Hallmark American Insurance Company v. Tom Wasson, et al

Filing 44

ORDER VACATING TRIAL DATE AND REQUESTING FURTHER BRIEFING. Signed by Judge Richard Seeborg on 12/8/16. (cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/8/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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HALLMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 15-cv-05536-RS
ORDER VACATING TRIAL DATE AND
REQUESTING FURTHER BRIEFING

v.
RONALD C. BROYLES, et al.,
Defendants.

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The parties are advised that due to the precedence of a criminal matter, trial in this action

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cannot go forward as scheduled on January 9, 2017, and that date is hereby vacated.

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Additionally, upon review of the joint pretrial conference statement and further consideration of

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the issues, it appears likely that there are no factual issues remaining to be tried in this action. The

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prior order on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment preserved the trial date because, for the

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reasons stated therein, plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration in its favor that the maximum

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possible recovery under the insurance policy in dispute is only $100,000 in total, as opposed to a

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maximum of $100,000 for the injuries suffered by Ronald Broyles, and a separate limit of

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$100,000 for the loss of consortium claim advanced by Jean Broyles. As there had been no cross-

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motion for summary judgment brought by defendants, it appeared entry of a final judgment would

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have been premature.

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To the extent that language in the summary judgment order implied it would be incumbent
on Jean Broyles to prove in this action that she suffered a “bodily injury,” that is not correct.

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Indeed, in the pretrial conference statement, the parties appear to be in agreement on this point, as

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they state, “[n]either Hallmark nor the Broyles believe issue for trial includes the nature and extent

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of any bodily injury Jean Broyles may have suffered or the amount of any damages, if any, to

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which she may be entitled.”

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As indicated in the summary judgment order, this case is governed by Abellon v. Hartford
Insurance Co., 167 Cal.App.3d 21 (1985) and by the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Fibus, 855 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1988), that Abellon represents the applicable California law
when the policy language is like that present here. Under Abellon and Fibus, there is separate
coverage for Jean Broyle’s loss of consortium claim as a matter of law. Abellon, 167 Cal. App. 3d
at 33 (“[W]e conclude when the insurance policy is read as a whole it covers Jeanne’s loss of
consortium damages. Specifically, we find Jeanne’s independent injury covered by the ‘per

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

occurrence’ limitation . . . If Hartford wants to limit liability in accidents where loss of consortium
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damages are sought, it should expressly provide that such damages are subject to the “per person”
limitation.”) Additionally, under Abellon and Fibus, policy language requiring “bodily injury”
does not serve to preclude coverage for loss of consortium claims, for reasons explained in
Abellon at some length. See 167 Cal. App. 3d at 26-30.
Of course, for purposes of indemnity coverage, Jean Broyles must still prove a loss of

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consortium claim in the underlying action. Those issues, however, are not for trial here.

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Accordingly, it appears there is nothing left to be adjudicated in this action, and that entry of a

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final judgment providing plaintiff some, but not all of the declaratory relief it sought is

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appropriate. As noted above, in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment from the

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Broyles, it was not immediately apparent that granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in

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part, and denying it in part would lead to that result.

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Because this leaves the case in something of a procedural limbo, the parties’ views on how

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to proceed will be solicited. Accordingly, the parties are directed to meet and confer in light of

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this order. No later than January 9, 2017, they shall submit either a stipulation for entry of

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judgment including a proposed form of judgment, or a joint statement setting out any agreement

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they have reached as to how the matter should proceed, or in the event they have not reached

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CASE NO.

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15-cv-05536-RS

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agreement, their respective separate proposals.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 8, 2016
______________________________________
RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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CASE NO.

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15-cv-05536-RS