Kestler v. City of Santa Rosa et al
Filing
45
ORDER by Hon. Thelton E. Henderson granting 36 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. First Amended Complaint due by 06/10/16. (tehlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/2/2016)
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
4
BRIAN KESTLER,
Plaintiff,
5
6
7
8
v.
CITY OF SANTA ROSA, et al.,
Case No. 15-cv-01361-TEH
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Defendants.
9
10
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
Having carefully considered the parties’ written arguments, the Court finds this matter
12
suitable for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the June 6, 2016
13
hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby GRANTS
14
Plaintiff’s motion.
15
16
17
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of an incident that occurred on April 11, 2013, where Santa
18
Rosa Police Officers Kertianis and Farrington, along with Officer Kyle Boyd, allegedly
19
used excessive force in removing Plaintiff Brian Kestler (“Plaintiff”) from his home and
20
placing him under arrest. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 24, 2015 against
21
Defendants City of Santa Rosa and Officers Kertianis and Farrington, as well as Doe
22
Defendants 1-25. Compl. (Docket No. 1). The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was
23
questioned by the defendant officers, and then was pulled out of his home and assaulted by
24
Officer Farrington. Compl. ¶¶ 12-16. The complaint further alleges that “[a]dditional City
25
of Santa Rosa Police Officers arrived and assisted Officer Ferrington [sic] by hog-tying
26
[Plaintiff].” Compl. ¶ 17.
27
28
The Santa Rosa Police Department’s incident report, obtained during related
criminal proceedings, provides additional detail. Incident Rept., Ex. 4 to Lacy Decl.
1
(Docket No. 37-4). The incident report clarifies that Officer Boyd was one of the officers
2
who arrived on the scene to assist Officer Farrington in restraining Plaintiff. Id. at 5, 7.
3
The incident report indicates that when Officer Boyd arrived, Officer Farrington was
4
holding Plaintiff face down on the ground, but that Plaintiff was still resisting and
5
thrashing his legs. Id. The incident report further indicates that in order to subdue
6
Plaintiff, Officer Boyd “delivered approximately three flashlight-jab strikes” to Plaintiff’s
7
mid-section. Id. at 5.
8
The parties are currently involved in fact discovery. On March 8, 2016, Plaintiff
deposed Defendant Officer Farrington. Mot. at 6 (Docket No. 36). During Officer
10
Farrington’s deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Officer Farrington whether he felt
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
confident that he was safe while restraining Plaintiff, at the time Officer Boyd arrived on
12
the scene. Farrington Depo. Transcript, Ex. 5 to Lacy Decl. at 4 (Docket No. 37-5).
13
Officer Farrington replied: “I felt confident that [Plaintiff] couldn’t harm me from that
14
position, that is correct, yes.” Id.
15
Plaintiff now moves to amend the complaint, in order to substitute Officer Boyd for
16
one of the Doe Defendants, and to allege additional facts relating to Officer Boyd’s
17
involvement in the incident. Defendants timely opposed the motion, and Plaintiff timely
18
replied. Opp’n (Docket No 40); Reply (Docket No. 42).
19
20
21
LEGAL STANDARD
After the time has passed for a party to amend a pleading as a matter of course, the
22
party may only amend further after obtaining leave of the court, or by consent of the
23
adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “The court should freely give leave when justice so
24
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme
25
liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)
26
(quotation omitted). “Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only if there is strong
27
evidence of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
28
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
2
1
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment, etc.’”
2
Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Ret. Emps. v. Sonoma Cnty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013)
3
(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
4
Of these so-called Foman factors, prejudice is the weightiest and most important.
5
See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent
6
prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a
7
presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. Evaluation of the
8
Foman factors “should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.”
9
Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999).
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that when he filed the original complaint, he was “unaware of the
13
roles each of the individual officers played” in the incident. Mot. at 6. Plaintiff asserts
14
that prior to Officer Farrington’s deposition, “the nature of Officer Boyd’s use of force was
15
uncertain” – namely, that Plaintiff was in a subdued position when Officer Boyd struck
16
him. Id. at 7. Courts have interpreted California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474,
17
which governs the amendment of pleadings, to allow amendment “[i]f the identity of the
18
Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not
19
know facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that liability is probable.”
20
Bolbol v. City of Daly City, No. 09-CV-1944-EMC, 2011 WL 3156866, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
21
July 26, 2011) (quoting McOwen v. Grossman, 153 Cal. App. 4th 937, 943 (2007)).
22
Defendants argue that Plaintiff knew about Officer Boyd’s role in the incident at
23
least since August 8, 2013. Opp’n at 2. On August 8, 2013, Plaintiff’s criminal defense
24
attorney filed a Pitchess motion and accompanying declaration, in which he stated:
25
“Defendant asserts that he was the victim of an unprovoked attack and brutality at the
26
hands of [Officers Farrington, Boyd, Kertianis, and Siwy].” Ex. B3 to Fritsch Decl. at 2
27
(Docket No.41-5). Therefore, according to Defendants, Plaintiff already knew at that time
28
that Officer Boyd had attacked him, unprovoked.
3
The Court disagrees, however, with Defendant’s reading of the declaration. The
2
Court finds that the language used in the declaration – listing the officers whose names
3
appeared in the incident report as having attacked him – does not establish that Plaintiff
4
knew the specific facts as to Officer Boyd’s involvement at the time of filing the Pitchess
5
motion. Even the incident report itself is somewhat muddled. Officer Farrington’s
6
narrative in the incident report states: “I was confident that [Plaintiff] would not be able to
7
harm me if I maintained control of this position [on top of Plaintiff, who was on the
8
ground],” but then he also states that he requested backup, and that later, Officer Boyd’s
9
“strikes subdued [Plaintiff] and he stopped kicking.” Incident Rept. at 5. Officer Boyd’s
10
narrative states that when he arrived, Plaintiff “was twisting his body and moving his legs
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
in what appeared to be an attempt to get away from Officer Farrington.” Id. at 7.
12
I.
The Foman Factors Favor Granting Leave to Amend
13
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would be futile, because all
14
of the causes of action in the complaint are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
15
Opp’n at 7; see Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1. However, after the statute of limitations has
16
run, an amendment may be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint “provided
17
recovery is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of facts.” Austin v. Mass.
18
Bonding & Ins. Co., 56 Cal.2d 596, 600 (1961).1 Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Boyd
19
are clearly based on the same incident; therefore any amendment would relate back to the
20
original complaint.
Defendants also argue futility on the basis that there is no evidence of injury to
21
22
Plaintiff. Opp’n at 9. However, the Court’s inquiry into whether an amendment would be
23
futile is separate from ruling on the merits of a cause of action. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton,
24
Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set
25
of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid
26
1
27
28
The Ninth Circuit has squarely held that where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to assert
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the question of whether such claims can be related back to
the original complaint must be determined under California, not federal, law. Merrit v.
Cty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989).
4
1
and sufficient claim or defense.”). At this time, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s
2
claims against Mr. Boyd would be barred as a matter of law; therefore, Defendants have
3
not made the “strong showing” of futility required to overcome the presumption of
4
granting leave to amend. See Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.
5
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend the
complaint on the basis of undue delay. Opp’n at 9. Defendants remind the Court that
7
Plaintiff has been represented by “exceptional and well-qualified lawyers” since one week
8
after the incident occurred, over 38 months ago. Id. However, the Court finds that
9
Plaintiff’s contention reasonable: that he was unaware of Officer Boyd’s potential liability
10
until Officer Farrington directly stated that Plaintiff was already subdued. Therefore, with
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
all inferences made in favor of granting leave to amend, the Court finds that there was not
12
undue delay, because Plaintiff filed the instant motion less than two months after the
13
deposition occurred.
14
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that granting leave to amend would not unduly prejudice
15
Defendants. In opposition, Defendants only argue that amendment would be futile and
16
result in undue delay; they take no position on prejudice. The Court agrees with Plaintiff.
17
The proposed amendment would not substantially alter the relief or causes of action in the
18
original complaint, and at this early stage of litigation, such amendment would not greatly
19
affect discovery or other deadlines in the case.
20
II.
Judicial Estoppel Does Not Bar Amendment
21
Defendants argue that the language provided in Plaintiff’s Pitchess motion in
22
Superior Court is “clearly irreconcilable” with Plaintiff’s position in the instant motion,
23
and therefore the Court should deny leave to amend based on judicial estoppel. Opp’n at
24
8-9. “[J]udicial estoppel, ‘generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a
25
case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another
26
phase.’ ” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Pegram v.
27
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000)). However, as noted above, the Court disagrees
28
with Defendants’ reading of the two arguments, and does not find them to be clearly
5
1
irreconcilable. The Court is not convinced that Plaintiff is “playing fast and loose with the
2
courts” such that judicial estoppel would be applicable here. Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d
3
1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990).
4
III.
Plaintiff May Amend the Complaint
5
Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is not futile, and none of the other factors such as
prejudice or undue delay are present here. Accordingly, as leave to amend should be
7
freely given, Plaintiff may amend the complaint by filing the proposed First Amended
8
Complaint for Damages, filed concurrently with the instant motion. Ex. 1 to Lacy Decl.
9
(Docket No. 37-1). Plaintiffs amendment will also remove Defendant Joshua Kertianis;
10
thus serving to DISMISS all claims against Defendant Joshua Kertianis, as stipulated by
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
the parties.
12
13
14
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file his
15
proposed “First Amended Complaint for Damages” no later than June 10, 2016.
16
Plaintiff’s amendment will relate back to the date of the original complaint. Plaintiff’s
17
claims against Defendant Joshua Kertianis are DISMISSED.
18
19
IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
21
22
Dated: 06/02/16
_____________________________________
THELTON E. HENDERSON
United States District Judge
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?