Bagley v. Santa Clara County et al

Filing 95

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granting in part and denying in part 70 Motion to Dismiss. Amended Complaint due by 8/16/2017. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/17/2017)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

LEE S. BAGLEY,
Plaintiff,

8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

Case No.16-cv-02250-JSC
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
CITY OF SUNNYVALE, et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 70

Defendants.

12
13

Plaintiff Lee Scott Bagley alleges violation of his civil rights during and after his

14

December 22, 2012 arrest. Defendants, the City of Sunnyvale (the “City”) and various Sunnyvale

15

Police Officers (collectively “Officer Defendants”), collectively referred to herein as Defendants,

16

have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for failure to state a

17

claim. (Dkt. No. 70.) Plaintiff brings three claims for relief: (1) excessive force as to the Officer

18

Defendants; (2) a Devereaux claim for falsification of police reports; and (3) a Monell claim

19

against the City. (Dkt. No. 66.) After carefully considering the papers filed by the parties, and

20

having the benefit of oral argument on July 13, 2017, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part

21

and DENIED in part as stated on the record and confirmed below.
DISCUSSION

22
23

I. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim

24

Plaintiff claims excessive force against all of the Officer Defendants, but Defendants have

25

only moved to dismiss the claims against Defendants Himenes, Wilkes, Winkleman, Isaacs, Doss,

26

and Sartwell. Plaintiff alleges that these Officer Defendants, except Lieutenant Sartwell, were

27

outside of his home “securing the perimeter” at the time the excessive force occurred. (SAC ¶ 33.)

28

Plaintiff nonetheless seeks to hold them liable for actions that occurred inside the home and

1

outside their presence based on a theory of either integral participation or failure to intercede.

2

Liability under Section 1983 arises based on an officer’s “integral participation” in the

3

alleged violation. See Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294–95 (9th Cir.1996). The integral

4

participation standard “does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a

5

constitutional violation. [] But it does require some fundamental involvement in the conduct that

6

allegedly caused the violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 492 n.12 (9th Cir.

7

2007) (citing Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004)). Alternatively, officers

8

have a “duty to intercede” if they have an opportunity to intercede “when their fellow officers

9

violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” Monteilh v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 820
F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Both theories of liability

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

depend on an officer’s active participation in or knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations.

12

See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “merely [] being present at

13

the scene of an alleged unlawful act” is insufficient for integral participation); Monteilh, 820 F.

14

Supp. 2d at 1092 (holding that an officer only has a duty to intercede if they “know or have reason

15

to know of the constitutional violation.”).

16

As stated at oral argument, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which suggest that Officer

17

Defendants Himenes, Wilkes, Winkleman, Isaacs, and Doss, who were outside of his home

18

securing the perimeter during the excessive force incident, were either active participants in the

19

use of excessive force or that they knew that their fellow officers were engaged in the alleged

20

constitutional violation. Accordingly, the claims against these Officer Defendants are dismissed

21

without leave to amend.

22

With respect to Lieutenant Sartwell, Plaintiff alleges that he “was [] in [Plaintiff’s] home at

23

the time of the attack,” but Plaintiff has not alleged that Lieutenant Sartwell was in same room as

24

the other officers when the excessive force incident occurred or that he otherwise had knowledge

25

of the alleged constitutional violation. (SAC ¶ 28.) The excessive force claim is therefore

26

dismissed as to him as well. However, to the extent that Plaintiff can allege additional facts as to

27

Lieutenant Sartwell’s knowledge or proximity to the incident, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend

28

his claim as to Lieutenant Sartwell to include such allegations.
2

1

II. The Devereaux Claim

2

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleges that Officer Defendants Lima, Pistor, Gottfred,

3

Kassel, and Larkin falsified their police reports regarding the incident. “A Devereaux claim is a

4

claim that the government violated the plaintiff’s due process rights by subjecting the plaintiff to

5

criminal charges based on deliberately-fabricated evidence.” Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d

6

382, 386 (9th Cir. 2015). While Plaintiff alleges that Officer Defendants Lima, Pistor, Gottfred,

7

Kassel, and Larkin falsified their police reports regarding the incident, Plaintiff has failed to allege

8

that these falsifications (to the extent any are identified) resulted in his prosecution for resisting

9

arrest. Even if Plaintiff could allege such causation, his Devereaux claim may be barred by Heck
v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff may not recover damages for

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

“harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”

12

unless he or she can prove that the conviction or sentence has been overturned, expunged or

13

declared invalid). Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Devereaux

14

claim with leave to amend to the extent that Plaintiff can adequately plead such a claim and can do

15

so in good faith in light of the potential Heck bar.

16

III. The Monell claim

17

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief is a Monell claim against the City. To state a Monell claim,

18

a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was

19

deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to

20

the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional

21

violation. Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997); see

22

also AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[P]laintiffs must

23

establish that the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the

24

moving force behind the constitutional violation they suffered.”) (citation omitted). “Statistics of

25

unsustained complaints of excessive force and other police misconduct, without any evidence that

26

those complaints had merit, does not suffice to establish municipal liability under § 1983.”

27

Hocking v. City of Roseville, No. 06-0316, 2008 WL 1808250, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008).

28

Here, Plaintiff has pled two theories of Monell liability: (1) that there is an official policy,
3

1

custom, or practice of excessive force by the City’s officers, and (2) a failure to train officers.

2

Plaintiff has not adequately pled facts to establish either claim. However, Plaintiff alleges that he

3

“personally knows of at least five or six people who were arrested and handcuffed by Sunnyvale

4

police officers, and then bitten by police K9 dogs.” (SAC ¶ 53.) The Court grants Plaintiff leave

5

to amend to the extent he can in good faith plead additional facts as to these dog bite incidents that

6

would show a custom or practice of excessive force regarding use of K9s or a failure to train

7

regarding the use of force and K9s.

8

IV. Prayer for Punitive Damages
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against the City

9

which Judge Koh previously dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 56 at 32.) Plaintiff’s opposition

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

brief concedes that he does not seek punitive damages against the City and only seeks punitive

12

damages against the Officer Defendants. (Dkt. No. 83 at 20-21.) Accordingly, the motion to

13

dismiss the punitive damages claim is GRANTED as to the City.
CONCLUSION

14

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

15
16

DENIED IN PART, as follows:
1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is GRANTED without

17
18

leave to amend as to Officer Defendants Himenes, Wilkes, Winkleman, Isaacs, Doss, and

19

GRANTED with leave to amend as to Lieutenant Sartwell;
2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Devereaux claim against Officer Defendants

20
21

Lima, Pistor, Gottfred, Kassel and Lieutenant Larkin is GRANTED with leave to amend;
3) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim is GRANTED with leave to

22
23
24
25

amend.
4) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED as
to the City without leave to amend.

26

5) Any amended complaint shall be filed within 30 days of the date of this Order.

27

The previously scheduled Case Management Conference remains on calendar for August

28

10, 2017.
4

1

This Order disposes of Docket No. 70.

2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3

Dated: July 17, 2017

4
5
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States Magistrate Judge

6
7
8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5