Wilson v. Walt Disney Company,

Filing 154

ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Vince Chhabria on 4/16/2015. (knm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/16/2015)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KELLY WILSON, Case No. 14-cv-01441-VC Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 10 THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 84, 105 Defendants. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 The cross-motions for summary judgment are denied. 14 Wilson's Motion 15 Wilson contends she should win on summary judgment because the Frozen trailer and The 16 Snowman are so "strikingly similar" that they could not have been created independently. In 17 support of this argument, Wilson primarily cites emails from Disney employees to one another 18 about the similarities between the two works, including one email in which a Disney employee 19 described the works as "strikingly similar." But the Disney employee appears to have been 20 speaking as a layperson; the employee does not appear to have been using the phrase "strikingly 21 similar" as it is used in copyright law. Nor does the testimony of Wilson's expert, assuming for 22 purposes of this discussion that it would be admissible at trial, establish as a matter of law that the 23 works are "strikingly similar." Indeed, a reasonable jury could go either way on whether the 24 Frozen trailer and The Snowman are "substantially similar," see Doc. No. 39, which by definition 25 prevents a finding that they are "strikingly similar" as a matter of law. 26 Disney's Motion 27 Because a reasonable jury could go either way on whether the works are substantially 28 similar, and because Disney has not established as a matter of law that the Frozen trailer was 1 created independently, Disney cannot win its summary judgment motion unless it can show that 2 the creators of the Frozen trailer lacked access to The Snowman as a matter of law. But as 3 discussed below, there is a genuine factual dispute on this issue as well. 4 To get the "access" question to a jury, Wilson need not present evidence that the creators 5 of the trailer actually viewed or copied the The Snowman. Nor is the Court permitted to credit the 6 Disney witnesses' denials that they'd ever seen The Snowman. Wilson need only present evidence 7 that people involved in the creation of the trailer had enough of a connection to The Snowman that 8 there was a "reasonable possibility" that they had an "opportunity" to view or copy it. L.A. Printex 9 Ind., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012); Three Boys Music Corp. v. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2000); 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.02. The most direct connection between The Snowman and the creators of the trailer – a 12 connection that's sufficient on its own to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 13 access – comes from the 2011 San Francisco International Film Festival. There, The Snowman 14 was screened four times back-to-back with the short film Play by Play, which was created by 15 employees of Pixar, a Disney subsidiary. Many Pixar employees attended the festival, including 16 Elyse Klaidman, an executive producer of Play by Play. Klaidman works with John Lasseter, who 17 is Chief Creative Officer for both Disney and Pixar. Lasseter was heavily involved in the creation 18 of the Frozen trailer. Klaidman also had at least some work-related interaction with two other 19 Disney people who participated in the creation of the Frozen trailer – Greg Coleman and Jessica 20 Julius. Therefore, the connection between The Snowman and people involved in creating the 21 Frozen trailer is fairly close. And in contrast to many copyright cases, Klaidman is not merely 22 some random employee who is alleged to have received a routine submission of a copyrighted 23 work from a random aspiring artist and then passed it on to the creator of the allegedly infringing 24 work. Klaidman's exposure to The Snowman was much more noteworthy – she saw it at a film 25 festival where it was shown back-to-back with her own work. And Klaidman's connection with 26 Lasseter was more direct – she has known him for 15 or 16 years, interacts with him every few 27 months, and has access to him whenever she needs to speak with him. This connection is 28 therefore less attenuated than in other cases where courts have let the question of access go to a 2 1 jury. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d at 482-85; Straughter v. Raymond, 2 2011 WL 3651350, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); Allen v. Destiny's Child, 2009 WL 2178676, 3 at *5-7 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2009); Francescatti v. Germanotta, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81794, at 4 *11-21 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2014). For that matter, the connection is less attenuated than in the 5 cases Disney relies on for the proposition that there is no access as a matter of law. See, e.g., 6 Gable v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 727 F.Supp.2d 815, 824-29 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Stewart v. Wachowski, 7 574 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1088-89 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Meta-Film Assoc., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F.Supp. 8 1346, 1355-56 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 9 Although the above-described connection is enough on its own to send the case to a jury, additional circumstances make the "possibility" even more "reasonable" that the creators of the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Frozen trailer had an opportunity to view or copy Wilson's work. For example, there is evidence 12 that roughly sixteen Pixar employees saw The Snowman at the San Francisco International Film 13 Festival, and Wilson spoke on-stage with Pixar employees twice during the festival. The 14 Snowman was also shown at seven other film festivals, which is not an insignificant thing in the 15 film world. A screening at a total of eight film festivals (including at least one attended by many 16 Pixar employees) might not rise to the level of "widespread dissemination" within the meaning of 17 copyright law. Cf. Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm't Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 18 2009). But that shouldn't make it irrelevant to the ultimate question whether there is a reasonable 19 possibility the defendants had an opportunity to view or copy the work. Film festivals are news- 20 generating events, and their inclusion of The Snowman certainly increases the chances that people 21 in the industry, including people involved in the creation of the Frozen trailer, learned of The 22 Snowman through word of mouth and viewed it. 23 And there are other circumstances, albeit less significant ones. Wilson and her co-creator 24 sent numerous job applications to Disney and Pixar, some of which included images from or 25 references to The Snowman. The Snowman was available on YouTube and Vimeo, and one 26 unknown person did a YouTube search for "snowman and rabbit" at the same time Disney's 27 people were meeting to create the trailer. Disney rightly points out that The Snowman was not 28 popular online, but the lack of online popularity actually makes this YouTube search, and its 3 1 timing, more noteworthy. And Wilson's co-creator for The Snowman was Facebook friends with 2 one of the animators on Frozen, meaning that whenever Wilson's co-creator posted The Snowman, 3 the animator could have been notified of the posting. None of these additional circumstances 4 would, on their own, create a reasonable possibility that the people involved in the creation of the 5 Frozen trailer had an opportunity to copy or view The Snowman. But they further increase the 6 possibility, making Disney's case for summary judgment on the question of access even weaker. 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 16, 2015 ______________________________________ VINCE CHHABRIA United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

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