Hendrickson v. Octagon, Inc.

Filing 91

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL by Judge Charles R. Breyer (crblc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/14/2016).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DOUGLAS HENDRICKSON,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO
DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

Defendant.
__________________________________
CLIFFORD LABOY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
OCTAGON INC,
Defendant.
/

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

C 14-01416 CRB
C 14-01417 CRB

OCTAGON INC,

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No.

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Defendant has moved in both the cases at issue here to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel

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based on an asserted conflict of interest. See Motions to Disqualify (dkts. 67 and 74). The

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Court concluded that these matters were suitable for resolution without oral argument. See

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Orders Vacating Hearing (dkts. 85 and 91). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES

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Defendant’s motions to disqualify.

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“Motions to disqualify counsel are strongly disfavored” because they “can be misused

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to harass opposing counsel, to delay the litigation, or to intimidate an adversary into

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accepting settlement on terms that would not otherwise be acceptable.” Visa U.S.A., Inc. v.

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First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207

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Cal. App. 3d 291, 301 (1989). For this reason, “disqualification motions should be subjected

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to ‘particularly strict judicial scrutiny.’” Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int’l Corp. v. Style Cos.,

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Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985).

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As an initial matter, Defendant has not made a convincing showing that a conflict

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exists here under relevant case law. The actions presently before the Court involve, in part,

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certain fee sharing clauses in contracts entered into by Plaintiffs and Defendant. See
Complaints (dkts. 1 and 1); Mot’s. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs entered into similar

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contracts with their new sports agency, which is represented here by the same attorneys who

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represent Plaintiffs. See Mot’s. Thus, according to Defendant, Plaintiffs’ counsel cannot

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represent both Plaintiffs and their new agency because those parties’ interests conflict. Id.

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This argument fails because Defendant admits that “no cause of action [here]

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explicitly contests the enforceability of [the new agency’s] fee tail provision.” See Replies

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(dkts. 77 and 83). Relevant case law thus indicates that Defendant impermissibly raises a

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“hypothetical” conflict, see Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294

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(2001), or a “non-issue,” see Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564

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(2009). Defendant also fails to explain how it has standing to bring the motions presently

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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before the Court. See In re Marriage of Murchison, 245 Cal. App. 4th 847, 851–53 (2016).

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Furthermore, even if the Court assumed a conflict did exist here, Plaintiffs’ attorneys

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have submitted sworn affidavits indicating that their clients have been fully informed of the

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subject of these motions to disqualify and have “waived any [] conflicts” that the Court might

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find to exist. See Declarations (dkts. 82 and 88). Defendant has not established that the

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asserted conflict here is unwaivable, and thus Defendant’s arguments would fail even if the

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Court reached their merits. See U.S. v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1987); Visa U.S.A.,

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Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motions to disqualify
counsel. See Motions to Disqualify (dkts. 67 and 74).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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CHARLES R. BREYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 12, 2016

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