Presley v. Colvin

Filing 39

Order by Hon. James Donato granting in part plaintiff's 35 Motion for EAJA Fees. (jdlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/10/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MELANIE CAROL PRESLEY,
Plaintiff,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 14-cv-01814-JD

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EAJA
FEES
Re: Dkt. No. 35

In this social security appeal, plaintiff has requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs

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under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The request is granted

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with some modifications by the Court.

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Defendant does not deny that plaintiff is a “prevailing party” but contends that no fees are

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warranted because defendant’s legal position was “substantially justified” under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2412(d)(1)(A). The problem with this argument is that it focuses only on the legal positions the

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government took during the defense of the case. Under the EAJA, the “position of the United

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States” which must be “substantially justified” “means, in addition to the position taken by the

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United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil

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action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Our Circuit has expressly stated that “[i]n the social

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security context, we have consistently treated the ALJ’s decision as the ‘action or failure to act by

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the agency upon which the civil action is based.’” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2013).

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It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified, and it has

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failed to do so in this case with respect to the ALJ’s decision upon which this action is based. The

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February 5, 2016 order of the SSA Appeals Council remanding this case back to the

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administrative law judge points out certain errors in the ALJ’s September 12, 2012 decision.

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These include the ALJ’s failure to properly weigh “the medical opinion evidence pertaining to the

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claimant’s psychological impairments,” and the ALJ’s improper reliance on the vocational expert

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evidence for the reasons stated in the Appeals Council’s remand order. Dkt. No. 37-1 at 1-2. The

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Court finds that these errors, which were identified by the Social Security Administration itself,

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preclude the government from showing here that the ALJ’s decision was “substantially justified,”

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or that it had “a reasonable basis in both law and fact.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (quoting Pierce v.

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Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). The Court consequently finds that plaintiff is entitled to

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an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA.

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For the specific amount to be awarded, the government has argued that the amount sought
by plaintiff -- $13,769.70 -- should be reduced. Dkt. Nos. 35, 36.
The Court in its discretion rejects the government’s arguments about the fees that were

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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allegedly excessive, unreasonable or duplicative. Dkt. No. 36 at 5-7. The Court generally finds

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the fees and costs challenged by defendant to be reasonable and sufficiently documented.

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The government has also made arguments about specific fees that are not properly

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compensable under the EAJA, Dkt. No. 36 at 7-8, and plaintiff has made no reply about those

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items. Dkt. No. 37. The Court consequently subtracts from the amount requested the fees for time

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spent before the complaint was filed, as well as for time spent on plaintiff’s subsequent application

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for benefits after the filing of this case. These result in a subtraction of $519.51 from the

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$13,769.70 sought by plaintiff.

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The Court consequently orders defendant to pay $13,250.19 of EAJA fees and costs to

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plaintiff, Melanie Presley, as soon as practicable. The government may make the amount payable

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to plaintiff’s counsel instead, should it determine that it can properly do so under the applicable

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rules and regulations. Dkt. No. 36 at 8-9. The Court declines to set a time limit for the payment

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and orders the government to make the payment as soon as practicable. Plaintiff may, however,

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request the Court’s further assistance in the event no payment has been made within 120 days.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 10, 2016

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JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

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