Avendano-Ruiz v. City of Sebastopol, et al

Filing 61

ORDER by Judge Richard Seeborg denying 59 Defendants' Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration and Certification for Interlocutory Review. (cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/27/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NAHUM AVENDANO-RUIZ,

Case No. 15-cv-03371-RS

Plaintiff,
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW

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CITY OF SEBASTOPOL, et al.,
Defendants.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

Dissatisfied with the denial of their motion for summary judgment, defendants seek leave

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to file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7-9(b)(3). In the alternative, they

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request certification for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Defendants have

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done nothing more than improperly rehash old arguments and argue issues they raised for the first

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time in reply. Accordingly, they have failed to demonstrate any manifest error warranting

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reconsideration or extraordinary circumstances to justify an interlocutory appeal.

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II.

RECONSIDERATION

To qualify for leave to file such a motion, a party must demonstrate “[a] manifest failure

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by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the

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Court before such interlocutory order.” Local Rule 7-9(b)(3). The rules are quite clear that “[n]o

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motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made

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by the applying party in support of or in opposition to the interlocutory order which the party now

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seeks to have reconsidered.” Local Rule 7-9(c). Parties that choose to ignore this admonition

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“shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.” Id.

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Yet, defendants do just that: they contend the order includes legal errors and rehash the

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arguments raised in their moving papers and reply briefs. In particular, defendants repeat their

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argument that violation of a criminal traffic statute in the presence of a police officer justifies

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vehicle impoundment. They assert the order fundamentally misapplied Miranda v. Cornelius, 429

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F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005), because that case did not involve a criminal traffic infraction. To

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the contrary, defendants ignore and misapply Miranda’s explicit holding: “A driver’s arrest, or

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citation for a non-criminal traffic violation as in this case, is not relevant except insofar as it

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affects the driver’s ability to remove the vehicle from a location at which it jeopardizes the public
safety or is at risk of loss.” Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit made its position on the

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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distinction between criminal and non-criminal statutes quite clear, albeit in dicta, but nonetheless

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clearly instructive. See Sheet Metal Workers Pension Trust of N. California v. Trayer Eng’g

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Corp., No. 15-CV-04234-LB, 2016 WL 1745676, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016) (“Even if it were

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technically dicta, though, it expresses clearly and forcefully the Ninth Circuit's view on the

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matter.”).

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Defendants also argue that it was improper to rely on the reasoning of Sandoval v. County

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of Sonoma, 72 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014), because the facts of Sandoval and this case

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are different. This contention overlooks two fundamental points. First, the order acknowledged

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the factual differences between the two cases, but nevertheless found the reasoning of the

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Sandoval court persuasive. Second, the opinions of other district courts are persuasive, not

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binding, and the Sandoval opinion was treated as such. Defendants may not like the fact this court

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found Sandoval’s reasoning persuasive, but such disagreement alone is not the sort of manifest

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error that warrants a motion for reconsideration.

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Perhaps more troubling is the fact defendants contend the court manifestly failed to

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consider a legal argument it raised for the first time in reply: that they could impound Avendano-

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Ruiz’s car as an “instrumentality of crime.” Defendants’ new argument was improper, and

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therefore defendants’ motion would have been denied even had they raised a dispositive legal

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ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
CASE NO. 15-cv-03371-RS

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argument. Despite the fact Avendano-Ruiz has never had the opportunity to respond to this new

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argument, the court read the authorities and was unpersuaded by defendants’ argument. The

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analysis was not essential to the outcome, and therefore defendants’ current attempt to use analysis

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of their improper argument to unlock a motion for reconsideration is not well taken. Accordingly,

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defendants’ motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is denied. While sanctions

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certainly would be available under the applicable local rule, the court will refrain from imposing

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them.
III.

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CERTIFICATION FOR APPEAL

In the alternative, defendants request an amendment to the order authorizing an
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Such a motion must conform to Local Rule

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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7-2, which defendants’ motion does not, and it accordingly will be denied without prejudice.

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Should defendants wish to request certification from this court, they must file and properly notice

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the motion.
IV.

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and for certification for

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an interlocutory appeal are denied.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 27, 2016
______________________________________
RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
CASE NO. 15-cv-03371-RS

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