their intentional misrepresentation claims to 8 be insufficiently specific. 9 Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim sounds in fraud and Additionally, the manner of Plaintiffs' Therefore, the Court finds that United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 is subject to the Rule 9(b). For the same reasons that their 11 intentional misrepresentation claim fails, Plaintiffs' negligent 12 misrepresentation claim also fails. 13 WITH PREJUDICE. This claim, too, is DISMISSED 14 C. 15 "Promissory estoppel applies whenever a promise which the 16 promissor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 17 on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce 18 such action or forbearance would result in an injustice if the 19 promise were not enforced." 20 4th 1179, 1185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 21 must be clear and unambiguous." 22 Promissory Estoppel Lange v. TIG Ins. Co., 68 Cal. App. "To be binding, the promise Id. Again, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants broke numerous 23 promises. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants promised that 24 the original loan would be held at a fixed interest rate for thirty 25 years, but then adjusted the interest rate. 26 discussed above, the adjustable rate rider attached to the loan 27 contradicts that allegation. FAC ¶ 57. As This claim is DISMISSED WITH 28 9 1 PREJUDICE to the extent that it is premised on a promise not to 2 adjust the interest rate. 3 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants promised that 4 Plaintiffs' monthly payments under the LMA would be around $3,300, 5 including the escrow deposits. 6 allege that Defendants charged them additional fees that were not 7 included among those specified in the LMA. 8 hearing on the original motion to dismiss, the Court found the 9 promissory estoppel claim, as it related to the allegedly Id. ¶ 58. However, Plaintiffs Id. ¶¶ 31-32. After a United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 undisclosed charges after execution of the LMA, adequately pled so 11 as to survive a motion to dismiss. 12 in the FAC or Defendants' motion papers alters that conclusion. 13 Accordingly, Defendants' motion is DENIED with respect to that 14 particular claim. Prior Order at 10-11. Nothing 15 D. Civil Code Section 2923.55 16 Section 2923.55 provides that a mortgage servicer may not 17 record a notice of default until a number of requirements are met 18 and sets forth a list of information that the mortgage servicer 19 must send to the borrower in writing. 20 dismissed Plaintiffs' Section 2923.55 claim because Plaintiffs 21 failed to "specify how Defendants ran afoul of the statute or which 22 particular provisions are at issue." 23 Plaintiffs have clarified their allegations somewhat. 24 claim that, after recording the first notice of default in December 25 2011, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the 26 Note, identity of the beneficiary, and assignment and accounting of 27 the loan -- as required by law -- even after Plaintiffs requested 28 that information. FAC ¶ 65. The Court previously Prior Order at 8-9. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs also allege that 10 1 Defendants failed to provide the required advanced notice before 2 recording the second notice of default in February 2013. The Court has already rejected that second argument, finding 3 4 that the loan modification discussions constituted sufficient 5 notice as required by statute. 6 Defendants apparently find no fault with Plaintiffs' allegations 7 regarding Defendants' failure to provide the required information. 8 See Mot. at 8-10. 9 2923.55 remains undisturbed as it relates to the allegation that See Prior Order at 8-9. However, Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim for violation of United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Defendants failed to provide the required documents after 11 Plaintiffs requested them. 12 in all other respects. E. 13 This claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 14 Plaintiffs' next claim is for breach of the implied covenant 15 16 of good faith and fair dealing. "A typical formulation of the 17 burden imposed by the implied covenant of good faith and fair 18 dealing is 'that neither party will do anything which will injure 19 the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.'" 20 Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates, 125 Cal. App. 4th 578, 589 (Cal. 21 Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 22 573 (Cal. 1973)). 23 dealing "cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the 24 contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms 25 of their agreement." 26 Supp. 2d 1092, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Agosta v. Astor, 120 27 Cal. App. 4th 596, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). 28 /// The implied covenant of good faith and fair Lane v. Vitek Real Estate Indus. Grp., 713 F. 11 1 In its prior order, the Court permitted Plaintiffs' claim to 2 remain undisturbed to the extent it is "premised on the theory that 3 Defendants assessed them for additional charges in violation of the 4 executed loan modification agreement . . . ." 5 However, Plaintiffs have amended their claim to make it less 6 specific. Compare ECF No. 1-1 Ex. 2 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 80-98, with FAC 7 ¶¶ 74-81. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs still manage to state a claim in 8 this respect. 9 claim because Plaintiffs have "not identified an express provision Prior Order at 11. In every other respect, Plaintiffs fail to state a United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 or even the underlying purpose giving rise to [their] claim[s] of 11 an implied covenant." 12 01399-KJM, 2014 WL 5473554, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014). 13 Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 14 and fair dealing remains undisturbed as to the allegation that 15 Defendants charged Plaintiffs fees beyond those permitted by the 16 loan modification agreement. 17 PREJUDICE in all other respects. Moenig v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:14-CV- This claim is DISMISSED WITH 18 F. Wrongful Foreclosure 19 Next, Plaintiffs bring a claim for wrongful foreclosure, in 20 lieu of their claim (asserted in the original complaint) that 21 Defendants lacked standing to foreclose on the subject property. 22 Plaintiffs again assert that "Defendants failed to perfect any 23 security interest in the subject property." 24 the FAC fails to explain why Plaintiffs believe that is the case. 25 None of the facts asserted provide any basis for Plaintiffs' 26 assertion that Defendants failed to perfect their security 27 interest. 28 distinguish this claim from their cancellation of interests claim, FAC ¶ 83. However, In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs fail to 12 1 and they provide no argument to separately support a wrongful 2 foreclosure claim. 3 PREJUDICE. Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED WITH 4 G. Cancellation of Instruments 5 In its order on Defendants' motion to dismiss the original 6 complaint, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' cancellation of 7 instruments claim with prejudice to the extent that it was premised 8 on Defendants' violation of a pooling services agreement. 1 9 Court held that Plaintiffs' cancellation of instruments claim The United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 survived to the extent that it is based on the allegation that 11 Defendants assessed Plaintiffs' monthly charges in violation of the 12 LMA. 13 prior ruling. 14 undisturbed to the extent that it is premised on Defendants' 15 violation of the LMA. Nothing in the FAC or Defendants' motion alters the Court's Plaintiffs' cancellation of instrument claim remains 16 17 V. CONCLUSION Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 18 19 part: 20 • The motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for intentional misrepresentation. 21 • 22 The motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation. 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 In the original complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Wells Fargo transferred its beneficial interest in the deed of trust to U.S. Bank through a Corporate Assignment Deed of Trust (the "Corporate Assignment"). They further alleged that the Corporate Assignment shows that the deed of trust was transferred to a mortgage backed security trust, and that this trust was governed by a Pooling Services Agreement. Compl. ¶ 21, Ex. B. 13 1 • The motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part 2 with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for promissory estoppel. 3 The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants 4 assessed fees beyond those permitted in the LMA. 5 is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claims regarding all other 6 promises Defendants' allegedly made. 7 • The motion The motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part 8 with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for violation of Section 9 2923.55. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claim that United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Defendants violated the LMA. 11 Plaintiffs' other Section 2923.55 claims. 12 • The motion is GRANTED as to The motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part 13 with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied 14 covenant. 15 Defendants violated the LMA. 16 Plaintiffs' other breach of implied covenant claims. 17 • The motion is GRANTED as to The motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful foreclosure. 18 19 The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claim that • The motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part 20 with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for cancellation of 21 instruments. 22 that Defendants breached the LMA. 23 Plaintiffs' other cancellation of instrument claims. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claim /// 14 The motion is GRANTED as to 1 All claims dismissed by this order are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 6 November 25, 2014 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15

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