Cour v. Life360, Inc.

Filing 65

ORDER granting 39 Defendant's motion to dismiss. 48 Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. 47 Plaintiff's motion to stay is denied as moot. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 07/28/16. (tehlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/28/2016)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3
4

TERRY COUR II,
Plaintiff,

5
6

v.

7

LIFE360, INC.,

Case No. 16-cv-00805-TEH
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant.

8
9
10

This matter came before the Court on July 25, 2016, on Defendant Life360, Inc.’s

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Terry Cour II’s first amended complaint. After carefully

12

considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the Court GRANTS the motion for the

13

reasons discussed below.1

14
15

BACKGROUND

16

Plaintiff Terry Cour II received the following unwanted text message, sent from

17

“890-50,” on February 13, 2016: “TJ, check this out! lf360.co/i/g2a5iJaTBOO5.” First

18

Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 35 & Fig. 12. He responded with, “Who is this?” and received

19

another text stating, “I’m sorry, but we weren’t able to understand your message. Please

20

reply YES, NO, or HELP.” Id. at Fig. 12. Cour alleges that he received this message from

21

Defendant Life360, Inc., id. ¶ 35, which operates a mobile application that allows users to

22

communicate with and see the location of their friends and family members. Id. ¶ 14. He

23

is not and has never been a Life360 user, and he “has never downloaded the Life360 app

24

onto any device.” Id. ¶ 36.

25
26
27
28

1

Life360 moves in the alternative for summary judgment, but the Court finds it
unnecessary to reach this alternative motion because the issues are suitable for resolution
on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Cour’s motion to stay summary judgment
proceedings and to allow discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) is
DENIED as moot.

Cour alleges that the Life360 application works as follows: After downloading the

2

Life360 application and creating an account, users are asked, “Want to see others on your

3

map?” Id. ¶ 17 & Fig. 3. Users who click on the “Yes” button are asked permission for

4

Life360 to access their contacts. Id. ¶ 18 & Fig. 4. Users who allow permission are then

5

brought to a screen to “Add Member[s],” with certain “Recommended” members pre-

6

selected by “an algorithm created by Defendant.” Id. ¶ 19 & Fig. 5. Each

7

“Recommended” contact appears with a checkmark next to it. Id. at Fig. 5. At the bottom

8

of this screen is an “Invite” button showing the number of selected invitations in

9

parentheses. Id. Users who press the “Invite” button are then brought to a new screen that

10

says, “Great! Want to know when they join?” Id. ¶ 20 & Fig. 6. At no time does Life360

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

indicate to users how invitations will be sent, nor does Life360 inform users of when

12

invitations will be sent. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 24. Instead, Life360 “has full control over the content

13

of the text message, whether a text message will be sent and, and [sic] – if a I [sic] text

14

message is to be sent – when, subsequent to the user pressing the ‘invite’ button, it will be

15

sent.” Id. ¶ 24.

16

Cour seeks to represent a class of “[a]ll persons in the United States who received

17

one or more text message calls from (or on behalf of) Life360, Inc.” Id. ¶ 39. The first

18

amended complaint brings two claims: one for violation of the Telephone Consumer

19

Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and a second for violation of California’s

20

unfair competition law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. Life360 now

21

moves to dismiss both claims.

22
23
24

LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a

25

plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a

26

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

27

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

28

Plausibility does not equate to probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility
2

1

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

3

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

4

alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

5

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts must “accept all material allegations of fact

6
7

as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

8

Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). However, courts are

9

not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556

10

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

DISCUSSION

13

I.

Article III Standing

14

Before addressing the merits of Cour’s claims, the Court must first consider

15

Life360’s argument that Cour has failed to allege a concrete injury, which, if true, would

16

require that the case be dismissed for lack of standing.2 Article III standing requires that a

17

plaintiff “have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged

18

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

19

decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). The “injury in fact must

20

be both concrete and particularized.” Id. at 1548. The Supreme Court recently made

21

clear that, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory

22

violation,” and a plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement

23

whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to

24

sue to vindicate that right.” Id. at 1549. That is, a plaintiff cannot “allege a bare

25
2

26
27
28

In a footnote in its moving papers, Life360 also argued that the case must be
dismissed because Cour must arbitrate rather than litigate his claims. Mot. at 21 n.13.
However, Life360 abandoned that argument in its reply, perhaps acknowledging the
difficulty of proving that Cour should be bound by Life360’s terms of service when there
is no basis to conclude that Cour, who allegedly never signed up for Life360’s services,
ever reviewed or had reason to review those terms.
3

1

procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact

2

requirement of Article III.” Id.

3

Here, however, Cour has not simply alleged a procedural violation; instead, he

4

relies on an allegation that he was harmed because Life360 invaded his privacy. FAC

5

¶ 53. On the standing question, this case is indistinguishable from Meyer v. Bebe Stores,

6

Inc., in which the plaintiff alleged that she received a single unsolicited text message from

7

the defendant and “alleged an invasion of privacy.” No. 14-cv-00267-YGR, 2015 WL

8

431148, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015). The court held that this was sufficient to meet

9

Article III standing requirements even though the plaintiff did “not allege she incurred any

10

carrier charges for the specific text message at issue.” Id. at *2.
Cour relies on two other cases that have also found concrete injuries based on

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

alleged violations of the TCPA: Rogers v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 1:15-CV-

13

4016-TWT, 2016 WL 3162592, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2016) (finding concrete injury

14

where the plaintiffs alleged that “Defendant made unwanted phone calls to their cell phone

15

numbers”), and Booth v. Appstack, Inc., No. C13-1533JLR, 2016 WL 3030256, at *5

16

(W.D. Wash. May 24, 2016) (finding concrete injury in the form of “waste[d] time

17

answering or otherwise addressing widespread robocalls”). Life360 attempts to

18

distinguish these cases on grounds that the alleged conduct there was more pervasive –

19

“widespread robocalls” in Booth, id., and “at least 40 calls” to one plaintiff’s cell phone in

20

Rogers, 2016 WL 3162592, at *1. However, such distinctions go only to the extent of the

21

injury, not whether there was a concrete injury at all. Indeed, in Rogers, another plaintiff

22

allegedly received only two unwanted calls, id., and the Eleventh Circuit case relied on by

23

the court found standing where the plaintiff allegedly received only one unwanted fax

24

message, Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245,

25

1251 (11th Cir.2015). In light of these authorities, the Court rejects Life360’s argument

26

that Cour has failed to allege a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing.

27

//

28

//
4

1
2

II.

TCPA Claim
The Court next considers whether Cour has stated a claim under the TCPA, which

3

makes it unlawful “to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or

4

made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone

5

dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned

6

to a . . . cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). A text message is a

7

“call” within the meaning of this statute. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d

8

946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
Life360 argues that Cour has failed to state a TCPA claim because his allegations

10

do not establish that Life360 “made” the unwanted call or used an “automatic telephone

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

dialing system.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). The Federal Communications Commission

12

(“FCC”) recently examined these and other issues in In the Matter of Rules & Regulations

13

Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961

14

(2015). The FCC explained that it looks to “the totality of the facts and circumstances

15

surrounding the placing of a particular call to determine: 1) who took the steps necessary

16

to physically place the call; and 2) whether another person or entity was so involved in

17

placing the call as to be deemed to have initiated it, considering the goals and purposes of

18

the TCPA.” Id. ¶ 30.

19

Of particular relevance to this case, the FCC considered whether two companies,

20

TextMe and Glide, “make” calls as defined by the TCPA. The FCC concluded that Glide

21

“makes” calls when it “automatically sends invitational texts of its own choosing to every

22

contact in the app user’s contact list with little or no obvious control by the user.” Id. ¶ 35.

23

Under these circumstances, the FCC found, “the app user plays no discernible role in

24

deciding whether to send the invitational text messages, to whom to send them, or what to

25

say in them.” Id.

26

TextMe, by contrast, does not automatically send invitational texts. Instead, before

27

an invitational text is sent, “[a]n app user must: (1) tap a button that reads ‘invite your

28

friends’; (2) choose whether to ‘invite all their friends or [] individually select contacts’;
5

1

and (3) choose to send the invitational text message by selecting another button.” Id. ¶ 36.

2

The FCC concluded that:

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

These affirmative choices by the app user lead us to conclude
that the app user and not TextMe is the maker of the
invitational text message. While we agree with commenters
that TextMe’s control of the content of the invitational text
message is a reason for concern, and take into account the
goals and purposes of the TCPA, we conclude that the app
user’s actions and choices effectively program the cloud-based
dialer to such an extent that he or she is so involved in the
making of the call as to be deemed the initiator of the call. . . .
TextMe is not the maker or initiator of the invitational text
messages because it is not programming its cloud-based dialer
to dial any call, but “merely ha[s] some role, however minor, in
the causal chain that results in the making of a telephone call.”
Id. ¶ 37 (footnotes omitted).
Both parties urge this Court to follow the FCC’s ruling, but they disagree over its

12

application. Cour asserts that Life360 is similar to Glide, but this Court disagrees. The

13

only affirmative step by the user of the Glide app is to allow Glide to access his or her

14

contacts. Glide then decides to send invitational text messages to all such contacts; the

15

user plays no role at all in deciding which of his or her contacts should receive an

16

invitation. Here, by contrast, Life360 users choose which of their contacts should receive

17

an invitation and then press an “invite” button before invitations are sent.

18

Life360 is therefore much more similar to TextMe. The principal difference

19

between the two applications is that Life360 is not alleged to inform the app user how the

20

selected contacts will be invited – i.e., whether they will receive a text message or be

21

notified in some other way. Another court in this district considered a similar application

22

in Glauser v. GroupMe, Inc., No. C11-2584 PJH, 2015 WL 475111, at *6 (N.D. Cal.

23

Feb. 4, 2015). The court assumed that the GroupMe app user, known as a “group creator,”

24

never asked GroupMe to send welcome texts and was never informed that text messages

25

would be sent. Id. The court nonetheless concluded that there could be no violation under

26

the TCPA because the welcome texts “were triggered” when GroupMe obtained the

27

telephone numbers of newly added group members from the actions of the group creator,

28

and the texts were therefore “sent to plaintiff as a direct response to the intervention of . . .
6

1

[the] group creator.” Id. This Court agrees that it makes no difference, for purposes of

2

determining who “makes” a call under the TCPA, whether an application informs the user

3

how invitations will be sent. The goal of the TCPA is to prevent invasion of privacy,

4

Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954, and the person who chooses to send an unwanted invitation is

5

responsible for invading the recipient’s privacy even if that person does not know how the

6

invitation will be sent.

7

As Cour correctly observes, two other courts in this district found no TCPA liability
where defendants did inform users that invitations would be sent via text message.

9

However, neither court focused on that characteristic as a decisive factor. To the contrary,

10

the key factor in McKenna v. WhisperText was the “human intervention” that resulted from

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

the fact that “the Whisper App [could] send SMS invitations only at the user’s affirmative

12

direction to recipients selected by the user.” No. 5:14-cv-00424-PSG, 2015 WL 5264750,

13

at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The

14

court’s decision did not even mention that users were informed that messages would be

15

sent by text, an allegation that was discussed in an order dismissing a prior version of the

16

complaint. McKenna v. WhisperText, No 5:14-cv-00424-PSG, 2015 WL 428728, at *2

17

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015). Likewise, while the court in Huricks v. Shopkick, Inc.

18

concluded that the undisputed evidence showed that users were told how invitations would

19

be sent to selected contacts (i.e., by text, email, or Facebook), the court did not indicate

20

whether this was a dispositive factor in its analysis. No. C-14-2464-MMC, 2015 WL

21

5013299, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015). This Court is therefore not persuaded that

22

either of these cases warrants a finding that Life360 is the maker of the calls at issue here.

23

Cour also points to another difference between Life360 and TextMe: that Life 360

24

initially automatically pre-selects certain contacts for the user to invite, while TextMe does

25

not. This difference is immaterial. Prior to reaching the screen on which the contacts have

26

been pre-selected, the Life360 user must first indicate a willingness to share contacts with

27

the app and, upon answering that question in the affirmative, has the option to de-select

28

any contacts whom the user does not want to invite – and, as Cour’s counsel conceded at
7

1

oral argument, can choose to de-select all of the pre-selected contacts so as not to invite

2

anyone. Invitations are not sent until the user presses an “invite” button, and they are only

3

sent to those contacts selected by the user. As the FCC found regarding TextMe, these

4

“affirmative choices by the app user” lead this Court to conclude that it is the app user who

5

initiates the invitation and, therefore, is the maker of the call. 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961 ¶ 37.

6

Life360 is not the maker of the call and, consequently, cannot be liable under the TCPA.3

7

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Life360’s motion to dismiss Cour’s TCPA claim

8

and DENIES Cour’s corresponding motion for partial summary judgment.

9
10

III.

UCL Claim

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

At oral argument, Cour’s counsel conceded that Cour’s UCL claim should be

12

dismissed if the Court dismissed his TCPA claim. Having dismissed the TCPA claim, the

13

Court therefore also GRANTS dismissal of the UCL claim.

14
15

CONCLUSION

16

For all of the above reasons, Life360’s motion to dismiss the first amended

17

complaint is GRANTED. Dismissal is with prejudice because, as Cour’s counsel

18

acknowledged at oral argument, leave to amend would be futile. The Clerk shall enter

19

judgment and close the file.

20
21

IT IS SO ORDERED.

22
23

Dated: 07/28/16

24

_____________________________________
THELTON E. HENDERSON
United States District Judge

25
26
3

27
28

Because this conclusion is sufficient to dismiss Cour’s TCPA claim, the Court
does not address Life360’s separate contention that dismissal is appropriate because
Life360 does not use an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(a)(1).
8