Anakin v. Contra Costa Regional Medical Center et al

Filing 33

ORDER by Judge Maria-Elena James denying 28 Motion to Dismiss. (cdnS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/18/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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YURIY ANAKIN,

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Case No. 16-cv-00161-MEJ

Plaintiff,
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT

v.
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CONTRA COSTA REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, et al.,

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Re: Dkt. No. 28

Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Yuriy Anakin (“Plaintiff”) brings this federal civil rights action pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 1983, based on a blood test after his arrest for driving under the influence. Pending

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before the Court is Defendant Contra Costa County’s1 (the “County”) Motion to Dismiss

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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)

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12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 28. Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 31), and the County filed a Reply

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(Dkt. No. 32). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and

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VACATES the June 16, 2016 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having

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considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court

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DENIES the County’s Motion for the following reasons.

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BACKGROUND

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On December 22, 2014, Defendant Officer Lucas Eatchel of the California Highway Patrol

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(“CHP”) arrested Plaintiff on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). First

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Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 13, Dkt. No. 26. Plaintiff was then transported to the CHP office in

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Martinez, where he complained of severe stomach pain related to an ulcerative stomach condition.

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Id. CHP officers transported Plaintiff to the Contra Costa Regional Medical Center (“CCRMC”)

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Defendant Contra Costa County was erroneously sued as the Contra Costa Regional Medical
Center. Mot. at 1 n.1.

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for medical attention. Id. While Plaintiff was at CCRMC, Officer Eatchel obtained a search

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warrant for Plaintiff’s blood, signed by Judge Lois Haight of the Superior Court of Contra Costa

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County. Id. ¶ 14. The warrant specified that Plaintiff’s blood was to be drawn “in a reasonable,

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medically approved manner.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that while at CCRMC, despite his verbal refusal and physical resistance to

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submit to blood testing, Officer Eatchel, along with Defendant Officer J. Jackson and Defendants

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John Does 1 and 2, “used great physical force to restrain and immobilize Plaintiff horizontally

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against a hospital gurney by forcing Plaintiff’s wrists and ankles into ‘four point restraints,’ with

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each of the above-named defendants holding and manipulating one of Plaintiff’s limbs.” Id. ¶ 15.

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Defendant Deputy W. Armstrong arrived on the scene and joined Officers Eatchel and Jackson in

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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physically restraining Plaintiff by “wrestling Plaintiff’s arms and legs flush against the gurney,

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with each of these three defendants forcefully holding and manipulating one or more of Plaintiff’s

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limbs with the understanding that a non-consensual blood draw was about to occur and that a

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TASERTM was about to be deployed by Defendant OFFICER J. JACKSON to effectuate said

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blood draw.” Id. Officer Jackson then deployed the taser, “delivering millions of volts of

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electricity to Plaintiff’s ribcage area,” thereby allowing Defendant Phlebotomist Jonathan Young

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“to pierce Plaintiff’s right arm and draw four (4) vials of blood, all without Plaintiff’s consent,

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against Plaintiff’s strenuous and vocal objections, and without legal justification in light of the

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limited scope of the search warrant.” Id. As a result of these acts, Plaintiff alleges he “suffered

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extreme physical pain, extreme mental anguish, and unconscionable violation of personal dignity

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and bodily integrity” as a result of Defendants’ acts. Id. ¶ 19.

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Plaintiff further alleges the County “has no official training policy regarding the limitations

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on a Deputy’s authority to use force during the execution of a blood draw pursuant to a search

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warrant specifying . . . that the blood is to be drawn ‘in a reasonable, medically approved

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manner.’” Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff contends that if Deputy Armstrong received appropriate training, “he

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would have realized that his co-defendants were breaking the law and he would not have

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participated in the group effort . . . to immobilize and TASERTM Plaintiff in a hospital emergency

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room, and the TASER’ing and blood draw would thus not have been possible.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff
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alleges the County’s “lack of an appropriate training policy was a substantial cause of, and the

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moving force behind,” his injuries. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that County Sheriff’s Deputies

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“routinely fail to observe any limitations on the amount of physical force permitted when drawing

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blood from an uncooperative suspect, and that is therefore likely, given the quantity of D.U.I.

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arrests and the common search warrant language, that many other individual’s rights have been

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violated similarly to Plaintiff’s.” Id. ¶ 17.

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Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on January 11, 2016, alleging two causes of action: (1)
violation of his right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free

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from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) battery under California Civil Code section 3281.

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Compl. ¶¶ 18-23, Dkt. No. 1. The County and Deputy Armstrong moved to dismiss the claims

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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against them, arguing the § 1983 claim against the County failed because Plaintiff did not allege

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any of the elements necessary for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social

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Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). First Mot. to Dismiss at 2, Dkt. No. 11. As to the Fourth

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Amendment claim against Deputy Armstrong, they argued it failed because (1) a search warrant

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authorized the blood draw following Plaintiff’s arrest, and (2) it does not specify what each

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defendant did to cause any constitutional violation. Id. As to the state law battery claim, the

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County and Deputy Armstrong argued the claim failed because Plaintiff did not file a government

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tort claim with the County at any time following the alleged incident, and the time to file said

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claim has passed. Id. Finally, the County and Deputy Armstrong also sought dismissal of

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Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims against the County. Id.

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On March 17, 2016, the Court granted the County and Deputy Armstrong’s Motion with

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leave to amend as to certain claims. Order, Dkt. No. 23. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s battery

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claim without leave to amend based on his failure to comply with the California Government Tort

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Claims Act. Id. at 11. As public entities are immune to punitive damages under California state

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law, and punitive damages against the County are not otherwise available under § 1983, the Court

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also dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against the County without leave to amend.

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Id. As to Plaintiff’s Monell claim, the Court found Plaintiff had failed to state a claim because he

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“ha[d] not identified or alleged a policy, practice or custom that may have caused a deprivation of
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his rights, and he fail[ed] to allege that such practice was the ‘moving force’ behind his alleged

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injury.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, the Court dismissed this claim with leave to amend. Id. at 6. As to

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Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, the Court found his unreasonable search claim had facial

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plausibility, but dismissal was appropriate because he failed to allege with the required specificity

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which defendant performed what act. Id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on April 13, 2016, again alleging (1) violation

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of his right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from

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unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) battery under California Civil Code section 3281.2 FAC

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¶¶ 20-25. The County now moves to dismiss the Monell claim against it.
LEGAL STANDARD

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must therefore

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provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Bell Atl.

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not contain enough

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facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. “A claim has facial

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plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

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more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

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U.S. at 557). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

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detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

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relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).

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Although Plaintiff does not state which named Defendant(s) he brings his battery claim against,
there appears to be no dispute that it cannot be brought against the County and Deputy Armstrong
based on the Court’s previous Order.
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In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as

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true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus,

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551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). In

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addition, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

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Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

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If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no
request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly

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be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

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banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court may deny leave to amend

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for a number of reasons, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

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Northern District of California

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movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice

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to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.”

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Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v.

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Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
DISCUSSION

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The County argues Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails once again because he does not allege a

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County policy, custom, or practice that caused the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. Mot. at

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6. The County further argues that, although Plaintiff asserts a Monell theory based on lack of a

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training policy, he fails to allege any facts showing that the deficiency in training actually caused

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the alleged conduct, or that any failure to train was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate

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indifference. Id. at 7-8.

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In response, Plaintiff maintains his Monell claim is sufficient because the County “had a

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policy or custom to refrain from interfering with, and to allow[] Sheriff’s Deputies to employ

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virtually unlimited force, including the use of a TASER, to carry out a search warrant to obtain

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blood from DUI suspects without their consent.” Opp’n at 7. Plaintiff also argues there is “ample

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support” for a claim based on inadequate training “because it is highly predictable that certain DUI

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suspects will remain uncooperative with a blood draw even in the face of a search warrant. Under

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those circumstances, it is to be expected that certain Deputies will exceed reasonable limitations
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on force in their zeal to gather evidence against DUI suspects, emboldened by the search warrant

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and believing that the search warrant insulates themselves from any such limitations.” Id. at 7-8.

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A.

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Legal Standard
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state

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law, deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

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of the United States. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides

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a vehicle for a plaintiff to bring federal statutory or constitutional challenges to actions by state

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and local officials. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Anderson v. Warner, 451

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F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). A local government entity “may not be sued under § 1983 for an
injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Instead, a

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Northern District of California

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municipality is liable only if the individual can establish that the municipality “had a deliberate

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policy, custom, or practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation he [or

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she] suffered.” Id. at 694-95; Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007); Galen v.

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Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). To hold a public entity liable, a plaintiff must

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demonstrate that the unlawful governmental action was part of the public entity’s policy or

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custom, and that there is a nexus between the specific policy or custom and the plaintiff’s injury.

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Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92, 694-95.

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“In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a Monell claim must

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consist of more than mere ‘formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, conducts or

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habits.’” Bedford v. City of Hayward, 2012 WL 4901434, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012)

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(quoting Warner v. Cty. of San Diego, 2011 WL 662993, *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011)); see also

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AE v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Twombly and Iqbal pleading

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standard also applies to Monell claims). Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit had held

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that “a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to

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dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that individual officers’

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conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t,

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839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). However, such conclusory allegations no longer suffice and a

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plaintiff is required to state facts sufficient “to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).

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B.

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Application to the Case at Bar
As a preliminary matter, although Plaintiff argues his allegations support a Monell claim

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based on both a policy or custom allowing officers “to employ virtually unlimited force, including

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the use of a TASER, to carry out a search warrant to obtain blood from DUI suspects without their

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consent,” Opp’n at 7, he makes no such allegations in his First Amended Complaint. The Court

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previously warned Plaintiff that “‘[i]n order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

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claim, a Monell claim must consist of more than mere formulaic recitations of the existence of

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unlawful policies, conducts or habits.’” Anakin v. Contra Costa Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2016 WL
1059428, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016) (quoting Bedford, 2012 WL 4901434, at *12). Despite

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this warning, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific policies or customs in his FAC. “While the

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Court recognizes the inherent difficulty of identifying specific policies absent access to discovery,

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that is nonetheless the burden of plaintiffs in federal court.” Roy v. Contra Costa Cty., 2016 WL

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54119, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016); see also Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900-01

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(9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal where complaint “lacked any factual allegations . . .

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demonstrating that [the] constitutional deprivation was the result of a custom or practice [] or that

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the custom or practice was the ‘moving force’ behind [the] constitutional deprivation”); City of

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Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (holding that “[a]t the very least there must be an

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affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged”). Thus, the

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Court finds Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient allegations of a specific policy or custom.

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Instead, Plaintiff focuses on a lack of training. The Supreme Court has held that

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inadequate training may constitute a “policy” under Monell that gives rise to municipal liability.

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City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1988); Long v. Cty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178,

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1186 (9th Cir. 2006). “The issue is whether the training program is adequate and, if it is not,

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whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent municipal policy.” Long, 442

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F.3d at 1186. A plaintiff alleging a failure to train claim must show: (1) he was deprived of a

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constitutional right, (2) the municipality had a training policy that “amounts to deliberate

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indifference to the [constitutional] rights of the persons’ with whom [its police officers] are likely
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to come into contact;” and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the

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municipality properly trained those officers. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484

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(9th Cir. 2007); Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). “Only where a

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municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate

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indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city

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‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389; Long v. City

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& Cty. of Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2007).

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A municipality is “deliberately indifferent” when the need for more or different action, “is
so obvious, and the inadequacy [of the current procedure] so likely to result in the violation of

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constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately

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indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; Lee, 250 F.3d at 682. A “pattern of

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tortious conduct,” despite the existence of a training program, or “highly predictable”

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constitutional violations due to a “failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to

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handle recurring situations,” are circumstances in which liability for failure to train may be

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imposed. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1997); Long, 442 F.3d at

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1186-87. However, “adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do

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says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the [municipality] liable.” City

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of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391; see also Merritt v. Cty. of L.A., 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989);

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McDade v. West, 223 F.3d at 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Plaintiff alleges (1) the County “has no official training policy regarding the limitations on

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a Deputy’s authority to use force during the execution of a blood draw,” (2) the County’s Sheriff’s

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Deputies “routinely fail to observe any limitations on the amount of physical force permitted when

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drawing blood from an uncooperative suspect,” (3) if Deputy Armstrong received proper training,

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he would not have participated with the other officers, and (4) “given the quantity of D.U.I. arrests

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and the common search warrant language, that many other individual’s rights have been violated

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similarly to Plaintiff’s.” FAC ¶¶ 16-17. These allegations are plausible and are sufficient to put

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the County on notice of the specific training policies that allegedly caused the constitutional

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violation at issue. See Bass v. City of Fremont, 2013 WL 891090, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013)
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(finding Monell claim based on allegations of officers “engaged in a pattern and practice of using

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unnecessary and excessive force and falsely reporting crimes, and that the municipal entities

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demonstrated deliberate indifference to this pattern and practice of constitutional violations” found

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to be “plausible and . . . sufficient to give the municipal entities notice of the specific policies,

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customs, and practices that are alleged to have caused the deprivation of Bass’s rights”); Howard

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v. City of Vallejo, 2013 WL 6070494, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2013) (allegations that city failed

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to discipline officers for prior misconduct was “sufficient to give the City fair notice of plaintiff’s

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claim that the City has a policy of deliberate indifference to a pattern and practice of excessive use

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of force and other violations of the constitutional rights of citizens by City police officers,
particularly minority citizens, that is manifested in its failure to discipline or retrain officers

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Northern District of California

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involved in such incidents”); Johnson v. Shasta Cty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2015);

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see also Flores v. Cty. of L.A., 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Flores must allege facts to

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show that the County and Baca ‘disregarded the known or obvious consequence that a particular

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omission in their training program would cause [municipal] employees to violate citizens’

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constitutional rights.’” (quoting Connick v. Thompson, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011)).

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The County argues Plaintiff’s Monell claim must fail because he focuses on the December

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22, 2014 incident and does not allege facts establishing a pattern of similar constitutional

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violations. Reply at 3. In general, “[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not

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sufficient to impose liability under Monell. . . .” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24; Trevino v. Gates, 99

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F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The custom must be so persistent and widespread that it

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constitutes a permanent and well settled city policy. . . . Liability for improper custom may not be

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predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient

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duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying

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out policy.” (internal quotations omitted)); Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th

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Cir. 1989) (“A plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely

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on the occurrence of a single incident of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking

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employee.”).

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Although Plaintiff focuses on his own blood draw, his FAC alleges that the defendant
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Officers violated his rights based on a lack of training that was inadequate as to all officers. In

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other words, Plaintiff does not allege these policies applied only to Armstrong; instead, he

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maintains they apply to all officers. FAC ¶¶ 16-17. Such allegations can constitute a plausible

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claim. For instance, in Dasovich v. Contra Costa County Sheriff Department, the plaintiff alleged

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the county defendant “developed and maintained training policies that led to the improper use of

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canines by individual officers, including the release of canines to bite on individuals when it is not

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objectively reasonable to do so.” 2014 WL 4652118, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (internal

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quotations and citation omitted). Although he made this allegation generally, his allegations

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focused solely on the training of an individual deputy. Id. Still, the court allowed the plaintiff’s

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Monell claim to proceed, finding “the language of Plaintiff’s FAC can be interpreted to apply to

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all individuals that are trained using said policies.” Id. Although a single incident is ultimately

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insufficient to establish liability, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by stating a plausible

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Monell claim based on failure to train, so long as the allegations apply to all individuals that are

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trained using the policy at issue. Id. Thus, under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) and

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drawing the reasonable inference that one or more Defendants is liable for the misconduct alleged,

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the Court finds the First Amended Complaint contains sufficient allegations to give fair notice to

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the County and to enable it to defend against the allegations effectively.

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Accordingly, the Court must deny the County’s Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION

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Based on the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: May 18, 2016
______________________________________
MARIA-ELENA JAMES
United States Magistrate Judge

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