Williams vs Centerplate Inc

Filing 22

Order by Hon. Vince Chhabria granting 13 Motion to Remand to San Francisco Superior Court.(knm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/24/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOHNNY WILLIAMS,

Case No. 14-cv-02967-VC

Plaintiff,
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v.
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CENTERPLATE, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE
COURT
Re: Dkt. No. 13

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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The motion to remand this case to state court is granted.

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On April 24, 2014, Plaintiff Johnny Williams filed a putative class action complaint

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against Defendants Centerplate, Inc. et al. in Superior Court of California, San Francisco, alleging

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wage and hour violations under the California Labor Code arising from Defendants' employment

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of "roving vendors" at sporting and event venues in California. Docket No. 5, Exhibit #1. On

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June 26, 2014, The defendants removed to this Court on the grounds that, because the terms of

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Williams' employment (and the employment of many of the employees Plaintiff seeks to represent

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in the putative class action) are governed in part by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")

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with Teamsters Local 853, his claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Relations

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Management Act ("LRMA") and by Garmon preemption. Docket No. 1; see San Diego Bldg.

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Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).

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Section 301 of the LRMA provides jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts

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between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "[T]he preemptive force of

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§ 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for [such a] violation . . . .

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Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would

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provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301." Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers

Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). Section 301 preemption "must be construed to

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cover most state-law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements." Balcorta v.

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Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks

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omitted). However, "not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a

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provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the

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federal labor law." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). "[T]he Supreme

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Court has distinguished between claims that require interpretation or construction of a labor

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agreement and those that require a court simply to 'look at' the agreement." Balcorta, 208 F.3d at

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1108. And the Ninth Circuit "ha[s] stressed that, in the context of § 301 complete preemption, the

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term 'interpret' is defined narrowly—it means something more than 'consider,' 'refer to,' or 'apply.'"

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Id. Moreover, "the mere fact that a broad contractual protection . . . provide[s] a remedy for

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conduct that coincidentally violates state-law does not make the existence or the contours of the

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state law violation dependent upon the terms of the private contract." Lingle v. Norge Div. of

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Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1988). "[W]here a plaintiff contends that an employer's

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actions violated a state-law obligation, wholly independent of its obligations under the CBA, there

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is no preemption." Espinal v. Nw. Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Here, Williams claims that the defendants violated California law by, among other things,

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failing provide meal and rest periods, failing to pay minimum wages, overtime wages, and failing

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to indemnify employees for work expenditures. Docket No. 5, Exhibit #1. To be sure, Williams'

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allegations might also state a claim for breaches of the CBA. But evaluation of Plaintiff's state

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claim is not "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Allis–

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Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213. Rather, Williams' claims are based on "nonnegotiable rights conferred

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on individual employees as a matter of state law, . . . independent of rights under the collective-

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bargaining agreement." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (internal quotation marks

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omitted). Such claims are not preempted by § 301. Id. at 123–24.

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Nor is there removal jurisdiction under Garmon. In that case, the Supreme Court held that

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the NLRB has original, exclusive jurisdiction over claims of unfair labor practices arising under

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Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 ("When an
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activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must

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defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board."). The Ninth Circuit

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has since made clear both that "Garmon preemption is not a basis for removal from state to federal

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court jurisdiction," and that "the assertion of Garmon preemption does not create a federal

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question for federal court jurisdiction." Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d 1506, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991).

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In his remand motion, Williams seeks an award of attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1447(c), which provides that "[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs

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and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." The

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decision whether to award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) is committed to the discretion of the
district court. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005). "Absent unusual

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party

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lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." Id. at 141.

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While Garmon preemption did not provide Defendants' with an objectively reasonable

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basis for removal, the Court cannot say the same about Defendant's argument for preemption

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under § 301 of the LRMA. "There is no question that [this] argument [was a] loser[]. But

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removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party's arguments lack

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merit." Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court

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therefore declines to award attorney's fees in this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 24, 2014
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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