Wroth v. County of Sonoma et al

Filing 23

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 14 (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 4/21/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ESA WROTH,

Case No. 14-cv-05519-SI

Plaintiff,
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v.
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COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
Re: Dkt. No. 14

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Before the Court is the motion of defendants, County of Sonoma, et al., to dismiss plaintiff

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Esa Wroth's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 14. Pursuant to

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Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral

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argument and hereby VACATES the hearing. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in

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part and DENIES in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, and GRANTS plaintiff leave to

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amend. The case management conference scheduled for 2:30 p.m. on April 24, 2015 remains on

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calendar.

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff Esa Wroth is an individual residing in Sonoma County, California. Compl. ¶ 3.

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Defendants are the County of Sonoma, Sonoma County Sheriff Steve Freitas, five correctional

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officers employed by Sonoma County, and twenty-five unnamed persons. Id. ¶¶ 4-11.

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Wroth's complaint alleges as follows. Wroth was arrested for a DUI on January 2, 2013,

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and transported to the Sonoma County Jail without incident. Id. ¶ 15. During the booking process

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at the jail, the defendant correctional officers knocked Wroth's head against a concrete wall, and

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threw his body to the floor. Id. At all relevant times, Wroth's hands were cuffed behind his back.

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Id. As Wroth lay face down on the floor, the five correctional officers proceeded to wrench

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Wroth's arms out of their sockets and knee Wroth in the face. Id. The officers additionally Tased

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Wroth more than twenty times. Id. These acts are captured on a video which Wroth attached his

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complaint. Compl. Ex. A.

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The officers' actions caused several immediate injuries. For instance, Wroth was knocked

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unconscious, suffered bruises, lacerations, abrasions, puncture wounds, swelling, and burns.

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Compl. ¶ 16. Two Taser barbs became impacted in Wroth's body and required surgical removal.

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Id. The actions caused longer-lasting effects as well. In addition to scars, Wroth suffers from

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permanent nerve damage and recurring dislocation of his shoulders. Id.
The complaint alleges that Sheriff Freitas encouraged the correctional officers' conduct

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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through inadequate training or supervision, including a failure to investigate and discipline the jail

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staff. Id. ¶ 18. The complaint further alleges that Sheriff Freitas "condoned and ratified" the

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officers' acts as the final decision-maker and policy-maker for Sonoma County. Id.

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On December 18, 2014, Wroth filed the current action asserting four claims against

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defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first cause of action alleges a violation of his Fourth

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Amendment right to be free from intentional and unreasonable use of excessive force. Id. ¶¶ 23-

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26. He alleges that, under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the booking, an

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objectively reasonable officer would have known that the level of force used against Wroth was

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excessive and had the potential to cause serious injury or death. Id. ¶ 25. He further alleges that

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defendants acted willfully and maliciously, and that defendants' misconduct was the cause of his

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injuries.

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Wroth's second cause of action alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were

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violated. Id. ¶¶27-30. Plaintiff alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health

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and safety, and acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to any legitimate police purpose. Id. ¶ 28.

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The complaint alleges that the defendants acted willfully and maliciously, and that the defendants'

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misconduct was the cause of his injuries. Id. ¶¶29-30.

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Wroth's third cause of action alleges upon information and belief that the constitutional

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violations were the result of "(1) inadequate training, supervision, and discipline of officers by
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Steve Freitas and the County of Sonoma, and/or (2) official policies, practices or customs of the

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County of Sonoma regarding the use of force . . . and/or (3) the deliberate indifference of the

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County of Sonoma to the use of excessive force." ¶ 32. The complaint alleges that the Sheriff and

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County knew or should have known that their acts or omissions would likely result in the

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constitutional violations alleged, and that the County's acts or omissions were the cause of his

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injuries. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.

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Wroth's fourth cause of action alleges that "the County of Sonoma and Steve Freitas knew

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or should have known that its act and omissions would likely result in a violation of the Fourth

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and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a person in plaintiff's situation." Id. ¶ 33.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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On February 11, 2015, defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wroth's complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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LEGAL STANDARD

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint

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if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

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dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard

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requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

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has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require

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“heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to

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relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555.

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In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

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court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences

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in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

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However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory,

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unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536

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F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

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If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend.
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The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no

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request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly

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be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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DISCUSSION

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a

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right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

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deprivation of the right was committed under color of state law. Marsh v. County of San Diego,
680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012).

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Wroth has alleged that his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of county

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correctional officials during the booking process at a county jail.

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Defendants challenge the first, third, and fourth causes of action on the grounds that Wroth

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has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim against certain of the defendants. Defendants

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also argue that Wroth's second cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment fails as a matter

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of law, as excessive force claims are limited to the Fourth Amendment. Finally, defendants

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contend that Wroth's request for injunctive relief is improper.

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I.

Wroth's First Cause of Action - Fourth Amendment/Excessive Force

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Defendants contend that Wroth's first cause of action fails to allege sufficient facts to state

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a claim against either Sheriff Freitas or Sonoma County. Defendants do not appear to challenge

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the first cause of action as it is asserted against the individual officers.

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Wroth has alleged that the five correctional officers caused his physical injuries. Compl. ¶

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15. He has not alleged that Sheriff Freitas was present at the jail, or directly participated in the

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alleged use of excessive force during the booking process. See id. Rather, Wroth alleges that

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Sheriff Freitas encouraged the alleged conduct through inadequate training and supervision, and a

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failure to investigate and discipline the officers, and that he ratified the individual officers'

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conduct. ¶ 17. Supervisors may be held liable in an individual capacity for their own culpable
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action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of their subordinates. Menotti v. City of

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Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). However, a complaint fails to state a claim when it

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provides only assertions that lack further factual development. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. By

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alleging only that Sheriff Freitas encouraged and ratified the officers' conduct, Wroth has recited

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the elements supervisory liability without providing any further factual support.

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Accordingly, Wroth's first cause of action is insufficient insofar as it is asserted against Sheriff

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Freitas under a theory of supervisory liability. See id.

See id.

The first cause of action fails to state a claim against Sonoma County for the same reasons.

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Plaintiffs may hold a municipality liable if action pursuant to official municipal policy caused the

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plaintiff's injuries. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). "Official municipal

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials,

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and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Id. Wroth

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alleges neither that his injuries were caused by the decisions of Sonoma County lawmakers, nor

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that there is a persistent and widespread pattern of excessive force among the County's

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correctional officers. He does allege, however, that Sheriff Freitas is a final policy-making official

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for Sonoma County. Compl. ¶ 17. That said, Wroth provides only conclusory allegations of

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Freitas's actions or inactions upon which the County's liability hangs, which is insufficient to state

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a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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For these reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss Wroth's first cause of

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action as it is asserted against Sheriff Freitas and Sonoma County. Wroth has requested leave to

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amend his complaint to clarify his allegations and to introduce new facts which support

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supervisory and municipal liability. The Court GRANTS Wroth leave to amend in order to do so.

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II.

Defendants correctly contend that Wroth's second cause of action improperly asserts a

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Wroth's Second Cause of Action - Fourteenth Amendment

claim for excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment.1

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Plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion clarifies that the Fourteenth Amendment claim
alleges excessive force, rather than deliberate indifference to medical needs.
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The Supreme Court has held that "if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific

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constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed

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under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due

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process." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (discussing Graham v. Connor,

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490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). The Ninth

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Circuit has held that "the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitation on the

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treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or

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found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest." Pierce v. Multnomah

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County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197

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(9th Cir. 2002).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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To the extent Wroth challenges his treatment during the booking process at the Sonoma

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County jail, the Fourth Amendment standard applies. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; Pierce, 76 F.3d

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at 1043. He has not alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation that is distinct from his Fourth

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Amendment claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 27-30. His allegation that the officers acted punitively and

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without any legitimate police purpose relates to the same excessive force that underlies both

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claims.

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The cases upon which Wroth relies to support the applicability of the Fourteenth

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Amendment to this case are inapposite because those cases do not involve arrests. In County of

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Sacramento v. Lewis, involving a claim of excessive force during a high-speed police chase, the

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Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment standard would be inappropriate if the

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conduct at issue were covered by the Fourth Amendment. 523 U.S. at 843. However, the Court

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found the Fourth Amendment inapplicable because the defendant officer never effectuated an

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arrest. Id. at 843-44. In A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2013), the

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Ninth Circuit followed Lewis in using the Fourteenth Amendment to evaluate an officer's use of

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deadly force at the conclusion of a high-speed police chase. See also Moreland v. Las Vegas

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Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving an officers' accidental shooting of an

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individual during a shootout in front a bar where the officer neither attempted nor completed arrest

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of decedent).
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Because Wroth cannot state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for the alleged excessive

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force he experienced after his arrest, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss the second

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cause of action without leave to amend. This order does not preclude Wroth from bringing any

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Fourteenth Amendment claims he may have against defendants that do not duplicate his Fourth

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Amendment claim.

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III.

Wroth's Third and Fourth Causes of Action - Municipal Liability
Wroth does not specify the defendants against whom he asserts his third and fourth causes

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of action. See Compl. ¶¶ 31-36. However, it appears that these causes of action assert municipal

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liability claims. See id. Wroth's opposition to defendants' motion confirms his intention to assert

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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these causes of action only against Sonoma County. See Pl.'s Opp. at 8-10.

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Wroth's third cause of action alleges that his injuries were caused by inadequate training,

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supervision, and discipline of officers by the Sheriff and County, by official policies, practices, or

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customs of the County, or by the County's deliberate indifference to the use of excessive force.

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Compl. ¶ 5. A municipality may be held liable on any of these grounds. See Connick, 131 S.Ct. at

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1359. However, the complaint lacks any further facts to support these allegations. The third cause

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of action therefore fails to state a claim against Sonoma County. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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Wroth's fourth cause of action adds only that Sheriff Freitas ratified the use of excessive

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force, that the Sheriff has final policy-making authority for Sonoma County, and that the Sheriff

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knew and specifically approved of the alleged violative acts. Compl. ¶ 36. Again, the complaint

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contains no facts to support these allegations, and therefore fails to state a claim against Sonoma

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County. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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The Court therefore GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss the third and fourth causes of

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action against all defendants. Wroth has requested leave to amend his complaint to clarify his

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allegations and to introduce new facts which support supervisory and municipal liability. The

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Court GRANTS Wroth leave to amend in order to do so.

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IV.

Wroth's Prayer for Injunctive Relief

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Defendants argue that Wroth has failed to plead facts demonstrating that he is entitled to

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seek injunctive relief in this case. However, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to rule on this

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issue at this early stage of the litigation.

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defendants may reassert their arguments at that time.

If and when Wroth moves for injunctive relief,

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss the first

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cause of action against Sheriff Freitas and Sonoma County, and GRANTS defendant's motion to

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dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action against all defendants. The Court DENIES

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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defendants' motion to dismiss Wroth's prayer for injunctive relief. The Court GRANTS Wroth's

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request to amend his complaint except with respect to his second cause of action, which is

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dismissed with prejudice.

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Any amended complaint must be filed on or before May 1, 2015.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 21, 2015
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SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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