Cunningham v. Singer et al

Filing 134

ORDER DENYING 126 MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT by Hon. William Alsup. (whalc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/28/2016)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ARCHIBALD CUNNINGHAM,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 14-03250 WHA

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO VACATE JUDGMENT FOR
FRAUD ON THE COURT

KEVIN SINGER, et al.,
Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
Following entry of judgment against him and denial of his motion for reconsideration

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long ago, plaintiff now moves to vacate the judgment for fraud on the court pursuant to FRCP

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60(d)(3). Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

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STATEMENT
Following a protracted series of abusive and frivolous lawsuits and appeals, plaintiff

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Archibald Cunningham brought the instant action in 2014. A previous order granted

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defendants’ motions to dismiss and declared plaintiff a vexatious litigant (Dkt. No. 113).

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Judgment was entered against him the same day (Dkt. No. 114). Plaintiff then moved for

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reconsideration pursuant to FRCP 59(e) (Dkt. No. 116). The motion was denied (Dkt. No. 120).

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Now, almost two years later, plaintiff moves to vacate the judgment for fraud on the court

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pursuant to FRCP 60(d)(3) (Dkt. No. 126). Defendants John Scott McKay, Michael Coombs,

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and Tamara Woods oppose (Dkt. No. 127). Defendant Kevin Singer joins in the opposition.

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ANALYSIS
Courts have inherent equity power to vacate judgments obtained by fraud. United States

U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). Subsection (d)(3) of FRCP 60, which governs relief from a judgment or

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order, states that the rule “does not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on

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the court.” Not all fraud, however, is fraud on the court. In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119

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(9th Cir. 1999). In determining whether fraud constitutes fraud on the court, the relevant

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inquiry is whether it harmed the integrity of the judicial process. Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444

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(quotations omitted). Fraud on the court must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

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at 443–44. Importantly, “[m]ere nondisclosure of evidence is typically not enough to constitute

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For the Northern District of California

v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501

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United States District Court

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fraud on the court, and ‘perjury by a party or witness, by itself, is not normally fraud on the

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court.’” Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444 (quoting Levander, 180 F.3d at 1119).

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Plaintiff’s briefs narrate at length his grievances with long-ago state court proceedings in

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connection with his eviction. His motion essentially attempts to relitigate those grievances on

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their merits and puts up only a threadbare facade of Rule 60(d) analysis consisting primarily of

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unsupported accusations of fraud. The accusations connect to no actual allegations describing

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fraudulent conduct but rather function as mere buzzwords signifying plaintiff’s disagreements

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with his opponents’ actions and arguments. For example, plaintiff claims defendants committed

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fraud by using Section 568 of the California Code of Civil Procedure against him (Dkt. No. 126

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at 7–8), taking steps to effectuate his eviction (id. at 10–16), and defending their legal positions

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against him during oral argument before the undersigned (id. at 16; Dkt. No. 129 at 7–13). In

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short, plaintiff recasts virtually every step defendants took in this litigation — at least insofar as

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he disagreed with said steps — as fraud. Moreover, his allegations — even if true — would

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constitute only fraud on the state court, not fraud on this Court. Rehashing of long-settled state

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law issues, however, cannot support a Rule 60(d) motion here, nor can plaintiff use Rule 60(d)

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as a procedural vehicle to relitigate his eviction on the merits in federal court.

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Plaintiff also requests “an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the extrinsic frauds

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Attorney McKay has committed on the state court, the SF Sheriff’s Dept., and the district court”
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(Dkt. No. 126 at 23). Aside from the apparent desire to relitigate all his grievances, plaintiff

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offers no discernible rationale why fraudulent conduct in state court necessitates an evidentiary

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hearing here. Plaintiff also complains that the undersigned “allowed Attorney McKay to

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‘testify’ as to the facts and law during oral argument and treated his unsworn statements as

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‘evidence’ that [plaintiff] had been properly evicted and was ‘vexatious’” (id. at 22). Plaintiff is

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wrong. Parties do not “testify” by speaking to facts and law during oral argument, and the

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Court’s previous order dismissing plaintiff’s case did not make factual findings regarding

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plaintiff’s eviction or rely on attorney statements from oral argument as evidence.

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established entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on his allegations of fraud.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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In short, plaintiff has not shown fraud on the court by clear and convincing evidence or

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 28, 2016.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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