Marlene Henderson et al v. County of Santa Cruz et al

Filing 109

Order by Judge William H. Orrick re: 108 Discovery Letter Brief. (jmdS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/6/2020)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARLENE HENDERSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 14-cv-03544-WHO
ORDER ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE

v.

Re: Dkt. No. 108
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al.,
Defendants.

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James Henderson, a former inmate at the Santa Cruz County Jail Mental Health Unit,

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murdered his parents Joseph and Edyth Henderson sometime after he was released from jail. In

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this action, Marlene Henderson, James’s sister and daughter of Joseph and Edyth, alleges that

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various Santa Cruz County municipal agencies acted wrongfully in releasing James Henderson.

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This case was originally stayed pending the outcome of the criminal case. The stay was lifted

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once James Henderson was convicted of two counts of first degree murder with special

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circumstances. Parties are now in the midst of discovery and dispute over requests that would

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require defendants to produce the medical and health records of James Henderson.

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Defendants believe that they cannot produce the medical and mental health records of

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James Henderson without his authorization or a court order. Plaintiffs contend that James

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Henderson lacks the capacity to consent to the release of his records by reason of his severe

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mental disabilities, which was alleged in his criminal trial to be the impetus of his murder of his

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parents. Instead, they argue that defendants are still required to produce the requested records

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because the parties have entered into a qualified protective order.

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Plaintiffs point to the applicable provisions of the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e). Section 164.512 subsection (e) of

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HIPAA allows disclosure of information in the course of judicial and administrative proceedings.

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Disclosures may be compelled “[i]n response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful

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process, that is not accompanied by an order of a court or administrative tribunal,” if either the

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individual whose information has been requested has been given notice of the request or

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reasonable efforts have been made by the requesting party to secure a “qualified protective order.”

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See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(ii)(A)-(B).

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A qualified protective order is defined as “an order of a court or of an administrative

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tribunal or a stipulation by the parties to the litigation or administrative proceeding” that meets the

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following two requirements:
(A) Prohibits the parties from using or disclosing the protected health
information for any purpose other than the litigation or proceeding for
which such information was requested; and
(B) Requires the return to the covered entity or destruction of the
protected health information (including all copies made) at the end of
the litigation or proceeding.

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45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v).

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Here, parties have agreed to a protective order. [Dkt. No. 81]. Section 7.1 of the

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protective order satisfies the first requirement as it limits the use of protected material disclosed or

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produced in this case for litigation purposes only. Section 13 satisfies the second requirement

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because it details the process at final disposition, particularly that “each Receiving Party must

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return all Protected Material to the Producing Party or destroy such material.” Notably, under

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section 14, parties have already “agree[d] that all documents produced by Defendant County of

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Santa Cruz containing James Henderson’s medical, mental health or other sensitive information

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shall be designated as ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ under this Protective Order and handled accordingly.”

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Therefore, I find that HIPAA does not preclude production of the medical and mental

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health records because the protective order adequately safeguards James Henderson’s privacy

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rights. See, e.g., Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D. 164, 167 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering

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municipality entity to produce medical and workers’ compensation files of police officer in civil

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rights suit because there was already a protective order in the case that adequately protected police

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officer’s privacy); Allen v. Woodford, No. CVF051104OWWLJO, 2007 WL 309485, at *5 (E.D.

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Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) (45 CFR § 164.512(e) permits the disclosure of third-party medical records
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covered by HIPPA so long as there is a satisfactory protective order in place); Mayfield v. Orozco,

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No. 2:13-CV-02499 JAM AC, 2016 WL 8731367, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2016) (ordering

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production of documents and responses to interrogatories subject to a HIPAA-compliant

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protective order).1
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants produce to plaintiff within 20 days of this

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Order the requested medical and mental health records, in accordance with the HIPAA-compliant

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protective order in this case. Plaintiffs also seek an order for production for other categories of

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documents that defendants previously agreed to produce. Defendants indicate that they will

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produce them on or before May 1, 2020.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Dated: April 6, 2020

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William H. Orrick
United States District Judge

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Defendants’ cite to the five-factor test in Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 553 (9th
Cir. 2004) is inapposite. The Ninth Circuit in that case was evaluating whether a particular state
statutory scheme regulating abortion clinics violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
of physicians. The five-factor test was used to determine whether the governmental interest in
obtaining information outweighed the individual’s privacy interest. By contrast, the relevant
question here is whether a government entity can produce medical and mental health records of a
third-party.
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