Saldana et al v. Bank of America, National Association et al

Filing 18

Order by Hon. James Donato granting 16 defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (jdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/1/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RAYMUNDO SALDANA, et al.,

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Case No. 15-cv-01161-JD

Plaintiffs,
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v.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

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BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, et al.,

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Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Re: Dkt. No. 6

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Plaintiffs Raymundo Saldana, Joe Ruiz and Luz Ruiz ask this Court for declaratory and

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injunctive relief, and to order the specific performance of an alleged “short sale” contract between

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them and defendant Bank of America National Association (“Bank of America”). 1 Bank of

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America has moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint is completely devoid of any

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independent cause of action. The plaintiffs filed no opposition and the Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

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As alleged in the complaint, on November 15, 2005, Plaintiff Raymundo Saldana obtained

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a loan from America’s Wholesale Lender for $825,000. Dkt. No. 1-2, Ex. A ¶¶ 1, 11. The loan is

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secured by a deed of trust on real property in Oakley, California, and Bank of America National

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Association (“Bank of America”) is the current beneficiary of the deed. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 12. Saldana

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took out a second loan for $165,000, which is secured by a deed of trust on the same property. Id.

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Defendants also include National Default Servicing Corporation, Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2. For purposes of this motion,
the court will refer only to defendant Bank of America.

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¶¶ 13-14. The complaint suggests that Bank of America is also the beneficiary of that deed, but

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that is only vaguely alleged. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

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In 2007 and 2008, Saldana suffered “business losses which made it impossible for him to
maintain payments on the loans he received.” Id. ¶ 30. A notice of default was recorded on April

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29, 2008, which indicated that Bank of America intended to sell the property to satisfy Saldana’s

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loan obligations. Dkt. No. 6 at 1. Saldana tried to “seek relief through a ‘short sale,’ which would

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involve [Bank of America’s] consent.” Dkt. No. 1-2, Ex. A ¶ 30. At that time, Saldana believed

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that the fair market value of the property was $252,000; Joe and Luz Ruiz, also plaintiffs in this

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action, agreed to take over the obligation for the remaining loan, subject to a $252,000 price. Id.

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¶¶ 2, 31. After negotiations with Bank of America, who determined that the $252,000 price was

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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insufficient, the Ruiz’s agreed to pay $258,000. Id. ¶ 32. Bank of America then sent out a letter,

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“which was electronically signed by Eric Maza of [Bank of America’s] Home Loan Team,

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confirming the agreement and arranging for payment of the said $258,800.” Id. ¶ 32.

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The complaint alleges that Bank of America then backed out of the sale agreement

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because, according to the bank, it “had neglected to consider the satisfaction of [Saldana’s] second

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loan in their negotiations.” Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiffs now seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well

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as specific performance of the short sale. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 34. Defendant Bank of America has

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moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety for failure to state any substantive claim.

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Dkt. No. 6. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion.

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DISCUSSION

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A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory

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or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

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Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). To avoid dismissal, the

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plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded

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factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly at 556). In

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evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and
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must draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d

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556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the Court need not “accept as true allegations that are merely

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conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec.

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Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). When the Court dismisses a complaint, it “should

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grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that

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the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203

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F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Plaintiffs ask for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and specific performance relating to a
failed agreement to conduct a short sale of Saldana’s property. Dkt. No. 1-2, Ex A ¶¶ 22, 25, 34
(asking for (1) a “judicial determination and declaration of Plaintiffs’ and Defendant [Bank of

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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America’s] respective rights and duties”; (2) an injunction enjoining the sale of the real property at

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issue; and (3) a “decree of specific performance requiring conveyance of the Real Property to

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Plaintiffs Ruiz for the agreed purchase price of $258,000.”). But these are remedies, not claims.

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See Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

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(“Declaratory and injunctive relief are not causes of action; rather, they are remedies.”) (citation

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omitted); see also Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 796 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 2005)

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(“Specific performance is a form of contractual relief, not an independent claim.”). Plaintiffs do

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not allege a substantive claim at all in the complaint. It is therefore dismissed in its entirety. See

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Riese v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. C 11-03297 NJV, 2011 WL 4344590, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

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13, 2011) (dismissing claims for injunctive relief and specific performance because they are

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remedies, not separate claims).

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The Court is concerned about plaintiffs’ failure to respond to the motion in any way. With

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some reluctance in light of that default, the Court dismisses the complaint without prejudice.

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Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within 14 days of this order, should they wish to do so.

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In the amended complaint, plaintiffs must explicitly and clearly include an independent cause of

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action, and facts supporting each element of the claim. Failure to do so, especially in light of

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plaintiffs’ failure to respond to this motion, will result in the dismissal of this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 1, 2015

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________________________
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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