Ferdaws Amiri et al v. Dyncorp et al

Filing 48

ORDER transferring case to the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer venue 33 is GRANTED. The case management conference set for February 20, 2015 is VACATED. Signed by Judge Samuel Conti on January 13, 2015. (sclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/13/2015)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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FERDAWS AMIRI, ILYAS YONISI
Plaintiffs,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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v.

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DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL, INC., et
al.

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Defendants.

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Case No. 14-CV-03333 SC
ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE TO
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
VIRGINIA

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I.

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INTRODUCTION
Now before the Court is Defendants DynCorp International Inc.

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("DII"), DynCorp International LLC ("DI LLC"), Worldwide Recruiting

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and Staffing Services LLC, and DTS Aviation Services, LLC's1

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(collectively, "Defendants" or "DynCorp") motion to dismiss

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Plaintiffs Ferdaws Amiri and Ilyas Yonisi's second amended

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27
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DTS Aviation Services, LLC was erroneously sued as "DynCorp
Aviation Services, Inc." ECF No. 35 ("French Decl.") at ¶ 9. For
simplicity the Court will refer to the Defendant by its correct
name, or "DTS" for short.

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complaint ("SAC"), ECF No. 22, for lack of personal jurisdiction

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and improper venue.

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ECF No. 40 ("Opp'n"), and Defendants filed a reply.

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("Reply").

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argument under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

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below, the motion is GRANTED and the Court DIRECTS the clerk to

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transfer the action to the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria

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Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a).

ECF No. 32 ("Mot.").

The motion is opposed,
ECF No. 42

The motion is appropriate for resolution without oral
For the reasons set forth

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II.

BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury case alleging claims for battery,

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assault, and various forms of negligence that arose from a car

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accident in Afghanistan.

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Plaintiffs worked for a company called AECOM Government

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Services as military contractors, and were in Afghanistan to

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participate in human intelligence gathering in support of United

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States military operations.

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worldwide activities, Defendants provide an array of military

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contracting services including transportation, security, training,

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advising, and mentoring for the Afghan National Police.

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Among many other nationwide and

Plaintiffs allege that, while driving military informants from

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Camp Phoenix (a military installation in Kabul maintained by the

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United States Army) two DynCorp vehicles driven by DynCorp

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employees repeatedly tried to run Plaintiffs off the road.

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Plaintiffs' vehicle was struck several times, and both Plaintiffs

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suffered serious injuries as a result.

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contend that DynCorp was aware of other similar acts by its drivers

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Furthermore, Plaintiffs

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but, rather than attempt to prevent such conduct, encouraged its

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employees to act aggressively.

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Plaintiffs are citizens of California.

DII is incorporated in

is organized in Delaware with its principal place of business in

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Virginia, and is wholly owned by DII.

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("DTS Aviation") is organized in Nevada with its principal place of

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business in Texas, and DI LLC is its sole member.

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Recruiting and Staffing Services LLC ("Worldwide") is organized in

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United States District Court

Delaware with its principal place of business in Virginia.

5

For the Northern District of California

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DI LLC

Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas, and DI LLC

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is its sole member.

DTS Aviation Services, LLC

Worldwide

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Now Defendants move to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) and

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12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the

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Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants and that venue is

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improper in this district.

Plaintiffs oppose.

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

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A.

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Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

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defendants may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

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Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the Court has personal

22

jurisdiction over Defendants.

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F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

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that the plaintiff make only a prima facie showing of

25

jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss."

26

(quotations omitted).

27

favor of the plaintiff . . . ."

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Personal Jurisdiction

See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453
"[T]his demonstration requires

Id.

"[T]he court resolves all disputed facts in
Id. (quotations omitted).

The Court follows state law in determining the bounds of

3

1

personal jurisdiction.

2

(2014).

3

limits of federal due process.

4

Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004).

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nonresident's physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction

6

of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have

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'certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the

8

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

9

substantial justice.'"

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10
11

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121

California's long-arm statute is coextensive with the
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor
"Although a

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (quoting Int'l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the

12

relevant forum, personal jurisdiction may be founded on either

13

general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.

14

L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).

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in this case rely solely on general jurisdiction.

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jurisdiction exists only when the defendant's contacts "'are so

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continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in

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the forum state.'"

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(2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

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131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Panavision Int'l,
Plaintiffs

General

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752

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B.

Venue

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a defendant to

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move to dismiss an action for improper venue.

On a Rule 12(b)(3)

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motion, "the pleadings need not be accepted as true, and the court

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may consider facts outside of the pleadings," but the court must

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draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in

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favor of the non-moving party.

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362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004).

Murphy v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc.,

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2
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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs do not argue that the Court may exercise specific

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jurisdiction over Defendants.

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jurisdiction here is founded on general jurisdiction.

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Additionally, Plaintiffs allege venue is proper in this district

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solely on the basis of the Court's personal jurisdiction over

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Defendants.

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judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Instead, they argue that personal

See 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(3) (providing for venue in "any

personal jurisdiction . . .").
Because the Court concludes it lacks personal jurisdiction
over Defendants, the Court finds venue improper as well.

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A.

Personal Jurisdiction

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In order to exercise general (sometimes called "all-purpose")

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jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court must conclude that

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Defendants have "certain minimum contacts with [California] such

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that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional

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notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"

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U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

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Even if Plaintiffs can satisfy that test, the exercise of general

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jurisdiction also requires a showing that Defendants' contacts with

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California are "'so continuous and systematic as to render

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[Defendants] essentially at home'" in California.

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Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (internal

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quotation marks omitted).

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home in the forum [s]tate," a company must be "comparable to a

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domestic enterprise in that State."

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Int'l Shoe, 326

Daimler, 134 S.

In other words, to be "essentially at

Id. at 758 n.11.

Some have called this the "home-state test," and outside a

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corporation's place of incorporation or principal place of business

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it is rarely satisfied.

3

Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc

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81, 83 (2013).

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these two forums -- the place of incorporation and principal place

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of business -- the "paradigm all-purpose forums . . . ."

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134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.

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the Supreme Court did not restrict general jurisdiction to only

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those two forums.

See Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State

In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has termed

Daimler,

Nonetheless,

Instead, the Court pointed out "that in an

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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exceptional case . . . a corporation's operations in a forum other

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than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of

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business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render

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the corporation at home in that state."

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(citing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437

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(1952)).

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is, its treatment of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,

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342 U.S. 437 (1952), indicates the bar for such a finding is very

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high.

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Daimler, at 761 n.19

While the Court did not define what an "exceptional case"

In Perkins, the defendant was a corporation organized under

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the laws of the Philippines.

During the Japanese occupation in

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World War II, the defendant's president moved to Ohio where he

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maintained an office, the company's files, and organized the

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company's activities.

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in Ohio on a claim that had no connection to Ohio.

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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that exercising general

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jurisdiction over the defendant was appropriate because "Ohio was

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the corporation's principal, if temporary, place of business."

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Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780, n.11 (1984).

Id. at 448.

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The plaintiff sued the company
Id. at 438.

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"This presumably is the type of situation that [Daimler] envisioned

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as the 'exceptional case' in which a defendant's affiliations with

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the forum are 'comparable' to those of a domestic company."

4

M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 Vand. L. Rev.

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(forthcoming 2015) at 20, available at:

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417040 (last

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accessed January 9, 2015).

8

cases there will be no occasion to explore whether a Perkins-type

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exception might apply" because the Supreme Court's analysis in

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Yet "in the overwhelming majority of

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

Daimler focused almost exclusively on the paradigmatic bases for

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general jurisdiction -- the corporation's place of incorporation

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and principal place of business.

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at 761)).

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Id. (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct.

None of the paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction are

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present in this case.

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California, and none have their principal place of business here.

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs must show that this is the kind of

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"exceptional case" in which Defendants' operations in California

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are "so substantial and of such a nature as to render [Defendants]

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at home in" California.

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Defendants are not incorporated in

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.

Plaintiffs argue that five sets of contacts between Defendants

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and California are sufficient to create general jurisdiction: (1)

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DI LLC's contracts to do business with NASA at Edwards Air Force

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Base in Edwards, California, (2) DI LLC's contract to do aircraft

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maintenance for the Marine Corps in Miramar, California, (3) DII's

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contract with the State of California to fight wildfires, (4) two

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aircraft maintenance facilities owned or operated by DII or DI LLC

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in Redding and Ukiah, California, and (5) DI LLC's 239 employees in

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California.
As a preliminary matter, Defendants take issue with some of

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these factual allegations.

While these factual issues ultimately

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do not affect the outcome (the Court lacks personal jurisdiction

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regardless), the Court pauses to address them.

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For instance, Plaintiffs argue that DII's contacts with

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California are sufficient to render it at home here because (1) it

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has a contract with CalFire, a state agency, to fight wildfires,

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and (2) DII or its subsidiaries operate two aircraft maintenance

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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facilities in the state.

Defendants do not dispute the particulars

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of the CalFire contract, which was in place in one form or another

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since 2001, was the subject of a $137.7 million extension in 2008,

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includes responsibility for wildfire prevention and control for 30

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million acres of state land, and involved 7,550 flight hours by

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DynCorp pilots in 2007 alone.

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several declarations, the CalFire contract is actually between

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DynCorp International LLC, not DynCorp International, Inc.

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same declarations aver that DII is not registered to do business in

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California, has no registered agent in California, and has no

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employees, contracts, or facilities in California.

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("French Decl.") at ¶¶ 3-6; 37 ("Castillo Decl.") at ¶ 3.

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Plaintiffs ignore these declarations, instead resting on the

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allegations in their complaint and the declaration of one of their

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attorneys attaching various documents located during Internet

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searches.

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documents is a press release indicating that DII has the contract

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with CalFire, and two entries from yp.com, the internet version of

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the Yellow Pages, showing DynCorp locations in Redding and Ukiah.

Instead, as Defendants point out in

See ECF No. 40-2 ("Flores Decl.") Ex. A.

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Those

See ECF Nos. 35

Among those

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2

Id. at 1-7.
Defendants complain that "Plaintiffs contend that a press

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release has the same force and effect, and in fact, should be

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deemed more reliable than declaration [sic] submitted to this court

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under penalty of perjury."

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Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court must resolve factual disputes in

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Plaintiffs' favor.

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"[w]hen a defendant provides affidavits to support a Rule 12(b)(2)

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motion, the plaintiff may not simply rest on the allegations of the

Reply at 4.

But for the purposes of a

See Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154.

True,

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

complaint."

11

(3d ed.); see also Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647

12

F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011), however that is not what happened

13

with these allegations.

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exceedingly weak in light of Defendants' substantial submissions,

15

because the Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, the Court

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must treat Plaintiffs' allegations about the CalFire contract and

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Redding and Ukiah locations as true for the purpose of the motion.

18

Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328

19

F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003).

20

Wright & Miller, 4 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1067.6

Even if Plaintiffs' declaration appears

This is not true, however, of several of the unsupported

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allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint.

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contend that DII is the parent company of the various DynCorp

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entities and "controls and is involved in the contracts and

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decision making for doing business that DynCorp International LLC

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and other entities has in California . . . ."

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Plaintiffs' view "[t]his has been pleaded in the Complaint and is

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sufficient to subject DynCorp International Inc[.] to jurisdiction

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in California as it is the principal of its agent DynCorp

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For example, Plaintiffs

Opp'n at 9.

In

1

International LLC and the other DynCorp defendants."

Id. (citing

2

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 for the proposition that "the Supreme

3

Court assumed the contacts of the subsidiary could be imputed to

4

the parent").

5

Plaintiffs' sole basis for this factual conclusion is the

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allegations in their Complaint.

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in their declarations, DII is not the managing member of any of the

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other DynCorp entities and "makes no decisions as it has no

9

employees."

Tabling Plaintiffs' legal conclusion for the moment,

However, as Defendants point out

Reply at 4 (citing French Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 14).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

Instead, DII is the sole member of DI LLC which, in turn, is the

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sole member of DTS Aviation and Worldwide.

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declarations contradict Plaintiffs' unsupported allegation that DII

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has been registered with the California Secretary of State to do

14

business in the state since 1946.

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Decl. ¶ 4.

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contradicted by affidavit," the Court "may not assume the[ir]

17

truth . . . ."

18

v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977))

19

(quotation marks omitted).

20

Similarly, Defendants'

Compare Compl. ¶ 13, with French

Because these are "allegations in a pleading [that] are

Marvix, 647 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Data Disc., Inc.

As a result, the relevant contacts are as follows.

DII's

21

contacts are limited to the CalFire contract and the Ukiah and

22

Redding addresses.

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between $46.6 million and $176.9 million (depending on whether NASA

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exercises certain options) for aircraft maintenance and support

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split between four facilities, one of which is located in

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California (Edwards Air Force Base), (2) a $9,643,087 contract with

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the Marine Corps with 16 percent of the work to be performed at the

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Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, (3) 239 employees who

DI LLC has (1) a contract with NASA worth

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reside in California, and (4) registration with the Secretary of

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State to do business in California.

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California on its website, which lists positions with DynCorp

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entities worldwide.

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between DTS Aviation Services LLC and California, however,

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Plaintiffs do allege that DTS (and the other DynCorp entities) is

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an agent or alter ego of the other Defendants.

Worldwide posts jobs in

Plaintiffs do not allege any direct contacts

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Considering the DynCorp entities' activities "in their

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entirety, nationwide and worldwide," none of the DynCorp entities

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

can be deemed "at home" in California.

11

n.20.

12

review two recent cases, Daimler and a subsequent Ninth Circuit

13

case, Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014),

14

both of which found contacts between corporate defendants and

15

California insufficient to satisfy the home-state test.

16

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762

Nonetheless, to understand that conclusion it is helpful to

First, in Daimler, the Supreme Court held that the California

17

activities of Daimler's subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

18

("MBUSA"), were insufficient to subject Daimler to general

19

jurisdiction in California.

20

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New

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Jersey had multiple facilities in California, was "the largest

22

supplier of luxury vehicles to the California market," with

23

California sales accounting for 2.4% of Daimler's worldwide sales.

24

Id. at 752.

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both that MBUSA would be subject to general jurisdiction and that

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MBUSA's contacts with California could be imputed to Daimler, the

27

Court nonetheless held that Daimler's contacts were insufficient

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"to render [it] essentially at home" in California.

134 S. Ct. at 750-51.

MBUSA, a

While the Supreme Court assumed (without deciding)

11

Id. at 751.

1

Instead, the Court emphasized that general jurisdiction is

2

available against corporate defendants outside a corporation's

3

place of incorporation and principal place of business in only

4

"exceptional case[s] . . . ."

5

Id. at 760-61 & n.19.

Second, after Daimler, the Ninth Circuit rejected an attempt

6

to assert general jurisdiction against a foreign corporation in

7

California.

8

jurisdiction against ATR, a French company, based on several

9

hundred million dollars of contracts to sell aircraft and

In Martinez, the plaintiffs alleged general

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

components in California, sending company representatives to

11

California for business purposes, an unaffiliated entity's use of

12

ATR's aircraft for flights in California, and advertisements in

13

publications distributed in California.

14

heavily in Daimler, Judge Fletcher wrote that these contacts were

15

"plainly insufficient to subject ATR to general jurisdiction in

16

California."

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was organized and had its principal place of business in France,

18

had no offices, staff, or other physical presence in California,

19

was not licensed to do business in California, and its California

20

contacts were minor compared to its worldwide activities.

21

Id.

764 F.3d at 1071.

Relying

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted that ATR

Id.

In light of these cases it is easy to conclude that DTS

22

Aviation and Worldwide are not "at home" in California.

23

aside the possibility of jurisdiction based on an agency or alter

24

ego theory (which the Court will address later), Plaintiffs allege

25

no contacts at all between DTS Aviation and California.

26

do allege contacts between Worldwide and California stemming from

27

Worldwide's website, which lists jobs available in California,

28

however, that is not sufficient either.

12

Setting

Plaintiffs

Worldwide provides

1

staffing and recruiting services for all the DynCorp entities

2

worldwide, not simply or predominantly in California.

3

"in their entirety" Worldwide's California activities are at best a

4

small part of a much larger, worldwide business, and fall far short

5

of the high bar for exercising general jurisdiction.

6

otherwise would leave Worldwide subject to suit in any state in

7

which it operates -- a result that runs directly contrary to

8

Daimler.

9

render jurisdiction "presumably . . . available in every other

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

When viewed

Concluding

See 134 S. Ct. at 761-62 (rejecting a theory that would

State in which [an entities'] sales are sizeable").
General jurisdiction is also inappropriate as to DII or DI

11
12

LLC.

First, while DII has two addresses in California, the Supreme

13

Court has signaled that the existence of local offices or real

14

property "should not attract heavy reliance today."

15

S. Ct. at 761 n.18.

16

result of the shift from the territorial view of jurisdiction,

17

embodied in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), to today's more

18

flexible view.

19

locations as well as DII's CalFire contract and DI LLC's NASA and

20

Marine Corps contracts and California employees in light of DII and

21

DI LLC's "activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide,"

22

it is clear neither is "at home" in California.

23

instance, the most recent amendment to Form S-4 filed by DII stated

24

that it had "approximately 89 active contracts and approximately

25

128 active task orders," with ordinary contracts ranging "from

26

three to ten years."2

Daimler, 134

The reason to discount local offices is a

Daimler, at 754-55 & n.18.

Moreover, viewing those

Id. at n.20.

For

Similarly, DI LLC's California contracts

27
28

2

See Delta Tucker Holdings, Inc. & DynCorp International, Inc.,
Am. No. 1 to Form S-4 (filed June 3, 2011). The Court takes

13

1

"together equate to approximately 1% of worldwide revenues," ECF

2

No. 36 ("Hille Decl.") at ¶ 2, and just 239 of its 13,350 worldwide

3

employees work in California, none of whom are corporate officers.

4

Castillo Decl. ¶ 5-7.

5

enough to subject DI LLC to suit for causes of action having

6

nothing to do with those contracts (or even the forum state), then

7

DI LLC would presumably be amenable to suit in all 33 states in

8

which it operates.

9

similar theory in Daimler when it said "[s]uch exorbitant exercises

If a few isolated government contracts were

See id. at ¶ 5.

The Supreme Court rejected a

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state

11

defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum

12

assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them

13

liable to suit."

14

omitted); see also United States ex rel. Imco Gen. Const., Inc. v.

15

Ins. Co of Pa., No. C14-0752RSL, 2014 WL 4364854, at *3 (W.D. Wash.

16

Sept. 3, 2014).

17

DI LLC's "California contacts are minor compared to [their] other

18

worldwide contacts," neither can be properly deemed "at home" in

19

California.

20

134 S. Ct. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks

As a result, the Court finds that because DII and

Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1070.

Nor are Plaintiffs' agency or alter ego allegations sufficient

21

to provide jurisdiction over Defendants.

The Ninth Circuit's

22

approach to determining personal jurisdiction based on agency or

23

alter ego is in flux after the Supreme Court's decision in Daimler.

24

See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction after Bauman,

25

66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 197, 199 (2014) ("The Court appears to be

26

calling into doubt whether a subsidiary's contacts can ever be

27
28

judicial notice of this filing. See In re Netflix, Inc., Sec.
Litig., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

14

1

imputed to establish general jurisdiction . . . ."); see also

2

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759 n.13 (pointing out that even though

3

agency relationships are relevant to specific jurisdiction, "[i]t

4

does not inevitably follow, however, that similar reasoning applies

5

to general jurisdiction") (emphasis in original).

6

Before Daimler, under Ninth Circuit law a court could impute a

7

subsidiary's contacts with the forum to the parent if one of two

8

tests was satisfied.

9

unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of

The first test asks whether "there is such

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

the two entities no longer exists and . . . that failure to

11

disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or

12

injustice."

13

(alterations omitted) (quoting Am. Tele. & Telegraph Co. v.

14

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996)).

15

other words, are the entities alter egos?

16

which the Ninth Circuit called the agency test, required "a showing

17

that the subsidiary functions as the parent corporation's

18

representative in that it performs services that are sufficiently

19

important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a

20

representative perform them, the corporation's own officials would

21

undertake to perform substantially similar services."

22

The Supreme Court took issue with this second test, pointing out

23

that it "stacks the deck," and "will always yield a pro-

24

jurisdiction answer" because "'[a]nything a corporation does

25

through a[] . . .

26

corporation would do by other means if the . . . subsidiary . . .

27

did not exist.'"

28

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2011)

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)

In

The second approach,

Id. at 928.

subsidiary . . . is presumably something the

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (quoting Bauman v.

15

1

(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc))

2

(internal quotation marks omitted).

3

Here the Court need not decide whether DI LLC or the other

4

DynCorp entities' contacts with California can be imputed to DII or

5

if Defendants are all alter egos of one another.

6

the sake of argument that Defendants are all alter egos of one

7

another and their California contacts can be imputed to one

8

another, those contacts still fall far short of showing that this

9

is an "exceptional case" where any of the DynCorp entities is at

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

home in California.

11

light of DynCorp's substantial worldwide and nationwide activities,

12

render it "at home" virtually everywhere it operates.

13

corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at

14

home in all of them."

15

agency/alter ego theory or standing alone, Defendants' contacts are

16

simply insufficient to render them answerable for all claims in

17

California.

18

general jurisdiction would be appropriate here, and Defendants

19

motion is GRANTED.

20
21

1.

Id. at n.19.

Even assuming for

Concluding otherwise would, in

Id. at n.20.

But "[a]

Here, whether based on an

As a result, Plaintiffs have not shown the exercise of

Jurisdictional Discovery and Leave to Amend

In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek jurisdictional discovery

22

or leave to amend their complaint to allege additional

23

jurisdictional facts.

24

"Discovery may be appropriately granted where pertinent facts

25

bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a

26

more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary."

27

Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Data Disc.,

28

557 F.2d at 1285 n.1)).

Boschetto v.

However, "[w]here a plaintiff's claim of

16

bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by the

3

defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery."

4

Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Terracom v. Valley Nat'l

5

Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995)).

6

[sic] seeking jurisdictional discovery must provide some basis to

7

believe that discovery will lead to relevant evidence providing a

8

basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction," and courts have

9

discretion to "deny requests based 'on little more than a hunch

10

United States District Court

personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on

2

For the Northern District of California

1

that [discovery] might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts.'"

11

Pfister v. Selling Source, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1118 (D. Nev.

12

2013) (quoting Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020).

13

"To this end, plaintiff's

Here, Plaintiffs suggest that jurisdictional discovery is

14

appropriate because there is "possible confusion" over Defendants'

15

corporate structure.

16

all the contacts Plaintiffs have identified can be imputed to DII,

17

that is still insufficient to permit the Court to exercise general

18

jurisdiction over DII or the other Defendants.

19

Plaintiffs' discovering more about Defendants' corporate structure

20

is highly unlikely to yield jurisdictionally relevant facts.

21

Plaintiffs also request discovery into "the specific nature of

22

[Defendants'] business in California," but this is also

23

insufficient because it is based on nothing more than a hunch that

24

additional discovery might yield additional contacts.

25

14; see also Boschetto at 1020.

26

found potentially relevant jurisdictional facts through

27

jurisdictional discovery, there is no basis aside from speculation

28

for concluding those facts would render this the kind of

However, as the Court found earlier, even if

As a result,

Opp'n at 13-

Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs

17

1

"exceptional case" in which exercising general jurisdiction outside

2

the paradigm all-purpose forums is appropriate.

3

S. Ct. at 761 n.19.

4

See Daimler, 134

Because the Court finds, as discussed further below, that

5

transferring the action, rather than dismissing it, is the

6

appropriate course of action, the Court declines to dismiss the

7

action.

8

argument about leave to amend.

9

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

As a result, there is no need to address Plaintiffs'

B.

Venue

Additionally, the Court finds venue is improper in this

11

District.

12

on 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(3), which provides for venue in "any

13

judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's

14

personal jurisdiction" when "there is no district in which an

15

action may otherwise be brought."

16

that none of the Defendants is subject to the Court's personal

17

jurisdiction, venue is clearly improper under this subsection.

18

Pfister, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.

19

other subsections of Section 1391(b) can be satisfied because none

20

of the Defendants reside in this District, and the events at issue

21

did not take place here.

22

Accordingly, Defendants' Rule 12(b)(3) motion is GRANTED.

23

Plaintiffs allege venue is proper in this District based

Id.

Because the Court finds

See

Similarly, neither of the two

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2).

Anticipating this conclusion, Plaintiffs urge the Court to

24

transfer the case to a proper venue rather than dismiss the action,

25

pointing out that their claims might be time-barred if the Court

26

dismisses the action.

27

to cure venue defects "in the interest of justice" by transferring

28

the case "to any district or division in which it could have been

28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a) permits the Court

18

1

brought" rather than dismissing the action.

2

recognized, "[a] compelling reason for transfer is that the

3

plaintiff, whose case if transferred . . . will be time-barred if

4

his case is dismissed and thus has to be filed anew in the right

5

court."

6

(Posner, J.).

7

rather than dismissing the action is in the interests of justice.3

Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1999)
As a result, the Court finds that transferring

Defendants concede personal jurisdiction exists in Virginia

8
9

As other courts have

and argue that venue is proper there as well.

However, Defendants

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

do not specify which of Virginia's two districts, the Eastern and

11

Western Districts, would be proper.

12

it appears that DynCorp global headquarters is located at 1700 Old

13

Meadow Road, McLean, Virginia 22102.

14

Contact, http://www.dyn-intl.com/about-di/contact/ (last accessed

15

January 12, 2015).

16

falls within the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division.

17

E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 3(B)(1).

18

Clerk to transfer this action there.

19

///

20

///

21

///

22

///

23

///

24

///

25

///

26

///

27

3

28

Based on the Court's research,

See DynCorp International,

McLean is in Fairfax County, and therefore

Accordingly, the Court DIRECTS the

The Court notes that it has the authority to transfer venue even
when it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).

19

1
2

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the exercise

3

of general jurisdiction is inappropriate here and venue does not

4

lie in this District.

5

the Court DIRECTS the clerk to transfer the action to the Eastern

6

District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, for all further

7

proceedings.

Accordingly, in the interests of justice,

8
9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10
11
12

Dated: January 13, 2015
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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