ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan Board of Trustees et al v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company et al

Filing 60

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by Hon. William Alsup granting 55 Motion for Leave to File.(whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/11/2016)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 ILWU-PMA WELFARE PLAN BOARD OF TRUSTEES and ILWU-PMA WELFARE PLAN, 12 13 14 No. C 15-02965 WHA Plaintiffs, v. 16 CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INS. COMPANY, GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, and CAREWISE HEALTH, INC., f/k/a SHPS Health Management Solutions, Inc., 17 Defendants. 15 / 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT INTRODUCTION In this action for breaches of various duties relating to the administration of an ERISA 21 employee welfare benefit plan, an order granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to 22 dismiss. Plaintiffs now seek leave to file a second amended complaint. For the reasons stated 23 below, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. 24 25 STATEMENT The facts of this case have been detailed in a prior order (Dkt. No. 53). Briefly, plaintiff 26 ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan is an “employee welfare benefit plan” and a “multi-employer plan,” 27 as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and plaintiff ILWU-PMA 28 Welfare Plan Board of Trustees is the “named fiduciary and plan administrator” of the Plan (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5). 1 This matter concerns plaintiffs’ relationship with certain third-party vendors that 2 provided services that assisted plaintiffs in administering a healthcare indemnity program on 3 behalf of the Plan’s members. Specifically, defendant Carewise Health, Inc., negotiated 4 discounts on fees from out-of-network healthcare providers, and defendants Great-West Life & 5 Annuity Insurance Company and Connecticut General Life Insurance Company processed and 6 paid members’ claims under the indemnity program according to a scheme for reimbursement 7 developed by the Plan. The instant motion only relates to plaintiffs’ agreement with 8 Connecticut General. Plaintiffs allege that Connecticut General disregarded the scheme for 9 claims processing established by the Plan and failed to properly maintain records of the processed claims, among other contractual breaches. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Plaintiffs commenced this action in June 2015 and filed their first amended complaint in 12 September 2015. Defendants each separately moved to dismiss the first amended complaint in 13 October 2015. The order on defendants’ motions to dismiss allowed the Board’s claims under 14 ERISA, both plaintiffs’ indemnity claims against Great-West and Connecticut General, and 15 both plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims against Great-West and Carewise to proceed. 16 Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against Connecticut General and their negligence and Unfair 17 Competition Law claims against all defendants were dismissed although plaintiffs could seek 18 leave to amend those claims. All other claims were dismissed without leave to amend. 19 Plaintiffs timely sought leave to file a second amended complaint within fourteen days 20 of the order on defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs only seek leave to amend their claim 21 for breach of contract against Connecticut General. This order follows full briefing and oral 22 argument. 23 ANALYSIS 24 “Five factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to 25 amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and 26 whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Futility alone can justify the denial 27 of a motion to amend.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 28 citation omitted). Connecticut General limits its opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to futility. The 2 1 test for futility is whether the proposed amended complaint would survive a motion to dismiss. 2 Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). In considering a motion for 3 leave to amend, all inferences should be drawn in favor of granting the motion. Griggs v. Pace 4 American Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 5 A prior order dismissed plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against Connecticut General 6 because the complaint failed to allege facts that plausibly showed that plaintiffs performed their 7 contractual obligations or that their performance was excused — a necessary element of their 8 breach of contract claim against Connecticut General. See First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. 9 Reece, 89 Cal. App. 4th 731, 745 (2001). Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 includes the following allegation (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 122): Notwithstanding [Connecticut General]’s failures and its breach of its contractual duties under the [agreement] the Plan and the Board performed all of their material obligations under the [agreement]. In particular, the Plan and the Board established the necessary banking arrangements, made all necessary payments to [Connecticut General], handled member enrollment, furnished information when requested by [Connecticut General], distributed [summary plan descriptions] to members, and otherwise performed their obligations. To the extent the Plan and the Board failed to perform any of their obligations under the [agreement] such failure to perform was excused by [Connecticut General]’s failures and breach of its own contractual duties. 17 Connecticut General argues that this proposed allegation is inadequate inasmuch as it omits 18 certain responsibilities under the agreement, and it offers only the conclusion that plaintiffs’ 19 performance was excused without alleging facts to support that conclusion. This order holds 20 that plaintiffs have adequately pled their breach of contract claim against Connecticut General, 21 as now discussed. 22 Connecticut General argues that plaintiffs failed to allege that they “retain[ed] 23 responsibility for all Plan benefit claims and all expenses incident to the Plan,” a duty created 24 by the agreement between the parties (Maddigan Decl., Exh. A § 5.3). Connecticut General 25 omits critical language from that provision of its agreement with plaintiffs. The excerpted 26 sentence actually reads, “[e]xcept as otherwise explicitly provided in this Contract, [plaintiffs] 27 shall retain responsibility for all Plan benefit claims and all expenses incident to the Plan” 28 (ibid.) (emphasis added). The excluded prefatory clause is critical, because the agreement in 3 1 fact required Connecticut General to undertake the bulk of the responsibility for claims 2 adjudication, the derogation of which forms the basis for plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 3 (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 20–23). 4 Connecticut General also points to language indicating that “[a]ny review by 5 [Connecticut General] of a claim or of charges declined is made as a service for [plaintiffs], 6 who retain[] the final responsibility for determining [their] liability under the Plan” (id. § 2). 7 Connecticut General argues that if plaintiffs had in fact retained “final responsibility,” then it 8 could never have acted as a fiduciary. Thus, Connecticut General contends that by proceeding 9 with claims for both breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties under ERISA, plaintiffs have been forced to plead “alternative factual versions of reality” rather than merely 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 “alternative legal theories,” rendering the legal theory posed in the proposed second amended 12 complaint implausible in light of plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duties. Connecticut 13 General’s argument fails for three reasons. 14 First, as it did in its motion to dismiss, Connecticut General ignores that its authority 15 over the disposition of plan assets (i.e., the ability to write checks) is a sufficient basis to 16 conclude it acted as a de facto fiduciary under ERISA whether or not it possessed or exercised 17 discretionary authority over other aspects of plan administration. IT Corp. v. General American 18 Life Insurance Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1997). Second, plaintiffs alleged that 19 Connecticut General acted to undermine plaintiffs’ authority over plan assets by disregarding 20 the established standards for adjudicating claims. Connecticut General’s alleged usurpation of 21 plaintiffs’ authority excused any failure by plaintiffs to exercise a duty to retain “final 22 responsibility” over the adjudication of claims. Third, it is not apparent from the quoted 23 language (or the agreement as a whole) that the parties intended to impose on plaintiffs a duty to 24 retain final authority over claims adjudication. At the pleading stage, it is plausible that the 25 quoted language retained a “veto power” for plaintiffs over any adjudication made by 26 Connecticut General rather than imposing a duty. Indeed, the purpose of the agreement 27 between the parties appears to have been to delegate the responsibility for claims adjudication 28 to Connecticut General. 4 1 At this stage, plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint plausibly alleges that they 2 performed their duties under the agreement with Connecticut General or that such performance 3 was excused. Accordingly, the proposed amendment would not be futile. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended 6 complaint is GRANTED. There will be no further Rule 12 motions. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: February 11, 2016. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

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