EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Apple Inc.
Filing
208
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER. Signed by Judge William H. Orrick on 09/22/2016. (jmdS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/22/2016)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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EON CORP IP HOLDINGS LLC,
Case No. 14-cv-05511-WHO
Plaintiff,
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v.
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
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APPLE INC.,
Defendant.
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BACKGROUND
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The parties ask me to construe ten terms from the two patents asserted in this case. The
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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patents in suit relate to wireless communication systems designed to enable two-way
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communications between a network and an individual subscriber unit, such as a cell phone.
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The ’101 Patent (Patent Number 5,388,101, issued Feb 7, 1995) is titled “Interactive
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nationwide data service communication system for stationary and mobile battery operated
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subscriber units.” The ’101 Patent describes a wireless system wherein portable subscriber units
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can communicate with a network while moving through geographical zones.
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The ’491 Patent (Patent Number 5,592,491, issued Jan 7, 1997) is titled “Wireless
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modem.” The ’491 Patent is a continuation-in-part of the ’101 Patent. The system claimed by the
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’491 Patent broadly operates by determining whether “Path A,” typically a cellular network
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connection, is impaired such that a subscriber unit cannot communicate with the network. See ’491
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Patent at 2:14-41. If it is, the system communicates using “Path B,” typically a wireless or Wi-Fi
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network connection, via a modem.
LEGAL STANDARD
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I.
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY
Claim construction is a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
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U.S. 370, 372 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Terms contained in claims are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics,
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90 F.3d at 1582. In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court begins with the
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intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of the claim language, the patent specification, and, if in
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evidence, the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
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see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “A claim term used in multiple claims should be construed
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consistently . . . .” Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d
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1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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“The appropriate starting point . . . is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.”
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Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he ordinary
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and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “There are only two exceptions to this
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general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when
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the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during
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prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not
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only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of
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the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “Claims speak to those
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skilled in the art,” but “[w]hen the meaning of words in a claim is in dispute, the specification and
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prosecution history can provide relevant information about the scope and meaning of the claim.”
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Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations
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omitted). “[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
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Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics,
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90 F.3d at 1582. “However, claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only
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in the specification.” Id. “Thus, although the specifications may well indicate that certain
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embodiments are preferred, particular embodiments appearing in a specification will not be read
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into the claims when the claim language is broader than such embodiments.” Id. Conversely,
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“where [ ] the claim language is unambiguous, [the Federal Circuit has] construed the claims to
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exclude all disclosed embodiments.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 12152
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16 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “[T]he description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the
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invention and may define terms used in the claims,” and the “patentee is free to be his own
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lexicographer,” but “any special definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the
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specification.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 989-90.
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On the other hand, it is a fundamental rule that “claims must be construed so as to be
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consistent with the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. “The construction that stays true to
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the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be,
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in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d
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1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Finally, the court may consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history may “inform the meaning of the claim
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language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor
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limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would
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otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83); see also Chimie
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v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the
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prosecution history in construing a claim is to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed
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during prosecution.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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In most situations, analysis of this intrinsic evidence alone will resolve claim construction
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disputes. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. However, “it is entirely appropriate . . . for a court to consult
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trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent
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file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in
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the pertinent technical field.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309
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(Fed. Cir. 1999). Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the patent and
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prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”
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Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. All extrinsic evidence should be evaluated in light of the intrinsic
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evidence, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319, and courts should not rely on extrinsic evidence in claim
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construction to contradict the meaning of claims discernible from examination of the claims, the
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written description, and the prosecution history, Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (citing Vitronics,
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90 F.3d at 1583). While extrinsic evidence may guide the meaning of a claim term, such evidence
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is less reliable than intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19.
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II.
SENSUS LITIGATION
In a prior case brought by EON, the Hon. Jon S. Tigar of this District construed terms from
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the ’491 patent. Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Aruba Networks Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 942 (N.D.
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Cal. March 5, 2014) (Sensus). In ruling on the Sensus defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
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Judge Tigar further construed claims from the ’491 patent. EON CorpIP Holdings LLC v. Cisco
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Sys. Inc, 36 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2014) (Sensus II). He granted defendants’ motion
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for summary judgment and his decision was affirmed on appeal by the Federal Circuit. Id., aff’d
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sub nom. EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 595 F. App’x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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this case, I have already determined that Judge Tigar’s summary judgment determinations in
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Sensus II collaterally estop EON from relitigating the same issues here. August 17, 2015 Order
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(Dkt. No. 130). With respect to claim construction, collateral estoppel likewise will apply against
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EON (but not Apple)1 to constructions made by Judge Tigar that Apple argues should be adopted
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here. Even if collateral estoppel did not apply, I consider Judge Tigar’s constructions persuasive
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and absent a showing that it would be erroneous to adopt them in this case, I will follow them.
DISCUSSION
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As an initial matter, the parties agree to the following constructions:
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“An interactive video data system comprising,” as used in the preamble of claim 19 of the
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‘101 Patent, is not limiting.
The term “modem,” as used in claims 13 and 17 of the ‘491 Patent, is defined as: “a device
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that modulates an analog carrier signal to encode digital information, and demodulates such a
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carrier signal to decode the transmitted digital information.”
The term “multiplexed,” as used in claim 13 of the ‘491 Patent, is defined as: “combined
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messages transmitted over a single channel.”
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W. v. Quality Gold, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-03124-JF HRL, 2011 WL 6055424, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
16, 2011) (noting collateral estoppel can only be applied in the claim construction context against
a party who was a party in the prior proceeding).
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The term “synchronously related,” as used in claim 13 of the ‘491 Patent, is defined as:
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“related in time.”
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I.
’491 PATENT
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A. “network hub switching center”
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As used in claim 13:
A two-way communication system comprising:
...
a network hub switching center for routing communications from
and to said at least one subscriber unit, and
....
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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EON’s Proposal
“a switching center
that performs the
switching functions
needed for
operation of the
subscriber units in a
group of cells that
the switching center
services.”
Sensus
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Apple’s Proposal
“a switching center
that performs the
switching functions
needed for
operation of the
subscriber units in a
group of cells that
the switching
center services.”
The switching
center is a network
hub that is
responsible for
routing packetized
data messages to
and from subscriber
units.
Patent/Term
“a network hub
switching center”
(claims 13 and 17 of
the ‘491 Patent)
An Internet
server—i.e., one
that provides for
email, social
networks, location
services, search
engines, or
other Internet-based
services—does not
fall within the
scope of the term.
In Eon CorpIP Holdings LLC v. Aruba Networks Inc, 62 F. Supp. 3d 942, 968 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (Sensus I), Judge Tigar construed this term to mean: “a switching center that performs the
switching functions needed for operation of the subscriber units in a group of cells that the
switching center services.” Id. at 957-58. Although both parties adopt the Sensus I construction,
each argues additional language is necessary to clarify the scope of the claim. See, e.g., Eon Corp.
IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (courts are required
to resolve appropriate disputes “about claim scope” unless the parties’ arguments go to
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infringement and not construction). Under Apple’s proposal, the network hub switching center
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cannot be an Internet server. Under EON’s proposal, the network hub switching center operates
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on packetized data. I address each of these limitations in turn.
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1. Operation on the Internet
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Apple argues that EON is precluded from arguing that the network hub switching center
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could be a “third-party Internet server,” because that interpretation was explicitly rejected in
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Sensus. Oppo. 4. Apple contends that, in relation to the meaning of “network hub switching
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center,” Sensus decided that: “(1) the claimed ‘network’ is a ‘cellular core network,’ and (2) the
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Sensus Court’s claim construction ‘requires the switching center to be a cellular core network
component.’” Oppo. 5. EON contends that Apple’s additional language is improper because (1) it
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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is inconsistent with the intrinsic record; (2) it is impermissibly based on Apple’s infringement
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position; and (3) it incorrectly conflates the Sensus court’s construction of “network hub switching
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center” with the court’s application of that construction at summary judgement. Opening Br. 5-6;
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Reply 1.
As noted above, I have already concluded that Sensus may preclude EON from raising
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issues that were decided in that case. Dkt. 130. Here, preclusion turns on whether Apple’s
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proposed limitation was “actually litigated” in Sensus.2 I conclude that it was. In the Sensus
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summary judgment order, the court clarified its construction of “network hub switching center” in
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several ways. First, the court clarified that in its prior claim construction order it “used the word
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“network” to mean a cellular core network, “not something as expansive as the internet.” Sensus
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II, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 928. Judge Tigar also concluded that “the public switched network is part of
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the cellular network.” Id. at 928 (citing the ’491 Patent specification). Second, the court rejected
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EON’s contention that “a third-party Internet server may constitute the claimed ‘network hub
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switching center.’” Id. Although not part of the Sensus court’s explicit construction, Judge Tigar
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adopted these limitations to define the scope of the word “network” in “network hub switching
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The other three issue preclusion factors – that the issues in Sensus were disposed of in a final
judgment, that they were “actually litigated,” and that Eon was a party to Sensus – are satisfied for
the same reasons as explained in my order granting summary judgment. Dkt. 130.
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center.” EON has already attempted to argue that a “network hub switching center” can be an
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Internet server, and a court has already rejected this contention. EON does not get a second bite at
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this Apple. Therefore, I conclude that EON is estopped from arguing that a “network hub
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switching center” can be an Internet server.
EON argues that Sensus II made an infringement determination specific to the facts in that
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case, but did not create a “per se rule” that prevents network hub switching centers from being
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Internet servers. Reply 1-2. In particular, EON distinguishes Sensus on the grounds that the
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allegedly infringing network hub switching centers in that case were not in the networks of the
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accused infringers (Sprint and US Cellular). Reply 3. At the claim construction argument, EON
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similarly argued that Judge Tigar’s construction can only be preclusive as to third-party NHSCs
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Northern District of California
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(which Judge Tigar concluded were outside the accused cellular networks), but should not be
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extended to excluding “the internet” or NHSCs operated by defendant Apple.3
In making this argument, EON falls prey to the same mistake of which it accuses Apple:
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infecting claim construction with infringement contentions. Although Apple’s proposed language
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is derived from the Sensus summary judgment order (which, of course, deals with EON’s
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infringement contentions), the court’s reasoning in excluding internet servers from its definition of
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“network” had nothing to do with these contentions. Instead, the court based its reasoning on the
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intrinsic record, specifically Figure 2 of the ‘491 Patent, which showed the placement of the public
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switched network as being part of the cellular network and, therefore, network hub switching
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centers likewise excluded third-party servers. Sensus, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 928.
The Sensus court’s conclusion applies not only to the specific infringement dispute before
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it, but to the meaning of the term generally. As such, it is appropriate here to define “network hub
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At claim construction, EON argued that the portion of the Sensus order I rely on was focused on
third party networks, as shown by Judge Tigar’s reliance on Figure 2 in the 491 patent to show
placement of public switched network. EON argues that Figure 3, which shows the NHSC itself,
is more relevant to the question before me. However, Judge Tigar’s reliance on Figure 2 was to
show that the “network” at issue was the cellular one used by the patent process, as opposed to
third party networks (operated by defendants in Sensus). The network limitation would flow to
and likewise limit the NetworkHSC, as confirmed by Judge Tigar’s conclusion that “since a thirdparty server does not fall within the scope of the term ‘network hub switching center,’ EON’s
argument fails.” EON is focusing on a distinction without a difference.
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switching center” as not including an internet server.4
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2. Packetization
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EON argues that the intrinsic record demonstrates that the network hub switching center
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communicates through a packet-switched network and routes messages. Opening Br. 7. There is
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support for Eon’s position, ’101 Patent at 7:57-59 (“… messages from the individual subscriber
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home units 4, (X) longer than 240 bits require several frames, with accumulation into packets
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…”). Apple does not dispute that many communication networks (including networks other than
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the Internet) used packetized data. Apple Br. 7-8. EON’s proposed addition, however, could be
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read to imply that the NHSC always routes packetized data, a limitation which is not supported.
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Therefore, I will adopt EON’s proposed language with slight modification.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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3. Construction
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Therefore, “network hub switching center” is construed to mean “a switching center
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that performs the switching functions needed for operation of the subscriber units in a group
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of cells that the switching center services. The switching center is a network hub that is
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responsible for routing data, including packetized data messages, to and from subscriber
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units. An Internet server—i.e., one that provides for email, social networks, location
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services, search engines, or other Internet-based services—does not fall within the scope of
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the term.”
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B. Conditional Terms
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1. “transferring . . . if said at least one subscriber unit is unable to communicate
directly with a local base station repeater cell.”
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As used:
A two-way communication system comprising:
...
a modem communicatively coupled to said at least one subscriber
unit and said network hub switching center for transferring
multiplexed synchronously related digital data messages of
variable lengths between said at least one subscriber unit and
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Apple objects to evidence submitted with EON’s reply regarding the NHSCs, including
dictionary definitions and excerpts of the deposition testimony of Apple’s expert, Dr. Kevin J.
Negus. Dkt. No. 188. EON argues its reliance on this evidence was appropriate given the
arguments made by Apple in Apple’s claim construction statement. Dkt. No. 189. In construing
the term at issue, I have considered but do not rely on EON’s reply evidence.
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said network hub switching center if said at least one subscriber
unit is unable to communicate directly with a local base station
repeater cell, said modem also adapted for communicating with
said local base station repeater cell if communication therebetween
is not otherwise prevented.
Patent/Term
“transferring . . . if
said at least one
subscriber unit is
unable to
communicate directly
with a local base
station repeater cell”
(claim 13 of the ‘491
Patent)
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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The transferring
function of the
modem is conditioned
on whether the
subscriber unit is
unable to directly
communicate with the
local base station
repeater cell.
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EON’s Proposal
“transferring . . . if
said local subscriber
units are unable, for
some reason other
than the user
intentionally disabling
said unit, to directly
communicate with
said local base station
repeater cell.” The
method is binary,
meaning that the
subscriber unit either
communicates with
the local base station
or the modem, but
does not communicate
the same data over
both paths at the same
time.
Apple’s Proposal
“transferring . . . if
said local subscriber
units are unable, for
some reason other
than the user
intentionally disabling
said unit, to directly
communicate with
said local base station
repeater cell.” The
system is binary,
meaning the
subscriber unit either
communicates
directly with the local
base station repeater
cell or the modem, but
not both.
The “transferring
function” of the
modem is conditioned
on whether the
subscriber unit is
unable to directly
communicate with the
local base station
repeater cell.
2. “if said subscriber unit” is or is not “receiving signal from said local base station
repeater cell”
As used:
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A method of communicating between a subscriber unit and a
network hub switching center in a two-communication system
comprising the steps of:
determining whether a subscriber unit located with a base station
geographic area associated a said local base station repeater cell is
receiving a signal from said local base station repeater cell;
if said subscriber unit is receiving a signal from said local base
station repeater cell, performing the steps of:
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...
if said subscriber unit is not receiving a signal from said local base
station repeater cell, performing the steps of:
....
“if said subscriber
unit is not receiving a
signal from said local
base station repeater
cell . . .” (claim 17 of
the ‘491 Patent)
EON’s Proposal
The method steps
listed after “if said
subscriber unit is not
receiving a signal
from said local base
station repeater cell,
performing the steps
of” are not performed
if the subscriber unit
is receiving a signal
from said local base
station repeater cell.
Using the modem to
communicate
regardless of whether
there is signal
reception does not fall
within the scope of
the claim.
Apple’s Proposal
The method steps
listed after “if said
subscriber unit is not
receiving a signal
from said local base
station repeater cell,
performing the step
of” are not performed
if the subscriber unit
is receiving a signal
from said local base
station repeater cell.
Using the modem to
communicate
regardless of whether
there is signal
reception does not fall
within the scope of
the claim.
The method is binary,
meaning that the
subscriber unit either
communicates with
the local base station
or the modem, but
does not communicate
the same data over
both paths at the same
time.
Patent/Term
“if said subscriber
unit is receiving a
signal from said local
base station repeater
cell . . .” (claim 17 of
the ‘491 Patent)
The method is binary,
meaning the
subscriber unit either
communicates
directly with the local
base station repeater
cell or the modem, but
not both.
The Sensus court construed these “conditional if” terms together. Sensus, 62 F. Supp. 3d at
961-966. Over EON’s objection, Judge Tigar adopted a “binary limitation,” clarifying that the
claims recite a communication pathway that is an “either/or proposition” id., at 963, 965, and a
“conditional limitation,” clarifying that the claim scope extends only to situations in which the
condition of being unable to communicate currently exists. Id. The court also adopted a “user
intervention” limitation (for claim 13), clarifying that the inability to communicate occurred for
some reason other than the user intentionally disabling the unit. Id. 964.
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Here, with respect to the “transferring … if” term of claim 13, Apple’s proposal is a
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verbatim adoption of the Sensus construction, with the addition of “but not both” to reflect that the
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binary limitation of the claim does not allow for the subscriber unit to communicate over two
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paths at the same time. EON’s proposed addition goes the other way and seeks to add “but does
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not communicate the same data over both paths at the same time.” EON’s proposal would allow
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different data to be sent over both paths at the same time. That would defeat the “binary
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limitation” repeatedly recognized by Judge Tigar and is not appropriate here. Apple’s additional
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language provides additional clarification and is fully consistent with the Sensus construction.
With respect to the method language, as above, Apple’s proposed addition simply makes
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clear that the method is binary and the binary limitation does not allow for the subscriber unit to
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Northern District of California
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communicate over two paths at the same time. Apple’s clarification, unlike EON’s proposed
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addition, is consistent with the Sensus court’s constructions and will be adopted.
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The “transferring if” language from Claim 13 is construed as: “transferring . . . if said
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local subscriber units are unable, for some reason other than the user intentionally disabling
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said unit, to directly communicate with said local base station repeater cell.” The system is
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binary, meaning the subscriber unit either communicates directly with the local base station
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repeater cell or the modem, but not both. The “transferring function” of the modem is
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conditioned on whether the subscriber unit is unable to directly communicate with the local
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base station repeater cell.
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The method steps following “if” from Claim 17 are construed as: The method steps listed
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after “if said subscriber unit is not receiving a signal from said local base station repeater
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cell, performing the step of” are not performed if the subscriber unit is receiving a signal
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from said local base station repeater cell. Using the modem to communicate regardless of
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whether there is signal reception does not fall within the scope of the claim. The method is
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binary, meaning the subscriber unit either communicates directly with the local base station
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repeater cell or the modem, but not both.
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C. “determining whether a subscriber unit . . . is receiving a signal from said local
base station repeater cell”
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As used:
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Northern District of California
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A method of communicating between a subscriber unit and a
network hub switching center in a two-communication system
comprising the steps of:
determining whether a subscriber unit located with a base
station geographic area associated a said local base station
repeater cell is receiving a signal from said local base station
repeater cell;
if said subscriber unit is receiving a signal from said local base
station repeater cell, performing the steps of:
...
if said subscriber unit is not receiving a signal from said local base
station repeater cell, performing the steps of:
....
Patent/Term
“determining whether
a subscriber unit
located with a base
station geographic
area associated a said
local base station
repeater cell is
receiving a signal
from said local base
station repeater cell”
(claim 17 of the ‘491
Patent)
EON’s Proposal
The step of
determining may be
performed by the
subscriber unit or the
network, but not by
the human end user of
the subscriber unit.
Apple’s Proposal
The step of
“determining” is
performed by the
subscriber unit, not an
end user.
The parties agree that the “determining” cannot be done by a human “user.” The question
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is whether the claim includes determining by the network or is limited to determining by the
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subscriber unit. In Sensus, EON argued – to overcome a prior finding of indefiniteness – that
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various components in the subscriber unit were disclosed as helping gather information about
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signal strength and determining ability to receive a signal. Sensus I, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 950. Apple
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contends that EON wants to walk away from that argument and broaden its position on which
24
parts of its system are involved in “determining” process. EON argues that the “hand off”
25
function described in the ‘101 Patent at 8:31-33, 9:4-11 (“the base station repeater cell 3 may
26
initiate the hand-off[;] . . . a signal strength (RSSI) measurement may serve as a criterion for
27
handoff, with the cell directing the subscriber into a set-up routine when signals below a threshold,
28
-80dBm for example, are encountered.”) is intrinsic evidence showing that the network can be
12
1
involved in the determining step. Mot. 11-12. In opposition Apple points out that the “hand off”
2
functionality is expressly described as being performed by the base stations (even if “directed” by
3
the cell) and no mention of “network” involvement is found. In reply, EON points again to the
4
’101 Patent at 9:7-11, which contemplates the cell playing “some role” in the determining process.
5
Id., (“Thus a signal strength (RSSI) measurement may serve as criterion for hand-off, with the cell
6
directing the subscriber into a set-up routine when signals below a threshold, —80dBm for
7
example, are encountered.”).
8
9
At the claim construction argument, Apple expressed concern that EON’s argument – that
while the subscriber unit may perform the determining step “other network elements” are not
necessarily excluded from playing a role – is an attempt to preserve some role for the end “user.”
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Both sides had agreed that any role of a human user has been excluded by Sensus. For purposes of
12
claim construction, I do not see a need to resolve whether components other than subscriber units
13
are involved in “determining,” as long as it is clear that a human user is not involved in that step.
14
Therefore, “determining whether a subscriber unit . . . is receiving a signal from said
15
local base station repeater cell” is construed as: the step of “determining” can be performed
16
by the subscriber unit, but not by the human end user of the subscriber unit.
17
D. “switching means for selecting a communication path within said network”
18
As used:
A two-way communication system comprising:
at least one subscriber unit disposed within a predetermined base
station geographic area, said at least one subscriber unit including
switching means for selecting a communication path within said
communication system . . . .
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Patent/Term
“switching means for
selecting a
communication path
within said
communication
system” (claim 13 of
the ‘491 Patent)
EON’s Proposal
Function: “selecting a
communication path”
Structure: electronic
switch 13 and
equivalents.
Apple’s Proposal
Function: “selecting a
communication path,”
which is a fairly
narrow function akin
to "toggling," or
“assuming a
position.”
Structure: An
electronic switch 13,
which merely toggles
27
28
13
between the two paths
on the basis of
determinations
performed entirely by
the subscriber unit
and, as such, there is
no room left for a
human user to be part
of the claimed system.
1
2
3
4
5
6
On EON’s motion for reconsideration, the Sensus court determined that the structure for
7
“switching means” (a means-plus-function claim) was adequately supported in the specification by
8
Figure 2 in subscriber unit 12, an electronic switch [13], which worked with other specified
9
functions in the subscriber unit to perform the function. Sensus I, 62 F. Supp.3d at 950. On
summary judgment, Judge Tigar concluded based upon his constructions that “if the ‘determining’
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
processes are performed entirely by the subscriber unit, and the ‘electronic switch’ merely toggles
12
between the two paths on the basis of those determinations, there is no room left for a human user
13
to be part of the claim system.” Sensus II, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 923.
14
Apple, in its proposed construction, wants me to adopt Judge Tigar’s determination as to
15
scope as determined on summary judgment in Sensus, and make clear that the identification of
16
structure for switching means in the ’101 Patent leaves no room for human involvement. EON’s
17
competing proposal is limited to the identification of the electronic switch [13] and “its
18
equivalents.” EON clarified at the hearing that it does not object to the “toggling” language but
19
objects to Apple’s proposed “determining” language and exclusion of human involvement. I
20
conclude that, at this juncture, it is not necessary to address whether the patent claims leave room
21
for human involvement in the selection of a communication path. The use of “toggling” to define
22
the terms is sufficient to provide guidance to the jury. I also agree, however, that EON’s “and
23
equivalents” language is neither necessary nor appropriate as no other “equivalent” structures have
24
been identified.
25
Therefore, the function is: “selecting a communication path,” which is a fairly narrow
26
function akin to “toggling,” or “assuming a position.” The structure is: An electronic switch
27
13.
28
14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
E. “a modem communicatively coupled to said at least one subscriber unit and said
network hub switching center.”
As used:
A two-way communication system comprising:
...
a modem communicatively coupled to said at least one
subscriber unit and said network hub switching center for
transferring multiplexed synchronously related digital data messages
of variable lengths between said at least one subscriber unit and said
network hub switching center . . . .
EON’s Proposal
“A modem is
connected to the local
subscriber unit and
the network hub
switching center for
the purpose of
communications
between the two.”
Apple’s Proposal
A modem is
connected to the local
subscriber unit and
the network hub
switching center for
the purpose of
communications
between the two.”
The term “coupled”
within the context of
the '491 Patent does
not require a physical
connection. Likewise,
the term “connected”
in the construction
does not require a
physical connection.
This construction does
not imply that a
“connection” must
occur in a circuit
switched rather than a
packet switched
network.
Patent/Term
“a modem
communicatively
coupled to said at
least one subscriber
unit and said network
hub switching center”
(claim 13 of the ‘491
Patent)
The term “coupled”
within the context of
the '491 patent,
requires a connection,
not merely the
capability of such a
connection.
The Sensus court construed this term as “a modem is connected to the local subscriber unit
23
and the network hub switching center for the purpose of communications between the two.” 62
24
F.Supp. 3d at 954-55. In doing so, Judge Tigar agreed with Apple that “[t]he term ‘coupled,’
25
within the context of the patent, requires a connection, not merely the capability of such a
26
connection.” Id. at 954. But Judge Tigar also declined to adopt Apple’s proposed language
27
because Apple’s proposal implied “a spatially or geographically specific type of connection that is
28
not reflected in the intrinsic record.” Id. at 955. By declining to adopt Apple’s language, Judge
15
1
Tigar also attempted to “assuage” EON’s concern that Apple’s proposed construction implied a
2
physical connection (e.g., a wire or cable). Id. As the parties suggest that Judge Tigar’s
3
construction should be clarified to explicitly include both of these explanations (connection
4
required but it does not have to be a physical connection), those suggestions are adopted.
5
6
7
EON’s attempt to take that construction a step further and discuss the “implications” for
circuit versus packet switched networks is not necessary.
Therefore, a modem communicatively coupled to said at least one subscriber unit and
8
said network hub switching center is construed as: A modem is connected to the local
9
subscriber unit and the network hub switching center for the purpose of communications
between the two.” The term “coupled” within the context of the '491 patent, requires a
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
connection, not merely the capability of such a connection. The term “coupled” within the
12
context of the ’491 patent, does not require a wired connection.
13
II. ‘101 PATENT
14
A. “subscribers with portable subscriber units”
15
As used:
An interactive video data system comprising:
subscribers with portable subscriber units and facilities for
communicating from the subscriber units when moved through
different geographic zones, and
a set of subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities
comprising digital transducers and means for transmitting digital
data derived by said transducers.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Patent/Term
“subscribers with
portable subscriber
units” (claim 19 of the
‘101 Patent)
EON’s Proposal
Subscribers can be
persons, entities,
organizations,
corporations,
companies,
partnerships, or any
other association, or
machine or apparatus
associated with or
incorporating a
subscriber unit.
Apple’s Proposal
Persons using the
portable subscriber
units.
The parties agree that “subscribers” can be persons using portable subscriber units.
However, under EON’s definition, a subscriber can also be: (i) an association, such as an
16
1
organization, corporation, or company; or (ii) a machine or apparatus. After reviewing the claims,
2
specification, and prosecution history, I find little support for Apple’s contention that subscribers
3
must be persons.
4
Several passages of the ’101 Patent acknowledge the possibility of subscribers being nonperson entities. For instance, the specification describes a base station as serving “a gridwork of
6
receiver sub-cell sites distributed at locations permitting reliable response by subscribers
7
transmitting with milliwatt digit signal levels in the FCC authorized 218-219 MHz band.” ’101
8
Patent at 4:4-5. The statement suggests that a subscriber is a machine because humans cannot
9
transmit signals in the 218-219 MHz band. In addition, the specification describes FIG. 6B as a
10
system flow diagram “for transmitted messages between local subscribers[,] the cell data center
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
5
and the satellite connected network of cell sites.” ’101 Patent at 4:46-51. Here again, a
12
“subscriber” would seem to be a machine because it exchanges messages with a “cell data center”
13
and a “satellite connected network.” In view of the specification, a person having ordinary skill in
14
the art would understand the term “subscribers” to include more than simply human persons.
15
EON Ex. F ¶ 29 (“Kesan Declaration”).
16
Apple argues that the language of claim 19 limits “subscribers” to persons. Oppo. 19. For
17
instance, Apple contends that the word “with” in the phrase “subscribers with portable subscriber
18
units” indicates a possessory relationship that would only make sense if “subscribers” were
19
persons. Id. But even assuming that the subscriber units are possessed by subscribers, this does
20
not preclude EON’s construction. For example, I see no reason why an association or machine
21
could not possess a subscriber unit. Apple further argues that because claim 19 recites subscriber
22
units that are “moved through different geographic zones,” an animate subscriber must exist to
23
move the inanimate subscriber units. Id. But this again improperly reads into the claim
24
limitations that do not exist. In sum, the language of claim 19 does not justify limiting
25
“subscribers” to persons. See 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315
26
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A]bsent other limiting circumstances, a patentee is entitled to the full breadth
27
of claim scope supported by the words of the claims and the written description.” (citations
28
omitted)).
17
1
Apple also contends that use of the term “subscribers” in the specification suggests that
they are human users and not computer components. Oppo. 19. Apple relies on ’101 Patent 5:31-
3
39 and ‘101 Patent 10:20-28. Id. At best, these passages can be read to suggest that a subscriber
4
may, in some cases, be a human person. But neither of these passages suggests that a subscriber
5
must be a human person. Apple also argues that the portions of the specification relied on by
6
EON use the term “subscriber 4” as a shorthand for a “subscriber unit 4” or a “subscriber video
7
station.” Id. 19-20. But even assuming this is true and the relevant passages refer to subscriber
8
units, Apple has not identified anywhere in the specification that explicitly limits the term
9
“subscriber” to human persons. See Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d
10
1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Absent a clear disclaimer of particular subject matter, the fact that
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
2
the inventor anticipated that the invention may be used in a particular manner does not limit the
12
scope to that narrow context.”).
13
Apple further contends that EON conceded to Apple’s definition of “subscribers” during
14
prosecution. Oppo. 19. Apple relies on EON’s statement during reexamination that “[s]ubscribers
15
are users which use the portable subscriber devices.” Apple Ex. 7 at 3. But prosecution history
16
disclaimer does not apply where the alleged disavowal is ambiguous, or even amenable to multiple
17
reasonable interpretations. Avid Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc., 812 F.3d 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir.
18
2016) (citations and quotations omitted). EON’s statements do not foreclose a broad reading of
19
“subscribers” because organizations and machines can also “use” (in the ordinary meaning of the
20
term) portable subscriber devices. Because the relied-upon statement is not an unambiguous
21
disavowal, it cannot be used to limit claim scope.
22
Accordingly, for the phrase subscribers with portable subscriber units, subscribers are:
23
persons, entities, organizations, corporations, companies, partnerships, or any other
24
association, or machine or apparatus associated with or incorporating a subscriber unit.
25
B. “facilities for communicating from the subscriber units when moved through
different geographic zones”
26
27
28
As used:
An interactive video data system comprising:
subscribers with portable subscriber units and facilities for
communicating from the subscriber units when moved through
18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
different geographic zones, and
a set of subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities
comprising digital transducers and means for transmitting digital
data derived by said transducers.
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
EON’s Proposal
Function:
“communicating from
the subscriber units
when moved through
different geographic
zones.”
Apple’s Proposal
Function:
“communicating from
the subscriber units
when moved through
different geographic
zones.”
Structure: Subscriber
units 4, 4', 4'', or 4'''
(Figs. 1, 2, 6A, 7A,
9A), including
software control
facilities or Software
Control Data
Processor 54 and the
corresponding set-up
algorithm to the
extent disclosed in
Fig. 6B and '101
Patent 8:15-62, 9:1419, and statutory
equivalents.
Patent/Term
“facilities for
communicating from
the subscriber units
when moved through
different geographic
zones” (claim 19 of
the ‘101 Patent)
Structure: Subscriber
units 4, 4', 4'', or 4'''
(Figs. 1, 2, 6A, 7A,
9A), including
software control
facilities or Software
Control Data
Processor 54 and the
corresponding set-up
algorithm to the
extent disclosed in
Fig. 6B and '101
Patent 8:15-62, 9:1419.
The debate here is over EON’s proposed inclusion of “and statutory equivalents.” While
18
“a determination of corresponding structure is a determination of the meaning of the ‘means’ term
19
in the claim and is thus [] a matter of claim construction,” Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts v.
20
Cardinal Indus. Inc., 145 F.2d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998), “‘the scope of literally infringing
21
‘equivalents’ under § 112[f] is a factual determination’ best reserved for a later stage of the
22
litigation.’” Northpeak Wireless LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. 09-cv-00602-SI, 2015 WL 5117020, at
23
*7 fn. 6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2015) (citing Symbol Techs, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569,
24
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
25
26
27
28
I agree with Apple. The purpose of claim construction is to identify the structures; what
may be equivalent to those structures is a fact question for the jury.
Therefore, the function is: “communicating from the subscriber units when moved
through different geographic zones.” The structure is: Subscriber units 4, 4', 4'', or 4''' (Figs.
19
1
1, 2, 6A, 7A, 9A), including software control facilities or Software Control Data Processor 54
2
and the corresponding set-up algorithm to the extent disclosed in Fig. 6B and '101 Patent
3
8:15-62, 9:14-19.
4
5
6
7
8
9
C. “subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities . . . digital transducers”
and “digital transducers”
As used:
An interactive video data system comprising:
subscribers with portable subscriber units and facilities for
communicating from the subscriber units when moved through
different geographic zones, and
a set of subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities
comprising digital transducers and means for transmitting
digital data derived by said transducers.
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
Patent/Term
“subscriber units
limited to digital
processing facilities
comprising digital
transducers and means
for transmitting digital
data derived by said
transducers” (claim 19
of the ‘101 Patent)
EON’s Proposal
No construction
necessary; plain and
ordinary meaning as
explained in EON v.
Landis+Gyr Inc., No.
6:11-cv-317, Dkt. No.
249 (EDTX).
17
18
19
Apple’s Proposal
Subscriber units
restricted to digital
processing facilities,
and not including
components operating
in analog. The digital
processing facilities
include digital
transducers and means
for transmitting digital
data derived by said
transducers.
Apple’s construction of this term generally tracks the claim language but explicitly
excludes the subscriber units from “including components operating in analog.” EON contends
20
that no construction is needed, or alternatively, that the term should take its plain and ordinary
21
meaning as explained in Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Landis±Gyr Inc., No. 6:11-CV-001522
LED-JDL, 2012 WL 5874625, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2012) (“Landis”) rev’d on other grounds,
23
Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
24
25
This claim construction dispute warrants resolution. “When the parties raise an actual
dispute regarding the proper scope of these claims, the court . . . must resolve that dispute.” O2
26
Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, an
27
actual dispute exists as to whether “digital processing facilities” can or cannot include
28
20
1
“components operating in analog.” Leaving this question unanswered would impermissibly
2
delegate the task of determining claim scope to the jury.5
I conclude that “components operating in analog” should not be excluded from the recited
3
4
“digital processing facilities.” Apple contends that the claim’s phrase “limited to digital
5
processing facilities” inherently cannot include analog processing. Oppo. 22. This exclusion of
6
analog processing might have been compelling if the subscriber units were simply “limited to
7
digital processing.” However, claim 19 recites “digital processing facilities” (emphasis added).
8
Apple has provided no authority for the contention that digital processing facilities cannot include
9
any analog components whatsoever. For example, Apple does not identify any passage of the
specification that clearly excludes analog components from the digital processing facilities.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
12
2001) (in order for the specification to narrow the scope of a claim, the specification must “make[]
13
clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.”). Absent such a showing, to the
14
term “digital processing facilities” is entitled to its full breath. See 3M Innovative Properties, 725
15
F.3d at 1333.
Therefore, “subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities comprising digital
16
17
transducers and means for transmitting digital data derived by said transducers” are defined
18
as: “Subscriber units restricted to digital processing facilities, which may include
19
components operating in analog. The digital processing facilities include digital transducers
20
and means for transmitting digital data derived by said transducers.”
21
D. Digital Transducers
22
Patent/Term
“digital transducers”
(claim 19 of the ‘101
Patent)
23
24
EON’s Proposal
A device that
measures physical
quantities and
Apple’s Proposal
A device that
measures physical
quantities and
25
26
27
28
5
See Silver Springs, 815 F.3d at 1319 (holding that the district court’s decision not to construe two
claim terms was legal error because doing so failed to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the
scope of the terms). Notably, Silver Springs reversed the Landis court’s decision to give two
terms (neither of which is at issue in the present case) their “plain and ordinary meaning.” The
terms at issue in this case were not construed by Silver Springs.
21
transmits the
information as coded
digital signals rather
than as continuously
varying current or
voltages, i.e., analog
signals.
1
2
3
4
5
A “digital
transducer,” as used in
the claims does not
preclude a transducer
that measures
quantities in analog
format, and then
converts those analog
signals to digital
signals for
transmission.
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
transmits the
information as coded
digital signals rather
than as continuously
varying currents or
voltages.
The parties both adopt the basic definition of “digital transducer” provided in the McGraw-
13
Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms Fourth Edition. Nagdev Ex. 6 at 5 [Dkt. No.
14
186-7]. Apple’s proposed construction matches the dictionary definition, whereas EON’s
15
proposed construction includes additional description, matching the construction provided in
16
Landis, 2012 WL 5874625, at *9.
17
Ultimately, I find little practical difference between the parties’ proposed constructions. At
18
bottom, both Apple and EON agree that a transducer is an apparatus that measures some physical
19
quantity and outputs a digital signal. None of the additional verbiage in EON’s proposed
20
construction significantly changes the meaning of the McGraw definition. For instance, the phrase
21
“i.e., analog signals” serves to define “analog signals” as “continuously varying current or
22
voltages” but does not appear to modify the definition of the “device” itself. The additional
23
sentence “[a] “digital transducer” . . . transmission” is only meaningful insofar as it clarifies that
24
an analog signal is a “physical quantit[y]” that can be measured by a transducer, but this is not
25
inconsistent with Apple’s construction. Given the essentially identical meanings adopted by the
26
parties, I conclude that EON’s much longer construction would only serve to confuse the jury.
27
See Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127 (D. Mass. 2001) (“In the end,
28
claim construction must result in a phraseology that can be taught to a jury of lay people.”).
22
1
Accordingly, a “digital transducer” is defined as: “A device that measures physical
2
quantities, which may include analog signals, and transmits the information as coded digital
3
signals rather than as continuously varying currents or voltages.”
4
E. “means for transmitting digital data derived by said transducers.”
5
As used:
An interactive video data system comprising:
subscribers with portable subscriber units and facilities for
communicating from the subscriber units when moved through
different geographic zones, and
a set of subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities
comprising digital transducers and means for transmitting digital
data derived by said transducers.
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Patent/Term
“means for
transmitting digital
data derived by said
transducers” (claim 19
of the ‘101 Patent)
EON’s Proposal
Function: transmitting
digital data derived by
said transducers.
Structure: transceiver
50 (FIG. 9A) as
described at '101
Patent 10:9-13 and
transceiver 4 (FIG. 2)
as described at '101
Patent 5:59-66, and
statutory equivalents.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
23
Apple’s Proposal
Function:
“transmitting digital
data derived by said
transducers”
Structure: Transceiver
50 (FIG. 9A) as
described at '101
Patent 10:9-13, which
states that “[t]he
transceiver 50 permits
two way wireless
communications in
the 218-219 MHz
bands set forth in FIG.
8, and compatible
with the functions
hereinbefore set forth
such as in connection
with FIG. 6A,” and
transceiver 4 (FIG. 2)
as described at '101
Patent 5:59-66, which
states “[t]ransceiving
subscriber units X 4,
4', etc. located within
the subdivided
response zones 22
communicate with the
local remote receivers
20 over a significantly
reduced transmission
path distance within
the subdivided
response areas 22, as
compared with direct
transmission from a
local base station
repeater cell [to]
transceiving
subscriber units X 4,
4'.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
The parties dispute whether “and statutory equivalents” should be included in the
8
definition. As I held earlier in this Order, it should not. The only other dispute is over Apple’s
9
inclusion of the descriptions of the structures that both sides agree disclose the means in this
means-plus-function claim. Apple argues that including this descriptive language (quoted directly
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
from the patent) is necessary to prevent EON from arguing that the frequency limitations in those
12
disclosed structures should not apply. Apple Br. at 25. However, the identification of the
13
structures by reference to specific portions of the patent suffices at this juncture.
14
Therefore, the function is: transmitting digital data derived by said transducers. The
15
structure is: transceiver 50 (FIG. 9A) as described at '101 Patent 10:9-13 and transceiver 4
16
(FIG. 2) as described at '101 Patent 5:59-66.
CONCLUSION
17
18
The terms are construed as follows:
‘491 Patent
19
20
“network hub switching center” is construed to mean “a switching center that
21
performs the switching functions needed for operation of the subscriber units in a group of
22
cells that the switching center services. The switching center is a network hub that is
23
responsible for routing data, including packetized data messages, to and from subscriber
24
units. An Internet server—i.e., one that provides for email, social networks, location
25
services, search engines, or other Internet-based services—does not fall within the scope of
26
the term.”
27
28
The “transferring if” language from Claim 13 is construed as: “transferring . . . if said
local subscriber units are unable, for some reason other than the user intentionally disabling
24
1
said unit, to directly communicate with said local base station repeater cell.” The system is
2
binary, meaning the subscriber unit either communicates directly with the local base station
3
repeater cell or the modem, but not both. The “transferring function” of the modem is
4
conditioned on whether the subscriber unit is unable to directly communicate with the local
5
base station repeater cell.
6
The method steps following “if” from Claim 17 are construed as: The method steps listed
after “if said subscriber unit is not receiving a signal from said local base station repeater
8
cell, performing the step of” are not performed if the subscriber unit is receiving a signal
9
from said local base station repeater cell. Using the modem to communicate regardless of
10
whether there is signal reception does not fall within the scope of the claim. The method is
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
7
binary, meaning the subscriber unit either communicates directly with the local base station
12
repeater cell or the modem, but not both.
13
“determining whether a subscriber unit . . . is receiving a signal from said local base
14
station repeater cell” is construed as: the step of “determining” can be performed by the
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subscriber unit, but not by the human end user of the subscriber unit.
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For “switching means for selecting a communication path within said network,” the
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function is: “selecting a communication path,” which is a fairly narrow function akin to
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“toggling,” or “assuming a position.” The structure is: An electronic switch 13.
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“a modem communicatively coupled to said at least one subscriber unit and said
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network hub switching center” is construed as: A modem is connected to the local subscriber
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unit and the network hub switching center for the purpose of communications between the
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two.” The term “coupled” within the context of the '491 patent, requires a connection, not
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merely the capability of such a connection. The term “coupled” within the context of the
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’491 patent, does not require a wired connection.
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‘101 Patent
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For the phrase “subscribers with portable subscriber units,” subscribers are: persons,
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entities, organizations, corporations, companies, partnerships, or any other association, or
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1
2
machine or apparatus associated with or incorporating a subscriber unit.
For “facilities for communicating from the subscriber units when moved through
3
different geographic zones,” the function is: “communicating from the subscriber units when
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moved through different geographic zones.” The structure is: Subscriber units 4, 4', 4'', or
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4''' (Figs. 1, 2, 6A, 7A, 9A), including software control facilities or Software Control Data
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Processor 54 and the corresponding set-up algorithm to the extent disclosed in Fig. 6B and
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'101 Patent 8:15-62, 9:14-19.
8
9
“subscriber units limited to digital processing facilities comprising digital transducers
and means for transmitting digital data derived by said transducers” are defined as:
“Subscriber units restricted to digital processing facilities, which may include components
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
operating in analog. The digital processing facilities include digital transducers and means
12
for transmitting digital data derived by said transducers.”
13
A “digital transducer” is defined as: “A device that measures physical quantities,
14
which may include analog signals, and transmits the information as coded digital signals
15
rather than as continuously varying currents or voltages.”
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For the “means for transmitting digital data derived by said transducers,” the function
17
is: transmitting digital data derived by said transducers. The structure is: transceiver 50
18
(FIG. 9A) as described at '101 Patent 10:9-13 and transceiver 4 (FIG. 2) as described at '101
19
Patent 5:59-66.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 22, 2016
______________________________________
WILLIAM H. ORRICK
United States District Judge
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