The Board of Trustees of the Cement Masons Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California, et al v. Jesus M. Ruiz, et al

Filing 39

Order by Hon. James Donato granting 22 Motion for Entry of Default. (jdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/25/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
CEMENT MASONS HEALTH AND
WELFARE TRUST FUND FOR
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 14-cv-01153-JD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Re: Dkt. No. 22

v.
JESUS RUIZ, et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiffs sued defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)

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and the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1132; 29 U.S.C. § 185. The complaint

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and summons were served on March 22, 2014. Dkt. No. 10. The defendants have not appeared or

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answered. Plaintiffs requested that the clerk of the court enter default, which the clerk did on

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January 21, 2015. Dkt. Nos. 18-20. On May 4, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion for default

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judgment. Dkt. No. 22. The Court grants the motion, and finds oral argument unnecessary

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pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b). The August 12, 2015 hearing date is vacated.

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Under FRCP 55(b)(2), a party may apply to the Court for entry of judgment by default.

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“The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe

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v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court may consider the following factors in

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deciding whether to grant a motion for default judgment:

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(1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff, (2) the merits of
plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4)
the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a
dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was
due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

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Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The second and third Eitel factors -- the

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merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the complaint -- are generally considered together

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because after the entry of default, well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are taken as

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true, except as to the amount of damages. Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th

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Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently states a sound cause of action for breach of fiduciary

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duty under ERISA.
The remaining factors, on balance, also weigh in favor of granting default judgment. The

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plaintiffs will be prejudiced if default judgment is not granted because they will be left with no

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way to recover damages. The requested amount is reasonable considering the liquidated damages

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and interest mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). Because defendants have not appeared, there is

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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no indication that their default is due to excusable neglect, that the material facts are subject to

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dispute, or that a decision on the merits will be possible.

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Defendants are ordered to pay the Trust Funds $26,121.67 in unpaid contributions, $3,300

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in liquidated damages and $32,365.78 in interest. Defendants are also ordered to pay $11,863.75 1

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in attorney’s fees and $971.67 in costs. To the extent plaintiffs wish to pursue other unpaid

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contributions, they should do so in a separate action. The Court will not retain jurisdiction. The

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action is dismissed and the case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 25, 2015

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________________________
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

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Plaintiffs’ counsel requests an additional $1,625.00 for “an appearance at the hearing on the
motion for default judgment and follow-up work regarding the judgment entered by the Court.”
Dkt. No. 22 at 6. Because the Court vacates the hearing, this request is denied.
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