Coleman v. Barnes

Filing 4

ORDER of Dismissal. Signed by Judge Edward M. Chen on 9/3/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service). (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/3/2014)

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7
8

RAHSAAN COLEMAN,

9

Plaintiff,

10

v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

No. C-14-1640 EMC (pr)

R. E. BARNES, Warden; et al.,

12

Defendants.
___________________________________/

13
14

I.

15

INTRODUCTION

Rahsaan Coleman, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this pro se prisoner civil

16

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the Court for review under 28

17

U.S.C. § 1915A.

18

II.

19

BACKGROUND

This action asserts claims based on Mr. Coleman’s inability to access the law library with

20

sufficient frequency when he had an upcoming deadline in the Ninth Circuit. To analyze the claims

21

in the present action, it is necessary to recount a portion of Mr. Coleman’s litigation history.

22

A.

23

Events Leading Up To This Action
Mr. Coleman was convicted in 1998 in Contra Costa County Superior Court of voluntary

24

manslaughter and possession of a firearm by a felon, with sentence enhancements. He was

25

sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison, plus a consecutive nine-year prison

26

term. His conviction was affirmed, and various state habeas petitions were denied. See Coleman v.

27

McGrath, No. C 04-4069 PJH, Docket # 27-1 at 6.

28

1

Mr. Coleman filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2004. See Coleman v.

2

McGrath, No. C 04-4069 PJH, Docket # 1. One of the grounds upon which relief was sought was

3

that his conviction was invalid because a state municipal court judge and superior court judge had

4

failed to sign, record and file their oaths of office within the time prescribed by law. See Coleman v.

5

McGrath, No. C 04-4069 PJH, Docket # 24 at 2. The district court dismissed the claim because it

6

presented only a question of state law for which federal habeas relief was not available. Id.

7

Eventually, the district court denied the habeas petition and denied a certificate of appealability in

8

2012. Coleman v. McGrath, No. C 04-4069 PJH, Docket # 53. The Ninth Circuit also denied a

9

certificate of appealability, Coleman v. McGrath, Ninth Cir. No. 12-15767, and the U.S. Supreme
Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari in Coleman v. Lewis, U.S. S. Ct. No. 12-10601.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

In late 2012, Mr. Coleman filed a civil rights action against two state court judges who had

12

presided over portions of his criminal trial, and alleged that they had failed to sign, record and file

13

their oaths of office within the time prescribed by law. See Coleman v. Brown, No. C 12-6291

14

EMC, Docket # 1. This Court dismissed the complaint as barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey,

15

512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Coleman v. Brown, No. C 12-6291 EMC, Docket # 5. In its order of

16

dismissal, the Court described the Heck rule and then explained why it barred Mr. Coleman’s

17

complaint.

18
19
20
21
22
23

Mr. Coleman claims that defendants violated his rights by causing his
conviction in an allegedly unlawful trial – unlawful because
defendants’ oaths of office were defective. Although he alleges at one
point that his complaint “is not challenging the criminal conviction or
sentence,” he alleges in the next breath that he is “challenging the
established state procedure itself which destroyed his rights to a fair
trial.” Docket # 1-1, p. 15. He requests that the Court issue an order
vacating his sentence and conviction, and order a new trial for him.
Id. at 18. Mr. Coleman’s claims are squarely within the Heck rule
because success on them would call into question the validity of his
conviction and sentence from the Contra Costa County Superior Court.
The complaint must be dismissed.

24
25

Id. at 2-3. The Court also explained that the “exclusive method for a state prisoner to challenge his

26

state court conviction or sentence in federal court is by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus

27

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,” noted that Mr. Coleman had already filed a federal petition for writ of

28

2

1

habeas corpus, and explained that Ninth Circuit permission was necessary for him to file a second or

2

successive habeas petition. Id. at 3.

3

Mr. Coleman filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of Coleman v. Brown, No. C 12-

4

6291. The Ninth Circuit referred the matter to this court to determine whether in forma pauperis

5

status should continue for plaintiff on appeal or whether the appeal was frivolous or taken in bad

6

faith. This Court determined that the appeal was frivolous and revoked Mr. Coleman’s in forma

7

pauperis status. Coleman v. Brown, No. C 12-6291 EMC, Docket # 10.

8

Meanwhile, things were happening in the appellate court. The Ninth Circuit had docketed

appeal on May 9, 2013. Coleman v. Brown, Ninth Cir. No. 13-15949, Docket # 1. The documents

11
For the Northern District of California

the appeal, and sent out to Mr. Coleman a “case opening packet” and “docketing letter” for a pro se

10

United States District Court

9

included directions for Mr. Coleman to file his opening brief by August 14, 2013, and explained

12

how to seek an extension of deadlines. See Coleman v. Brown, Ninth Cir. No. 13-15949, Docket #

13

1-1 at 8 and Docket # 1-2 at 2. Mr. Coleman mailed his opening brief to the appellate court on July

14

23, 2013; the brief was received at the Ninth Circuit on July 30, 2013. Coleman v. Brown, Ninth

15

Cir. No. 13-15949, Docket # 7-1 at 1 and # 7-2 at 37. On August 28, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued

16

an order in which it stated: “The district court has certified that this appeal is frivolous and has

17

revoked appellant’s in forma pauperis status. We deny appellant’s motion to proceed in forma

18

pauperis on appeal because we also find the appeal is frivolous.” Coleman v. Brown, Ninth Cir. No.

19

13-15949, Docket # 8. The Ninth Circuit further ordered that, if Mr. Coleman “wishe[d] to pursue

20

this appeal despite the court’s finding that is it frivolous,” he had to pay the $455.00 filing fee within

21

21 days or the action would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. When Mr. Coleman did not

22

pay the filing fee, the appeal was dismissed on November 5, 2013. Coleman v. Brown, Ninth Cir.

23

No. 13-15949, Docket # 12. Mr. Coleman filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal on

24

November 22, 2013, but the Ninth Circuit has not, to date, ruled on it. Coleman v. Brown, Ninth

25

Cir. No. 13-15949, Docket # 13.

26

B.

27
28

Allegations In The Complaint
The current complaint blames the dismissal of the just-mentioned appeal on inadequate law

library access at Pelican Bay. Specifically, Mr. Coleman alleges that he was granted preferred legal

3

1

user (“PLU”) status on July 7, 2013 for the period from July 15 - August 14, 2013 but received less

2

law library time than he should have received under the prison rules and regulations. He alleges that

3

he should have received four hours per week as a PLU, but he only received a total of 2 hours in the

4

library. Mr. Coleman alleges that the failure to provide adequate law library access “prevented

5

plaintiff to follow-up on the legal research conducted on July 18, 2013. Subsequently, plaintiff

6

submitted his opening brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, haphazardly –

7

prepared to the best of plaintiff’s abilities as a pro se litigant” so that he could meet the schedule

8

deadline of August 14, 2013. Docket # 1 at 9; see also id. at 17.

9

III.

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

DISCUSSION

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

12

§ 1915A(a). In its review the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

13

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

14

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro

15

se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699

16

(9th Cir. 1990).

17

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

18

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the violation was

19

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

20

(1988).

21

A constitutional right of access to the courts exists, but to establish a claim for any violation

22

of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must show that there was an inadequacy in the

23

prison’s legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

24

350-51 (1996). To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy hindered him

25

in presenting a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See id.

26

at 353, 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a prisoner whose complaint was

27

dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the

28

prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a prisoner who had “suffered

4

1

arguably actionable harm” that he wished to bring to the attention of the court, but was so stymied

2

by the inadequacies of the prison’s services that he was unable even to file a complaint. See id. at

3

351.

4

The complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Even if Mr.

5

Coleman was hindered in his efforts to obtain law library access, he was not hindered in presenting a

6

non-frivolous claim, and that is a threshold requirement for a denial of access to the courts claim.

7

As the Supreme Court explained in Lewis v. Casey:

8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

Not everyone who can point to some “concrete” act and is “adverse”
can call in the courts to examine the propriety of executive action, but
only someone who has been actually injured. Depriving someone of an
arguable (though not yet established) claim inflicts actual injury
because it deprives him of something of value—arguable claims are
settled, bought, and sold. Depriving someone of a frivolous claim, on
the other hand, deprives him of nothing at all, except perhaps the
punishment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions.

12
13
14

Id. at 353 n.3 (emphasis added).
Here, this Court had dismissed Mr. Coleman’s underlying action for failure to state a claim

15

upon which relief was granted because the complaint was barred by the Heck rule. When Mr.

16

Coleman appealed, the district court certified that Mr. Coleman’s appeal was frivolous, and the

17

Ninth Circuit similarly found that the appeal was frivolous. Even if he had 24-hour-a-day access to

18

the law library, he would have fared no better on his appeal. The Heck bar was an absolute bar to a

19

civil rights action in the circumstances Mr. Coleman faced, and he was not going to find anything in

20

the law library that would have changed that fact. His complaint for denial of access to the courts

21

fails as a matter of law because the appeal he allegedly lost due to non-access to the library was

22

frivolous. See Lewis v. Casey, 555 U.S. at 356; accord Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415

23

(2002) (in an access-to-the-courts claim, the plaintiff must identify a nonfrivolous, arguable claim

24

that was lost); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1. (failure to show that a nonfrivolous legal

25

claim had been frustrated was fatal to access-to-courts claim).

26

The fact that Mr. Coleman filed a motion for reconsideration in the Ninth Circuit does not

27

change the result, because the current ruling of the Ninth Circuit is that the appeal was frivolous. (In

28

the extremely unlikely event the Ninth Circuit ever reconsiders and overturns its earlier ruling, Mr.

5

1

Coleman might file a new action.) Also, the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate resolution of the

2

appeal was to dismiss it after Mr. Coleman failed to pay the full appellate court filing fee does not

3

change the result here, because that fee became due only upon a finding that the appeal was

4

frivolous.

5
6

IV.

CONCLUSION

The complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave to

7

amend will not be granted because it would be futile: plaintiff has fully described the facts and those

8

facts do not amount to a constitutional violation. This action is dismissed for failure to state a claim

9

upon which relief may be granted. The dismissal of this action is without prejudice to plaintiff
pursuing any state law claims he has in state court. The clerk shall close the file.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13
14

Dated: September 3, 2014

15

_________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

6