Sessoms v. Williamson et al

Filing 8

ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. Signed by Judge William Alsup on 2/7/14. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(dt, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/10/2014)

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1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 TIO DINERO SESSOMS, No. C 14-0233 WHA (PR) Plaintiff, 9 ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL v. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 J.I WILLIAMSON; J. CROSBY; S. TOMLINSON; RANDY GROUNDS. 12 Defendants. 13 / 14 INTRODUCTION 15 16 Plaintiff, a California prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 1983. He is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. The clerk notified 18 plaintiff that his original complaint was defective because it was unsigned, and he was given 28 19 days to file an amended complaint. He did so, and, based on a review of his amended complaint 20 (dkt. 6) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915, it is dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for 21 relief. ANALYSIS 22 23 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 24 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 25 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 27 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 1 (9th Cir. 1990). 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the 3 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the 4 statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds 5 upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). 6 Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a 7 plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than 8 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 9 do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. 12 at 1974. 13 B. 14 LEGAL CLAIMS Plaintiff claims that defendants, who are law librarians and the Warden at Salinas Valley 15 State Prison, violated his constitutional right to access the courts. Plaintiff wanted to prepare 16 and file documents in a civil rights case that is currently pending in this court, Sessoms v. 17 Thornton, et al., No. C 13-0714 WHA (PR), between May and September 2013. He alleges that 18 defendants only allowed him limited time in the law library, delayed his requests to photocopy 19 documents such as his discovery requests, and did not give him sufficient paper and pens to 20 complete his drafts of documents in a timely fashion. This caused delays, including his having 21 to request an extension of time. 22 To establish a claim for any violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner 23 must prove that there was an inadequacy in the prison's legal access program that caused him an 24 actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996). To prove an actual injury, the 25 prisoner must show that the inadequacy in the prison's program hindered his efforts to pursue a 26 non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. Id. at 354-55. 27 Defendants’ actions have not caused plaintiff “actual injury” within the meaning of 28 Lewis. In analyzing whether a purported denial of access to the courts caused “actual injury,” 2 1 the Ninth Circuit has "differentiated between two types of access to courts claims: those 2 involving prisoners' right[s] to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners' rights to 3 litigate without active interference." Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) 4 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s claims do not involve active interference with his litigation, 5 cf., e.g., id. at 1103-04 (claims involved active interference where plaintiff alleged that he was 6 repeatedly transferred between different facilities in order to hinder his ability to litigate his 7 pending civil lawsuits and prison officials seized and withheld all of his legal files), but rather 8 his right to affirmative assistance from prison officials in the form of law library access, 9 photocopies and pens and papers. The right to such assistance is limited to the pleading stage because the state is not required to enable the prisoner to discover grievances or to litigate 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 effectively once in court. Ibid.; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. To whatever extent defendants’ actions 12 delayed or hindered his discovery efforts, that is not an “actual injury” because it falls outside 13 of the pleading stage. It is clear, moreover, both from the amended complaint and the filings in 14 plaintiff’s case, that he was able to effectively file his amended complaint. The amended 15 complaint was found to state cognizable claims and was ordered served upon defendants.. 16 Examples of impermissible hindrances that cause “actual injury” include: a prisoner 17 whose complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, 18 because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a 19 prisoner who had "suffered arguably actionable harm" that he wished to bring to the attention of 20 the court, but was so stymied by the inadequacies of the library that he was unable even to file a 21 complaint. See id.; see, e.g., Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 343 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff 22 demonstrated that denying him law library access while on lockdown resulted in "actual injury" 23 because he was prevented from appealing his conviction); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 24 (9th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with district court that prisoner “did not allege injury, such as inability 25 to file a complaint or defend against a charge, stemming from the restrictions on his access to 26 the law library”). None of these hindrances are alleged to have taken place here. Plaintiff’s 27 case has not been dismissed, and it currently proceeds apace. 28 Even if, as he alleges, he was delayed in filing his amended complaint or other papers, 3 1 mere delay in filing papers is not an “actual injury” where they were nevertheless timely filed or 2 accepted and considered by the court. See Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 3 1982). Plaintiff’s requests for extensions of time have been granted, and neither his pleadings 4 nor any of his other motions or other filings have been rejected on timeliness grounds. 5 Although plaintiff would undoubtedly prefer additional law library access and other assistance 6 from prison officials, he has been able to file numerous documents, motions and other requests 7 in the case. Most importantly, he has been able to effectively present his claims through the 8 pleading stage. As a result, he has not suffered “actual injury” within the meaning of Lewis, 9 and therefore any shortcomings in the assistance provided by prison officials has not violated 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 his constitutional right of access to the courts. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants limited his access to the law library access and 12 other assistance to retaliate against him for his prior lawsuit. This claim is based solely on his 13 allegation that defendants’ conduct began after he filed suit. Retaliation is not established 14 simply by showing adverse activity by defendant after protected speech; rather, plaintiff must 15 show a nexus between the two. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) 16 (retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., "after this, 17 therefore because of this"). Plaintiff alleges no nexus between his prior lawsuit and defendants’ 18 conduct, only that the one preceded the other. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a 19 claim for retaliation. 20 21 22 CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, this action is DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 23 The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: February 26 7 , 2014. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28 4

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