Wilson v. Colvin

Filing 26

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. This matter is remanded to the Agency for further proceedings. Signed by Judge William H. Orrick on 05/09/2017. (jmdS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/9/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ANTHONY F. WILSON,

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

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CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

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Re: Dkt. Nos. 19, 22

Defendant.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 16-cv-01971-WHO

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Anthony F. Wilson (“Wilson”) and the Commissioner of Social Security

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(“defendant” or “Commissioner”) cross-move for summary judgment, contesting whether the

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ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment failed to correctly reflect examining

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psychologist Dr. DeBattista’s opinion. The question is whether an inconsistency exists between

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DeBattista’s opinion that Wilson can perform “one to two-step instructions” and the ALJ’s RFC

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assessment limiting Wilson to “simple, repetitive tasks” and, if so, whether that inconsistency was

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required to be addressed by the ALJ. Compare Administrative Record (“AR”) 465 with AR 16. I

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conclude that the ALJ failed to explain why he rejected DeBattista’s one to two-step instructions.

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Therefore, I GRANT plaintiff’s motion and remand this case for further proceedings.

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BACKGROUND
I.

WILSON’S IMPAIRMENTS
Wilson filed for disability in May 2012, claiming he was disabled due to having been shot

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in the head, and that he suffered from paranoia, seizures, anxiety, and memory loss starting in

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October 19, 2009. AR 59.1

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The scope and impact of Wilson’s impairments – physical or mental – are not really at issue on
this appeal. Instead, the issue is a legal question of whether the ALJ properly took into account an

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In February 2010 (pursuant to a prior application for disability benefits), Wilson’s medical

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history was reviewed by non-examining state-agency psychologist Dr. Paul Klein. AR 333 – 346.

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Klein opined that Wilson had “adequate memory and understanding for simple 1-2 step tasks;

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adequate sustained concentration, persistence, and pace for simple 1-2 step tasks; adequate social

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interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and limited public contact; adequate adaptability to

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change in most routine work-like settings.” AR 346. Klein added that Wilson was capable of

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“new learning of simple 1-2 step tasks” but might need supervision while transitioning. AR 346.

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In February 2011, Wilson was seen by agency examining psychologist Dr. Jonathan

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Howard. Wilson took the Wechsler Memory Scale-III test and scored an Immediate Visual
Memory of 49 and a Working Memory of 79, which is in the eighth percentile. AR 368. The

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Immediate Visual Memory score is “below the first tenth of the first percentile.” Pl.’s Mot. 5; AR

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368 (“(<0.1%ile; 90% C.L.: 49-66)).” The Working Memory score is in the 8th percentile. Id.

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Howard’s diagnostic impression was that Wilson had a cognitive disorder not otherwise specified

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and a mood disorder not otherwise specified with anxious features. AR 368. In addition, Howard

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opined that Wilson had marked impairments in understanding, remembering and carrying out both

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complex as well as short and simple instructions. AR 368.

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In March 2011, non-examining agency psychologist Dr. Robert Liss reviewed Wilson’s

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records. AR 369-382. Liss determined Wilson was “able to complete simple tasks; able to

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maintain [concentration, persistence or pace] over a full work week; able to interact, with limited

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public contact; able to adapt to ordinary workplace stress and change.” AR 382.

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In October 2012, at the initial review level, agency mental health consultant Dr. Patricia

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Heldman concluded that there was evidence of a severe “affective disorder” but “insufficient

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evidence” in the record of any limitations in mental functioning. AR 62-64.

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In April 2013, Wilson was examined by agency psychologist Dr. Charles DeBattista. AR

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460-466. On the psychiatric evaluation, DeBattista noted that Wilson had a “five forward digit

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span,” meaning Wilson could remember three out of three objects immediately but was unable to

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examining psychologist’s limitation when determining Wilson’s RFC.
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recall any of the three objects after five minutes. AR 464. DeBattista also noted Wilson would

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“benefit from neuropsychologic testing to assess the extent of his memory difficulties.” AR 465.

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Based on his examination, De Battista opined that Wilson was able to “understand, remember, and

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carry out simple one or two-step job instructions.” AR 465. He, however, was “not able to do

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detailed and complex instructions.” Id.

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In May 2013, non-examining agency psychiatrist Dr. F. L. Williams reviewed the record

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for a “Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.” AR 78-79. Williams determined that

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Wilson was not significantly limited in the ability to “carry out very short and simple

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instructions.” AR 78. However, Wilson was moderately limited in the ability to “carry out
detailed instructions.” AR 78. Williams opined that Wilson did not have adaptation limitations

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but when asked to explain in “narrative form” the adaptation limitations, Williams wrote “SRT.”2

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AR 79.

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II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wilson filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits

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and a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security Income on May 9, 2012. AR 12. His

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claims were denied initially and on reconsideration on October 9, 2012 and May 21, 2013. AR 12.

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On March 19, 2014, Wilson testified at a hearing before an ALJ. AR 27-58. At the

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hearing, a Vocational Expert was asked what possible work Wilson could perform assuming a

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“capacity for work at all exertional levels, nonpublic, simple, repetitive tasks, no heights or

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hazards . . . [like] moving machinery, operating heavy equipment.” AR 46. The Vocational

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Expert testified that, although Wilson’s previous jobs were precluded, there were other jobs

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Wilson could perform. AR 46-48. The examples included: an industrial cleaner (SVP Level 2), a

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hand packager (SVP Level 2), and a sandwich maker (SVP Level 2). AR 47-48.
On August 7, 2014, the ALJ denied Wilson’s request to reopen his prior applications for

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disability benefits and declined to award him benefits going forward, concluding he was not and is

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not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 12-13. On April 14, 2016,

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According to Wilson’s motion, “SRT” stands for “simple, repetitive tasks or simple, routine
tasks.” Pl.’s Mot. 6.
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Wilson filed this appeal.

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III.

ALJ DECISION
The ALJ utilized the five-step sequential evaluation to determine Wilson’s disability claim.

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AR 13; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(b). At step one, the ALJ determined that Wilson

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met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2012, as Wilson

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had not engaged in any “substantial gainful activity” since his “alleged onset date.” AR 14. At

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step two, the ALJ found that Wilson had the following severe impairments: “status post multiple

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gunshot wounds…; seizure disorder; a cognitive deficit of unclear etiology; and obesity.” AR 15.
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Wilson’s impairments did not meet or equal the

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severity required for the listed impairments. AR 15. The ALJ then determined that Wilson had a

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RFC to “perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional

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limitations: he must avoid workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights and working with,

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around, or operating moving machinery; and he is limited to simple, repetitive tasks with no public

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contact.” AR 15.
When determining Wilson’s RFC, the ALJ asserted that he considered “all symptoms…as

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consistent with the objective medical evidence.” AR 16. He characterized his assessment as

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consistent with Williams’ consultative May 2013 opinion and as more restrictive than the October

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2012 initial determination by Heldman. AR 16-17. The ALJ “accepted” the April 2013

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assessments of DeBattista who, according to the ALJ, opined that Wilson “remains capable of

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performing simple repetitive tasks, subject to a moderate limitation in maintaining concentration,

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attention, persistence and pace.” AR 17. The ALJ further characterized DeBattista’s opinions and

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his own conclusions as “consistent” that while Wilson “would be unable to perform complex and

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detailed tasks, he could be able to understand, remember and carry out simply one and two-step

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job instructions, subject to a moderate limitation in concentration, attention and persistence.” AR

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18.

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At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Wilson was unable to perform past relevant work.

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AR 20. At step five, the ALJ considered “age, education, work experience, and RFC” and found

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there were jobs in the national economy Wilson could perform, identifying three jobs by their
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DOT titles. AR 21.3 As a result, the ALJ determined Wilson was not disabled as defined by the

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Social Security Act. AR 21.
Wilson argues that the ALJ’s decision must be reversed because the ALJ’s RFC

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assessment – limiting him to “simple repetitive tasks” – failed to take into account examining

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psychologist DeBattista’s assessment that Wilson was able to perform “one or two-step job

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instructions.” Pl.’s Mot. 2. In addition, Wilson argues that the ALJ failed to give a reason for

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rejecting DeBattista’s contrary opinion. Id. The Commissioner cross-moves for summary

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judgment, contending that the ALJ’s RFC assessment “properly set forth his pertinent findings

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regarding evidence from DeBattista.” Cross- Mot. 3, 7

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LEGAL STANDARD
I.

DISABILITY DETERMINATION
A claimant is “disabled” as defined by the Social Security Act if: (1) “he is unable to

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engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

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mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

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to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the impairment is “of such

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severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

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education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

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in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 c(a)(3)(A)-(B); Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159

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(9th Cir.2012). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ engages in a five-step

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sequential analysis as required under 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).
In the first two steps of the evaluation, the claimant must establish that he or she (1) is not

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performing substantial gainful activity, and (2) is under a “severe” impairment. Id. §

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416.920(a)(4)(i)-(ii). An impairment must have lasted or be expected to last 12 months in order to

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be considered severe. Id. § 416.909. In the third step, the claimant must establish that his or her

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impairment meets or medically equals a listed impairment described in the administrative

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regulations. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal one of

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According to Wilson, and not disputed by the Commissioner, each job identified by the VE and
relied on by the ALJ has a GED “reasoning level 2.” Pl.’s Mot. 8.
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the listed impairments, before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ is to make a RFC

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determination based on all the evidence in the record; this determination is used to evaluate the

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claimant’s work capacity for steps four and five. Id. § 416.920(e).
In step four, the claimant must establish that his or her impairment prevents the claimant

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from performing relevant work he or she did in the past. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant

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bears the burden to prove steps one through four, as “[a]t all times, the burden is on the claimant to

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establish [his] entitlement to disability insurance benefits.” Id. (alterations in original). Once the

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claimant has established this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show at

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the fifth step that the claimant is able to do other work, and that there are significant number of

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jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do. Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v),(g); 416.960(c).

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II.

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LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR STEP FIVE
At step five, the Commissioner considers the RFC assessment, the claimant’s age,

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education, and work experience in order to determine if the claimant is able to perform other work.

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20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The RFC assessment consists of the “physical and mental” limitations on

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what a claimant can do as a result of his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). Then the ALJ

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evaluates potential occupations that a claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.966. The

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Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) is used to determine what jobs

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exist in the national economy. Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2015). The DOT

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lists the General Education Development (“GED”) Levels needed for a job, such as the “aspects of

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education (formal and informal) . . . required of the worker for satisfactory job performance.” Id.;

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DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th ed.1991).

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The GED Levels consist of “the reasoning ability required to perform the job, ranging from
Level 1 (which requires the least reasoning ability) to Level 6 (which requires the most).”
Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846. Reasoning Level One is defined as ability to “[a]pply commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions. Deal with standardized situations
with occasional or no variables in or from these situations encountered on the job.” Rounds v.
Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2015). Reasoning Level Two is
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defined as being able to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved

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written or oral instructions. Deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from

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standardized situations.” Id. The ALJ may also rely on the testimony of a Vocational Expert for

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information on what occupations a claimant can perform given his or her RFC. 20 C.F.R. §

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416.966(e); Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir.2009). Lastly, the

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ALJ takes all the information, including “the claimant's [RFC], age, education, and work

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experience” to determine if he or she can perform a job in the national economy. Valentine, 574

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F.3d at 689; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). If conflict arises between the Vocational Expert’s

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testimony and the DOT, the ALJ “is required to reconcile the inconsistency.” Zavalin, 778 F.3d at
846.

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III.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), I review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ's

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findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. See Smolen v. Chater, 80

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F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir.1996); DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir.1991) (ALJ's

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disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and based on the proper legal

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standards). Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but less than a

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preponderance.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521–22 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Richardson v.

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Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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I must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence.

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See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir.2006). Where evidence is susceptible

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to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. See Morgan v.

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Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1999). “However, a reviewing court

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must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific

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quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879

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F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.1989)); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.2007). If the legal error

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is harmless, then a reversal is unwarranted. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th
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Cir.2012) (“We may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless”). An

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error is harmless when it is “inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination.”

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Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (citing Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162

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(9th Cir.2008)).

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DISCUSSION
Wilson argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that he has the RFC to perform “simple,

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repetitive tasks” because that conclusion is in conflict with DeBattista’s opinion that Wilson could

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perform “simple one or two-step instructions.” Pl.’s Mot. 7; see AR 16; AR 465. According to

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Wilson, DeBattista’s opinion encompassed a “more restrictive” limitation than the RFC
assessment. Pl.’s Mot. 7. Wilson asserts that DeBattista’s “simple one or two-step instructions”

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limitation is consistent only with Level One reasoning on the GED scale. Pl.’s Mot. 8. In

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contrast, the “simple, repetitive tasks” limitation adopted by the ALJ falls under Level Two or

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Level Three reasoning. Pl.’s Mot. 8. As the potential jobs identified by the Vocational Expert

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during the examination, and adopted by the ALJ in his opinion, require Level Two reasoning, the

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ALJ’s determination is “facially inconsistent” with DeBattista’s “one or two-step job instructions”

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opinion. Pl.’s Mot. 8.

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The main issues I must address are whether a distinction exists between the two

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assessments and, if so, whether the ALJ was required to address that distinction and explain why

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he selected the “simple, repetitive tasks” limitation. I conclude that there is a distinction between

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the two assessments and, therefore, the ALJ was required to address it and justify his decision to

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adopt an RFC assessment limiting Wilson to “simple, repetitive tasks.”

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Wilson relies on Rounds v. Commissioner Social Security Administration to argue that

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there is a critical distinction between the “simple one or two-step instructions” assessment adopted

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by DeBattista and the “simple, repetitive tasks” limitation adopted by the ALJ. Pl.’s Mot. 7, 8. In

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Rounds, the ALJ’s RFC determination limited the plaintiff to “one to two-step tasks.” Rounds v.

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Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015). A Vocational Expert testified that

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the plaintiff could perform jobs like a kitchen helper, hand packager, and recycler – all requiring

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Level Two reasoning on the GED scale. Id. at 1002. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the RFC
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limitation to “one to two-step tasks” matched Level One reasoning (“ability to carry out simple

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one- or two-step instructions”) and, therefore, she could not as a matter of law perform the Level

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Two jobs identified by the Vocational Expert. Id. at 1103. The Ninth Circuit agreed and found a

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conflict between the RFC limit to “one and two step tasks” tasks and the Vocational Expert’s

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selection of Level Two reasoning jobs, given the “close similarity” between the RFC limitation

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and Level One reasoning. Id. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case so that the ALJ could

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articulate a reasonable explanation to justify relying on the Vocational Expert’s testimony and

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selection of Level Two reasoning jobs. Id. at 1004.
Wilson also relies on Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015), where the Ninth

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Circuit held that there was “an apparent conflict between the residual functional capacity to

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perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning.” Id. at 847. In Zavalin,

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as here, the plaintiff was limited by the ALJ to carrying out simple, repetitive tasks. There,

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however, the ALJ adopted the Vocational Expert’s testimony that the plaintiff could perform

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Level Three reasoning jobs.4 The Ninth Circuit saw a problem because “Level 2 Reasoning—

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applying common sense to carry out detailed but uncomplicated instructions and dealing with

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problems involving a few variables—seems at least as consistent with Zavalin’s limitation as

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Level 3 Reasoning, if not more so.” Id. at 847. Because “the ALJ failed to recognize an

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inconsistency, she did not ask the expert to explain why a person with Zavalin’s limitation could

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nevertheless meet the demands of Level 3 Reasoning,” and the case was remanded. Id.
Rounds shows that a significant distinction exists between Level One and Level Two

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reasoning jobs, with Level One jobs typically lining up with the ability to perform one or two step

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job instructions. However, Rounds differs from this case in a significant way. The conflict in

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Rounds focused on the differences between the RFC-imposed limitation to one and two-step jobs

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and Vocational Expert’s identification of appropriate jobs falling at the Reasoning Two level. Id.

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In the present case, plaintiff does not argue that a conflict exists between the ALJ’s RFC-imposed

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Level Three reasoning requires application of “commonsense understanding to carry out
instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with problems involving
several concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d at 847.
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limitation (“simple, repetitive tasks”) and the Vocational Expert’s testimony identifying Level

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Two jobs. See AR 16-18. Instead, the alleged conflict is between DeBattista’s assessment (that

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on its face potentially matches Level One reasoning) and the ALJ’s RFC-imposed limitation to

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simple and repetitive tasks.

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Following Rounds, a number of district courts in this Circuit have reversed ALJ decisions
imposing a “simple, repetitive tasks” RFC limit where the ALJs fail to address and distinguish

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conclusions by doctors that claimants can perform one-and-two step instructions. For example, in

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Burson v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-04991-DMR, 2017 WL 1065140, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017),

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after noting that Rounds made clear the distinction between a limitation to one-and-two-step

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instructions and the ability to perform simply, repetitive tasks, the court addressed a factually

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similar scenario and concluded the ALJ erred. “The court concludes that the ALJ erred with

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respect to Dr. Bailey’s opinion. To the extent that the ALJ accepted the opinion that Plaintiff is

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limited to one– and two–step instruction work, the ALJ’s RFC assessment does not account for

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that limitation. . . . To the extent that the ALJ rejected that portion of Dr. Bailey’s opinion, he

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erred by failing to provide any reasons for doing so.” Id. at *4; see also Banales v. Berryhill, No.

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EDCV 16-1247 AGR, 2017 WL 651941, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017) (remanding where ALJ

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acknowledged a doctor’s functional assessment that claimant could perform one- or two-step

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instructions, but did not expressly discount that conclusion and instead limited claimant to

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performing “simple repetitive tasks”); Garcia v. Colvin, No. CV 16-00652-JEM, 2016 WL

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6304626, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (“the ALJ’s simple, repetitive tasks RFC limitation is

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consistent with Dr. Deaver’s ‘simple, routine non-stressful work’ opinion (AR 63) but plainly

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inconsistent with his ‘easy 1, 2 step directions’ limitation which the ALJ decision never mentions.

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The ALJ necessarily rejected the latter limitation without any explanation as required by Social

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Security regulations.”); Wells v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-0285-JLT, 2016 WL 4744668, at *8 (E.D.

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Cal. Sept. 13, 2016) (remanding where ALJ purported to accept doctor’s opinion “who reviewed

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the medical evidence and concluded Plaintiff could ‘sustain simple one-two step repetitive tasks,”

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but “did not adopt this limitation in the RFC, instead limiting Plaintiff to “simple, routine, and

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repetitive tasks.”); cf. Navarro v. Astrue, No. CV 10-217-PLA, 2010 WL 5313439, at *5 (C.D.
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Cal. Dec. 16, 2010) (after noting that a number of district court cases in the 9th Circuit had

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concluded that “a person capable of performing simple repetitive tasks can perform jobs with a

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GED reasoning level of one . . . and jobs with a GED reasoning level of two,” court concluded

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that the “ALJ’s determination that plaintiff can do simple work (i.e., jobs with GED reasoning

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levels of one and two) did not adequately encompass” the doctor’s conclusion that plaintiff could

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perform one-and-two step instructions).5
Following Rounds, I agree that there is a significant distinction between limitations to one-

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to two-step instructions and RFCs allowing performance of simple, repetitive tasks. The ALJ’s

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attempt to adopt DeBattista’s opinions, but subsequent failure to address DeBattista’s functional

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assessment effectively limiting plaintiff to carrying out “simple one or two-step job instructions”

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and express preclusion of ability to cope with “detailed and complex instructions,” was erroneous.

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The Commissioner points out that non-examining psychologist Dr. Williams limited Wilson to

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simple repetitive tasks. Cross-Mot. 5; AR 79. True, but the ALJ was still required to give a

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reasoned explanation of why he was rejecting the limitation of DeBattista, despite his apparent

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acceptance of DeBattista’s opinions, in favor of Dr. Williams. The ALJ gave no reason to

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disregard DeBattista’s limitation. The Commissioner’s post-hoc attempts to buttress the ALJ’s

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decision are not sufficient. See, e.g., Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ

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must give clear and convincing reasons to “reject an examining physician’s opinion”).
Despite the Commissioner’s arguments otherwise, the error was not harmless. The attempt

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A number of cases pre-dating Rounds concluded the opposite, in part based on the rationale that
the doctors’ opinions that claimants could perform one or two-step instructions were not
limitations per se but assessments of what claimants could do and as long as the ALJ “simple,
repetitive tasks” RFCs were not otherwise in conflict with the evidence, there was no error. Some
of those courts also noted that there was additional evidence in the record from which the ALJ
could, nevertheless, determine that the claimant could perform simple, repetitive tasks in addition
to ones that involve only one or two-step instructions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Colvin, No. 13-CV04862-EDL, 2014 WL 5794337, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s doctors did not
phrase the one- to two-step job instructions as a limitation, and the ALJ weighed the evidence
from the whole record to make a rational determination that Plaintiff retained an RFC for simple,
repetitive tasks.”); Salas v. Astrue, No. 1:10-CV-0478 SKO, 2011 WL 2620370, at *6 (E.D. Cal.
June 29, 2011) (affirming ALJ decision which “expressly acknowledged” doctor’s opinion that
claimant was “able to perform one-to-two step, simple job instructions” but considered it
consistent with his RFC-limitation to “simple, routine work,” in part because doctor “did not
affirmatively limit Plaintiff to one- to two-step tasks” but instead “the affirmative limitation was
directed to job instructions that were complex or technical.”).
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to equate unskilled work (or SVP 2 work, as the jobs identified by the VE were) with jobs

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requiring only one- or two-step instructions is not persuasive. Cross-Mot. 6. The Commissioner

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has not shown that regulations and SSA guidance defining unskilled work necessarily equate to

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the ability to perform only one or two-step job instructions. See, e.g., Reply at 3 (arguing that

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“unskilled work” can cover jobs requiring various reasoning levels); see also Use of Vocational

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Expert & Vocational Specialist Evidence, & Other Reliable Occupational Info. in Disability

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Decisions, SSR 00-4P (S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000), 2000 WL 1898704.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, I GRANT Wilson’s motion for summary judgment and DENY the

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. This matter is remanded to the Agency for

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further proceedings.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 9, 2017

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William H. Orrick
United States District Judge

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