Morris v. Koh et al

Filing 10

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Judge James Donato on 4/29/16. (lrcS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/29/2016)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

CONDALEE MORRIS,
Plaintiff,

8

LUCY H. KOH, et al.,
Defendants.

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.

9
10

Case No. 16-cv-00581-JD

12
Condalee Morris, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.

13
14

§ 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
DISCUSSION

15
16

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

17

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

18

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

19

§ 1915A(a). The Court will identify any cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous,

20

malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a

21

defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings are liberally

22

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

23

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim

24

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed

25

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

26

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

27

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

28

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

1

omitted). A complaint must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

2

face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face”

3

standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

4

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

5

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

6

to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by

7
8

the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was

9

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

10

II.

LEGAL CLAIMS

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

Morris seeks monetary and declaratory relief because a District Judge in this Court denied

12

his motions for default judgment in another case. A federal judge is absolutely immune from civil

13

liability for acts performed in his judicial capacity and, unlike the judicial immunity available to

14

state judges sued under § 1983, a federal judge’s immunity is not limited to immunity from

15

damages, but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. See Moore

16

v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996); Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385,

17

1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying judicial immunity to actions under Bivens). If a federal judge

18

violates a litigant’s constitutional rights in a proceeding pending in federal court, Congress has

19

provided carefully structured procedures for taking appeals and for petitioning for extraordinary

20

writs in Title 28 of the United States Code. See id.

21

Absolute immunity “is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to nonjudicial officers

22

for all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions.” Burton v. Infinity Capital

23

Management, 753 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

24

Courts “take a functional approach to whether a nonjudicial officer is entitled to absolute quasi-

25

judicial immunity by looking to ‘the nature of the function performed and not to the identity of the

26

actor performing it.’” Id. at 960 (quoting Curry v. Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002)).

27

“To qualify for absolute immunity, the function performed must be a judicial act with ‘a

28

sufficiently close nexus to the adjudicative process.’” Id. (quoting Castillo, 297 F.3d at 948). “[I]t
2

1

is only when the judgment of an official other than a judge involves the exercise of discretionary

2

judgment that judicial immunity may be extended to that nonjudicial officer.” Castillo, 297 F.3d

3

at 949. To be protected, the function must “involve the exercise of discretion in resolving

4

disputes.” Id. at 948.
Morris alleges that Judge Lucy Koh denied several of his motions for default judgment in

5
6

another case, Morris v. Sandoval, Case No. 12-cv-6132-JD, that was previously assigned to Judge

7

Koh.1 He also alleges that the former Clerk of Court erred in sending out waivers of service of

8

summons’ to defendants. Morris says that defendants filed their answers late, and so default

9

judgment should have been entered and he should have received money damages. Morris seeks

10

monetary damages of $14.4 billion against the City of San Jose, the defendant from the other case.
Morris is not entitled to relief because defendants are entitled to immunity for these acts

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

performed in their judicial capacities and functions. Judge Koh is also immune from Morris’

13

challenges to her other rulings in the case. Morris has also named as a defendant, a defense

14

attorney employed by the California State Attorney General’s Office. It is difficult to ascertain the

15

exact nature of the allegations against this defendant other than the attorney opposed Morris’

16

motions. This fails to state a claim for relief. Because no amount of amendment would cure the

17

deficiencies in this complaint which is frivolous and fails to state claim, it is dismissed with

18

prejudice.
CONCLUSION

19
20

This action is DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

21

IT IS SO ORDERED.

22

Dated: April 29, 2016

23
24
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

25
26
27
1

28

This case continues as counsel was recently appointed for Morris and a second settlement
conference is pending.
3

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3
4

CONDALEE MORRIS,

Case No. 16-cv-00581-JD

Plaintiff,
5
v.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6
7

LUCY H. KOH, et al.,
Defendants.

8
9
10

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.
District Court, Northern District of California.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15

That on April 29, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing
said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by
depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery
receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

16
17
18

Condalee Morris ID: V96203
CSP-Sacramento
P.O. Box 290060
Represa, CA 95671

19
20
21

Dated: April 29, 2016

22
23

Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

24
25
26
27

By:________________________
LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable JAMES DONATO

28
4